Freedom of Association/Contributions
What specific events or ideas contributed to its identification as a fundamental right?
An array of historical events have contributed to the identification of the right to freedom of association as a fundamental right ranging from the red scare during the Cold war, guilt by association laws, and the dismantling of legislation permitting the existence of racial segregation. A specific event that contributed to the identification of freedom of association as a fundamental right was the emergence of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; this enactment historically marked the end of segregation and legally prohibited the discrimination of people on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender or religious affiliation. After this act was enacted into law, people living in the American South were free to associate with anybody regardless of their racial or ethnic identity. Although the Civil Rights act was an example of legal identification of the freedom of association as a fundamental right, this was not the first time in history that association was debated over whether or not it constituted a right. The introduction of the acknowledgment of the right to freedom of association begins with the existence of guilt by association laws, as well as labor union provisions. These legal prohibitions restricting an individual from freely exercising their right to association with people of their choosing point to the significance of the legal precedent permitting the right to freedom of association to remain protected under law.
An example of an event that led to the classification of the right to freedom of association as impenetrable liberty under the law is drawn from a ruling that was decided in the early 20th century but drew upon a case from the 1890s to point out the precedent that the right to freedom of association had under Missouri state law. “The distinction [of the right to freely associate] was of some significance in the criminal syndicalism cases of the early twentieth century precisely because the Missouri Supreme Court had three decades earlier (in 1896) invalidated a St. Louis vagrancy ordinance that sought to forbid residents from “knowingly...associat-[ing] with persons having the reputation of being thieves, burglars, pickpockets, pigeon droppers, bawds, prostitutes or lewd women or gamblers, or any other person, for the purpose or with the intent to agree, conspire, combine or confederate, first, to commit any offense, or, second, to cheat or defraud any person of any money or property.” It was here, in a context far removed from public meetings and speeches, that lawyers and judges first considered a right to freedom of association.” (Whittington, 2008, pg. 81). This specific analysis of the documented Missouri Supreme Court invalidation placed upon the St. Louis' vagrancy ordinance in 1896 underlined an imperative element to the right to freely associate; a state cannot legally abridge someone from willingly associating with people that are assumed to have a negative reputation or past history within the legal system. This legal precedent solidified the right to freedom of association as a federally protected right; prohibition of the freedom to exercise an individual’s right to freedom of association would result in federal action against a state that chose to interfere.
Although the freedom to associate with people freely can include restrictions placed on an individual, there are indeed group prohibitions under the right to freedom of association. “Notions of political discrimination in the public workplace derived initially from the Cold War era in a series of cases dealing with loyalty oaths. Loyalty oath cases derived from the fear of the spread of Communism after the Russian Revolution in 1917. During this time and thereafter, many laws were passed in the United States which sought to limit the ability of Communists or Communist sympathizers from gaining government employment and undermining the government. In particular, numerous federal and state laws were passed prohibiting the holding of public employment by those who refused to swear that they had not had any connection with the Communist Party.” (Secunda, 2008, pg. 351). When the US government chose to reinforce fierce associative laws prohibiting the free exercise of choice to associate in groups with people that held different political ideological beliefs, the federal right to freedom of association was subjunctively infringed upon. During a volatile time for the US, while fighting against communist encroachment, the right to freedom of association was more or less viewed as something that could be used as a tool or weapon. By prohibiting the association of people in the US and Communists or supporters of the communist party, the US government was sending a clear message to those who aligned themselves with communism, that they would not be welcome to share their beliefs with other people through threats of blackballing or guilt by association.
An example of ideological group association that was upheld as a right to the freedom of association occurred in 1984, in of Roberts v. US Jaycees case. “Moreover, group expression is deemed essential in a democratic society to preserve political and cultural diversity and to protect unpopular views from majoritarian control.” (pg. Jameson, 1985, 1065). This idea of group expression extends beyond intimate associations, in the Supreme Court case Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the national organization of US Jaycees limited their full membership status to men aged eighteen to thirty-five; and subsequently prohibited women and older men in the organization from being eligible for full-time memberships. Justice William J. Brennan ultimately ruled that the inclusion of women and older men in ‘associate’ memberships constituted an acknowledgment of membership status. Thus the Jaycees had no legal right to exclude them from associating with the organization as full-time members. This ultimately affirmed the state of New Jersey’s court decision to institute an antidiscrimination policy within the bylaws of the US Jaycees membership requirements. “In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state’s interest in eliminating gender-based discrimination justified the impact that requiring the Jaycees to admit women may have on the male members’ freedom of association.” (Jameson, 1985, pg. 1058). Although the U.S. Jaycees were a private organization, the prior inclusion of women and older men as part-time members led the court to rule in favor of the NJ state decision, the Jaycees could not legally restrict women from associating themselves as full-time members within the Jaycees organization.
