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|contents=Kantianism influences conceptualizations about freedom of religion through an emphasis on the fundamental principle of autonomy in fostering religious liberty. Although he is often regarded as a secular philosopher and did not dedicate entire treatises explicitly about freedom of religion like many other Enlightenment philosophers such as Voltaire or Locke, his philosophical theories address the roots of inalienable rights. In particular, his 1793 Theory and Practice and his 1792 Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone provide insight into his thoughts on freedom of religion. Examining his notions of autonomy, the role of rationality in religious belief, and the function of the state in ensuring individual rights offers deeper understanding of the moral significance of freedom.  
|contents=The right to free expression is a notion central to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. In his eyes, the unrestricted, public articulation of one's ideas is of vital importance: it is a prerequisite for humanity to realize its social and political ends. At the outset, we must be careful not to assume that Kant shares in our modern, liberal conception of this right. We must also refrain from implying a unified interpretation of this freedom among nations where it is constitutionally codified. This would be empirically false: the form and scope of free expression varies widely across liberal democracies. However, a general account might be gleaned by examining the definitions given by well-established international human rights organizations. Article 19 of the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers" (UDHR, 1946). Generally put, freedom of expression is the right to publicly voice one's opinions, especially critical ones, without state interference. There are several exceptions to this principle, including public expression that incites violence, threatens national security, promotes indecency, is libelous, or constitutes hate speech. These restrictions arise from a practical tension between the necessity of free expression and the dangers it poses to society and the state. Kant's view on freedom of expression is no exception. His arguments balance the rational need for guaranteed free expression with our duty to respect the will of civil authorities.


Kant’s principle focus on the concept of autonomy underscores his belief in the right to religious liberty and morality. To Kant, freedom is the basis of all actions. Thus, freedom of religion should inherently be granted to everyone – morally and legally –  as religion is an assertion of moral agency. Which religious tradition is practiced is not as important as the level of choice one has in practicing it. Therefore, “It is freedom that sanctions religion, not religion that sanctions freedom” and “when a clash between freedom and religion takes place, it is religion that has to step aside” (Klein 2018, 37). Individual liberty in choosing or not choosing a religion is more important than allowing for religion to be practiced in a society. In his 1793 essay Theory and Practice Kant explains, “No-one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others, for each may seek his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to pursue a similar end which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else within a workable general law – i.e. he must accord to others the same right as he enjoys himself” (Kant 1793). It can be interpreted from this statement that religion is an individual choice that can develop one’s greater morality and happiness, and therefore is an autonomous decision so long as it does not impose on others. As a secular philosopher, Kant did not speculate much about beliefs within religious traditions, but he did talk about the development of good and evil. He stated, “Man himself must make or have made himself into whatever, in a moral sense, whether good or evil, he is or is to become. Either condition must be an effect of his free choice; for otherwise he could not be held responsible for it and could therefore be morally neither good nor evil” (Kant 1793). No higher power defines one’s sense of self nor one’s ability to express this morality; this is an agentic stance on the responsibility that accompanies freedom.  
Kant's treatment of the freedom of expression is inextricably linked to the project of the European Enlightenment. In his essay "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?," Kant describes the titular epoch, defining it by its motto of "Sapere Aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding” (Kant 1784, 1). The era of Enlightenment constituted an awakening from Europe’s long-held state of "immaturity," in which institutional dogmatism monopolized public thought (Kant 1784, 1). Individuals had historically put their faith in public institutions and authorities, whether political, religious, medical, academic, or otherwise, to shape their beliefs and way of life (Kant 1784, 1). Enlightenment was the end of such dependency; it was the process of learning to use one's own reason or to think for oneself. To Kant, this promulgation of critical thinking was necessary for humanity's social and political progress; without it, humankind threatened to become ideologically stagnant.
Kant claims that the sole condition for this awakening is the freedom of expression. In his own words: "nothing is required for this enlightenment, however, except freedom; and the freedom in question is the least harmful of all, namely, the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters" (Kant 1784, 2). Overcoming blind dogmatism demanded that people voice their ideas without legal restriction (Kant 1784, 2). Without this protection, the light of reason could neither spread nor become practically meaningful, as critical thinking only benefits society if it can be publicly communicated. This view constitutes Kant's general conception of freedom of expression, the right to express one's opinion publicly.
   
