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{{Introduction|When was it generally accepted as a fundamental, legally-protectable right?}}}
{{Question|Fundamentally accepted|When was it generally accepted as a fundamental, legally-protectable right?}}
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Latest revision as of 14:40, 5 January 2023

When was it generally accepted as a fundamental, legally-protectable right?

RightBreakoutContents
Freedom of AssociationThe Freedom of Association only became formally recognized in the US in 1958 with the landmark NAACP v Alabama SCOTUS decision (“NAACP v. ALABAMA, 377 U.S. 288” 1964). Just after the Brown v Board of Education ruling the NAACP became incredibly active in Alabama. When the state tried to demand a list of the organization's members, the NAACP refused. Freedom of Association can be found in the majority opinion where Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote “It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.” (“NAACP v. ALABAMA, 377 U.S. 288” 1964). Since the NAACP was allowed to organize their political group as an association and were afforded the privacy and rights they argued in the case.

Prior to this, this right can be found in several U.S. cases leading up to the 1958 opinion. The Supreme Court did not always recognize Freedom of Association however. In 1886, a case centered on the forming of state militias, the Court declared that the government had the ability to regulate and prohibit associations “have the power to regulate or prohibit associations and meetings of the people, except in the case of peaceable assemblies.” (Cornell Legal Information Institute). The right to protest is clearly laid out here, while the Freedom of Association is denied. Later on, in a 1945 case, the Court applied the freedom of assembly stating, “[i]t was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable.” This allowed unions to discuss benefits and consequences of organizing (“Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)”). Throughout the 1950s, the Court started to refer to the freedom of association as a separate but related freedom, close to speech and assembly, found in the First Amendment. By 1958, the Court deemed it "beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of" civil liberties like the freedom of speech. (Cornell Legal Information Institute). Internationally, the earliest autonomous associations were founded by religion. The Roman Catholic Church was the most important institution in medieval Western Europe. It kept its own organization and self-government, even in the several states where it served as the recognized religion (“Freedom of Association: History”). They encouraged trade associations, guilds for artisans, and other associations, frequently with the consent of the nation's ruler, who was typically a monarch (“Freedom of Association: History”). Outside of the US, one of the first instances of the debate regarding Freedom of Association in terms of organized labor was in Great Britain. At the end of the 18th century, the Comination Acts suppressed attempts to organize unions (“Freedom of Association: History” n.d.). This caused radical reformers to protest, driving workers to violence. Eventually, the government backed the repeal of the Acts in 1824. This repeal served as Britain’s first major increase in the ability to organize and unionize. Despite some infringements on labor rights in the 1980s and 1990s, the Trade Union Congress is still a strong force in the United Kingdom’s politics and economy (“Freedom of Association: History”). This was an early implication through labor rights that Freedom of Association existed. In order to address bad working conditions and social unrest, the ILO (International Labor Organization) devised a tripartite organization that included representatives from industry, labor, and government (“Freedom of Association: History”). The International Labor Organization (ILO) approved Convention No. 87 on freedom of association in 1948, and Convention No. 98 on the right to collectively bargain in 1949. As of 2013, 152 countries had ratified Convention No. 87, and 163 had ratified Convention No. 98, demonstrating how highly accepted these treaties are around the world (“Freedom of Association: History”). There are eight fundamental ILO conventions, some of which forbid child labor, forced labor, and employment discrimination. Only 14 of the 189 international standards treaties have been ratified by the US Senate, and only two of the eight core agreements (on forced labor in 1991 and child labor in 1999) have been ratified (“Freedom of Association: History”). On the other hand, nations in the former Soviet Union approved ILO treaties without ever putting them into use. Communist nations argued that since the Communist Party and its affiliated labor organizations represented workers' interests, there was no need for free trade unions, which are highly specific to certain trades (“Overview of Freedom of Association”). Thus, Soviet trade unions were the antithesis of free association and an "anti-trade union" paradigm. The official unions didn't shield workers from exploitation; instead, they made them labor longer and harder to satisfy government demands (Constitution Annotated). In democratic nations, private companies occasionally adopted a similar strategy known as "company unionism," but the Soviet Union's methods were systematic in nature and a crucial component of the totalitarian regime. The Soviet Union imposed its model on its Eastern European satellite governments and exported it to other communist nations (Constitution Annotated). The largest country still using a Communist Party-controlled official union structure is the People's Republic of China (Constitution Annotated). One of the ILO's greatest historical contributions was the inspiration and assistance it provided to Poland's Solidarity movement, which saw millions of workers rise up starting in 1980 and demand the implementation of Conventions 87 and 98 as well as the establishment of the right to form free unions (International Labor Organization 1982). As a result of the movement's success—10 million workers joined within a month of Solidarity's founding—a free trade union was officially recognized for the first time in a Communist nation. The Polish Solidarity Revolution had a tremendous impact on the entire Soviet bloc (International Labor Organization 1982). Solidarity's success was a rejection of the previous regimes. After seven years of nonviolent protest, Polish workers mounted a nationwide strike that compelled the government to re-legalize Solidarity and concede to partially free elections in June 1989, which ultimately led to the overthrow of the government (International Labor Organization 1982). Soon after, the Soviet Union as a whole disintegrated, paving the way for the rise of several new republics. Small clandestine publications that explained to employees their rights under ILO treaties served as the foundation for the entire operation (International Labor Organization 1982).

