Freedom of Expression/Limitations - Restrictions/Specific limitations: Difference between revisions

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|questionHeading=Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question?
|questionHeading=Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question?
|pageLevel=Question
|pageLevel=Question
|contents=Freedom of expression can be limited in times of crisis, most notably in wartime. This was first enacted in the late [[Probable year:: 1790]]s , with the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Sedition Act most markedly affected freedom of expression and freedom of the press by making it illegal to speak against the government or president ("Alien and Sedition Acts"). These limitations were consistently applied in times of war until World War I, when its legality was cemented by the Supreme Court with Schenck vs. United States (Emerson [[Probable year:: 1968]]) . In Schenck v. US, the Court ruled that the standards for regulation of freedom of speech were lower in wartime ("Schenck v. United States"). It also established, for the first time, the "clear and present danger" test, clarifying that "the First Amendment does not protect speech that approaches creating a clear and present danger of a significant evil that Congress has power to prevent ("Schenck v. United States"). During the Vietnam War, freedom of expression was upheld in New York Times v. United States by saying freedom of the press was "was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government" (Hudson).
|contents=Freedom of expression can be limited in times of crisis, most notably in wartime. This was first enacted in the late 1790s, with the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Sedition Act most markedly affected freedom of expression and freedom of the press by making it illegal to speak against the government or president ("Alien and Sedition Acts"). These limitations were consistently applied in times of war until World War I, when its legality was cemented by the Supreme Court with Schenck vs. United States (Emerson 1968). In Schenck v. US, the Court ruled that the standards for regulation of freedom of speech were lower in wartime ("Schenck v. United States"). It also established, for the first time, the "clear and present danger" test, clarifying that "the First Amendment does not protect speech that approaches creating a clear and present danger of a significant evil that Congress has power to prevent ("Schenck v. United States"). During the Vietnam War, freedom of expression was upheld in New York Times v. United States by saying freedom of the press was "was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government" (Hudson). In states of emergency, such as the national one declared at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the president is granted special troubles that include infringements on freedom of the press/expression. One such power is the ability to shut down radio stations during a time of "public peril." This ability is cemented in section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934 (Rottman 2020). Since the law was passed in 1934, it did not include other forms of news publication, such as websites and TV news stations. There is a fear, however, that the government could broaden the law to include these types of news dissemination (Rottman 2020). In the COVID-19 pandemic, states and counties have declared media companies as essential services, thus exempting them from quarantine and shelter-in-place limitations (Rottman 2020).
In states of emergency, such as the national one declared at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the president is granted special troubles that include infringements on freedom of the press/expression. One such power is the ability to shut down radio stations during a time of "public peril." This ability is cemented in section 706 of the Communications Act of [[Probable year:: 1934]]  (Rottman [[Probable year:: 2020]]) . Since the law was passed in [[Probable year:: 1934]], it did not include other forms of news publication, such as websites and TV news stations. There is a fear, however, that the government could broaden the law to include these types of news dissemination (Rottman [[Probable year:: 2020]]) . In the COVID-19 pandemic, states and counties have declared media companies as essential services, thus exempting them from quarantine and shelter-in-place limitations (Rottman [[Probable year:: 2020]]) .
War may justify limitations on expression. This has long been true in the US; as Justice Holmes wrote in Schenck v. US (1919), a case over anti-draft publications, “when a nation is at war, many things that might be said in times of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.” During the Civil War, President Lincoln prohibited the publishing of information of troop movements, and government officials censored newspapers critical of the Union. During WWI, the US passed legislation such as the Sedition Act, which sought to eliminate speech “urging any curtailment of the war with intent to hinder its prosecution.” The Supreme Court has at times limited the wartime justification for restrictions. This occurred in New York Times v. US (1971), where the government was not allowed to censor publication of the Pentagon Papers, which contained information about the Vietnam War (Hudson). Contemporary jurisprudence would likely not justify some restrictions that have been allowed in the past. Schenck was decided using the clear and present danger test, which has been superseded by the more stringent imminent lawless action test (Parker). Had the newer test been used, Schenck may have been decided differently; the dissent argued that speech should be restricted only when it “imminently threaten[s] immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purpose of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country” (Parker). The COVID-19 pandemic has caused press crackdowns in various countries, often to downplay the outbreak’s severity. Egypt and Iran, for example have systematically curtailed reporting on the epidemic (Egypt guarantees freedom of expression in its Constitution, though this has long not been the case in practice (“Egypt). Iran guarantees free press subject to derogation in the national interest or under “Islamic criteria”). Honduras went so far as to suspend the clause in its constitution guaranteeing free speech. South Africa has curtailed free speech, albeit not to promote a rosy view of the pandemic. Rather, it has criminalized misinformation (Simon 2020). Responses to the pandemic provide insight into potential restrictions during other disasters. If a large part of Egypt or Iran were leveled by an earthquake, their governments might restrict free speech to ensure that only positive information about the recovery effort surfaces. Similarly, the South Africans who support criminalizing pandemic misinformation may also support criminalizing hurricane-safety misinformation if such a storm barrelled toward South Africa (putting aside whether this is meteorologically possible). As is argued in a report by the organization Article 19, free expression may be of even greater importance than normal during an emergency. Citizens need complete access to the truth so that they can make decisions about their safety (6). Free expression is an excellent way to ensure this truth comes out.
References:


War may justify limitations on expression. This has long been true in the US; as Justice Holmes wrote in ​Schenck v. US ​([[Probable year:: 1919]]) , a case over anti-draft publications, “when a nation is at war, many things that might be said in times of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.” During the Civil War, President Lincoln prohibited the publishing of information of troop movements, and government officials censored newspapers critical of the Union. During WWI, the US passed legislation such as the Sedition Act, which sought to eliminate speech “urging any curtailment of the war with intent to hinder its prosecution.”
Hudson: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1597/free-speech-during-wartime#:~:text=Freedo
The Supreme Court has at times limited the wartime justification for restrictions. This occurred in ​New York Times v. US ​([[Probable year:: 1971]]) , where the government was not allowed to censor publication of the Pentagon Papers, which contained information about the Vietnam War (Hudson). Contemporary jurisprudence would likely not justify some restrictions that have been allowed in the past. ​Schenck​ was decided using the clear and present danger test, which has been superseded by the more stringent imminent lawless action test (Parker). Had the newer test been used, ​Schenck ​may have been decided differently; the dissent argued that speech should be restricted only when it “imminently threaten[s] immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purpose of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country” (Parker).
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused press crackdowns in various countries, often to downplay the outbreak’s severity. Egypt and Iran, for example have systematically curtailed reporting on the epidemic (Egypt guarantees freedom of expression in its Constitution, though this has long not been the case in practice (“Egypt). Iran guarantees free press subject to derogation in the national interest or under “Islamic criteria”). Honduras went so far as to suspend the clause in its constitution guaranteeing free speech. South Africa has curtailed free speech, albeit not to promote a rosy view of the pandemic. Rather, it has criminalized misinformation (Simon [[Probable year:: 2020]]) . Responses to the pandemic provide insight into potential restrictions during other disasters. If a large part of Egypt or Iran were leveled by an earthquake, their governments might restrict free speech to ensure that only positive information about the recovery effort surfaces. Similarly, the South Africans who support criminalizing pandemic misinformation may also support criminalizing hurricane-safety misinformation if such a storm barrelled toward South Africa (putting aside whether this is meteorologically possible).
As is argued in a report by the organization Article 19, free expression may be of even greater importance than normal during an emergency. Citizens need complete access to the truth so that they can make decisions about their safety (6). Free expression is an excellent way to ensure this truth comes out.


Hudson: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/[[Probable year:: 1597]]/ free-speech-during-wartime#:~:text=Freedo
Parker: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/898/clear-and-present-danger-test m%20of%20speech%20often%20suffers,backseat%20to%20security%20and%20order.&text=In %20other%20words%2C%20the%20Supreme,than%20in%20times%20of%20peace.
Simon: https://www.cjr.org/analysis/coronavirus-press-freedom-crackdown.php
Egyptian Constitution: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf
“Egypt”: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/egypt-unprecedented-crackdown-on-freedom-o f-expression-under-alsisi-turns-egypt-into-openair-prison/


Parker: ​https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/898/clear-and-present-danger-test m%20of%20speech%20often%20suffers,backseat%20to%20security%20and%20order.&text=In %20other%20words%2C%20the%20Supreme,than%20in%20times%20of%20peace.
Iranian Constitution: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ir/ir001en.pdf
 
Simon: ​https://www.cjr.org/analysis/coronavirus-press-freedom-crackdown.php
 
Egyptian Constitution: ​https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_[[Probable year:: 2014]]. pdf
 
“Egypt”: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/[[Probable year:: 2018]]/ 09/egypt-unprecedented-crackdown-on-freedom-o f-expression-under-alsisi-turns-egypt-into-openair-prison/
 
Iranian Constitution: ​https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ir/ir001en.pdf


Article 19 Report: https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/freedom-of-information-humanitarian-disa sters.pdf
Article 19 Report: https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/freedom-of-information-humanitarian-disa sters.pdf
}}
}}

Revision as of 12:27, 6 February 2023

Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question?

