Source/Freedom of Association

What is the oldest written source that mentions this right?

John Locke’s “A Letter Concerning Toleration” (1689) primarily concerns religious associations, but he extends certain arguments to associations in general. The text in the next paragraph is Boyd’s summarization (241), where sections in quotes come directly from “A Letter.” As Boyd notes, though Locke defends policies that allow freer association, he does so because of their practical benefits, not because it is a fundamental right (241).

“Suppose this Business of Religion were let alone,” Locke hypothesizes, “and that there were some other Distinction made between men and men, upon account of their different Complexions, Shapes, and Features.” Under conditions of differential treatment, such persons, “united together by one common persecution,” would become just as dangerous and disruptive. Conversely, if the state eliminated special privileges, on the one hand, or disproportionate burdens, on the other, then supposedly intractable religious or ethnic affiliations would become matters of complete indifference, no more or less contentious than other private decisions about how to spend one’s money, manage one’s estates, or marry off one’s daughter.

In 1776, Richard Price, a British writer who supported the American revolution published Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America. Unlike other commentaries on civil rights, he includes discussion on free assembly. He describes a prohibition on “associating for any purposes, except when leave should be given us by a Lord Lieutenant or Viceroy” as being part of a “state of oppression which no country can endure.” Though he does not phrase it as a fundamental right, the fact that Price deems draconian restrictions on association oppressive implies a belief in at least a limited freedom of association.

Though Enlightenment commentators like Locke argued for and against greater freedom to associate. However, the first to mention it as an absolute right was John Stuart Mill, who argues in On Liberty that “from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived” (1859, 16).

What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?

Australia

Australia has detailed records of its constitutional convention, which occurred in the 1890s. In 1897. One speaker alluded to the power of free association: “The English feel the vigor of their public spirit; they have experienced the vigilance of a free press, and the power of associations and public meetings.”

Botswana

Chapter 2 of Botswana’s Constitution (1966) guarantees “freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association.”

Brazil

Brazil’s constitution (1988) has exceptionally detailed freedom of association provisions. Title II-I-5 states that:

- there is total freedom of association for lawful purposes, but any paramilitary association is prohibited;

- creation of associations and, as set forth in law, of cooperatives, requires no authorization, prohibiting state interference in their operations;

- associations may be compulsorily dissolved or their activities suspended only by a judicial decision, which in the former case must be a final and unappealable decision;

- no one can be compelled to join an association or to remain in one;

- when expressly authorized, associations have standing to represent their members judicially and extrajudicially

Canada

Chapter 345 Section 5 of Saskatchewan’s Bill of Rights (1947) states that “every person and every class of persons shall enjoy the right to peaceable assembly with others and to form with others associations of any character under the law.”

Part 1 of the Canadian Bill of Rights (1960) lists “freedom of assembly and association” as a guaranteed right. This was an ordinary act of parliament, and it has been replaced by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, an amendment to the Canadian Constitution.

China

Chapter 2-4 of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China (1912) states that “citizens shall have the freedom of speech, of composition, of publication, of assembly and of association.”

The 1912 Republic of China Constitution refers to the one adopted by the nationalist government on the mainland, led by Sun Yat-sen. Despite its lofty ideals, this government never really maintained power. After a period of instability and civil war, the CCP forced the nationalist government to retreat to Taiwan, which is known now as the Republic of China. Taiwan suspended its constitution, and it was under a repressive martial-law system until 1987. It is now a constitutional democracy, and freedom of association is protected in its constitution. The PRC constitution claims to protect freedom of association, among other civil liberties.

Estonia

Section II-18 of Estonia’s first constitution (1920) states that “The forming of associations and unions is free in Esthonia."

France

Title I of the French Constitution of 1791 guarantees the right of peaceful assembly.

“Liberty to citizens to assemble peaceably and without arms in accordance with police regulations.”

Though the French Constitution of 1791 protected the right to assemble, French revolutionaries considered explicitly excluding free association (Boyd 257). The French enacted a law protecting free association in 1901, and enshrined it in their constitution in 1971 (Boyd 2008, 237).

Germany

The Weimar Constitution (1919) established freedom of association.

Article 123: “All Germans have the right to assembly peacefully and unarmed without giving notice and without special permission.”

Article 124: “All Germans have the right to form associations and societies for purposes not contrary to the criminal law.”

India

The following quote was attributed to Gandhi in 1922:

“Freedom of association is truly respected when assemblies of people can discuss even revolutionary projects, the State relying upon the force of public opinion and the civil police, not the savage military at its disposal, to crush any actual outbreak of revolution that is designed to confound public opinion and the State representing it.., The fight for swaraj means a fight for this threefold freedom before all else."

Part III Article 19 of the Indian Constitution (1950) grants citizens the right to “form associations or unions” (Dalton).

Republic of Ireland

Article 40 of the Irish Constitution (1940) guarantees “the right of the citizens to form associations and unions.”

Italy

Part 1 Title 1 Article 18 of the Italian Constitution (1947) states that:

- “Citizens have the right to form associations freely and without authorization for those ends that are not forbidden by criminal law.”

- “Secret associations and associations that, even indirectly, pursue political aims by means of organisations having a military character shall be forbidden.”

Japan

Chapter III Article 21 of the Japanese Constitution (1947): “Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.”

Additionally, though finding direct texts has proven difficult, there have been political movements for greater political expression since the pre-war era. The freedom and popular rights movement existed throughout the second half of the 19th century, and its members advocated for increased freedom of assembly beginning no later than 1886 (Tierney 2013, 21).

Latvia

The Latvian Constitution added a section on fundamental rights in 1998. Article 102 states that “everyone has the right to form and join associations, political parties and other public organisations.”

Mexico

From Section 1 Article 9 the Mexican Constitution of 1857: “No one shall be deprived of the right peaceably to assemble or to come together for any lawful purpose; but only citizens shall be permitted to exercise this right for the purpose of taking part in the political affairs of the country. No armed assembly shall have the right to deliberate.”

New Zealand

Part 2 Section 17 of the Bill of Rights Act (1990) states that, “Everyone has the right to freedom of association.”

Nigeria

Chapter IV Section 37 of the constitution of the Second Republic (1979) states that “every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and any political party, trade union, or other association for the protection of his interests.”

Pakistan

The following is from Part II, Chapter I, Section 17 of Pakistan’s current constitution (1973).

“Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, public order or morality.”

“Every citizen, not being in the service of Pakistan, shall have the right to form or be a member of a political party, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan and such law shall provide that where the Federal Government declares that any political party has been formed or is operating in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, the Federal Government shall, within fifteen days of such declaration, refer the matter to the Supreme Court whose decision on such reference shall be final.”

Portugal

Article 46 of the Portugese Constitution (1976):

“Citizens shall possess the right to freely associate with one another without requiring any authorisation, on condition that such associations are not intended to promote violence and their purposes are not contrary to the criminal law.”

“Associations shall pursue their purposes freely and without interference from the public authorities and shall not be dissolved by the state or have their activities suspended, except in such cases as the law may provide for and then only by judicial order.”

“No one shall be obliged to belong to an association, or be coerced to remain therein by any means.”

“Armed associations, military, militarised or paramilitary-type associations and organisations that are racist or display a fascist ideology shall not be permitted.”

South Africa

Chapter 3 section 17 of the 1993 Interim Constitution states that “every person shall have the right to freedom of association.”

South Korea

Chapter two Article Ten of the Constitution (1948): “All citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association.”

United Kingdom

The 1990 Human Rights Act protects the Right to assemble and associate, subject to reasonable and proportionate restrictions. The HRA primarily serves to codify the European Convention on Human Rights into British Law (the ECHR and its associated court are not related to the EU, and the UK is still a signatory).

In 1776, Richard Price, a British writer who supported the American revolution published Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America. Unlike other commentaries on civil rights, he includes discussion on free assembly. He describes a prohibition on “associating for any purposes, except when leave should be given us by a Lord Lieutenant or Viceroy” as being part of a “state of oppression which no country can endure.” Though he does not phrase it as a fundamental right, the fact that Price deems draconian restrictions on association oppressive implies a belief in at least a limited freedom of association. This is the first instance I could find of a political theorist invoking the concept of freedom of association (or the lack thereof).

There is a more explicit case for free association in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859). Mill lays a broad notion of individual liberty. He then argues that “from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived (16).”

Before any British thinkers espoused freedom of association as a right, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and David Hume addressed the issue (as Boyd helpfully summarizes). Hobbes detested associations, referring to them as “lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man” (257).

Locke disagreed with Hobbes’ cynical perspective on groups. John Locke’s “A Letter Concerning Toleration” primarily concerns religious associations, but he extends certain arguments to associations in general. The italicized text below is Boyd’s summarization (241), where sections in quotes come directly from “A Letter.” As Boyd notes, though Locke defends policies that allow freer association, he does so because of their practical benefits, not because it is a fundamental right (2008, 241).

“Suppose this Business of Religion were let alone,” Locke hypothesizes, “and that there were some other Distinction made between men and men, upon account of their different Complexions, Shapes, and Features.” Under conditions of differential treatment, such persons, “united together by one common persecution,” would become just as dangerous and disruptive.26 Conversely, if the state eliminated special privileges, on the one hand, or disproportionate burdens, on the other, then supposedly intractable religious or ethnic affiliations would become matters of complete indifference, no more or less contentious than other private decisions about how to spend one’s money, manage one’s estates, or marry off one’s daughter. Finally, David Hume’s “Of Parties in General” (1742) is another important piece of Enlightenment work skeptical of associations. His position is more nuanced that Hobbes; he understands that association may exist for different purposes. Factions “of interest” are deemed less dangerous than factions “of principle.” Regarding factions of principle, he wonders the following: “But where the difference of principle is attended with no contrariety of action, but every one may follow his own way, without interfering with his neighbour, as happens in all religious controversies; what madness, what fury can beget such unhappy and such fatal divisions?”

