Freedom of Expression/Philosophical Origins/Tradition contributions/Early Modern Rationalism
What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
Early Modern Rationalism
TThe late seventeenth century was a period of great philosophical advancement. Falling roughly at the close of the Enlightenment movement, the late 1900s and early 1700s saw an expansion in the European discourse on rights and liberties within political society. While rationalists during this time period generally did not deal with specific freedoms of the citizens in their writings, writers like Leibniz and Spinoza do reveal a tendency in the early-modern rational tradition to consider the benefits of citizens’ unrestrained expression. Sources do not indicate that these philosophers were thinking of free expression in terms of right or liberty, but their writings nevertheless reveal shades of support for the concept. Leibniz was a prolific writer who produced a plethora of work spanning a wealth of topics, but some of his most important work relating to freedom and liberty occurred in the field of political philosophy. In his “Reflections on the Common Concept of Justice,” he explains his thoughts on justice within political society and the transfer of right between citizen and state. In response to Hobbes’ argument in Leviathan, Leibniz explains that he thinks it impossible for an individual to transfer all of their freedom unto a sovereign in exchange for membership and security within a state. “In the end,” he writes, “in spite of what Hobbes says, each one has retained his right and his liberty regardless of the transfer to the state, and this transfer will be provisional and limited, that is, it will take place to the degree that we believe our safety is involved” (Leibniz, 573). This does not deal specifically with the right to liberty of expression, but it certainly implies that there are certain freedoms that the citizen retains within the context of wider society. Coupled with his definition of justice as “a constant will to act in such a way that no person has reason to complain of us,” it is not unreasonable to conclude that freedom of expression could be included in the set of liberties that Leibniz believes are not transferred to the sovereign in political society. (Leibniz, 566). Of course, Leibniz never directly argues in favor of the protection of the right to freedom of expression, so it is unclear whether he viewed it as an inalienable, natural right. The idea that certain forms of expression could potentially give a person “reason to complain” of another was certainly familiar to early-modern Europeans; defamation and libel laws had existed in England since the reign of Edward I (Statutes of the Realm). This means that Leibniz would have understood how certain forms of expression could be harmful to political society, and it is possible that he would have viewed certain forms of expression as unjust and therefore unprotected by natural right. Ultimately, Leibniz would have based his views on freedom of expression in his classification of the right itself. If he thought of it as an intrinsic natural right which citizens were incapable of giving up, then he likely would have viewed state restrictions on speech or demonstration as inherently impermissible. Unfortunately, Leibniz does not address specific rights, such as that to freedom of expression, within his discourse. Spinoza, on the other hand, deals somewhat more specifically with the freedom of expression, though he also refrains from advocating for it outright. Spinoza’s support for free expression within society stems from his belief that the state can never truly force belief upon its subjects. He does not address freedom of thought and expression; he sees them as inevitable. In his Theological-Political Treatise, h e discusses the rights and liberties that the individual surrenders to the state when he or she enters into political society under the sovereign. When he considers the state’s ability to impose belief upon its citizens, he concludes that “the individual justly cedes the right of free action, though not of free reason and judgment; no one can act against the authorities without danger to the state, though his feelings and judgment may be at variance therewith; he may even speak against them, provided that he does so from rational conviction” (Spinoza, 195). Elsewhere in the Treatise, he writes that: “I have thus shown:—I.That it is impossible to deprive men of the liberty of saying what they think. II.That such liberty can be conceded to every man without injury to the rights and authority of the sovereign power, and that every man may retain it without injury to such rights, provided that he does not presume upon it to the extent of introducing any new rights into the state, or acting in any way contrary to the existing laws.” (Spinoza, 199) Like Leibniz, Spinoza does not take issue with an individual’s freedom of belief, nor does he see any reason that a citizen’s right to express themself should be restricted. It is important to note that both thinkers limit the citizen’s liberty, whether it relates to speech or not, to action that does not break any of the sovereign’s laws. Neither philosopher believed that a sovereign’s word was always morally just, but both nevertheless took issue with a citizen’s blatant violation of the law. REFERENCES: Britain., Great. “The Statutes of the Realm : Printed by Command of His Majesty King George the Third, in Pursuance of an Address of the House of Commons of Great Britain. From V.1.” HathiTrust, babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000017915496. Johns, Christopher. “The Grounds of Right and Obligation in Leibniz and Hobbes.” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 62, no. 3, 2009, pp. 551–574. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40387825. Accessed 30 July 2020. “Reflections on the Common Concept of Justice (1702[?]).” Philosophical Papers and Letters, by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Leroy E. Loemker, Kluwer Academic, 1989. Spinoza, Benedictus de, and R. H. M. Elwes. The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza. G. Bell, 1891, oll resources.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1710/Spinoza_1321.01_EBk_v6.0.pdf.