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Article 8 of the 1994 Constitution reads: "The freedom of conscience, of assembly and the free exercise of worship are guaranteed to all within the conditions fixed by law. Any form of religious fundamentalism and intolerance is forbidden."
The Constitution of the Central African Republic was ratified on March 27, 2016. Articles 6 and 10 grant religious freedom, equality, and protections from discrimination. Article 25 declares separation of church and state.
References:
Constitution of the Central African Republic, Adopted on 28 December 1994, promulgated on 14 January 1995: https://g7plus.fd.uc.pt/pdfs/CentralAfricanRepublic.pdf
“Central African Republic 2016 Constitution.” Constitute. Last modified 2016. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Central_African_Republic_2016 +
Article 5 of the 1959 Chad Constitution guaranteed religious freedom: "the Republic assures to all equality of rights without distinction of race, of origin or of religion. Each one professes their religion freely and receives from the State,
for the exercise of their belief [culte], an equal protection;"
The 2018 Chad Constitution also guarantees religious freedom, in Title II, Chapter I, Article 27. Article 14 of Title II also guarantees equality without distinction of origin, of race, of sex, of religion, of political opinion or of social position.
References:
1959 Chad Constitution: "Title I: Of the State, of Sovereignty and of the Public Freedoms," Constitution of the Republic of Chad 31 March 1959 (1959): 3-4 https://heinonline-org.proxygw.wrlc.org/HOL/Page?collection=cow&handle=hein.cow/zztd0003&id=3&men_tab=srchresults
2018 Chad Constitution: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Chad_2018?lang=en +
Freedom of Religion was first guaranteed in the 1925 Constitution of The Republic of Chile under Chapter III, Article 10, Section 2: "Practice of all beliefs, liberty of conscience and the free exercise of all religions that may not be contrary to morality, good usage and public order."
Article 10.2 of the 1980 Chile Constitution with revisions up to 2021 offers a very similar formulation of freedom of religion.
References:
Constitute Project. 1925 Constitution of the Republic of Chile. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Chile_1925?lang=en
1980 Chile Constitution with revisions up to 2021: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Chile_2021 +
Article 6.7 of the 1912 Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China guaranteed freedom of religion.
Article 36 of the People's Republic of China Constitution of 1982 with Amendments through 2018 continues to offer a guarantee of freedom of religion: "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination." However, according to the US State Department in 2018: "The constitution states citizens have freedom of religious belief but limits protections for religious practice to “normal religious activities” and does not define “normal.” The government continued to exercise control over religion and restrict the activities and personal freedom of religious adherents when the
government perceived these as threatening state or Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interests, according to nongovernmental organization (NGO) and international media reports. Only religious groups belonging to one of the five
state-sanctioned “patriotic religious associations” (Buddhist, Taoist, Muslim, Catholic, and Protestant) are permitted to register with the government and officially permitted to hold worship services."
References:
1912 Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China: “The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China.” The American Journal of International Law 6, no. 3 (1912): 149–54.
https://archive.org/details/jstor-2212590/page/n1/mode/2up
China (People’s Republic of) 1982 (rev. 2018): https://constituteproject.org/constitution/China_2018
CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, XINJIANG, HONG KONG, AND MACAU) 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CHINA-INCLUSIVE-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf
Article 5(5) of the 1853 Constitution of New Grenada guaranteed: "The free profession of religion, whether public or private, so long as it does not disturb the public peace, offend good morals, or obstruct others in their worship;"
Article 19 of the 1991 Constitution states: "Freedom of religion is guaranteed. Every individual has the right to freely profess his/her religion and to disseminate it individually or collectively. All religious faiths and churches are equally free before the law."
References:
1853 Constitution of New Grenada: English translation of the Spanish original text of the Constitution of 1853 202 (2009) Title I: The Republic of New Granada; and Granadines
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=cow&handle=hein.cow/zzco0029&id=2&men_tab=srchresults
1991 Colombia Constitution (rev. 2015): https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015 +
Religious Freedom is not guaranteed in Comoros. The Constitution declares Sunni Islam the religion of the state under Chapter V, Article 97 under the current constitution. However, Under Title I, Chapter I, Article 2, equality before the law is guaranteed regardless of religion.