United States

Listed at the bottom of this section is language from the State Constitutions of New Hampshire and North Carolina and the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, all from 1776, which articulate the right to assemble (assembly and association are not always interchangeable, but many constitutions group them together). These documents all contain rights to assemble written in remarkably similar language, and they describe the right as politically driven. These were the oldest references to something like the right of association in governing documents.

Despite modern views of assembly as related to association, at the time of America’s founding, it would have been better understood as related to the right to petition. According to Congress’s online annotated Constitution, the assembly clause meant that the people have a right to assemble in order to petition the government. The site says that assembly was initially seen as a “subordinate and instrumental” right ("Freedom of Assembly and Petition"). The aforementioned state constitutions should be interpreted the same way. In fact, this is even more clear in these state constitutions than in the national one. The state constitutions surround the right to assemble with expressly political language, such as the right to petition and advocacy for the “common good,” while the First Amendment’s guarantees are political, but not entirely political (it protects religion, and protected speech and press are often, but not always, political).

As Richard Boyd argues in “The Madisonian Paradox of Free Association,” America’s founders did not explicitly include free association because at least some of them were skeptical of it, worrying that certain associations would be conspiratorial or seditious. He summarizes the British Enlightenment tradition skeptical of associations, which influenced the founders (I describe this in the last few paragraphs of the UK section, on Hobbes, Locke, and Hume). James Madison, the primary author of the Bill of Rights, feared the influence of factions, which private associations furthered. As Boyd notes, Madison viewed association as a “second-order” right (page 258), whose existence is tolerable because institutions can mitigate its worst effects (page 247). The following passage from “Federalist No. 10” illustrates his attitude toward factions arising from free association:

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

As Boyd notes, there are several possible reasons why Madison may not have enumerated the right to associate. It is possible that he saw it as implied by other First-Amendment rights, such as free assembly. It also may have been seen as less important or vulnerable than other rights, and Madison may have seen it as the type of auxiliary right protected by the Ninth Amendment. Finally, the right’s exclusion may have been because the founders were too skeptical of it for its inclusion (258).

Since the 1950s and 60s, SCOTUS has, to an extent, ruled that the speech and assembly rights imply a right to associate, especially for politically expressive purposes. For example, it ruled in NAACP v. Alabama that the NAACP cannot be forced to submit a membership roster to a state government. In 2000, in Boy Scouts v. Dale, the court held that the Boy Scouts could exclude gay members (in violation of state non-dsicrimination laws) because not being able to do so would undermine their ability to express a viewpoint - expressive association.

In Roberts v. US Jaycees, an organization for young business leaders’ ban on female members was challenged because it violated state non-discrimination law. This case is notable because the court identified a new form of association: intimate association. The opinion of the court states that “certain intimate human relationships be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.” The opinion places this right under the general aims of the First Amendment. The court ruled against the organization, but in so doing, it established the idea that Americans have the right to free intimate and expressive association. Still, one could argue that in a state with true freedom to associate, any group of people would be able to enact whatever membership restrictions it wanted, regardless of whether or not it falls into the categories of “expressive” or “intimate.”

Although assembly is the First-Amendment freedom that most seems to correspond with association, SCOTUS has not derived free association this way. Rather, it uses a more nebulous combination of various First-Amendment rights. As the majority held in NAACP v. Button, “It is not necessary to subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly, for there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity.”

Article XVIII of North Carolina’s Constitution: “That the people have a right to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their Representatives, and to apply to the Legislature, for redress of grievances.” Section 21 of New Hampshire’s Constitution: “The citizens have a right in a peaceable manner to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or for other purposes, by petition, address, or remonstrance. No law abridging the freedom of speech shall be enacted.”

Section XVI of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights: “That the people have a right to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances, by address, petition, or remonstrance.

Is there another noteworthy written source from the past that mentions this right?

Pope Leo XIII forcefully argued for free association in Section 51 of Rerum novarum (1891), an extremely influential text in Catholic thought.

"Private societies, then, although they exist within the body politic, and are severally part of the commonwealth, cannot nevertheless be absolutely, and as such, prohibited by public authority. For, to enter into a "society" of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State has for its office to protect natural rights, not to destroy them."

Is the identification of this right associated with a particular era in history, political regime, or political leader?

This right became an element of political discourse in the late Enlightenment, especially the American Revolution. In the mid and late 1800s, writers such as Mill and Leo XIII pushed the idea into the mainstream.

Legal Codification

Is this right protected in the Constitutions of most countries today?

Constitutions written after 1900 very often protect free association.

As the right to free association is upheld by numerous United Nations treaties, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it would be expected that most countries maintain legal provisions protecting it. Though, investigated by UN Special Rapporteur Maina Kiai, many countries enforce legislation that explicitly restricts civilians’ entitlements to free association (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law).

For example, noted by Kiai, in Malaysia, the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 bans individuals under the age of twenty one from organizing public demonstrations. Additionally, stipulated by the same act, children under the age of fifteen cannot participate in demonstrations. Article 33 of the Constitution of Mexico, Kiai asserts, prohibits foreigners from engaging with Mexican politics. Similarly, Kiai notes that in Myanmar, Article 354 prohibits foreigners from assembling. Through these various forms of legislation, political and social association are highly restricted, as individuals are prohibited from expressing their associations through protest and civic engagement.

Additionally, Kiai presents how legal restrictions on sexual orientation limit free association in several countries. For example, in Russia, a ban on gay pride parades was upheld by Moscow’s city council in 2012. Likewise, in Nigeria, the President ushered in the Same Sex Marriage Act in 2014, prohibting gay marriage and the ability to “participate in or support gay clubs, societies, organizations, processions or meeting.” Kiai notes a similar anti-homosexuality law was signed by Uganda’s president in 2014. Demonstrated by these numerous legal restrictions to homosexuality, free association is unprotected in numerous countries, as one can often be punished for associating with a specific sexual orientation.

In the remainder of his report, Kiai continues to elaborate on numerous legal provisions that restrict free association. For example, Kiai notes how both Chile and Turkey utilize counter-terrorism legislation to restrict free association. Similarly, he explains how criminal laws in Vietnam and El Salvador often deter individuals from exercising their rights to free association, as their voices may be met with harsh penalties from their governments.

Witnessed through Kiai’s reporting, the restrictions to free association are plentiful. This ultimately demonstrates that despite its entitlement by numerous United Nations treaties, the right to free association is highly vulnerable to violation and not widely internationally upheld.

Is it contained in the US Constitution?

No.

The right to free association is not explicitly stated in the United States Constitution. Though, The Supreme Court has historically upheld the constitutional right to free association, invoking the Fourteenth and First Amendments (Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School). In 1958, The NAACP v. Patterson ruling established this precedent. In response to Alabama’s aims to limit the NAACP’s business within the state, the Supreme Court ruled that it was “the right of petitioner's members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment” (Oyez). Furthermore, the court asserted that freedom of association was undoubtedly covered by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Oyez), which asserts no individual may be “"deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” The court additionally demonstrated the First Amendment to protect free association, Justice Marshall Harlan claiming “Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.” Thus, while the right to free association is not explicitly described by the Constitution, as witnessed in NAACP v. Patterson, it is upheld by American constitutional law.

Has it been interpreted as being implicit in the US Constitution?

Since the 1950s and 60s, SCOTUS has, to an extent, ruled that the speech and assembly rights imply a right to associate, especially for politically expressive purposes. For example, it ruled in NAACP v. Alabama that the NAACP cannot be forced to submit a membership roster to a state government. In 2000, in Boy Scouts v. Dale, the court held that the Boy Scouts could exclude gay members (in violation of state non-dsicrimination laws) because not being able to do so would undermine their ability to express a viewpoint - expressive association.

In Roberts v. US Jaycees, an organization for young business leaders’ ban on female members was challenged because it violated state non-discrimination law. This case is notable because the court identified a new form of association: intimate association. The opinion of the court states that “certain intimate human relationships be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.” The opinion places this right under the general aims of the First Amendment. The court ruled against the organization, but in so doing, it established the idea that Americans have the right to free intimate and expressive association. Still, one could argue that in a state with true freedom to associate, any group of people would be able to enact whatever membership restrictions it wanted, regardless of whether or not it falls into the categories of “expressive” or “intimate.”

Although assembly is the First-Amendment freedom that most seems to correspond with association, SCOTUS has not derived free association this way. Rather, it uses a more nebulous combination of various First-Amendment rights. As the majority held in NAACP v. Button, “It is not necessary to subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly, for there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity.”

Are there any exceptions in American law to this right?

Yes. As seen in Roberts v. US Jaycees, the right may be weighed against other state interests, especially when the association in question is neither expressive nor intimate. In that case, free association rights were curtailed to ensure adherence to non-discrimination laws.