References:

Constitution Annotated. “Overview of Freedom of Association.” Library of Congress. Accessed September 11, 2023. https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-8-1/ALDE_00013139/.

Cornell Legal Information Institute.“Overview of Freedom of Association.” LII / Legal Information Institute. Accessed September 11, 2023a. https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/overview-of-freedom-of-association.

“PRESSER v. STATE OF ILLINOIS.” LII / Legal Information Institute. Accessed September 11, 2023b. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/116/252.

“Freedom of Association: History.” Democracy Web. Accessed September 11, 2023. https://democracyweb.org/freedom-of-association-history.

International Labor Organization. 1982. “Interim Report - Report No 217, June 1982.” June 1982. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2900704.

“NAACP v. ALABAMA, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).” FindLaw. Accessed September 11, 2023. https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/377/288.html.

“Overview of Freedom of Association.” Library of Congress. Accessed September 11, 2023. https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-8-1/ALDE_00013139/.

“Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).” Justia Law. Accessed September 11, 2023. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/323/516/.
Freedom of Expressionaugment with new material expression answer for demonstration
Freedom of ReligionReligious freedom was originally identified as a fundamental right when Enlightenment thinkers began to question whether political society has the obligation, or even the right, to decide its citizens’ religion. At the time, the widespread conclusion was that religious toleration and freedom of belief were preferable to religious uniformity and faith-based oppression. Around the same time in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, political documents began to identify religious freedom as a fundamental, legally-protectable right with which the state had no right to interfere. Among the first western states to legislate freedom of religion were the English North American colony of Rhode Island, a few of its fellow American colonies, and the United States itself. There was some historical precedent for ideas relevant to religious toleration in the form of the 1598 Edict of Nantes and the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, but the Rhode Island Charter and the United States Constitution were among the first documents to completely prohibit governments from interfering in their citizens’ religious affairs.

The founding of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations is credited to Roger Williams, a preacher who was banished from the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1635 and went on to purchase from the Narragansett Native Americans a plot of land that would become the city of Providence, Rhode Island (Smithsonian Institution, “God, Government and Roger Williams’ Big Idea”). He was banished for holding religious views that contrasted with those upon which the Massachusetts Bay Colony was founded, and it is likely that this experience influenced his thoughts about religious freedom and the value of toleration within political society. He expresses these views quite effectively in his 1644 work, The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, which states that “the permission of other consciences and worships than a state professeth, only can (according to God) procure a firm and lasting peace, (good assurance being taken according to the wisdom of civil state for uniformity of civil obedience from all forts)” (Williams, “The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution,”). The Rhode Island Charter, which Williams secured from Parliament in July 1663, reflects this view. It states that:

   "No person within the said colony, at any time hereafter, shall be any wise molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any differences in opinion in matters of religion, and do not actually disturb the civil peace of our said colony; but that all and every person and persons may, from time to time, and at all times hereafter, freely and fully have and enjoy his and their own judgments and consciences, in matters of religious concernments, throughout the tract of lance hereafter mentioned." (“Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations - July 15, 1663”)