U.S. Department of State. Report on International Religious Freedom. 2021. Comoros. https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/comoros/
Constitute Project. 2018 Constitution of Comoros. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Comoros_2018 +
The notion of the freedom of religion is difficult to situate within the work of the Frankfurt School. In the early 20th century, a group of Western Marxist intellectuals founded the Institute for Social Research at Goethe University Frankfurt, an interdisciplinary research initiative that implemented a new approach to the social sciences (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Their distinctive "critical theory" revised "traditional theory," which sought merely to establish timeless, universal truths around specific subjects, seeking instead to further interpret scientific findings in a normative light (Horkheimer, 1937, 199). In other words, where traditional theory tells us merely how things are, critical theory tells us how they are and how they should be. This new project was, thus, in a sense, a radical marrying of philosophy and social sciences. As most of its 'first-generation' members took a Marxist or Freudian approach to their research, a 'freedom of religion' was not much discussed, perhaps more due to their suspicion of 'private liberties' than disdain for religion. However, we find in the work of the school's 'second-generation' thinkers (particularly in the work of Jurgen Habermas) a more complex philosophical discussion of both human rights and the relationship between religion and the state.
The “First-Generation”
Members of the so-called 'first generation' of the Frankfurt School saw value in religion's inclination towards social justice and concern for objective, 'non-instrumental' knowledge. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, two of the school's most notable theorists, were deeply critical of "instrumental reason," human rationality directed towards mere means rather than proper ends (Horkheimer, 1944). Their critique is too detailed to be fully treated here, but simply put, instrumental reason reduces rationality as a tool for exploiting nature and fellow man (particularly as a tool in capitalism) (Horkheimer, 1944). Prioritizing this form of reason reduces the value of knowledge to mere 'usefulness' or 'practicality' at the expense of bedrock, "objective truth" (Horkheimer, 1944, 156). To the intellectuals of the early Frankfurt School, religion shared with critical theory a concern for truth about the ends of human life and society (e.g., the nature of justice and goodness), topics lost in the thoughtless dogmatism of an age defined by instrumental rationality. Further, religion also shared a spirit of practical social activism, seeking not only to outline the 'ideal world' but also to realize it (Brittain, 2012, 207). Where capitalist society had dogmatically accepted that one's ultimate aim was to use instrumental reason to extract value from nature and man, religion offered a necessary alternative towards higher truth and worldly justice. A critical theory of religion, then, could provide unique value for the project of critical theory as a whole.
However, first-generation theorists largely ignored the discussion of universal human rights. We might attribute this fact to Marx's cynical view on private liberties, as expressed in his essay "On the Jewish Question." In this work, Marx claims that personal rights create a harmful division between the private or "civil sphere" and the public or "political sphere" (Marx, 1843). Such rights allowed individuals to retract from a concern for the universal, communal good into a private sense of happiness (Marx, 1843). As such, religious freedom was harmful in encouraging individuals to value their religion over their "species-being," their being part of a unified humankind (Marx, 1843). With this in view, we can understand why the early Marxist critical theorists might have discussed the value of freedom of religion: perhaps rights were irrelevant to their vision for society.
The "Second-Generation"
Most of the so-called "second-generation" critical theorists (whose work began in the 1970s) put less emphasis on religion, though we can see parallels with the first-generation views in the later work of Jurgen Habermas. Early in his career, Habermas reduced religion's status to that of a primitive socializing force (Habermas 1981). The need for religious attitudes was to be overcome by secular rationality in the form of his theory of communicative action, a philosophical system Habermas hoped would ground "the social sciences in a theory of language (Habermas 1988, xiv). In the mid-1980s, Habermas became less disparaging of religion, recognizing it as a source of necessary consolation for a suffering world (Habermas 1990). This positive view continued to develop through his later career, with Habermas eventually recognizing that religious ideas were a well of moral truth necessary in combating the moral decay of the techno-capitalist age (Habermas 2006). Though Habermas continued to advocate for a separation between law and religion, he believed that the public sphere could gather valuable moral intuition from religious teachings (Habermas 2006). Though nothing like a theocracy (the direct imposition of religious authority into the state apparatus) should exist, a respectful friendship between religion and state could prove essential in preserving society's ethical integrity. Furthermore, the later Habermas also defends the individual's right to freedom of religious practice (Habermas 2006). We see here both a growing similarity and marked difference to the first-generation theorists' view of religion, with Habermas acknowledging the value of religious teachings while also endorsing a more classically liberal respect for the freedom of religion.