Additionally, a significant exception to free association rights in the United States is witnessed through legislation regarding political parties. Furthermore, while one has the liberty to vote with, join, and create independent political parties, upheld by the William V. Rhodes ruling, the state can still regulate these parties if they violate other aspects of the Constitution. For example, in New York State Board of Elections vs. Lopez Torres, the court claimed,

A political party has a First Amendment right to limit its membership as it wishes, and to choose a candidate-selection process that will in its view produce the nominee who best represents its political platform. These rights are circumscribed, however, when the state gives a party a role in the election process...Then for example, the party’s racially discriminatory action may become state action that violates the Fifteenth Amendment Demonstrated by New York State Board of Elections vs. Lopez Torres, if a party associates with discriminatory or racist behavior, it cannot be involved in the state’s election process, demonstrating a limitation on free political association.

Additionally, sections of the Federal Election Campaign Act are often interpreted to be exceptions to free association, as they require the public disclosure of individuals’ political donations. This position was echoed by the Buckley v. Valeo ruling, where the Supreme Court argued that new campaign finance laws, “impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedom of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions.” Thus, witnessed by Buckley v. Valeo, campaign finance laws may be interpreted as an exception to free association, as one cannot privately financially contribute to the political party they associate with.

Within universities, freedom of association, specifically the right to associate as an exclusive religious group, may be regulated by anti-discrimination clauses. This was observed in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, where the court ruled in favor of Hastings’ College of Law’s anti-discrimintation policies, which prohibited Christian student group’s from excluding non-christians. Therefore, on university campuses, individuals must be able join any student group, regardless of their religious association. Ultimately, this decision restricted the parameters of free association, as one cannot actively discriminate on the basis of it.

Consequently, decided by Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, certain groups can legally exclude individuals from associating with them. Furthermore, if an individual’s beliefs do not coincide with the group’s mission, the individual may be prohibited from membership. Specifically, the court claimed that by mandating the Boston Veterans’ Council to include Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual individuals in their parade, the Massachusetts State Court, “violates the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say.” Thus, while still restricting free association, the ruling counters Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, as individuals can be restricted from associating with certain groups if it is deemed that their identity does not conform to the group’s platform.

Ultimately, these exceptions arise from the implicit nature of the freedom of association within the Constitution, as what qualifies as “association” is highly subject to interpretation by Supreme Court justices. For this reason, depending on who is sitting on the bench, freedom of association can be left unchecked or potentially be highly restricted.

Is this right enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties?

Yes. It is protected explicitly in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights.

Specifically, free association is upheld by Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which claims, “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”Additionally, it is enshrined in Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which claims “ Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; No one may be compelled to belong to an association.” In Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the rights to association are specifically outlined, as it upholds “In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Lastly, The International Labor Organization similarly supports freedom of association in the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which asserts that all members have “freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;”

Philosophical Origins

What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?

Buddhism

The Five Precepts of Buddhism condemn activity relating to “sexual misconduct, falsehoods, and intoxicants” (Peek,529), possibly limiting the ability of individuals to associate with certain behaviors or activities. While Buddhism does warn against disobeying the Five Precepts, as this may result in bad Karma, it ultimately asserts that it is the choice of the individual to decide whether or not they wish to follow the declarations of the Five Precepts (Peek, 529). Furthermore, Buddhism’s focus on moral authority, in which the individual is not subordinate to the Five Precepts, can be interpreted as allowing individuals freedom in regards to association. Demonstrated by this, although Buddhism provides guidelines for what followers ought to avoid associating with, these are merely suggestions. Thus, emphasizing the freedom of the individual, Buddhism can be seen to support the right to free association.

Though, the traditions of Buddhist monks reveal how certain Buddhist practices restrict freedom of association. As explained by Holmes Welch, “According to the Buddha’s rule, when people become monks and nuns they lead a collective life. Not only is there no private property, but there is no thought for oneself. To take thought for oneself is to keep hold of the ego” (Welch, 146). Noted by Welch, upon entering monastic life, Buddhists are expected to relinquish all previously held associations. Therefore, observed through the expectations of monks, elements of Buddhism confine free association.

Additionally, through the Eightfold Path, the eight practices Buddhists are expected to follow on their journey to nirvana, certain behaviors are limited. For example, when following the Eightfold Path, individuals are restricted from making a living off selling animals, weapons, meat, poison, and liquor (Tilakaratne, 48). Condemning certain professions and ways of life, Buddhism again appears to limit the associations of its followers, undermining the strength of the freedom of association within the belief system.

Looking to Buddhist leaders, freedom of association is ultimately upheld. For example, in a 1993 Washington address, the Dalai Lama demonstrated his admiration for the principles of democracy, particularly the liberties, such as freedom of association, it guarantees to civilians. The Dalai Lama asserts, “Irrespective of whether we are rich or poor, educated or uneducated, belonging to one nation or another, to one religion or another, adhering to this ideology or that, each of us is just a human being like everyone else.” Through his words of acceptance, the Dalai Lama conveys that Tibetan Buddhism supports the ability to freely associate with many identities. Thus, while the Five Precepts, monastic codes, and Eightfold Path appear to restrict the liberties of followers, the Dalai Lama’s words affirm them.

Aristotelian thought

Aristotle, in his book Nicomachean Ethics, wrote that “Friendships are also important parts of our childhood and adult experience. Without them, we struggle to discover, shape, and pursue our ideas of what constitutes a good life. But, again, friendships can take many forms for many reasons, not all of which are grounded in mutual affection and convivial warmth” (Brownlee and Jenkins 2019). Friendships here form the basis of our associations in life; he ultimately argues that we as humans require association and assembly in our lives.

Aristotle argues that not all forms of association are political, particularly those that stem from material needs, including family, the market, and alliances for mutual defense/benefit- these can be organized into libertarian and capitalist principles. According to one’s needs, individuals are free to associate and disassociate within their own means of persuasion and trade, and none of this is political- or in other words, the government should have no business with the private associations of the people (Johnson 32, 2001). Regarding politically, he further argues that “It is not the case . . . that people come together for the sake of life alone, but rather for the sake of living well” (3.9.1280a31) and “the political community must be set down as existing for the sake of noble deeds and not merely for living together” (Johnson 32, 2001). He takes a stance against the dominance of individuals associating merely for political protection and gain, but he believed that the state should do more in its concern for the citizen, encouraging virtue and discouraging harm and vice (Johnson 32, 2001). He argues that the best political regime best delivers the “good life-” production and distribution of goods, both goods of the body and of the soul. Within this theory, Aristotle considers the production and distribution of bodily goods as private and the production and distribution of spiritual goods as public: “The primary goods of the soul are (1) moral and intellectual virtue, which are best produced by public education, and (2) honor, the public recognition of virtue, talent, and service rendered to the city. The principle of distributive justice is defined” (Johnson 38-39, 2001). Aristotle’s theory about freedom of association is that political associations’ ultimate goal is to help foster the virtues that are necessary in the pursuit of justice and happiness; therefore, “no legitimate regime can be indifferent to the virtue of the citizens” (Johnson 44, 2001). The polis is both the most inclusive and authoritative community according to Aristotle, seeing as Aristotle's polis is a mixed concept, fusing the political state with civil societal attributes including economic, religious, and other forms of association” (Miller 878, 1996).

Ancient Chinese Philosophy

Various schools of Chinese Philosophy contribute to society’s understanding of the right to free association.

Legalism, with its adherence to strict punishments for any violation of the law, limits the liberty of citizens to freely associate. At its core, Legalism restricts the ability of citizens to act freely, as under the philosophy individual’s lives become entirely controlled by administrative acts (MacCormack, 62). Furthermore, the legalist state was not concerned with the liberties of civilians. Rather, legalists focused their efforts towards strengthening the economic and military strength of the state through authoritarian power (MacCormack, 63). Thus, in the school of Legalism, there is little tolerance for associations that counter the laws of the state, undermining the right to free association.

Consequently, Confucianism emphasizes the ability of citizens to rebel against the emperor (Peek, 523). This bolsters the right to free association, as individuals are encouraged to join other political parties in the face of an unjust regime.

Though, more similarly to Legalism, additional elements of Confucianism vastly undermine the right to free association. As Confucianism evolved, the belief system began to emphasize a strict code of ethics, creating a rigid social structure (Peek, 532). This limited the ability of followers to freely associate, as they were confined to following a strict code of behavior. Thus, while Confucianism initially appears to support the right to free association, its development as a belief system has constricted the liberties of followers.

While Taoism does not discredit the right to free association, it does weaken the importance of associations as a whole. Advocating that individuals put aside their distinguishing characteristics, Taoism stresses that there “is one underlying and uniting all phenomena” among human beings (Chan, 316). Furthermore, Taoists argue that human beings must transcend their personal distinctions, diminishing the value of individuals’ associations. Thus, while Taoism does not proclaim individuals should not be able to associate themselves with certain groups, it does argue that associations are ultimately meaningless.