By prohibiting the molestation, punishment, disquieting, and questioning of any citizen on the basis of religion, the Charter sets a clear guarantee that those living within the colony had the legal right to religious freedom. This was groundbreaking not only because it was the first of the thirteen original American colonies to guarantee total religious freedom, but also because unlike most contemporary acts of toleration, the Charter did not exclude Quaker and Jewish citizens from enjoying the religious freedom that it promised. Of course, Rhode Island was not the only one of the thirteen original American colonies to identify religious freedom as a fundamental, legally protectable right. Colonies like Maryland and Pennsylvania are also noteworthy for their inclusion of religious groups that made up the English minority. Maryland famously welcomed Catholics inside its borders, and Pennsylvania was originally founded as a Quaker colony under William Penn. As the colonies grew they became examples to contemporary Enlightenment thinkers, who looked to their example as proof that religious toleration was a desirable principle within any system of government. In his work on religious toleration, Voltaire writes of Philadelphia that “discord and controversy are unknown in the happy country they have made for themselves; and the very name of their chief town, Philadelphia, which unceasingly reminds them that all men are brothers, is an example and a shame to nations that are yet ignorant of toleration” (Voltaire, “Toleration and Other Essays - Online Library of Liberty,”). The benefits of religious freedom were well-known by the time of the American Revolution, which explains why religious freedom was such an important building block of the early republic. The Constitution of the United States was also one of the first documents to identify religious freedom as a fundamental, legally protectable right. Its First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (“United States Bill of Rights, Amendment I”). The inclusion of this language in such an influential document represents an important step in the identification of religious freedom as a fundamental legal right. It should be noted, however, that the First Amendment does not explicitly separate church and state within the United States government. The principle of church and state separation was not explicitly outlined until 1802, when President Thomas Jefferson outlined it in a letter to the Baptist community of Danbury, Connecticut. It was written in response to community leaders’ complaint that religious freedom was being treated as a privilege, not a right within their state. They wrote that “our sentiments are uniformly on the side of religious liberty--that religion is at all times and places a matter between God and individuals--that no man ought to suffer in name, person, or effects on account of his religious opinions--that the legitimate power of civil government extends no further than to punish the man who works ill to his neighbors” (“Jefferson's Wall of Separation Letter”). In response, Jefferson famously asserted that “I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between Church & State” (“Jefferson's Wall of Separation Letter”). This separation to which he refers is built upon Enlightenment ideals set out by thinkers like Locke and Spinoza, and it represents the realization of a movement for religious freedom that originated centuries before with the Protestant Reformation. Religious freedom is a right with a long history, and for centuries after it first came into question within the western world it was debated and considered. Thinkers like Locke and Voltaire championed it, and documents such as the Treaty of Westphalia and the Edict of Nantes made important strides toward realizing it as a legally protectable right. However, many of the first true instances of legally protected religious freedom occurred in American documents such as the Rhode Island Charter and the United States Constitution. These landmark pieces of legislation framed the modern American stance on religious toleration and the right to freedom of belief.

References:

John M. Barry, “God, Government and Roger Williams’ Big Idea,” Jan. 2012, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/god-government-and-roger-williams-big-idea-6291280/

“Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations - July 15, 1663”)

“Jefferson's Wall of Separation Letter,” https://www.usconstitution.net/jeffwall.html United States Bill of Rights

Voltaire, Voltaire. Toleration and Other Essays. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1755. https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/mccabe-toleration-and-other-essays.