Human rights
Habermas also engaged in a comprehensive discussion of human liberties per se. His treatment of rights is situated within his "discourse theory," in which he seeks to resolve various epistemological, political, and ethical issues by analyzing inter-subjective communication (Habermas 1992, between facts and norms). Broadly speaking, Habermas asserts that society maintains itself over time only when its constituents view it as legitimate (Habermas 1996). The dawn of modernity, with its growing differences in religious and philosophical opinions, presents a challenge here: groups seek to impose their personal views of justice and happiness on others to their detriment and embitterment (Habermas 1996). Therefore, spheres of private freedom needed to arise to resolve this tension. Insofar as individuals can pursue their own visions of happiness (without interfering with the freedom of others), society can maintain its legitimacy (Habermas 1996). Rights are the legal feature that maintains such spheres of personal liberty. But for these private rights to be legitimate, individuals must have a say in the system that grants and manages them (Habermas 1996). This demand for public rights (i.e., the right to participate in government) makes democracy "co-original" with private rights; they rationally presuppose one another (Habermas 1996). The fundamental freedoms to be protected are determined through the rational deliberation of a constitutional democracy.
We find in Habermas a more coherent account of both rights and the freedom of religion than we do in the first generation of the Frankfurt School. Thinkers like Horkheimer and Adorno saw great value in a critical analysis of religion, but they left the notion of freedom of religion largely untreated. Though Habermas never gives a systematic account of why freedom of religion ought to be a sanctioned right, he asserts its intuitive importance to a healthy and just society. He also gives us much more to think about when it comes to the concept of human rights as such. This is not to say that first-generation critical theorists provide no insight into the relationship between religion and society. One can indeed gain much understanding of the topic from both scholarly eras, though later work gives us a more robust treatment of the freedom of religion.
The Constitution of Costa Rica was ratified on 1949 November 7. Article 75 both declares the Roman Catholic Church as the official religion of Costa Rica and grants freedom of religion.
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_2011.pdf +
Under Title III, Section II, Article 40, Freedom of religion is first asserted in the 1991 Constitution of The Republic of Croatia. Equality regardless of religion is also guaranteed under Article 14.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Croatia's Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2001. https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/cro129771.pdf +
Article 26 of the 1901 Constitution of Cuba, adopted in 1902, asserted separation of church from state and freedom of religious practice, "without further restriction than that demanded by the respect for Christian morality and public order."
The Constitution of Cuba was ratified on 24 February 2019. Articles 15, 42, and 57 grant religious freedoms, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. Articles 15 and 32.b declare Cuba a secular state.
References:
1901/1902 Constitution: English translation of the Spanish original text of the Constitution of 1901/2. 155 (2010)
Section I: Individual Rights: https://heinonline-org.proxygw.wrlc.org/HOL/Page?collection=cow&handle=hein.cow/zzcu0004&id=4&men_tab=srchresults
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2019.pdf?lang=en +
Modern utilitarianism, as communicated by thinkers such as Richard M. Hare, Peter Singer and David Lyons among others, has a relatively complex relationship regarding the freedom of religion and religion itself. Utilitarianism itself has been applied to various areas of knowledge from politics to economics to psychology but it has had many critiques since its growth in popularity in the 18th century.
Before commenting on the utilitarian perspective on the freedom of religion, utilitarianism itself must be defined. Utilitarians believe that the most ethical choice in any circumstance is the choice that results in the maximization of welfare for as many people as possible. Impartiality is one of the most important aspects of utilitarianism. It rests on the assumption that all are afforded the same moral consideration of their well-being regardless of, “gender, race, nationality, or even species,” but it is also based on a “family of related ethical theories,”(MacAskill et al. 2023). Richard M. Hare describes it like this: “[W]hat the principle of utility requires of me is to do for each man affected by my actions what I wish were done for me in the hypothetical circumstances that I were in precisely his situation; and, if my actions affect more than one man… to do what I wish, all in all, to be done for me in the hypothetical circumstances that I occupied all their situations”(Hare, 1982).The maximization of total welfare is also an integral pillar of utilitarianism as utilitarians are concerned with the consequences of one's actions rather than the actions themselves. In other words, the action itself has no intrinsic value, ethical or moral, as they are judged based on the consequences resulting from said actions. What this means is that intention is irrelevant and the inspiration behind such actions is as well. Therefore, one's decision to act should be solely based on a evaluation of the consequences to not only the individual but to anyone who may be affected by the decision. Peter Singer, famously known for his books Animal Liberation and How Are We to Live?, writes, “I must consider the interests of my enemies as well as my friends, and of strangers as well as family. Only if, after taking fully into account the interests and preferences of all these people, I still think the action is better than any alternative open to me, can I genuinely say that I ought to do it.”(Singer 2008). These are the basic principles of utilitarianism and the basis for the following evaluation.