Reformation Christianity

Reformation Christianity, Freedom of Association As mentioned above (section 1), John Locke’s 1689 “Letter Concerning Toleration” is widely believed to be the first written source to address, albeit indirectly, the right to freedom of association. While it is true that no source written prior to 1689 specifically explores the right in its entirety, there were a number of Reformation-era thinkers whose work formed the basis for Locke’s belief in the benefits of granting the right to free religious association. These sources were primarily English, written by such philosophers as Richard Hooker and Thomas More, though there is some evidence that Locke drew on themes from John Calvin as well. Among Locke’s most prominent sources of inspiration and guidance is Richard Hooker’s influential work, ​The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity​. This book, much of which was published posthumously in the late 1590s, was Hooker’s attempt to defend the fledgeling Anglican Church against attacks from the growing population of English Puritans. It explores a number of religious topics, one of which is the concept that all Churches, including those of “Rome, Corinth, Ephesus, England, and so the rest...are public Christian societies. And of such properties common unto all societies Christian, it may not be denied, that one of the very chiefest is Ecclesiastical Polity” (Hooker, 178). This idea that religious groups could be considered a “society” of people is advanced in Locke’s “Letter,” which takes the work one step further by examining one’s freedom to belong to these various religious societies. Hooker also explores this idea to some extent when he writes that “we rather incline to think it a just and reasonable cause for any Church, the state whereof is free and independent if in these things it differ from other Churches, only for that it doth not judge it so fit and expedient to be framed therein by the pattern of their example, as to be otherwise framed than they” (Hooker, 275). In this passage

Hooker essentially argues that different sects of Christianity ought to be allowed to practice their preferred faith in peace, provided they similarly respect other branches’ rights to believe and associate. Perhaps is not a surprising statement to find in a defense of the Anglican Church after it broke away from Catholicism, but Hooker’s conviction that “Churches are rather in this case like divers families than like divers servants of one family” nevertheless seems to have profoundly influenced Locke’s work in the same area (Hooker, 277).

In addition to this conceptual framework, Locke also seems to draw on Hooker for an interpretation of John Calvin’s teaching​.​ Hooker’s Fourth Book of ​Laws​ quotes Calvin, who supposedly writes that, “Yea, sometime it profiteth and is expedient that there be difference, lest men should think that religion is tied to outward ceremonies. Always provided that there be not any emulation, nor that Churches delighted with novelty affect to have that which others have not.” (Hooker, 276). This, Hooker says, provides a basis of acceptability for different religious sects to profess their religions differently. By arguing in favor of different churches practicing differently, Hooker also implies a support for citizens’ right to belong to various churches according to how they wish to worship. It is possible that Hooker was referring to Calvin’s statement in ​The Institutes of the Christian Religion,​ which says that that “it is a well-known doctrine, and one as to which all the pious are agreed,—that the right consideration of signs does not lie merely in the outward ceremonies, but depends chiefly on the promise and the spiritual mysteries, to typify which the ceremonies themselves are appointed.” (Calvin, ​Institutes of the Christian Religion, B​ ook IV, Chapter 16, 2). Calvin’s work then proceeds to explain the parallels between circumcision in the Jewish faith and Baptism in the Christian ones, before concluding that “Baptism has been substituted for circumcision (Calvin, ​Institutes of the Christian Religion,

Book IV, Chapter 16, 4). While this does not mean that Calvin believed in one’s right to belong to the association or religion of one’s choice, its influence on Hooker’s statement is apparent. In concert with Hooker and a number of other influences, Calvin’s philosophy guided Locke in his exploration of religious freedom and, by extension, freedom of association.

Locke’s “Letter” also displays some degree of influence from the writings of Thomas More, another Reformation-era thinker whose work addresses the citizen’s role in various religious associations. More’s famous work, ​Utopia,​ tells of a fictional country in which society is ordered and governed according to the way that More believed was best. Included in these guidelines are the principles of religious freedom, which likely had some influence on Locke’s thoughts on free association. Sanford Kessler’s “Religious Freedom in More’s ‘Utopia’” notes that “Locke's work contains arguments that are remarkably similar to More’s,” and explains that “In Utopia, religious freedom checked the threat of religious conflict by transforming a plethora of squabbling sects into tolerant, stable supporters of the government” (Kessler, “Religious Freedom”). The actual text of More’s work states that the founder of the mythical society in Utopia had “left matters open, making each person to follow his own beliefs,” (More, 110). While this does more to imply More’s support for religious freedom than for freedom of association, the idea that citizens should be able to belong to whichever religion they choose is certainly evident in Locke’s work on toleration. Freedom of association was not directly addressed prior to Locke’s work on toleration, but it is clear that Reformation-era philosophers influenced his work. Hooker’s thoughts on religious freedom and the relationship between religious societies shaped the way that Locke thought about religious toleration, and ideas from Calvin and More also influenced his work.

Sources Used: Calvin, Jean, and Henry Beveridge. ​Institutes of the Christian Religion​. Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1845, http://www.ntslibrary.com/PDF%20Books/Calvin%20Institutes%20of%20Christian%20 Religion.pdf​, www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html. Hooker, Richard. ​Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity.​ George Routledge and Sons, 1998, https://prydain.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/the_laws_of_ecclesiastical_polity_books_i-i V.pdf​. Kessler, Sanford. “Religious Freedom in Thomas More's ‘Utopia.’” ​The Review of Politics​, vol. 64, no. 2, 2002, pp. 207–229. ​JSTOR,​ www.jstor.org/stable/1408764. Accessed 8 July 2020. More, Thomas. ​Utopia​. Translated by Dominic Baker-Smith, Penguin Classics, 20012.

Hobbesian Thought

Hobbes distinguishes between public political networks, or bodies politic, which are authorized by the commonwealth (states and provinces, for example), and private associations (251). Hobbes is not particularly skeptical of small, private organizations made for harmless, known purposes. However, he distrusts larger organizations with nefarious or unknown intentions. He states that, “Irregular Systemes, are those which having no Representative, consist only in concourse of People; which if not forbidden by the Common-wealth, nor made on evill designe, (such as are conflux of People to markets, or shews, or any other harmelesse end,) are Lawfull. But when the Intention is evill, or (if the number be considerable) unknown, they are Unlawfull” (252). Regarding bodies politic, Hobbes argues that their representation must be limited and determined by the commonwealth, since the commonwealth’s ultimate authority cannot be supplanted (252). Hobbes identifies groups that we would today call private political associations: groups formed “not by obligation of one to another, but proceeding onely from a similitude of wills and inclinations” (265). He distrusts these groups, arguing that they are “for the most part unnecessary, and savour of unlawfull designe; and are for that cause Unlawfull, and go commonly by the name of factions, or Conspiracies” (265).

Lockean Thought/English Empiricism

Locke made little mention of free expression. However, one can draw inferences based on his views on religion and association, especially since there is substantial overlap between expression and association and religion. One can infer that, if Locke advocates for certain doctrinal limitations on churches and other associations, he would support limits on the expression of those doctrines. After all, forming associations that exist to further certain viewpoints is a form of expression (take the concept of “expressive association” in US jurisprudence). In ​A Letter​, Locke establishes some respect for freedom of opinion, writing that if an opinion does “not tend to establish domination over others, or civil impunity to the Church in which they are taught, there can be no reason why they should not be tolerated” (36). Scholars disagree strongly over the extent to which speech would be regulated in a Lockean society (Daniel 2013, 1).

Benthamite Utilitarianism

Bentham approached freedom of association as he did free expression: as a means of political advocacy and dissent. In Chapter IV Section 24 of A Fragment on Government, he advocates for “the liberty of public association; or the security with which malecontents may communicate their sentiments, concert their plans, and practise every mode of opposition short of actual revolt, before the executive power can be legally justified in disturbing them.”

Millian Utilitarianism

While Bentham’s free association is a political right, in On Liberty, Mill advocates for near-universal free association: “from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived” (Mill 1859, 16). In his introduction, Mill makes clear that his ideas of liberty come from utilitarianism, not natural rights, stating that, “I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of a man as a progressive being” (14).

Marxism

One central idea of Marx’s theory is the free association of producers. That is, workers are able to freely determine what associations and organizations they can form to contribute to the economy (Fetscher, 1973, 459). Though this is not what one would conventionally describe as free association - which usually refers more to civic and political groups - it is an interesting contribution to the study of free association. In Volume One of ​Capital​, Marx states the following: “The life​process of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan. This, however, demands for society a certain material groundwork or set of conditions of existence which in their turn are the spontaneous product of a long and painful process of development” (1867).

Fetscher: UMD library

Marx 1867: https://web.stanford.edu/~davies/Symbsys100-Spring0708/Marx-Commodity-Fetishism.pdf

Feminist Thought

Harriet Taylor, a feminist philosopher from the 19th century, wrote about the restrictions that limit women to the private sphere. Men, according to Taylor, decided that the private and domestic sphere is women’s “proper sphere”; however, she argues that any group’s proper sphere is the “largest and highest which they are able to attain to” (Taylor). Taylor argues that this is not possible without complete liberty and, if men are convinced of their mental superiority, should not be an issue if women and men are afforded the same opportunities (Taylor). This argument can be adapted to freedom of association because it essentially concludes that both women and men have the equal opportunity to associate with organizations if he or she can prove his or her worth.

In the Constitution, there are two interpreted freedom of associations. The First Amendment includes the freedom of expressive association. The Fourteenth Amendment includes the freedom of intimate association. Intimate association is an individual’s right to form/maintain close personal relationships without interference from the government (Hudson, 2009). Expressive association, recognized in NAACP v. Alabama (1958), refers to the right of individuals to congregate or association for expressive purposes, such as advancing a political opinion (Hudson, 2009). In Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984), Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion. Brennan concluded that the Jaycees could not exclude women from membership because their purpose as an economic organization for the advancement of young men was not jeopardized if women were members (Bernstein, 2009). Justice O’Connor concurred, but distinguished between expressive and non-expressive groups, which exist for other purposes (Bernstein, 2009). O’Connor concluded that the Jaycees primarily existed for economic reasons, not expressive ones, and, as such, could not exclude women on the basis that it would compromise their mission (Bernstein, 2009).

