Freedom of the Press/Conflicts with other Rights/Position: Difference between revisions
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|questionHeading=Is there a perception that this right is above or higher than other fundamental rights, or in general, that it has a particular place in a hierarchy of rights? | |questionHeading=Is there a perception that this right is above or higher than other fundamental rights, or in general, that it has a particular place in a hierarchy of rights? | ||
|pageLevel=Question | |pageLevel=Question | ||
|contents=The right to freedom of the press is commonly balanced against other rights and concerns, such as the right to privacy/ reputation and national security concerns. Freedom of the press is not inherently viewed to be above or higher than the right to privacy and potential security concerns, but rather the importance of freedom of the press is considered on a case by case basis, in comparison with the degree of other concerns. In the case of the right to privacy, free press can lead to an invasion of privacy in terms of the right of the public and the government to receive information, and can also lead to defamation especially in the case of false press or press being presented in a false light. When privacy law is applicable, historically, the courts try to assess how newsworthy and important the publication or information is for the public. The right to privacy often falls higher in the hierarchy of rights when the publication is not obviously important or newsworthy, whereas when the publication is very important for news purposes, the right to freedom of the press tends to be perceived as above the right to privacy. Additionally, in defamation cases, the degree to which reputation is harmed is considered by the courts. The courts may be more likely to uphold the right to reputation when a public figure is involved, and the cost to reputation is greater (Emerson [[Probable year::1979]], 333). | |contents=The right to freedom of the press is commonly balanced against other rights and concerns, such as the right to privacy/ reputation and national security concerns. Freedom of the press is not inherently viewed to be above or higher than the right to privacy and potential security concerns, but rather the importance of freedom of the press is considered on a case by case basis, in comparison with the degree of other concerns. In the case of the right to privacy, free press can lead to an invasion of privacy in terms of the right of the public and the government to receive information, and can also lead to defamation especially in the case of false press or press being presented in a false light. When privacy law is applicable, historically, the courts try to assess how newsworthy and important the publication or information is for the public. The right to privacy often falls higher in the hierarchy of rights when the publication is not obviously important or newsworthy, whereas when the publication is very important for news purposes, the right to freedom of the press tends to be perceived as above the right to privacy. Additionally, in defamation cases, the degree to which reputation is harmed is considered by the courts. The courts may be more likely to uphold the right to reputation when a public figure is involved, and the cost to reputation is greater (Emerson [[Probable year:: 1979]], 333). | ||
Another important factor is national security concerns; a tricky issue in terms of freedom of the press. There has been disagreement over what necessitates or makes permissible prior restraint on the press due to national security concerns. One example includes the case of New York Times Company vs. United States in [[Probable year::1971]] (New York Times Company v. United States). In [[Probable year::1967]], Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, conducted a government study about America’s involvement in Vietnam. The work was compiled in 7,000 pages, and only 15 copies were printed. The work revealed that the government had not been transparent with the American people about its engagement with Vietnam. The study was considered classified. Daniel Ellsberg, who had helped with the project, later secretly made more copies of the study and distributed them to New York Times employees who referred to them as “Pentagon Papers.” The Nixon Administration barred further publication of the papers by means of a restraining order due to what they considered national security concerns. The New York Times appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court ruled that the New York Times could continue to publish the Pentagon Papers. The Court decided that the Nixon Administration did not have enough justification for barring the publication of the Pentagon Papers. | Another important factor is national security concerns; a tricky issue in terms of freedom of the press. There has been disagreement over what necessitates or makes permissible prior restraint on the press due to national security concerns. One example includes the case of New York Times Company vs. United States in [[Probable year:: 1971]] (New York Times Company v. United States). In [[Probable year:: 1967]], Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, conducted a government study about America’s involvement in Vietnam. The work was compiled in 7,000 pages, and only 15 copies were printed. The work revealed that the government had not been transparent with the American people about its engagement with Vietnam. The study was considered classified. Daniel Ellsberg, who had helped with the project, later secretly made more copies of the study and distributed them to New York Times employees who referred to them as “Pentagon Papers.” The Nixon Administration barred further publication of the papers by means of a restraining order due to what they considered national security concerns. The New York Times appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court ruled that the New York Times could continue to publish the Pentagon Papers. The Court decided that the Nixon Administration did not have enough justification for barring the publication of the Pentagon Papers. | ||