Roger Williams, “The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution”
Freedom of the PressThe first piece of legislation granting citizens freedom of the press was the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act of 1776. The law allowed for free printing of anything that did not oppose religious faith, did not attack the constitution, and was not otherwise indecent (Nordin 2017, 137). In 1950, the European Convention of Human Rights accepted these same limitations for free press. The Swedish Freedom of the Press Act also gave citizens access to view official state documents. While other European countries had some level of free press, such as the Netherlands, the right to free press was not written into law (Nordin 2017, 138). The right to freedom of the press was accepted more globally with the publication of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (United Nations 1948) . Still, according to Freedom House, the population of the world with freedom of the press as of 2017 was only thirteen percent, due to limitations imposed by authoritarian regimes and Russian and Chinese regimes seeking to expand their global influence. There were even reports of threats to journalists and limitations to freedom of the press in some democracies (Dunham 2017) . As for the United States, the first guarantee of freedom of the press was written by George Mason in the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776 (Bogen 1983, 429). Thomas Jefferson revised Mason’s statement that “all men are born equally free and independent” when he wrote the Declaration of Independence (Vile). Likewise, James Madison later used the Virginia Declaration of Rights to help him in drafting the First Amendment in 1791. Specifically, the line “The Freedom of the Press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained by despotic Governments,” within the Virginia Declaration of Rights shows great similarity to Madison's later proposal for the guarantee of freedom of the press within the Bill of Rights (Bogen 1983, 445). Freedom of the press was accepted as a fundamental right for the United States as a whole with the ratification of the First Amendment in 1791 which states that, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (U.S. Const. amend. I). Freedom of the press is intertwined with freedom of speech, and both rights are seen as fundamental (Stewart).
Privacy RightsThe recognition of privacy rights as fundamental and legally-protectable can be traced back to seminal writings, key legal cases, and the growing awareness of the impact of technological advancements on personal privacy. The conceptualization of privacy has been widely debated and has undergone significant evolution over the past century. While deeply rooted in historical principles of ancient and common law, the concept of privacy has been continually redefined to address the challenges posed by technology and changing social landscapes. It has often been associated with personal freedom and dignity.

Earlier protections afforded to the inviolability of the home and correspondence made the privacy of property acceptable. These rights, enshrined in many constitutions during the 1800s, laid the groundwork for the modern concept of privacy. For example, the seminal 1789 “Declaration of the Rights of Man” stated, “Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on condition that the owner shall have been previously and equitably indemnified” (Declaration of the Rights of Man 1789). The inviolability of the home protected individuals from unwarranted intrusions by the state, recognizing a private sphere free from governmental interference. Similarly, the protection of correspondence remained confidential, safeguarding the privacy of individual expression.

Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 1890 article “The Right to Privacy” served as a catalyst in the movement to legally recognize privacy rights. They argued for the necessity of recognizing privacy as a distinct legal right, separate from existing protections of person and property under existing law. Additionally, the conceptualization of privacy was needed to respond to the modern era: “This development of the law was inevitable. The intense intellectual and emotional life, and the heightening of sensations which came with the advance of civilization, made it clear to men that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical things. Thoughts, emotions, and sensations demanded legal recognition” (Brandeis & Warren 1890, 193). Furthermore, they highlighted the inadequacies of existing legal frameworks to address the non-physical aspects of privacy, emphasizing the need for the evolution of the law in response to changing social and technological landscapes. In particular, the right “to be let alone” is a fundamental aspect of privacy to Warren and Brandeis in the modernizing world (Warren & Brandeis 1890, 194).

Despite Warren and Brandeis’s popular arguments, early 20th-century legal developments were slow to incorporate a broad conception of privacy rights. A notable example is the 1928 Supreme Court case Olmstead v. United States, where the Court held that wiretapping a person’s home telephone did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it did not involve a physical trespass (Solove 2008, 1101). However, legal decisions began to shift in the mid-20th century, starting with the 1965 Griswold v. Connecticut case. The Court ruled that a right to privacy could be inferred from several amendments in the Bill of Rights, thereby preventing states from making the use of contraception by married couples illegal (Griswold v. Connecticut 1985). This established privacy as a constitutionally protected right and laid the groundwork for subsequent decisions that expanded privacy protections.

Correspondingly, further landmark cases and bills recognized privacy rights. Katz v. United States in 1967 overruled the Olmstead decision; the Privacy Act of 1974, created in response to the Watergate scandal, aimed to regulation the collection and use of personal information by federal agencies; the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 was passed by Congress in response to a court case that held that individuals had not property interest in their bank records (Solove 2008, 1146; Regan 1995, 366).