Culture and Politics

Does public polling reveal insights about the right as experienced in different countries?

The World Bank measures freedom of association across 156 countries using a scale ranging from 0 ( very low freedom of association) to 1(very high freedom of association). Looking at high income countries, with the exception of Israel, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Singapore, freedom of association is generally reported to be above the world median. Additionally, among wealthier countries, the World Bank data demonstrates that levels of freedom of association have remained generally fixed since 1975, when the data was first collected. In particular, the data reveals Burundi, China, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Vietnam, and Yemen to have very low levels of freedom of association (below 0.3). Countries with very high levels of freedom of association (above 0.8) were more numerous, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Trinidad and Tobago, Switzerland, Sweden, Sri Lanka, Spain, South Africa, Slovenia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Portugal, Peru, Papua New Guinea, Panama, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Namibia, Mongolia, Mexico, Mauritius, Malawi, Liberia, Latvia, South Korea, Japan, Jamaica, Italy, Ireland, Honduras, Greece, Ghana, Estonia, Denmark, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Costa Rica, Canada, Benin, Belgium, Australia, and Albania.

An Open Government Partnership (OGP) report reveals additional insights about freedom of association. The report surveys individuals within 78 OGP partnered countries about elements of freedom of association. Furthermore, the survey presents that approximately 25% of freedom of association issues within OGP countries are rooted in restrictive laws on foreign funding. Additionally, the survey demonstrates that OGP countries presenting challenges to freedom of association generally have not taken actions towards better protecting the right in the future. When asked to respond to “In practice, people can freely join any political organization they want”, the majority of OGP countries responded “Agree” or “Strongly Agree”. Though, when asked to reply to “In practice, people can freely join any (unforbidden) political organization they want”, a large number of OGP countries, approximately 20%, responded “Disagree” . This finding demonstrates that in reality, freedom of association may be less protected by countries’ governments than it is perceived to be.

Within the International Labor Organization, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) addresses violations of freedom of association. In their 2018 annual report, the CFA reported 402 freedom of association complaints from Africa, 410 from Asian and the Pacific, 657 from Europe, 1,681 from Latin America and 186 from North America. Furthermore, their data reveals decreases in complaints in Africa, Asia and the Pacfic, and North America and increases in complaints in Latin America in 2018. 100% of the freedom of association cases examined by the CFA were brought about by workers, rather than employers. 50% of these workers were from the private sector. Violations of trade union rights and civil liberties composed the majority of freedom of association cases investigated by the CFA.

Conflicts with other Rights

Are there other specific fundamental rights that tend to conflict with this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?

The right to associate - specifically, the right for associations to exclude people from membership for whatever reason they want - may conflict with the right not to face discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as race and gender. The US Supreme Court has decided cases where an association’s decision to exclude members conflicts with non-discrimination law. In ​Roberts v. US Jaycees (​ 1984), the court rejected the free-association claim of a male-only business organization because its association was neither “expressive” nor “intimate.” In ​Boy Scouts v. Dale​ (2000), however, the court held that the Boy Scouts of America could exclude gay members because not being able to do so would violate the organization’s right to expressive association. Free expression is critical to the practice of free association. The US Supreme Court explicitly protects “expressive” association because many associations exist to express a particular viewpoint. If a government restricts the advocacy of certain ideas, it will almost certainly restrict the activity of groups whose purpose is to express those ideas. Additionally, freedom of association depends on the free exercise of religion. As Locke wrote in ​A Letter Concerning Toleration​, a church is a “a society of members voluntarily uniting” (Locke 1689, 9). Religious observance often requires worship in large groups, so restricting these religious practices entails the abridgement of free association. Roberts v. US Jaycees:​ ​https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/468/609 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale​: ​https://www.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-699 A Letter Concerning Toleration:​ https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/toleration.pdf

Is there a perception that this right is above or higher than other fundamental rights, or in general, that it has a particular place in a hierarchy of rights?

Numerous scholars offer interpretations of the hierarchy of rights, placing freedom of association at differing levels of importance. Noted by Tom Farer in “The Hierarchy of Human Rights”, human rights are non-negotiable, and thus are prioritized within the hierarchy. As to why certain rights remain at the top of the hierarchy, Farer answers “because all other rights are dependent on them.” Furthermore, Farer claims that a consensus among United States human rights organizations is that the rights to life, physical security, and due process are essential human rights. Excluding freedom of association from his selection of non-negotiable human rights, Farer undermines its importance within the hierarchy of rights. Thus, Farer emphasizes that the rights to life, physical security, and due process hold precedence over the right to free association.

Fernando Surez Muller argues that there is a select group of fundamental rights that are essential to the exercise of all other rights. With this, Muller emphasizes that certain rights must be prioritized in order for others to be functionally implemented. When analyzing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Muller interprets freedom of association to be a right of particular importance. Muller argues that the rights to communication and expression are impossible to exercise without the right of free association, claiming, “Related to this transcendental right to communication (cell 6) are also all mobility rights (mentioned in articles 13 to 15) because communication is not only a matter of expression but it is also a matter of transporting and receiving the message and this requires freedom of association.” Thus, from Muller’s perspective, freedom of association maintains a high position within the hierarchy of human rights.

Explained by Kimberley Brownlee and David Jenkins of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the right to associate often only pertains to certain associations. Because of this, different rights to different associations have varying ranks within the hierarchy of rights. Brownlee and Jenkins claim “However, since not all associations operate according to either implicit or explicit declarations of consent, exactly what counts as consent is a difficult thing to assess: How do we know when association is free? This problem is exacerbated by the hierarchical form that many associations take.” For this reason, Brownlee and Jenkins note that explicit associations, group identifications that are easy to identify and thus protect, are often prioritized within the hierarchy of rights.

What specific examples of hierarchies, manifestos, constitutions, or prioritized descriptions of rights cite this right’s high status? Low status? No status at all?

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights places freedom of association at a high position of value. The document asserts: “ Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; No one may be compelled to belong to an association.” While the document does not enumerate human rights in hierarchical order, the platform of the United Nations and the inclusion of the freedom of association within the document suffices the right’s universally accepted importance and position of high status.

Additionally, the inclusion of freedom of association within the European Convention on Human Rights emphasizes the value of the right. Asserting the importance of freedom of association, Article 11 claims, “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.” Stressing freedom of association to be an essential human right, the Convention echoes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, upholding the value of freedom of association.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms similarly elevates freedom of association to a high status. Within its fundamental freedoms section, the charter emphasizes “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: a. Freedom of conscience and religion; freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication; freedom of peaceful assembly; and freedom of association.” Explicitly stating that the freedom of association is one of the four fundamental freedoms, the Charter clearly asserts that freedom of association is essential to the liberty of individuals. Given the select group of fundamental freedoms, the placement of freedom of association within the list demonstrates its uplifted position within the greater hierarchy of human rights.

In the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the International Labour Organization additionally upholds the pertinence of freedom of association. Within the declaration, the ILO asserts four categories to be promoted by member states, including freedom of association. Similar to The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, by only including a select group of rights, the Declaration affirms the high status of these freedoms. Thus, the inclusion of freedom of association within the four categories asserts its importance

How does federalism change, if at all, the exercise or application of this right? What examples of this can one point to?

Differences in state and federal law contribute to varying levels of freedom of association across the United States. While Supreme Court cases such as Bates v. Little Rock, Shelton v. Tucker, Roberts vs. United States Jaycees, Boy Scouts of America vs. Dale, and Christian Legal Society vs. Martinez upheld the right to freedom of association, the right continues to be violated across states. Furthermore, despite its support from the Supreme Court, the system of federalism often leads to the restriction of freedom of association by local courts and authorities.

Particularly in South Florida, Lance Compa investigates how nursing home workers’ rights to free association have been violated. Furthermore, Compa explains how federalism exacerbates these violations. Noting the Palm Garden nursing home case, Copa discusses how nursing home workers were threatened with pay and benefit cuts if they decided to join unions. Additionally, Compa notes Palm Garden’s personnel manual, which states, “This is a non-union health center...if you are approached to join a union, we sincerely hope you will consider the individual freedoms you could give up, and the countless risks you could be taking.” After workers were in fact fired for joining unions, Compa notes, the NLRB asserted that Palm Garden must reinstate employees, as they had violated the workers’ right to free association. Still rejecting rehiring the employees, Compa explains that Palm Garden appealed to federal court, where the case still remains pending indefinitely. Furthermore, while the Supreme Court may uphold freedom of association, this does not mean the right can be strictly enforced throughout the United States, as appealing to federal courts demonstrates a significant challenge.

Additionally, Compa notes how freedom of association has been restricted for food processing workers. Specifically, Compa discusses the abuses faced by Smithfield workers in North Carolina, a state dominated by the food processing industry. Firing union activists and actively intimidating and discriminating against organizing workers, the Smithfield Plant violated its workers' freedom of association in numerous ways. Compa stresses that these abuses were ultimately the result of federalism, a system that contributes to the restriction of freedom of association. Compa states, “Instead of fulfilling the affirmative responsibility of government authorities to protect workers’ rights, state power was used to interfere with workers’ freedom of association in violation of international human rights norms.” Noting how local police were permitted to intimidate workers at the Smithfield Plant, Copa affirms how local authorities restrict freedom of association, countering federal law. This demonstrates how the division of state and federal power can weaken the strength of freedom of association, as local governments can discreetly work to limit the right.

Limitations / Restrictions

What are the typical exceptions or limitations placed on this right?