Justices took different stances on the issue at hand, with some believing prior restraint to never be justified and others believing it to be justified in certain circumstances, if a national security threat is clear and serious. These justices referred to the need for a “clear and present danger,” a precedent that established, in the case of Schenck vs. United States in [[Probable year::1919]], that the First Amendment does not protect speech which creates a clear and present danger with which Congress is equipped to prevent, (Schenck v. United States). In New York Times Company v. United States, the majority ruled that the threat to national security by publishing the Pentagon Papers was too vague and unclear to impose restrictions on the press (New York Times Company v. United States). In certain circumstances, the Supreme Court has restricted First Amendment rights due to national security concerns. Typically, the Supreme Court attempts to find a balance between allowing freedom of the press and disallowing real security threats. | Justices took different stances on the issue at hand, with some believing prior restraint to never be justified and others believing it to be justified in certain circumstances, if a national security threat is clear and serious. These justices referred to the need for a “clear and present danger,” a precedent that established, in the case of Schenck vs. United States in [[Probable year:: 1919]], that the First Amendment does not protect speech which creates a clear and present danger with which Congress is equipped to prevent, (Schenck v. United States). In New York Times Company v. United States, the majority ruled that the threat to national security by publishing the Pentagon Papers was too vague and unclear to impose restrictions on the press (New York Times Company v. United States). In certain circumstances, the Supreme Court has restricted First Amendment rights due to national security concerns. Typically, the Supreme Court attempts to find a balance between allowing freedom of the press and disallowing real security threats. | ||
References: | |||
Thomas I. Emerson, "The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 14, no. 2 (Summer 1979): 329-360 | |||
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971): https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/1873 | |||
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919): https://www.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/249us47 | |||
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Latest revision as of 06:34, 22 May 2023
Is there a perception that this right is above or higher than other fundamental rights, or in general, that it has a particular place in a hierarchy of rights?
The right to freedom of the press is commonly balanced against other rights and concerns, such as the right to privacy/ reputation and national security concerns. Freedom of the press is not inherently viewed to be above or higher than the right to privacy and potential security concerns, but rather the importance of freedom of the press is considered on a case by case basis, in comparison with the degree of other concerns. In the case of the right to privacy, free press can lead to an invasion of privacy in terms of the right of the public and the government to receive information, and can also lead to defamation especially in the case of false press or press being presented in a false light. When privacy law is applicable, historically, the courts try to assess how newsworthy and important the publication or information is for the public. The right to privacy often falls higher in the hierarchy of rights when the publication is not obviously important or newsworthy, whereas when the publication is very important for news purposes, the right to freedom of the press tends to be perceived as above the right to privacy. Additionally, in defamation cases, the degree to which reputation is harmed is considered by the courts. The courts may be more likely to uphold the right to reputation when a public figure is involved, and the cost to reputation is greater (Emerson 1979, 333).
Another important factor is national security concerns; a tricky issue in terms of freedom of the press. There has been disagreement over what necessitates or makes permissible prior restraint on the press due to national security concerns. One example includes the case of New York Times Company vs. United States in 1971 (New York Times Company v. United States). In 1967, Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, conducted a government study about America’s involvement in Vietnam. The work was compiled in 7,000 pages, and only 15 copies were printed. The work revealed that the government had not been transparent with the American people about its engagement with Vietnam. The study was considered classified. Daniel Ellsberg, who had helped with the project, later secretly made more copies of the study and distributed them to New York Times employees who referred to them as “Pentagon Papers.” The Nixon Administration barred further publication of the papers by means of a restraining order due to what they considered national security concerns. The New York Times appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court ruled that the New York Times could continue to publish the Pentagon Papers. The Court decided that the Nixon Administration did not have enough justification for barring the publication of the Pentagon Papers.
Justices took different stances on the issue at hand, with some believing prior restraint to never be justified and others believing it to be justified in certain circumstances, if a national security threat is clear and serious. These justices referred to the need for a “clear and present danger,” a precedent that established, in the case of Schenck vs. United States in 1919, that the First Amendment does not protect speech which creates a clear and present danger with which Congress is equipped to prevent, (Schenck v. United States). In New York Times Company v. United States, the majority ruled that the threat to national security by publishing the Pentagon Papers was too vague and unclear to impose restrictions on the press (New York Times Company v. United States). In certain circumstances, the Supreme Court has restricted First Amendment rights due to national security concerns. Typically, the Supreme Court attempts to find a balance between allowing freedom of the press and disallowing real security threats.
References:
Thomas I. Emerson, "The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 14, no. 2 (Summer 1979): 329-360
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971): https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/1873
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919): https://www.oyez.org/cases/1900-1940/249us47