One of the several legitimate critiques of utilitarianism has to do with the recognition of rights. John Greene, a Harvard professor and Doctor of Philosophy, highlights this in a 2015 “EconTalk” podcast episode stating, “utilitarianism doesn't adequately account for people's rights,” which has direct implications for the right to the freedom of religion. Essentially, utilitarianism does not take into account the rights that have been socially constructed and considered to be inalienable in a plethora of constitutions globally. Religion, like rights, is considered by many to be another form of social construct. Furthermore, taken in the context of Peter Singer’s presentation of utilitarianism, religion is seemingly incompatible with utilitarianism in and of itself: “Once we admit that Darwin was right when he argued that human ethics evolved from the social instincts that we inherited from our non-human ancestors, we can put aside the hypothesis of a divine origin for ethics,”(Singer 1994). Religion entails that our actions are determined by our morals, and those morals should be products of religious teachings and commandments. Since utilitarianism argues that our actions have no moral or ethical connotations, religion tends to be viewed as outdated by Singer and other utilitarians.
As previously mentioned, the right to freedom of religion is typically connected to the governing laws of a state and its constitution. These laws, as explained in David Lyon’s The Utilitarian Justification of the State, are innately coercive as they limit one's personal freedom. However, so long as these laws provide a larger welfare that has a greater good, laws that provide safety against any encroachments one may experience on their own “happiness” for example, the utilitarian view is fulfilled. This calculation, the utilitarian process of thinking or “deep pragmatism” as Greene states, applies to laws that also guarantee rights. Therefore, the utilitarian perspective on the right to freedom of religion rests on the consequences of having that right versus the consequences of not having that right. If the consequences of providing the right to freedom of religion, and the laws that come with it, prove to result in more positive conscious experiences than any other decision, then, according to the theory of utilitarianism, freedom of religion is the most ethical choice to make.
References:
Hare, R. M. (1982). Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism, in Sen, A.; Williams, B. (eds.),
Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 26
“Joshua Greene on Moral Tribes, Moral Dilemmas, and Utilitarianism - Econlib.” 2022. Econlib.
April 10, 2022. https://www.econtalk.org/joshua-greene-on-moral-tribes-moral-dilemmas-and-utilitarianism/#audio-highlights.
Schilbrack, Kevin. “E Social Construction of “Religion” and Its Limits: A Critical Reading of Timothy Fitzgerald.” Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, vol. 24, 2012, pp. 97–117, www.researchgate.net/publication/270542633_The_Social_Construction_of_Religion_and_Its_Limits_A_Critical_Reading_of_Timothy_Fitzgerald#:~:text=Abstract,say%2C%20is%20a%20social%20construction. Accessed 5 Aug. 2024.
Singer, Peter. How Are We to Live? : Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 206.
Singer, Peter. Ethics. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 6.
MacAskill, W., Meissner, D., and Chappell, R.Y. (2023). Introduction to Utilitarianism. In R.Y.
Chappell, D. Meissner, and W. MacAskill (eds.), Introduction to Utilitarianism, <https://www.utilitarianism.net/introduction-to-utilitarianism>, accessed 8/5/2024.
Under part II, Article 18, Freedom of Religion was first asserted in the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus. This Constitution was adopted upon independence from the UK in the same year.
International Labour Organization. Constitution of Cyprus 1960. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/47927/136251/F-1750868360/CYP47927_LEG_Constitution%201960.pdf
CIA World Factbook. Cyprus. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/cyprus/ +
The first assertion of freedom of religion within the Czech Republic was asserted in the 1960 Constitution of Czechoslovakia under Chapter II, Article 32. However, In the 1992 Constitution of the Czech Republic, freedom of religion is not mentioned. Instead, there is a supplemental document, The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, under the Constitutional Order of 1992 that covers religious freedom under Article 15.