However, Kant distinguishes two forms of expression to address the tension between public criticism and civil obedience. Kant is a staunch defender of public reason, but he defines this concept narrowly. Public reason is the "use that anyone as a scholar makes of reason before the entire literate world" (Kant 1784, 2). This contrasts with the "private use of reason," by which Kant means acts of intellectual dissent within a civic bureaucracy, a form of expression he forbids (Kant 1784, 2). For instance, police officers are obligated to enforce laws even if they agree with them, with the only alternative being resignation (Kant 1784, 3). They may criticize the legal system outside their post but must faithfully perform their roles when 'on the job.' Kant argues that for civic institutions to effectively achieve their intended ends (i.e., to preserve the commonwealth, protect rights, and promote collective happiness in accordance with personal freedom), they must not be obstructed by those appointed to operate them (Kant 1784, 3). Qua citizen, critique is healthy and necessary, but qua official, censure both practically obstructs and formally contradicts the very notion of a political appointment (Kant 1784, 3). We see here that freedom of expression has an inherent potential for conflict with public authority, one which Kant hopes to solve by differentiating public and private reason.
       
Kant takes this concern further by describing the ideal relationship of the sovereign to free expression. To him, a good ruler neither represses discourse nor caves to public opposition. Instead, they follow the policy: "argue as much as you like, but obey!" (Kant 1784, 2). Public reason allows citizens to voice criticisms of a regime, which is essential for a monarch to bring his rule in line with civil freedom and the public good (Kant 1784, 2). However, this does not justify recalcitrant resistance to the government. In his essay “Theory and Practice,” Kant argues that subjects should only exercise the "freedom of the pen… within the limits of esteem and love for the constitution," meaning their criticisms should proceed with respect for both the public good and the sovereign's authority in mind (Kant 1793, 302). In-kind, a ruler must listen to the voice of his subjects but never cede his own interpretation of justice to theirs (unless their appeals convince him) (Kant 1793, 302). The sovereign is a trustee and not a delegate of the people. Even when he errs, obstruction and rebellion are never justified, only the exercise of public reason.
     
The degree of overlap between Kantian and contemporary conceptions of freedom of expression is difficult to parse. Because Kant never specifically treats freedom of expression vis-a-vis speech, the press, peaceful assembly, petition, and association, we need to extrapolate from his larger argument to infer his views on the matter. Because he expresses no specific restrictions on the mode of expression, freedom of speech, peaceful assembly, press, association, and petition appear permissible as long as they are peaceful and lawful. But other forms of expression less universally accepted as a right, such as conscientious objection, are a more complicated matter. As we have seen, Kant suggests that if a civic worker's duties conflict with his ethical obligations, he must resign. But in the case of conscription, there is no such option: one serves or faces the penalty, creating a conflict between one's political and ethical obligations. Moreover, Kant does not directly discuss the typical restrictions of 'public reason,' when it constitutes a danger to individual safety or national security. Because our modern understanding of these rights is the product of two centuries of evolving political thought, it may be useless to judge precisely what Kant would say of them. But regardless, there is still something to be gained in this comparison. By examining Kant's discussion of "public reason," we can clarify the foundational motivations and conflicts that inform debates surrounding this freedom today: the right to free expression is essential for societal flourishing, yet this must be balanced with the social and political consequences it presents in its extreme forms.


Kant utilized rational thought to understand humanity and therefore analyzed religion within a logical framework. His 1792 work Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone examined how religion would fit within his world of ethics (MacKinnon 1975, 132). His disinterest in learning about religion alone is elaborated on: “It is not that he regarded the questions on which devoutly religious men and women differed from one another as trivial or even as impossible of settlement. It is rather that he supposed the moral outrage committed by any attempt to impose one set of beliefs against another as more evident than any of the competing systems” (MacKinnon 1975, 134). Again, he believed moral principles like autonomy were more influential in moral agency than religious beliefs themselves. Logically then, he concluded that “if any form of religion is to be acknowledged valid, it can only be one that does not dispute this sovereignty” (Mackinnon 1975, 134). Holding sovereignty over one’s choices is more critical to a society than the sovereignty and validity of religious traditions.
References:


In terms of the role of the State in enshrining the right to freedom of religion, Kant believed in the infrastructure of laws to grant autonomy. Religious liberty could be treated as a political concept, as it can be regarded as “an immediate consequence of every human’s innate right to freedom, which is both the objective but also the limit of all state power” (Guyer 2020, 276). Kant was both a liberal and a republican, creating a duality in how he views protection of freedom. Based on the former stance, scholars have presumed he thought that freedom of religion is an inalienable right; based on the latter stance, he could have understood that this right must be actively and institutionally protected through law (Klein 2018, 37). The one condition that Kant speculated about was the imposition of religion on others. He concluded that freedom of religion is not equally granted to those who “fail to grant the same moral rights to others” (Klein 2018, 37). If a group fails to respect another religion and imposes discriminatory laws against them, that group should no longer be afforded the freedom to practice their religion either. Freedom of religion is contingent upon everyone respecting the moral value of this right. There is a fine line, however, between state protection and state imposition. The acceptance of religious pluralism is crucial to maintaining everyone’s agency. Political leaders do not have the right to impose or favor a certain religion. As a general principle, “whatever a people cannot impose upon itself cannot be imposed upon it by the legislator either” (Kant 1793).  
Kant, I., & Wood, A. (1996). On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice (1793). In M. Gregor (Ed.), Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. 273-310). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511813306.011


Kant’s thoughts on religious intolerance stems from the morality of practicing a faith. Scholars posit three criteria for fostering religious tolerance; non-coercive force of religious beliefs, truthfulness about the practices, and the capacity to be a public religion (Klein 2018, 25). Non-coercive force of religious belief surrounds Kant’s idea that religion must be theoretically and morally separate from force; truthfulness regarding matters of faith involves providing freedom to ourselves and to others by not lying to them about faith so they may make autonomous, informed decisions; publicity of the religion relates to the capacity for people to legally exist and to foster public education in order to expand institutionally. Meeting these conditions promotes freedom of religion in the public sphere, simultaneously encouraging religion to be free from government interference while also being protected in a legal framework. If a group becomes intolerant of other religions or attempts to impose its own beliefs on others, it may not be granted the same freedoms (Klein 2018). Tolerance must precede freedom of religion.  
Kant, I., & Wood, A. (1996). An answer to the question: What is enlightenment? (1784). In M. Gregor (Ed.), Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. 11-22). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511813306.005


Overall, Kant’s philosophy provides a robust framework for understanding freedom of religion through the lenses of autonomy, rationality, and moral law. His arguments for the enshrinement of freedom of religion surround debates over morality and agency. By protecting the right to exercise religion and promoting religious tolerance, Kant supports a pluralistic society that is governed by rationality and harmonious respect.
United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
 
 
 
 
References
 
Guyer, P. “Freedom of Religion in Mendelssohn and Kant” in Reason and Experience in Mendlessohn and Kant. Oxford Academic (2020): 276-301. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198850335.003.0011.
 
Kant, I. Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. 1792. https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/kant/religion/religion-within-reason.htm.
 
Kant, I. Theory and Practice. 1793. https://users.sussex.ac.uk/~sefd0/tx/tp2.htm.
 
Klein, J. “Kant on Religious Intolerance.” Philosophica, 51 (2018): 25-38. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/286788933.pdf.
 
Pasternack, L. and Fugate, C. “Kant’s Philosophy of Religion.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2022). https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=kant-religion.
 
Pera, M. “Kant on Politics, Religion, and Secularism” in Universal Rights in a World of Diversity (2012): 546-676. https://www.pass.va/content/dam/casinapioiv/pass/pdf-volumi/acta/acta17pass.pdf#page=529.
 
MacKinnon, D. M. “Kant’s Philosophy of Religion.” Philosophy 50, no. 192 (1975): 131–44. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749503.
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Revision as of 00:09, 3 August 2024

Freedom of Expression

What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?

Kantianism

The right to free expression is a notion central to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. In his eyes, the unrestricted, public articulation of one's ideas is of vital importance: it is a prerequisite for humanity to realize its social and political ends. At the outset, we must be careful not to assume that Kant shares in our modern, liberal conception of this right. We must also refrain from implying a unified interpretation of this freedom among nations where it is constitutionally codified. This would be empirically false: the form and scope of free expression varies widely across liberal democracies. However, a general account might be gleaned by examining the definitions given by well-established international human rights organizations. Article 19 of the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers" (UDHR, 1946). Generally put, freedom of expression is the right to publicly voice one's opinions, especially critical ones, without state interference. There are several exceptions to this principle, including public expression that incites violence, threatens national security, promotes indecency, is libelous, or constitutes hate speech. These restrictions arise from a practical tension between the necessity of free expression and the dangers it poses to society and the state. Kant's view on freedom of expression is no exception. His arguments balance the rational need for guaranteed free expression with our duty to respect the will of civil authorities.