Restricting certain groupings and gatherings that are involved, or likely involved in crimes as was seen with the response to the formation of the Ku Klux Klan as a vigilante association, is a typical exception to the right of freedom of association (Australian Law Reform Commission 2016). In response to the crimes committed by the organization, Congress passed a Force Act in 1870 and the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871, which authorized the suppression of disturbances to the peace by force (Gruberg). This was in effort to stop terrorist organizations through heavy punishments, such as the suspension of habeas corpus under these acts. These acts were eventually found by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional and were repealed; however, although direct restrictions upon the group (who was behind the 1963 bombing of a black church in Alabama, numerous murders including that of three civil rights workers in 1964 Mississippi, and other criminal efforts to impose white supremacy on the masses and restrict the rights of African Americans) and its freedom of assembly and association have not been able to lawfully prevent such crimes in the name of violations of the freedom of association, modern civil rights laws and increased national surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation have indirectly impacted the KKK’s and other criminally-involved groups’ (such as terrorist groups like ISIL) freedoms of association and assembly. The First Amendment of the US Constitution grants the right to “peaceable assembly,” and any indication of unpeaceable assembly warrants government interference. When also the association infringes upon another group’s freedoms of association, endangers public safety and order, or does not benefit/or harms social need, as can be seen with the efforts of the KKK to restrict black Americans rights to vote and peaceably assemble, necessary limitations are placed upon the right.

In terms of certain limitations on peaceable assembly, the government has the right to limit this freedom based upon “time, place and manner” restrictions: “Time, place and manner restrictions are content-neutral limitations imposed by the government on expressive activity (O'Neill). These restrictions come in many forms including imposing limits on the noise level of speech, capping the number of protesters who may occupy a given forum, barring early-morning or late-evening demonstrations, and restricting the size or placement of signs on government property. ” These limits ultimately regard the facilitation of legitimate regulatory goals, such as preventing traffic congestion or preventing interference with nearby activities.

Religious rights often conflict with the right to free association. As observed in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, where a Christian student organization argued their First Amendment right to prohibit non-christians from their group, religious associations have used their rights to religious freedom to restrict certain individuals from associating with them. Though, as the Supreme Court ultimately ruled against the Christian Legal Society, rights to free association were ultimately upheld over contradicting religious rights.

A similar issued was observed in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group. Though, in this case, the Supreme Court asserted the right of groups to prohibit membership from individuals whose beliefs do not coincide with the group mission.Furthermore, Hurley exhibited how religious rights can counter rights to free association, as the decision emphasized that certain individuals could be blocked from associating with religious groups on the basis of their identity.

Rights to public safety additionally contradict rights to free association. This is often the argument made when prosecuting individuals associating with criminal and terrorist groups. For example in City of Chicago v. Morales, the Supreme Court upheld a Chicago law which criminalized public gang association, asserting that gang members had no constitutional rights to free association (Cole). Exhibited by the court’s decision, individuals are not constitutionally protected to align with criminal groups, as the public’s right to safety against such groups weighs against personal rights to association.

In regards to the right to free political association, parties hold a contradicting First Amendment right to limit party membership. Furthermore, while a candidate can identify as associating with a specific political party on a ballot, that party has the ability to disassociate from them (Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School). Through this, a candidate often cannot freely affiliate with the party they associate with, exhibiting a contradiction to the right to free association.

Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?

The freedom of association is derivative from the First Amendment which guarantees the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition (Hudson 2020). These freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition all form sub-categories of the freedom of association. Collectively, this right permits a group to act in the collective interest of its members and to maintain private associations and assemblies without government interference. The legal problems regarding its practice have only recently arisen- particularly from the loyalty investigations of the Communist Party membership and a series of other cases in the 1950s and 1960s in relation to the activities of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute 2020). For example, in 1958, with the case of the NAACP v. Alabama, the right to freedom of association was strengthened and supported by the Supreme Court who ruled in favor of the NAACP’s decision to withhold a list of members in the organization from the government (Hudson 2020). In response to Brown v. Board of Education 1954, Alabama authorities was closely investigating the NAACP under the foreign corporation law. The NAACP complied with the state’s request of its business records, including its charter and list of organizational officers and staff. They refused, however, to give lists of rank-and-file members due to confidentiality, potential economic reprisal attacks, and potential repression. Giving up the lists, civil rights activists said, would dissuade members and potential recruits from associating with the organization, ultimately violating their right of association.

Prior to this case the Court had supported a stronger suppression of the freedoms of association and assembly regarding organizations that were alleged to be involved in subversive and unlawful activities. In 1928’s New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman and 1951’s Dennis v. United States the Court had ruled in favor of government efforts to restrict and limit the rights of assembly and speech of both the KKK and the Communist Party (U.S. Supreme Court 1928, 1951). In this case, however, the Court said NAACP did not cause harm to government or society, and they had complied with the demands of the Alabama government sufficiently; therefore they were justified and protected by law in their decision to withhold membership lists.

Later, in the 1967 case of United States v. Robel in which Eugene Robel, an inactive member of the Communist Party, was charged with violating the Subversive Activities Control Act when he continued his work at the Todd Pacific Shipyards, a location that was deemed by the Secretary of Defense to be a defense facility (U.S. Supreme Court 2020). Under the Act, his actions was illegal due to his membership to the Communist Party and members of the Party’s legal inability to remain employed at a location deemed a “defense facility”. The Supreme Court ruled that the “defense facility” employment provision was an unconstitutional abridgment of the right of association regardless of its application solely to active Party members. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that the provision was overbroad while Justice William J. Brennan added that the designation of defense facilities being a power given to the Secretary of Defense was unconstitutional because the Act provided no meaningful standards for the Secretary to follow. This case was a milestone because, once tested, the Court upheld the broad freedoms of association and continued the prohibition of government interference and bias towards any individual based upon an affiliated association. Later cases regarding the Bar examine and admission to the bar further backed this right. In 1971’s Baird v. State Bar of Arizona and Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, the Supreme Court established that the government could only deny admission to the bar if an applicant’s membership in a group advocating overthrow of the government (such as the Communist Party) was legitimately coupled with the specific intent to achieve that end (U.S. Supreme Court 1971).

These cases established that organized groups in association that gather in efforts to advance political, economic, religious, or cultural matters may gather without government interference (and particularly without government knowledge of listed members) unless the group explicitly poses a threat to society or engages in criminal activity.

Under American jurisprudence, permissible exceptions to the freedom involve matters of internal affairs such as discrimination cases. In the 1976 case of Runyon v. McCrary, discrimination based upon race was established as a limitation to a body’s freedom of association after two children were denied access to certain private schools in Virginia as a result of the schools’ admitted segregationist school policies (U.S. Supreme Court 1976). Later, in the Roberts v. United States Jaycees court case of 1984, the court ruled that the Jaycees, an organization of young business leaders that only fully accepted male members and who claimed that the anti-discrimination laws that forced them to accept qualified women was a breach of their freedom of association, lacked “the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women,” ultimately prohibiting their exclusion of women (Bernstein 2020).

Also, if the state has a compelling interest, it can justifiably limit associations’ rights to organizational autonomy (Alexander 2008, 14). Here, the state would be setting limits and requirements for how a group is organizationally run and made up. By giving an organization a quota, the state forces a particular pattern of inclusion that is in the public interest. For example, the US government is permitted to work to create less segregated schools, involving programs like the Moving to Opportunity (MTO). It is permitted to do in efforts to promote certain patterns of inclusion and acceptance within communities and associations (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1992).

Under international human rights laws, what permissible exceptions (often called derogations) exist?

In Article 22 of the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the right to freedom of association is granted to all, including joining trade unions (United Nations 1966). Restrictions can only be placed on this right if the restrictions are prescribed by the state’s law and “are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Similarly, in Europe, derogations are permissible only when “prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” as is stated in Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (European Court of Human Rights 1953, 12). And Article 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights mirrors the decree of the ICCPR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1969).

Regarding the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and its adoption of Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, this body is in place to protect the labor interests of those around the world, and they are prohibited by international law to formulate and/or apply law so as to prejudice against any group (Swepston 1998, 172).

Have political theorists or philosophers discussed the permissibility of exceptions to this right?

Freedom of association is an essential facet of modern democracy, yet it is often overlooked in political discourse on the natural rights and liberties of the citizen. This could be due to the fact that freedom of association and assembly are often so closely related to freedoms of speech and expression, or it could be because it is so difficult for political theorists to decide which association should be allowed and which can be justifiably restricted. Whatever the case, the debate over exceptions to the right of free association continues to change and evolve even in the modern era.

John Locke is one of the earliest proponents of natural right theory; his second “Treatise on Government” famously outlines humankind’s three essential rights to life, liberty, and property (Locke, “Treatise on Government”). He does not specifically mention people’s freedom of association, but scholars point to his writings on religious assembly as an indication of his stance on the right. In a George Mason University publication, Eric Claeys refers to a passage from Locke’s “Letter Concerning Toleration,” which states that a church is simply a “free and voluntary society” (Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration”), saying that “if one reads the same passage from the Letter with an eye toward issues about associational freedom, Locke is making a far more radical point: All private societies, churches and otherwise, deserve a presumption of associational freedom” (Claeys, “The Private Society and the Liberal Public Good in John Locke’s Thought”). In light of Claeys’ assessment, it is easy to observe Locke’s thoughts on the freedom of association in the constitution that he wrote for the Carolina Colony in 1669. For example, Article 103 of this document states that “no person whatsoever shall speak anything in their religious assembly irreverently or seditiously of the government or governors, or of state matters” (Locke, “The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina: March 1, 1669”). This reveals a reluctance on Locke’s part to allow any association of citizens to gather in opposition of the established government, perhaps because he understands the potential threat that this could pose to political society. His position on the freedom of association is made all the more clear in his 108th Article, which stipulates that “assemblies, upon what presence soever of religion, not observing and performing the above said rules, shall not be esteemed as churches, but unlawful meetings, and be punished as other riots” (Locke, “The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina: March 1, 1669”). The “above said rules” to which Locke refers consist mostly of provisions to ensure free membership and movement between various religious establishments, but the classification of non compliant assemblies as “unlawful” or “riots” implies a Locke’s hesitation to allow totally free and unrestricted assembly.