International Labour Organization. Constitution of the Czech Republic https://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/docs/1967/Constitution%20of%20the%20Czech%20Republic.pdf
World Statesman. Constitution of Czechoslovakia. 1960. https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Czechoslovakia-Const1960.pdf
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS. https://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/ustavni_soud_www/Pravni_uprava/AJ/Listina_English_version.pdf +
Under Title II, Article 24, Freedom of religion is affirmed in the 1964 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, It does state that worship, teaching, practices, and performance of worship should be subject to the respect of public order and good morals. The current Constitution was ratified on February 18, 2006. Articles 13, 22, 45, and 61.7 grant religious protections and freedoms. It also declares the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a secular state.
U.S. Department of State. Report on Religious Freedom. 2022. Democratic Republic of The Congo. https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/
Wikisource. Translated 1964 Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Translation:Constitution_of_the_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_(1964)#Title_II._Fundamental_rights
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_2011.pdf?lang=en +
As early as 1849, elements of the right to religious freedom were asserted in the Fundamental Law of the Kingdom of Denmark. According to Article 76 of the 1866 revised version of the 1849 Fundamental Law, "Citizens shall have the right to organize themselves into societies for the worship of God according to their convictions, provided that their doctrines and conduct do not violate good morals or public order." Article 79 of the 1866 revision held that there could be no religious test for enjoyment of civil rights, or relief from civil obligations by reason of religion. Articles 75 and 78 of the 1866 revision described the legal regulation of the national church and of other churches.
Article 77 of the 1866 revision required that those unable to show membership in a denomination recognized by the government "shall pay into the educational funds the personal taxes authorized by law for the use of the national church." The 1953 Constitutional Act of Denmark addresses religious liberty in Sections 66-70, and in Section 68 asserts: "No one shall be liable to make personal contributions to any denomination other than the one to which he adheres."
References:
1849 Fundamental Law of the Kingdom of Denmark: French translation of the Fundamental Law of 1849 1218 (2010)
Fundamental Law of the Kingdom of Denmark: https://heinonline-org.proxygw.wrlc.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cow/zzdk0006&collection=cow
Fundamental Law of the Kingdom of Denmark [Revising the Fundamental Law of 1849], 1866: English translation of the Fundamental Law of 1866, revising that of 1849. 278 (2010), VIII: https://heinonline-org.proxygw.wrlc.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cow/zzdk0009&id=12&collection=cow&index=
1953 Constitutional Act of Denmark: https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/-/media/sites/ft/pdf/publikationer/engelske-publikationer-pdf/the_constitutional_act_of_denmark_2018_uk_web.pdf +
Djibouti’s constitution, adopted in 1992, affirms Islam as the state’s religion, though it respects all faiths and protects freedom of religion. The right is guaranteed under Article 11 (Djibouti 1992).
Djibouti. 1992 "Djibouti 1992 (rev. 2010)" Constitute Project. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Djibouti_2010 +
After its independence from the United Kingdom in 1979, the Commonwealth of Dominica adopted its Constitution, which had been written the year prior. Article 9 deals with “Protection of conscience” and protects freedom of religion (Dominica 1978).
Dominica. 1978 “Dominica 1978 (rev. 2014)” Constitute Project
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominica_2014 +
Article 11, Section 18 of the 1887 Constitution of the Dominican Republic offered religious toleration, observing that Roman Catholicism was the official religion, but allowing that "Other sects may hold their services freely in their respective houses of worship."
References:
English translation of the Constitution of 1887. 757 (2010) Chapter III: National Guarantees:https://heinonline-org.proxygw.wrlc.org/HOL/Page?collection=cow&handle=hein.cow/zzdo0006&id=3&men_tab=srchresults +
The introduction of Christianity met intolerance in Rome as a new religion. Its novelty was justification enough for widespread suspicion and scorn for its new followers. “Judaism's ancient history is one of the primary reasons why Rome tolerated its presence and made special exemptions with regards to emperor worship and Jewish rituals” (Weibe 2008, 15). Deviance from existing religious cultures was a test of the tolerance of free religion in society. While Judaism had an accepted position in common society, the history of persecution at the onset of early Christianity proves a lack of said freedom. "Association with Judaism would then have had advantages, since Christians could move under the protective umbrella of Judaism"1 (Wilson 1995, 13). The guise of Judaism provided Christianity with virtue, making it more tolerable. This would not prove successful, as the subsequent persecution of Christians took place on the basis of complete intolerance. “The mere declaration Christianus sum made them liable to the death-penalty” (Janssen 1979, 134). As enforced by the Roman government beginning after the Great Fire of Rome in 64 AD, Christian persecution would become the standard in the Roman Empire. “[D]uring actual persecutions, oftentimes those interrogating accused Christians would allow them to live if they recanted being a Christian” (Weibe 2008, 10). Freedom of religion was notably nonexistent at the early stages of Christianity.
