Freedom of Religion/Conflicts with other Rights/Dependants: Difference between revisions
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|section=Conflicts with other Rights | |section=Conflicts with other Rights | ||
|question=Dependants | |question=Dependants | ||
|questionHeading=Are there other specific rights that are critical to the exercise of this right? | |questionHeading=Are there other specific rights that are critical to the exercise of this right? Can you identify specific examples of this? | ||
|pageLevel=Question | |pageLevel=Question | ||
|contents=When dealing with cases in which freedom or religion seems to conflict with other guaranteed rights, international human rights law has historically precedented certain principles to consider in settling the matter: | |contents=When dealing with cases in which freedom or religion seems to conflict with other guaranteed rights, international human rights law has historically precedented certain principles to consider in settling the matter: | ||
“These include the principles of: non-discrimination, meaning that there is no ‘right to discriminate;…’ neutrality and impartiality of the state as between religions and as between religious and nonreligious forms of belief; respect for others to believe and the duty of the state to create a level playing field between different groups of different religions or beliefs or no religion or belief, which may be summarized as respecting the believer rather than the belief; pluralism and tolerance, which includes that there is no right not to be offended; institutional and personal autonomy; proportionality in determining whether an interference with the right to manifest one’s religion is justified: the restriction must have a legitimate aim and the means used to achieve that aim must be proportionate and necessary…; no hierarchy of rights, meaning that in each instance, an attempt is made to maximize each of the rights engaged and to ensure that none is inappropriately sacrificed; and, legality, i.e. that restrictions on rights must be clear, publicly accessible, non-retrospective, and that people must be able to understand the circumstances in which restrictions might be imposed and foresee the consequences of their actions with a degree of certainty” (Donald and Howard, 2015) | |||
All this is ultimately to outline the considerations necessary to consider when dealing with encroachments upon and/or suppression of the freedom of religion due to society’s necessity of freedom of conscience. Freedom of conscience is ultimately necessary and fundamental to the workings of democracy. The right to freedom of religion falls well under the category to the right to freedom of conscience. And within this category, the right against religious discrimination is a distinct and complimentary right to freedom of religion: “Religious freedom is best understood as protecting our interest in religious adherence (and non-adherence), understood from the committed perspective of the (non)adherent. This internal, committed perspective generates a capacious and realistic conception of religious adherence, which reflects the staggering plurality of forms of religiosity (or lack thereof) as extant in contemporary societies” (Norton and Khaitan 1125, 2019). | |||
One example regarding the right to non-discrimination and freedom of conscience working in tandem with the freedom of religion is the 2013 case of Eweida and Others v UK. This case saw two of the applicants, a registrar of birth, deaths and marriages (Ladele) and a relationship counsellor (McFarlane), deny their services to same-sex couples due to their company policies regarding their Christian, religious beliefs. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) deemed the court found that the applicants’ actions complied with their company policies and therefore did not constitute discrimination (Donald and Howard 7, 2015). The workings of freedom of religion and the expression of said religion as well as conscientious objection work in tandem to support the right to freedom of religion. | |||
REFERENCES: | |||
Dr Alice Donald and Dr Erica Howard, “The right to freedom of religion or belief and its intersection with other rights,” ILGA-Europe, 2015 London. | |||
Tarunabh Khaitan and Jane Calderwood Norton, “The right to freedom of religion and the right against religious discrimination: Theoretical distinctions,” 1125, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2019 New York. | |||
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Latest revision as of 11:59, 27 February 2023
Are there other specific rights that are critical to the exercise of this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?
When dealing with cases in which freedom or religion seems to conflict with other guaranteed rights, international human rights law has historically precedented certain principles to consider in settling the matter: “These include the principles of: non-discrimination, meaning that there is no ‘right to discriminate;…’ neutrality and impartiality of the state as between religions and as between religious and nonreligious forms of belief; respect for others to believe and the duty of the state to create a level playing field between different groups of different religions or beliefs or no religion or belief, which may be summarized as respecting the believer rather than the belief; pluralism and tolerance, which includes that there is no right not to be offended; institutional and personal autonomy; proportionality in determining whether an interference with the right to manifest one’s religion is justified: the restriction must have a legitimate aim and the means used to achieve that aim must be proportionate and necessary…; no hierarchy of rights, meaning that in each instance, an attempt is made to maximize each of the rights engaged and to ensure that none is inappropriately sacrificed; and, legality, i.e. that restrictions on rights must be clear, publicly accessible, non-retrospective, and that people must be able to understand the circumstances in which restrictions might be imposed and foresee the consequences of their actions with a degree of certainty” (Donald and Howard, 2015) All this is ultimately to outline the considerations necessary to consider when dealing with encroachments upon and/or suppression of the freedom of religion due to society’s necessity of freedom of conscience. Freedom of conscience is ultimately necessary and fundamental to the workings of democracy. The right to freedom of religion falls well under the category to the right to freedom of conscience. And within this category, the right against religious discrimination is a distinct and complimentary right to freedom of religion: “Religious freedom is best understood as protecting our interest in religious adherence (and non-adherence), understood from the committed perspective of the (non)adherent. This internal, committed perspective generates a capacious and realistic conception of religious adherence, which reflects the staggering plurality of forms of religiosity (or lack thereof) as extant in contemporary societies” (Norton and Khaitan 1125, 2019). One example regarding the right to non-discrimination and freedom of conscience working in tandem with the freedom of religion is the 2013 case of Eweida and Others v UK. This case saw two of the applicants, a registrar of birth, deaths and marriages (Ladele) and a relationship counsellor (McFarlane), deny their services to same-sex couples due to their company policies regarding their Christian, religious beliefs. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) deemed the court found that the applicants’ actions complied with their company policies and therefore did not constitute discrimination (Donald and Howard 7, 2015). The workings of freedom of religion and the expression of said religion as well as conscientious objection work in tandem to support the right to freedom of religion.
REFERENCES:
Dr Alice Donald and Dr Erica Howard, “The right to freedom of religion or belief and its intersection with other rights,” ILGA-Europe, 2015 London.
Tarunabh Khaitan and Jane Calderwood Norton, “The right to freedom of religion and the right against religious discrimination: Theoretical distinctions,” 1125, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2019 New York.