A situation that brought to light forceful infringements on the right to freedom of association occurred in the 2000s, following the exposure that the Boy Scouts of America excluded a scoutmaster from being a part of the organization after learning of his sexual orientation. “Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 2000, US Supreme Court struck down this application of New Jersey’s anti-discrimination law on the ground that forcing the Scouts to allow homosexuals to be members and scoutmasters would alter the Scouts’ “message” and thus violate their First Amendment right of freedom of expressive association.” (Alexander, 2008, pg. 6). Due to the nature of the scout’s organizational message, specifically mentioning their goal to “instill clean and straight moral values”, the Supreme court ruled in favor of the organization’s right to freely associate with those that aligned with their moral values. This particular ruling signifies the dichotomy within the right to freedom of association; a private organization can restrict members from joining if their personal associations go against their organization’s message and central core tenets. The difference between this case and that of the US Jaycees case was rooted in how the organization viewed members. Boy Scouts of America subjectively denied homosexuals entry from their scout memberships and the entire program, whereas Jaycees had already included women and older men in their associative memberships within the organization. Thus, the supreme court aligned its rulings with factual precedent; if a state interfered with an organization's right to associate with those who they chose, then the federal government would step in and uphold the right to freedom of association as long as the provisions of membership were not violated. Therefore, it did not violate the Jaycees' right to freedom of association by allowing women and older men to move from part-time members to full-time. However, with BSOA, their organization’s values and the core central message would have been infringed upon if the court demanded that the Boy Scouts accept homosexuals as scout leaders and members.
A circumstance in history where the right to the freedom of political association was upheld by the Supreme Court followed the exercise of discriminatory voting blocs by the Democratic party in Texas. “In Terry [Terry v. Adams, 1953], the Court prohibited a county in Texas from giving effect to what amounted to (successful) racial bloc voting. Democrats far outnumbered Republicans in the county, and thus the Democratic primary winners always prevailed in the general elections for county offices. Further, white Democrats appreciably outnumbered black Democrats within the county’s Democratic Party. Although the Court in one of the earlier White Primary cases had forced the Democratic Party in Texas not to discriminate against black voters in its primaries —which, after all, were run by the state itself out of tax revenues—and the Democratic primary in this county was indeed open to black voters, the white Democrats organized themselves into the Jaybird Club and held their own, privately supported “pre-primary primary.” (Alexander, 2008, pg. 5). The right to freedom of association does not necessarily extend to the right to freely exclude an entire group of people from a public political organization through the use of racial bloc voting. The Democratic party was prohibiting the right to freedom of association by not allowing Black voters to have a choice of whether or not they wanted to associate themselves with the candidate that the Jaybirds had elected.
Historical events that contributed to a widespread belief in the importance of the right to freedom of association can be shown from the decision in the Supreme Court case Loving v. Virginia; decided in 1967, this case determined that Southern states were legally required to allow interracial marriages to be permitted under law. The Loving decision brought forth a significant argument in favor of the right to freedom of association, a state could not legally abridge the right to freely associate with people in intimate capacities.
The right to freedom of group expression underlines the exceptions within precedent regarding the exercise of group political identities or participation with associative organizations. “Specifically, these cases dealt with the so-called "spoils system," or political patronage, which rewards public employment based on loyalty to a given political party. In Elrod v. Burns, for example, the plurality decision written by Justice [William] Brennan found that Illinois public employees, who were non-confidential, non-policymaking employees, could not be fired merely because of their partisan political affiliation." (Secunda, 2008, 352). The Burns decision highlights an interesting exception to the right to freedom of association, although the spoils system was legal under the Constitution, the use of political patronage against state employees for their political identity association was a direct infringement upon an individual’s exercise of the right to freely associate. In this particular IL public school, employees found themselves penalized for choosing to associate themselves with a particular political party or organization based on the principle that the state of IL deemed it appropriate to fire employees based on their political associations.
Another example of protecting the right to freely associate intimately with another person is underlined by the decision in Lawrence v. Texas. In 2003, the Supreme court struck down a TX sodomy law as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, legally allowing queer people in TX to associate freely with their partners without fear of legal repercussions. In an attempt to dictate the specific terms under the right to freedom of association, TX had formed a sodomy law prohibiting the free exercise of intimate forms of association. “‘Bowers had held that there was no constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy.' In overturning Bowers, Lawrence's central holding was that the Texas sodomy statute at issue furthered no legitimate state interest which could justify the intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual. The most important constitutional innovation wrought by this holding is the apparent attachment of some form of heightened scrutiny to the right to be free from decisional interference in matters of an intimate nature. Indeed, implicit in this holding is the need to balance individual privacy interests against legitimate and substantial state interests.” (Secunda, 2008, pg. 357). The significance of an intrusion on private associations in regards to exercising the freedom of association as a fundamental right divides the debate in half, a state government cannot abridge the freedom of association when deciding who someone can intimately be associated with under federal law. A legitimate state interest would need to be produced in order for an intimate association to be prohibited under TX state legislation.
References:
Alexander, Larry. "What is freedom of association, and what is its denial?." Social Philosophy and Policy 25, no. 2 (2008): 1-21.
Epstein, Richard A. "Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right." Stanford Law Review 66 (2014): 1241
Inazu, John D. "The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association”, 2010.
Jameson, Ann H. "Roberts v. United States Jaycees: Discriminatory Membership Policy of a National Organization Held Not Protected by First Amendment Freedom of Association." Catholic University Law Review 34, no. 4 (1985): 1055-1086.
Secunda, Paul M. "Reflections on the Technicolor Right to Association in American Labor and Employment Law." Kentucky Law Journal 96, no. 3 (2008).
Whittington, Keith E. "INDUSTRIAL SABOTEURS, REPUTED THIEVES, COMMUNISTS, AND THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION.", 2008.