Freedom of expression can be limited in times of crisis, most notably in wartime. This was first enacted in the late 1790s, with the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Sedition Act most markedly affected freedom of expression and freedom of the press by making it illegal to speak against the government or president ("Alien and Sedition Acts"). These limitations were consistently applied in times of war until World War I, when its legality was cemented by the Supreme Court with Schenck vs. United States (Emerson 1968). In Schenck v. US, the Court ruled that the standards for regulation of freedom of speech were lower in wartime ("Schenck v. United States"). It also established, for the first time, the "clear and present danger" test, clarifying that "the First Amendment does not protect speech that approaches creating a clear and present danger of a significant evil that Congress has power to prevent ("Schenck v. United States"). During the Vietnam War, freedom of expression was upheld in New York Times v. United States by saying freedom of the press was "was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government" (Hudson). In states of emergency, such as the national one declared at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the president is granted special troubles that include infringements on freedom of the press/expression. One such power is the ability to shut down radio stations during a time of "public peril." This ability is cemented in section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934 (Rottman 2020). Since the law was passed in 1934, it did not include other forms of news publication, such as websites and TV news stations. There is a fear, however, that the government could broaden the law to include these types of news dissemination (Rottman 2020). In the COVID-19 pandemic, states and counties have declared media companies as essential services, thus exempting them from quarantine and shelter-in-place limitations (Rottman 2020). War may justify limitations on expression. This has long been true in the US; as Justice Holmes wrote in Schenck v. US (1919), a case over anti-draft publications, “when a nation is at war, many things that might be said in times of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.” During the Civil War, President Lincoln prohibited the publishing of information of troop movements, and government officials censored newspapers critical of the Union. During WWI, the US passed legislation such as the Sedition Act, which sought to eliminate speech “urging any curtailment of the war with intent to hinder its prosecution.” The Supreme Court has at times limited the wartime justification for restrictions. This occurred in New York Times v. US (1971), where the government was not allowed to censor publication of the Pentagon Papers, which contained information about the Vietnam War (Hudson). Contemporary jurisprudence would likely not justify some restrictions that have been allowed in the past. Schenck was decided using the clear and present danger test, which has been superseded by the more stringent imminent lawless action test (Parker). Had the newer test been used, Schenck may have been decided differently; the dissent argued that speech should be restricted only when it “imminently threaten[s] immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purpose of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country” (Parker). The COVID-19 pandemic has caused press crackdowns in various countries, often to downplay the outbreak’s severity. Egypt and Iran, for example have systematically curtailed reporting on the epidemic (Egypt guarantees freedom of expression in its Constitution, though this has long not been the case in practice (“Egypt). Iran guarantees free press subject to derogation in the national interest or under “Islamic criteria”). Honduras went so far as to suspend the clause in its constitution guaranteeing free speech. South Africa has curtailed free speech, albeit not to promote a rosy view of the pandemic. Rather, it has criminalized misinformation (Simon 2020). Responses to the pandemic provide insight into potential restrictions during other disasters. If a large part of Egypt or Iran were leveled by an earthquake, their governments might restrict free speech to ensure that only positive information about the recovery effort surfaces. Similarly, the South Africans who support criminalizing pandemic misinformation may also support criminalizing hurricane-safety misinformation if such a storm barrelled toward South Africa (putting aside whether this is meteorologically possible). As is argued in a report by the organization Article 19, free expression may be of even greater importance than normal during an emergency. Citizens need complete access to the truth so that they can make decisions about their safety (6). Free expression is an excellent way to ensure this truth comes out. References:

Hudson: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1597/free-speech-during-wartime#:~:text=Freedo

Parker: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/898/clear-and-present-danger-test m%20of%20speech%20often%20suffers,backseat%20to%20security%20and%20order.&text=In %20other%20words%2C%20the%20Supreme,than%20in%20times%20of%20peace. Simon: https://www.cjr.org/analysis/coronavirus-press-freedom-crackdown.php Egyptian Constitution: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf “Egypt”: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/egypt-unprecedented-crackdown-on-freedom-o f-expression-under-alsisi-turns-egypt-into-openair-prison/

Iranian Constitution: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ir/ir001en.pdf

Article 19 Report: https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/freedom-of-information-humanitarian-disa sters.pdf