Subsequent political theorists built upon Locke’s theory of rights and liberties, and a number of them elected to deal with the right to freedom of association more directly. The United States Constitution, much of which rests upon Lockean political theory, is one of the first documents to directly address freedom of assembly in its text. Perhaps the buildup to the American Revolution, in which groups like the Sons of Liberty and the Stamp Act Congress were outlawed and broken up by the British government, affected the Constitutional Convention’s decision to include assembly in the Bill of Rights. The Constitution’s First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances” (The Constitution of the United States of America). The Constitutional Convention, led by prominent statesman James Madison, used the word peaceably to signal that citizens were not entitled to the complete freedom of assembly if such activity could potentially generate violence or unrest (Law Library of Congress, “The Right to Peaceable Assembly”). The Cornell Law Review writes that this guarantee gradually came to protect citizens’ rights to participate in organizations that regularly utilize their members’ constitutional rights to freely assemble and petition the government. It states that over time, “Supreme Court decisions gradually determined that “the right of association is derivative from the First Amendment guarantees of speech, assembly, and petition” (Legal Information Institute, “Right of Association”). While Madison and his colleagues did not directly address freedom of association in the Constitution’s text, they did lay the groundwork for its realization years later.

French diplomat Alexis De Tocqueville traveled to the United States in the early 1800s in order to observe the country, and in 1835 he published his findings in his first volume of Democracy in America. In this work the Frenchman sung praise for the American system of government, applauding it for spreading liberty and freedom within its borders. However, even de Tocqueville understood the danger inherent in the guarantee of totally unrestrained freedom of association. Linking the freedom of association to such constitutional rights as the freedom of petition and freedom of the press, he writes that “it cannot be denied that the unrestrained liberty of association for political purposes is the privilege which a people is longest in learning how to exercise. If it does not throw the nation into anarchy, it perpetually augments the chances of that calamity” (De Tocqueville, Democracy in America). De Tocqueville goes on to explain that American association is generally peaceful because citizens tend only to use it to oppose political groups, but he nevertheless must address the danger inherent in the guarantee of unrestricted freedom of association. Even in what he sees as a most ideal form of government, the Frenchman recognizes the risks inherent in unrestricted freedom when it comes to assembly and association.

Decades later, John Stuart Mill came to a similar conclusion in his 1859 work, On Liberty. Mill was familiar with the American system of government, as evidenced by his mentions of American religious toleration and prohibition of “fermented” drinks, so it is possible that his thinking was influenced in some way by Madison’s work on the Constitution (Mill, “On Liberty”). In his work, Mill advances the theory that humans band together solely for the purpose of protection, and that therefore we can never have the authority to restrain others’ liberty. However, he notes that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (Mill, “On Liberty”). Later on, he explicitly asserts that “freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived” (Mill, “On Liberty”). Clearly, Mill is aware of the dangers implicit in the creation of total freedom of assembly, and he agrees with the Constitutional Convention that this important right can permissibly be subject to certain regulations and limitations.

The political and philosophical debate over freedom and association and its acceptable limitations evolved dramatically in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Writing just over a century after Mill, First Amendment scholar Thomas Emerson produced an article entitled “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,” in which he addresses a number of issues relating to freedom of association by assessing court precedents and the lessons of history. Like the documents from Mill and Madison, Emerson’s article holds that complete freedom of association would be detrimental to society. Using the example of an organization whose sole aim is to perpetrate a successful bank robbery, Emerson points out that “some types of association need, and are entitled to, greater protection than others” (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,”). He goes on to state that “the legal doctrine that protects associational rights must be able to distinguish between them and to afford the required measure of protection in each case” (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression”). Taking into account twentieth-century court decisions, Emerson explains that “the Supreme Court, in recognizing an independent "right of association," has undertaken to give that right constitutional protection primarily through application of a balancing test” (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression”).

This balancing test is incredibly important in determining the constitutionality of certain restrictions on citizens’ association because it must avoid violating citizens’ unequivocal right to free expression while still preventing the perpetration of unlawful action (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,”). The case of NAACP v. Alabama is one case in which the Supreme Court attempted to find this balance. This instance in which the NAACP argued that the state of Alabama could not constitutionally require the organization to disclose a list of its members, proved incredibly important to our modern understanding of the right to association. Writing the majority opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan II explained that “it is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (Franklin, “NAACP v. Alabama”). This differed from other contemporary cases, such as New York ex. rel Bryant v. Zimmerman, in which the Supreme Court had ruled in favor of the state’s ability to restrict association related to the Ku Klux Klan. The difference, Harlan explained, was that unlike the KKK, the NAACP did not present a threat to society. For this reason, the organization and the members involved were protected under the First Amendment’s protection of citizens’ freedom to peaceably assemble (Franklin, “NAACP v. Alabama”). Harlan, like Madison, Locke, and Mill, understood the importance of restricting free association in order to preserve the peace in society.

The right to free association is famously difficult to address because the general consensus is that association should not be completely free. For that reason, political theorists and philosophers have gone to great lengths over the centuries to define exactly when and why free association should be limited or left alone. The general consensus is that assembly and association are detrimental to society when they lead to violence or unrest, but as with other rights it is difficult for theorists to decide exactly what criteria turn a given gathering from an expression of free assembly into a potential threat to civil society.

Is this right at times curtailed by private actors?

Philosophers and political theorists generally agree that it is sometimes necessary to curtail free association, but this agreement does not answer questions of which forms assembly and association can permissibly be restricted, how they should be limited, or who should control their regulation. It often falls to the government to decide when to step in during times of popular uprising or violent protest, but history also shows a number of instances in which private actors have curtailed citizens’ right to free association or assembly.

The most common way for private actors can curtail free association is by prohibiting assembly and demonstration on their privately-owned property. In U.S. law, there exists a precedent that protects citizens’ right to free association on public property precisely because the right is not guaranteed when it is practiced on private property. This doctrine was first introduced in 1936, when Jersey City mayor Frank Hague issued an ordinance prohibiting members of the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) from gathering in a public space and distributing “communist” literature (Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,”). The CIO, with the help of the American Civil Liberties Union, successfully argued that the New Jersey ordinance was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Hague appealed to the Supreme Court, which upheld the original decision and struck the ordinance down (Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,”). Justice Owen Roberts justified the decision for Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization by likening public spaces such as streets and parks to public forums, in which the free flow of ideas and discourse must be protected under the First Amendment. He made this ruling because he recognized that private actors retained the right to curtail citizens’ right to association when that association occurred on private property. In order to preserve the right to peaceable assembly, the Court’s decision set the precedent for the “public forum” doctrine, which continues to protect the right to association in public spaces to this day (Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,”). Writing for The First Amendment Encyclopedia, David Hudson writes that “in the Court’s forum-based approach, the government can impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in all three categories of property, but has limited ability to impose content-based restrictions on traditional or designated public forums” (Hudson, “Public Forum Doctrine | The First Amendment Encyclopedia,”). The doctrine specifically aims to protect peaceful association on public property because the right is not guaranteed when assembly occurs on private property.

One example of a private actor using its ownership of property to curtail free association can be observed in the 1994 case of Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. In this case, the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida filed a suit against anti-abortion protestors who had been blocking entrances to the building, harrassing abortion patients, and demonstrating outside of staff members’ homes (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). A court order was issued, ordering protestors to refrain from trespassing on Center property, blocking its entrances, and abusing staff and patients. When the court order was violated, the “the court created a 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveways (including the public sidewalk) within which all antiabortion speech was banned. It also prohibited excessive noise and images that patients could see or hear during surgery and recovery” (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). The Supreme Court later upheld the buffer zone rules, but struck down the prohibition of protestors’ practice of showing images to clients. It also ruled that the Florida court’s 300-foot buffer zone that prohibited protestors from approaching clients and staff at the Center and at their homes was too restrictive of First Amendment rights (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). The ruling, according to Chief Justice Rhenquist, sought to preserve protestors’ right to association and assembly while still protecting the patients and clients from intimidation and abuse (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). It also serves as a reminder that private citizens still reserve the right to curtail free association if said association makes them feel unsafe or threatened.