Internationally, many institutions influenced the development of privacy rights. Early on, Europe enacted several pieces of legislation to protect privacy. Article 8 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights explicitly recognized the right to respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence (Bygrave 2014, 12). This right has been one of the most frequently contested in case law and has influenced the development of privacy laws in Europe and across the globe. In fact, the United Nations Human Rights Committee stated, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks upon his honour and reputation” in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Bygrave 2014, 57).

In the 21st-century, significant advancements in digital technology make the protection of privacy rights challenging. The explosion of digitized information and the rise of new media forms raise complex questions regarding the adequacy of existing privacy laws. William Prosser’s influential work on privacy tort law, while providing a foundational framework, has been criticized for its limitations in addressing contemporary privacy issues (Richards & Solove 2010, 1187). In response, David Lyon and William Staples have discussed the implications of surveillance for privacy in modern society, highlighting the need for pinging vigilance and adaptation of privacy protections in response to evolving technological and social landscapes (Lyon 2001, 222).

Overall, the recognition of privacy rights as fundamental and legally-protectable has been a dynamic and evolving process. From the early arguments of Warren and Brandeis to the landmark Supreme Court cases and legislative action, the concept of privacy has continually adapted to new challenges and contexts. These actions were all in response to the changing nature of privacy threats and to ensure legal protections could continue to evolve to these new challenges.


References Bygrave, L. A. (2014). "Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective." Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675555.001.0001. Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789). https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/381/479/. Penfold, R. (2002). [Review of Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life; Everyday Surveillance: Vigilance and Visibility in Post Modern Life, by D. Lyon & W. Staples]. The British Journal of Criminology, 42(1), 222–224. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23638774 Regan, P. M. (1995). "Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy." University of North Carolina Press. Richards, N. M., & Solove, D. J. (2010). "Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy." California Law Review, 98(6), 1887-1924. https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2104&context=faculty_publications. Solove, D. J. (2008). "Understanding Privacy." Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/3481326.

Warren, S.D., & Brandeis, L.D. (1890). “The Right to Privacy.” Harvard Law Review, 4(5), 193-220. https://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/articles/privacy/Privacy_brand_warr2.html.
Voting Rights and SuffrageThe right to vote was first accepted as a fundamental and legally-protectable right with the ratification of the United States Constitution in 1788, specifically under Article 1. States were given the right to set their own voting requirements (National Archives and Records Administration). The framers of the Constitution claimed to have aimed to promote the common welfare, ensuring their right to liberty. However, states routinely enfranchised only white male property owners. Although President Andrew Jackson expanded the right to all white males more generally, it took years for African Americans, women, and Native Americans to be granted the same right (The Library of Congress).

In 1870, the 15th Amendment was enacted which declared that the right to vote would not be determined on the basis of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude” (The Library of Congress). Likewise the 19th Amendment in 1920 gave american women the right to vote. The actual realization of the 15th Amendment did not occur for many years following 1870, for many African Americans continued to face barriers which limited their ability to vote. For instance, the use of literacy tests and poll taxes worked to prevent African Americans from voting (The Library of Congress). The Civil Rights Act of 1870 worked in accordance with the 15th Amendment. The Act sought to enforce criminal penalties against the use of intimidation or threats that aimed to prevent African Americans from voting. The subsequent Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 further expanded the enforcement of such penalties (National Archives and Records Administration). Despite previous legislation, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 passed by President Lyndon Johnson proved to be the most effective at ensuring minorities the right to suffrage.

Following the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which “outlawed discrimination of the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” and the 24th Amendment which made illegal the use of poll taxes, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 changed state and federal relations with regards to voting rights. Historically, discrimination from local state officials sought to disenfranchise African Americans. The Voting Rights Act worked by allowing the federal government to register voters, specifically in many states in the south with a history of harsh discriminatory practices. This meant the discontinuation of literacy tests and also allowed for non-english speakers to more readily become registered to vote. It was later in 1971 when the national voting age was lowered to 18 for all political elections (National Archives and Records Administration).

References:

National Archives and Records Administration. (n.d.). The Constitution of the United States: A Transcription. National Archives and Records Administration. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript#toc-section-4-.

The Founders and the Vote : The Right to Vote : Elections : Classroom Materials at the Library of Congress : Library of Congress. The Library of Congress. (n.d.). https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/elections/right-to-vote/the-founders-and-the-vote/.