Freedom of Religion/Philosophical Origins/Tradition contributions/Lockean Thought/English Empiricism
What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
Lockean Thought/English Empiricism
In A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke advocates for religious freedom, albeit with qualification. He claims that toleration is the “chief characteristic mark of the true Church” (Locke 1689, 3). Locke justifies toleration by arguing that religious controversies cannot be solved by human beings, and since no religion has an objective claim to truth over another (not just between Christian denominations, but between, in the example he uses, Muslims, Christians and Jews), all religions must be tolerated (Kessler 1985, 490-91).
However, Locke prioritizes following the law over free worship, condemning religiously motivated illegal acts (Kessler 493). The following passage from A Letter demonstrates Locke’s view that humanity cannot identify a true religion: “For every church is orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous or heretical. For whatsoever any church believes, it believes to be true and the contrary unto those things it pronounce; to be error. So that the controversy between these churches about the truth of their doctrines and the purity of their worship is on both sides equal; nor is there any judge, either at Constantinople or elsewhere upon earth, by whose sentence it can be determined” (13-14). Locke separates “speculative” and “practical” beliefs, the former of which applies merely to conscience, and the latter of which influences action. Locke argues that speculative beliefs should always be respected, but identifies certain practical beliefs that should not be (Locke 30-31). These include beliefs incompatible with morality, that induce disloyalty to the state, and atheism (Kessler 494). He condemns non-belief because, “Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist” (Locke 36). He also argues for a separation of church and state, claiming that peace and security are incompatible with “religion propagated by force of arms” (Locke 15). Though a devout Christian, he rejects the application of Biblical law to modern societies; ‘“Hear, O Israel,” sufficiently restrains the obligations of the law of Moses only to that people” (Locke 28). He is unambiguous and absolute on separation, stating that “church itself is absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth and civil affairs. The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He mixes heaven and earth together, things most remote and opposite, who confuses these two societies, which in their origin, their end, and their whole substance are utterly and completely different” (Locke 15).
Locke does not argue for religious freedom because it is a fundamental right, but rather as a means of maintaining a free society in general. He argued that state enforcement of religious doctrine could serve as an excuse for tyranny. Locke believed that the large number of churches in a free society would maintain that freedom because these churches would be too varied for one to subjugate others and because they could collectively rise up against a threat to their freedom (Kessler 502). Finally, Locke embraced a form of civil disobedience when the government oversteps its bounds in making laws that restrict religion. As Locke argues in A Letter, “If the law, indeed, be concerning things that lie not within the verge of the magistrate’s authority (as, for example, that the people, or any party amongst them, should be compelled to embrace a strange religion, and join in the worship and ceremonies of another Church), men are not in these cases obliged by that law, against their consciences” (33). The following passage from A Letter demonstrates Locke’s view on the benefits of religious freedom and pluralism: “Take away the partiality that is used towards them in matters of common right; change the laws, take away the penalties unto which they are subjected, and all things will immediately become safe and peaceable; nay, those that are averse to the religion of the magistrate will think themselves so much the more bound to maintain the peace of the commonwealth as their condition is better in that place than elsewhere; and all the several separate congregations, like so many guardians of the public peace, will watch one another, that nothing may be innovated or changed in the form of the government, because they can hope for nothing better than what they already enjoy—that is, an equal condition with their fellow-subjects under a just and moderate government” (38-9).
Locke describes churches in A Letter as “a society of members voluntarily uniting (Locke 9). He argues that churches should have the right to exclude members (12), and to create their own bylaws (10). Locke’s respect for association is not restricted to churches; A Letter advocates for no difference in governmental treatment between associations for philosophy, business, religion, or recreation (38). He states that, “Neighbourhood joins some and religion others. But there is only one thing which gathers people into seditious commotions, and that is oppression.”
REFERENCES:
Sanford Kessler, “John Locke's Legacy of Religious Freedom,” Polity 17:3, Spring 1985 Locke, Letter Concerning Toleration