Both the Madsen and Hague cases illustrate that judges, in particular, have immense power to determine the breadth of citizens’ right to freedom of association as guaranteed in the First Amendment. For example, in the case of Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court determined that free expression in the form of a rock concert in New York’s Central Park could be subject to volume regulations under the First Amendment (O'Neill, “Time, Place and Manner Restrictions”). This decision, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, led to the creation of a test to determine whether assembly and expression could be restricted. The test asks whether the regulation is “content neutral,” whether it is “narrowly tailored” to fit a specific governmental interest, and whether it still provides ample opportunity for the message to be communicated (O'Neill, “Time, Place and Manner Restrictions”). If a regulation passes all three prongs of this test, then it can legally restrict or control the time, place, or manner in which assemblies like protests are carried out. The Law Library of Congress writes that since Kennedy’s decision, “the Supreme Court has held that it is constitutionally permissible for the government to require that a permit for an assembly be obtained in advance” (“Right to Peaceful Assembly: United States | Law Library of Congress”). Kennedy’s ruling also allows the government to “make special regulations that impose additional requirements for assemblies that take place near major public events” (“Right to Peaceful Assembly: United States | Law Library of Congress”). This legal doctrine has significantly shaped the way in which state and federal governments treat freedom of association and the right to peaceable assembly. While the Supreme Court can hardly be considered a private actor, Justices like Kennedy rely on personal study and private experience to create policy that affects American freedom of association as a whole.

Citizens within a political society have the right to free association as long as it is peaceable and does not infringe upon others’ rights or liberties. This principle lends itself to a number of complexities because its parameters for free association are so vague, but over the past few centuries the United States has worked to define when and how private actors can curtail others’ right to free association. The result is that the Supreme Court, and the justices that make it up, have set out precedents that test whether certain forms of association are constitutional and which ones can justifiably be restricted. The definition of public spaces as areas of free association and creation of buffer zones for private properties represent significant steps forward in this effort.

Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question?

The right to freedom of association is not an absolute right because it is subject to certain limitations. Political thinkers and legal experts generally agree that assembly and association can be justifiably restricted if it conflicts with other citizens’ security, liberty, or property. Another case in which the right is subject to certain limitations is in a case of emergency or long-run disaster. Recent history shows a number of instances in which the U.S. government has justified the restriction of the right to free association during times of war and natural disaster. Interestingly, it did not effectively curtail citizens’ right to free association during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.

Freedom of association most often restricted in the event of war. In his work, “The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly,” Washington University scholar John D. Inazu briefly explores the effect that World War I had on citizens’ right to gather and discuss the country’s affairs. He writes that during the late World War I years, “the freedom of assembly was constrained by shortsighted legislation like the Espionage Act of 1917 (and its 1918 amendments) and the Immigration Act of 1918, and the Justice Department’s infamous Palmer Raids in 1920” (Inazu, “The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly”). William Riggs of the First Amendment Encyclopedia similarly notes that the Vietnam War era, in particular, saw drastic reductions in Americans’ rights to peaceable assembly and association. He writes that “the war in Vietnam quickly became the focus of major protests that resulted in increased government attempts to limit First Amendment protections. These efforts mostly dealt with the right to assemble and what constituted appropriate free speech criticism of the war” (“Vietnam War | The First Amendment Encyclopedia,”). The U.S. government broadly justified these restrictions by arguing that they were made in the interest of national security, claiming wartime as an acceptable time for the limitation of free association.

Recently, the United States government has also walked back citizens’ right to freedom of association when dealing with natural disasters. A 2020 Congressional report on First Amendment rights during the COVID-19 pandemic notes that when public health and safety are at risk, the government is justified in its restriction of certain freedoms to widely assemble as long as these regulations aim to protect citizens’ essential rights, such as those to life or property. It notes that the government is justified in restricting freedoms of association at certain times of the day, as long as this action is taken with the explicit purpose of protecting citizens from further harms. “For example,” it says, “in upholding a county curfew following Hurricane Andrew, the Eleventh Circuit asked only whether the government (1) took that action in “good faith,” (2) with ‘some factual basis’ that the restrictions were ‘necessary to maintain order’” (Killion, CRS Report, “U.S. Library of Congress”). The report argues that “curfews, increased “police powers,” and other measures that are considered “essential to the public safety [and] health” all constitute acceptable restrictions of First Amendment rights-such as the right to freedom of peaceable assembly- during times of natural crisis (Killion, CRS Report, “U.S. Library of Congress”).

The recent COVID-19 crisis created another instance in which citizens’ right to freedom of association was called into question. The pandemic caused widespread and dramatic change within global society as the country entered a state of total lockdown, and in the process it raised a number of legal, moral, and philosophical questions about association and assembly. In June 2020, for example, plaintiffs Ron Givens and Christine Bish filed a lawsuit against California State officials after being denied permission to hold a protest outside the California State Capitol building. The assembly, which aimed to protest the state’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, was not allowed to take place because of the potential health risks it would create. In response to this denial, the Department of Justice filed a Friend-of-the-Court brief which argued that California’s de facto ban on public demonstrations directly conflicts with First Amendment guarantees and should therefore be struck down (“Department of Justice Files Friend-of-the-Court Brief in Support of Free Speech Challenge to California's COVID-19 Ban on In-Person Political Protests,”). The debate over pandemic restrictions and First Amendment rights became even more heated as the Black Lives Matter Movement sparked major demonstrations in major cities all over the country as citizens gathered to protest police actions in the murder of George Floyd. An MSN report on the protests in Boston notes that “Black Lives Matter Boston and Violence in Boston, two activist organizations who are expected to hold a protest in the city Tuesday evening, urged anyone who is at high risk due to COVID-19 to stay home. Organizers also asked participants to wear gloves and masks and bring hand sanitizer” (“Protesting amid the coronavirus crisis: Massachusetts officials say they respect demonstrators' 1st Amendment rights, urge them to take health precautions though,”). The DOJ’s Friend-of-the-Court brief, in addition to reports on the Boston protests, indicate that the U.S. government has largely decided to allow citizens to exercise the right to free association and assembly, despite the potential danger it could pose.

The right to freedom of association is subject to a number of limitations. Periods of war, natural disaster, and global pandemic all create conditions in which the United States has considered placing restrictions on the right to peaceable assembly. In the two former cases, it has generally been able to regulate its citizens’ exercise of their right to freely associate with one another. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that while the government may seek to limit its citizens’ assembly, it is not always able to enforce its regulations.

COVID-19 has demonstrated that freedom of association may be limited due to disease. The virus has prompted governments to limit the size of many types of gatherings, which tends to limit freedom of association. Certain associations, such as organized sports teams and churches, have their operations heavily restricted. Still, these restrictions do not limit one’s ability to associate with certain groups of people - just where and how these groups meet. The French government, for example, enacted a “State of Sanitary Emergency” to fight the virus, and the text of the legislation gives the government the power to “decide, by decree, and upon the recommendation of the minister of health, general measures limiting the freedom to go and come, the freedom to enterprise and the freedom to congregate as well as allowing him to proceed with requisitions of any goods and services necessary to fight against the sanitary disaster” (Momtaz 2020). Like in the US, freedom of association is not explicitly granted in the Constitution, but its Constitutional Council interpreted it as existing.

Curfews are also often instituted in response to disaster and unrest. For example, the mayor of New Orleans instituted a curfew following Hurricane Katrina (Rushton 2015). Various US cities enacted curfews in response to recent riots/looting (11 PM in Washington, DC in early June, for example). During times of conflict, governments may seek to limit associations that benefit the enemy. In 1954, Congress outlawed the Communist Party, charging that it was an instrument of a hostile foreign power. It has never been enforced (Auerbach 2020). The President of the US has the authority to declare martial law, though only under specific circumstances: during foreign invasion or civil war and when civilian courts can no longer operate (Feldman 2005, 1036). The latter restriction was cemented in ​Ex Parte Milligan (​ 1864), where the Supreme Court struck down the conviction of a confederate sympathizer by a military tribunal (Feldman 1033). Though there are no explicit rules regarding freedom of association, federal regulations grant broad power to military authorities to restrict civil liberties where it is necessary for civil order (Feldman 1037-8). In ​Milligan,​ the court wrote that martial law “destroys every guarantee of the Constitution and effectively renders the military independent of and superior to the civil power” (Feldman 1037-8). Several cases have tested the ability of governors to impose state-level martial law. In Moyer v. Peabody (​ 1909), a case arose when the governor of Colorado imposed martial law to quell a labor dispute. The court held that, “When it comes to a decision by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment.” The court later elaborated that state declarations of martial law should be subject to a proportionality test - the remedy must directly relate to the problem it addresses (Feldman 1034). In ​Duncan v Kahanamoku ​(1946), the use of military tribunals in Hawaii after the attack on Pearl Harbour was invalidated. The Supreme Court held that under the Hawaiian Organic Act (this act gave the state the authority to institute martial law) the use of such tribunals is only allowed during a period of actual war. The court did, however, leave the possibility open that such action was constitutional (Feldman 1034-5). France provides another good example of emergency power - it has Constitutional provisions providing for states of emergency and states of siege. Though precise statutory and constitutional justifications for restrictions have evolved over time (France has repeatedly replaced its constitution), it has long used emergencies to justify restrictions on freedom of association. During World War I, France prohibited protests and marches, and ordered the closure of gathering places such as bars and restaurants. France has instituted similar restrictions in response to later emergencies, such as a 1955 uprising in Algeria (Feldman 1031).

Momtaz: https://www.politico.eu/article/french-government-declares-state-of-sanitary-emergency/

Rushton: https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/08/24/timeline-hurricane-katrina-and-afterma th/32003013/

Association in France: https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/global-languages/21g-053-understanding-contemporary-french-politi cs-spring-2014/readings/MIT21G_053S14_Constitu.pdf

Communist Control Act: https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/congress-passes-communist-control-act​

Auerbach: https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/communist -control-act-1954

Feldman: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1666&co ntext=cilj