Other religions in Rome, however, experienced tolerance differently. Policies of toleration within the Empire were curtailed "when [...] cults were reputed to be immoral or were a danger to the good order and security of the state" (Canfield 1913, 45). Thus, Christianity posed a significant threat to the social order in its earlier centuries. Nero’s rule was an early example of the persecution to come. "Decius (249-251) was the first emperor to launch a systematic persecution against Christianity" (Plescia 1971, 124). Later, under Emperor Diocletian’s rule, religious edicts led to greater intolerance towards Christianity. "Following conferences in Nicomedia (302-303) among Diocletian, the Caesar Galerius, and their chief adviser, Hierocles, Diocletian decided to 'terminate' Christianity" (Lactantius, Mort. pers. 16.4; Ferguson 2013, 898). The severity of each persecution varied by ruler, but ample evidence indicates that religious freedom for Christians was consistently limited.
This changed with the Edict of Milan in 313. History shows a significant shift in societal acceptance of Christianity under Emperor Constantine. This newfound integration of the religion in Rome marked a transition from external intolerance to an understanding of religious freedom within Christianity itself. Lactantius, an early Christian author, became an advisor to Emperor Constantine. Constantine was the first Christian Emperor of Rome and passed the Edict of Milan, which "decriminalized Christianity and decreed that Roman citizens had ‘the liberty to observe the religion of [their] choice, and [their] particular mode of worship’" ("Arch of Constantine," Piranesi in Rome). Given his advisory role and influential contributions in early Christianity, "Lactantius [...] influenced Constantine’s religious policy" and "is an ideal lens through which to study Rome’s religious transformation" (Digeser, Elizabeth DePalma. The Making of a Christian Empire: Lactantius & Rome. Cornell University Press, 2000). It is with this perspective that freedom of religion from the viewpoint of an early Christian was permissible.
In Divine Institutes, his most notable theological work, Lactantius wrote about his views on religious tolerance: "But since the truth is revealed from heaven to us who have received the mystery of true religion, and since we follow God, the teacher of wisdom and the guide to truth, we call together all, without any distinction either of sex or of age, to heavenly pasture" (Lactantius, The Divine Institutes, Ante-Nicene Fathers 7:12). Lactantius’ views on the universality of true religion and his understanding of God being accessible to everyone reveal a tolerance for religious practices other than Christianity. While the Edict of Milan pushed the Roman Empire to embrace Christianity, it did not necessarily exclude alternative faiths.
Augustine of Hippo (354-430) was another influential theologian who advanced the idea of Freedom of Religion under Christianity. While he is commonly regarded as a figure whose idea of tolerance became stricter over time, interpretations of the reasons for this shift vary. Some justifications view his intentions as policy driven while others argue more along the lines of selfishness and his personal religious values (Rohr 1967, 60). Despite his wavering attitudes on religious tolerance, Augustine is considered a key figure in shaping Western Christianity (O'Donnell 2024). With such importance, his philosophical and theological contributions were highly regarded. Throughout his life, his ideas grew more intolerant as "Augustine sharpened his ecclesiological ideas and developed a theory of religious coercion based on an intentionalist understanding of Christian love" (Tornau 2024). The evolution of Augustine’s theological contributions is evident in a famous "vitriolic debate with the Pelagianist ex-bishop Julian of Aeclanum, who accused Augustine of crypto-Manicheism and of denying free will" (Tornau 2024). This denial of freedom was grounded in Augustine’s interpretation of original sin and divergence from a Christian approach to life, indicating a more assertive agenda as Christianity grew beyond its early years.