Kant's treatment of the freedom of expression is inextricably linked to the project of the European Enlightenment. In his essay "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?," Kant describes the titular epoch, defining it by its motto of "Sapere Aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding” (Kant 1784, 1). The era of Enlightenment constituted an awakening from Europe’s long-held state of "immaturity," in which institutional dogmatism monopolized public thought (Kant 1784, 1). Individuals had historically put their faith in public institutions and authorities, whether political, religious, medical, academic, or otherwise, to shape their beliefs and way of life (Kant 1784, 1). Enlightenment was the end of such dependency; it was the process of learning to use one's own reason or to think for oneself. To Kant, this promulgation of critical thinking was necessary for humanity's social and political progress; without it, humankind threatened to become ideologically stagnant. Kant claims that the sole condition for this awakening is the freedom of expression. In his own words: "nothing is required for this enlightenment, however, except freedom; and the freedom in question is the least harmful of all, namely, the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters" (Kant 1784, 2). Overcoming blind dogmatism demanded that people voice their ideas without legal restriction (Kant 1784, 2). Without this protection, the light of reason could neither spread nor become practically meaningful, as critical thinking only benefits society if it can be publicly communicated. This view constitutes Kant's general conception of freedom of expression, the right to express one's opinion publicly.

However, Kant distinguishes two forms of expression to address the tension between public criticism and civil obedience. Kant is a staunch defender of public reason, but he defines this concept narrowly. Public reason is the "use that anyone as a scholar makes of reason before the entire literate world" (Kant 1784, 2). This contrasts with the "private use of reason," by which Kant means acts of intellectual dissent within a civic bureaucracy, a form of expression he forbids (Kant 1784, 2). For instance, police officers are obligated to enforce laws even if they agree with them, with the only alternative being resignation (Kant 1784, 3). They may criticize the legal system outside their post but must faithfully perform their roles when 'on the job.' Kant argues that for civic institutions to effectively achieve their intended ends (i.e., to preserve the commonwealth, protect rights, and promote collective happiness in accordance with personal freedom), they must not be obstructed by those appointed to operate them (Kant 1784, 3). Qua citizen, critique is healthy and necessary, but qua official, censure both practically obstructs and formally contradicts the very notion of a political appointment (Kant 1784, 3). We see here that freedom of expression has an inherent potential for conflict with public authority, one which Kant hopes to solve by differentiating public and private reason.

Kant takes this concern further by describing the ideal relationship of the sovereign to free expression. To him, a good ruler neither represses discourse nor caves to public opposition. Instead, they follow the policy: "argue as much as you like, but obey!" (Kant 1784, 2). Public reason allows citizens to voice criticisms of a regime, which is essential for a monarch to bring his rule in line with civil freedom and the public good (Kant 1784, 2). However, this does not justify recalcitrant resistance to the government. In his essay “Theory and Practice,” Kant argues that subjects should only exercise the "freedom of the pen… within the limits of esteem and love for the constitution," meaning their criticisms should proceed with respect for both the public good and the sovereign's authority in mind (Kant 1793, 302). In-kind, a ruler must listen to the voice of his subjects but never cede his own interpretation of justice to theirs (unless their appeals convince him) (Kant 1793, 302). The sovereign is a trustee and not a delegate of the people. Even when he errs, obstruction and rebellion are never justified, only the exercise of public reason.

The degree of overlap between Kantian and contemporary conceptions of freedom of expression is difficult to parse. Because Kant never specifically treats freedom of expression vis-a-vis speech, the press, peaceful assembly, petition, and association, we need to extrapolate from his larger argument to infer his views on the matter. Because he expresses no specific restrictions on the mode of expression, freedom of speech, peaceful assembly, press, association, and petition appear permissible as long as they are peaceful and lawful. But other forms of expression less universally accepted as a right, such as conscientious objection, are a more complicated matter. As we have seen, Kant suggests that if a civic worker's duties conflict with his ethical obligations, he must resign. But in the case of conscription, there is no such option: one serves or faces the penalty, creating a conflict between one's political and ethical obligations. Moreover, Kant does not directly discuss the typical restrictions of 'public reason,' when it constitutes a danger to individual safety or national security. Because our modern understanding of these rights is the product of two centuries of evolving political thought, it may be useless to judge precisely what Kant would say of them. But regardless, there is still something to be gained in this comparison. By examining Kant's discussion of "public reason," we can clarify the foundational motivations and conflicts that inform debates surrounding this freedom today: the right to free expression is essential for societal flourishing, yet this must be balanced with the social and political consequences it presents in its extreme forms.

References:

Kant, I., & Wood, A. (1996). On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice (1793). In M. Gregor (Ed.), Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. 273-310). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511813306.011

Kant, I., & Wood, A. (1996). An answer to the question: What is enlightenment? (1784). In M. Gregor (Ed.), Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. 11-22). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511813306.005

United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights.



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