References
Canfield, Leon Hardy. The Early Persecutions of the Christians. Reprint, Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, vol. 55, no. 2. ATLA Monograph Preservation Program. New York: Columbia University, 1913. Originally published by Harvard University. Digitized May 16, 2006. ISBN 0790541947, 9780790541945.
Christian Tornau, "Augustine of Hippo," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, Summer 2024 ed., Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2024, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/augustine/.
Janssen, L. F. “‘Superstitio’ and the Persecution of the Christians.” Vigiliae Christianae 33, no. 2 (1979): 131–59. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1583266.
Lactantius. The Divine Institutes. In Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 7, edited by Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, page 12. Accessed July 7, 2024. https://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf07.toc.html.
Lactantius, Mort. pers. 16.4 (Ferguson, Everett, ed. Encyclopedia of Early Christianity: Second Edition. Vol. 1839 of Garland Reference Library of the Humanities. 2nd ed. Reprint. New York: Routledge, 2013), 898.
Luther, Martin. "Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed." In Works of Martin Luther, Vol. 3, edited by A. J. Holman, 225-273. Philadelphia: A. J. Holman, 1915. Accessed July 9, 2024. https://www.onthewing.org/user/Luther%20-%20Extent%20of%20Secular%20Authority.pdf.
O'Donnell, James. "St. Augustine." Encyclopedia Britannica, April 23, 2024. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saint-Augustine.
Plescia, Joseph. “On the Persecution of the Christians in the Roman Empire.” Latomus, vol. 30, no. 1, 1971, pp. 120–32. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41527858.
Rohr, John A. "Religious Toleration in St. Augustine." Journal of Church and State 9, no. 1 (1967): 51–70. Accessed August 1, 2024. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23913378.
Stephen G. Wilson, Related Strangers: Jews and Christians: 70-170 CE, Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995, 13.
Weibe, Melissa. “The Early Struggle: Understanding the Persecution of the Early Christians.” Master’s thesis, Concordia University, 2008. https://spectrum.library.concordia.ca/id/eprint/979201/1/MR67303.pdf.
While sociology has been studied for many years, with different academics commenting on classic works from many different people, one prominent figure is Stephen Lukes, a political and social theoriest at NYU, who commented on Émile Durkheim’s work. Lukes views Durkheim as someone whose thoughts on sociology are essential to our understanding of it; he explains that “he’s hard to escape because there are some profound insights which entered into the very bloodstream of sociology thinking.” Without Durkheim, it’s possible we may have some unanswered questions about things in the realm of sociology. In an interview with Nigel Warburton, he explains several concepts that Durkheim has worked through. He explains how in Durkheim’s book he defines a “social fact” as something “external to individuals, meaning any individuals taken singly, they constrain us, they are independent of us, and they exist, sometimes this is called the theory of emergence” (Social Science Bites). While Lukes does quote things directly from Durkheim, he also tries to explain some things that Durkheim has said in his own words, or seems to put is own spin on what he thinks they mean. When referencing Durkheim’s book on suicide, he explains that this work “elaborates a theory in which there are, what he calls, ‘suicidogeic’ currents, [and] in the end came down to two ideas really: the extend to which people were integrated into larger social unities, communities, or so on, and the extent to which they were regulated by norms” (Social Science Bites). Lukes brings up Durkheim’s concept of “organic solidarity,” but added on that while he sees this as a problem, Durkheim didn’t provide a solution to this.
Lukes explains that Durkheim's book on religion is a “masterpiece” and that his book was a “big, very ambitious thing.” He generalizes this book as being “an attempt to develop a general theory of religion, what religion is, what its elements are, by studying the tribal religions that had been investigated and written about by missionaries and travellers at that time” (Social Science Bites). In the 1970s, Lukes wrote a book about Durkheim, “Emilie Durkheim: His Life and Eork. A Historical and Critical Study.” He explains that Durkheim was obsessed with “the question of social determination, and the ways in which our thoughts and behavior are shaped by, and reflect our social conditions and social life” (Social Science Bites).
Durkheim’s thinking inspired Lukes’ “radical” view of power, and he believes it can be examined in “three dimensions - the overt, the covert, and the power to shape desires and beliefs” (Social Science Bites).
Bites, Social Science. “Steven Lukes on Durkheim.” Social Science Space. Last modified May 29, 2020. Accessed July 31, 2024. https://www.socialsciencespace.com/2015/05/steven-lukes-on-durkheim/.