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The Marshall Islands’ Constitution of 1979 contains the first assertion of freedom of religion in the country’s independent history. Section 1 specifically outlines this right.
“The Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands.” Republic of the Marshall Islands Parliament. Accessed July 27, 2023. https://rmiparliament.org/cms/constitution.html +
Early in Karl Marx’s career, he was widely read and praised for his press publications. In 1842, he became editor of the Rheinsche Zeitung für Politik. Handel und Gewerbe which was a newspaper that reported on issues pertaining to politics, trade and commerce. The Rheinische Zeitung as a whole was a reformist publication that presented and promoted many pro-democracy ideals in a time of Prussian absolutism. The freedom of the press was one of which Marx himself advocated for, largely in response to the government’s increasing support for censorship at the time. These debates that occurred within the Rhineland province of Prussia spurred several articles written by Marx that not only promoted freedom of the press in and of itself, but provided his own insight as to the importance of preserving such a freedom.
Throughout his articles, Marx rebukes arguments made both against the freedom of the press and for censorship. These claims come directly from the debates held by the Sixth Rhine Province Assembly. Marx lays down the foundation for his argument first by rationalizing the limitations of those within the Assembly advocating for free press by exposing their natural disconnect from the issue. Marx claims that “They have never come to know freedom of the press as a vital need. For them it is a matter of the head, in which the heart plays no part,” (Rheinische Zeitung No. 125, Supplement May 5 1842). This, in turn, leads defenders to put forward “vague arguments” that are overwhelmed by the opposing arguments promoting censorship. Notably, Marx then refers to another influential German thinker, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, alluding to the importance of sentimental bonds or, to put it bluntly, love for something. Marx concludes that in order to defend something, one must love it and in order to love something, that thing must be essential to one's existence. The defenders of freedom of the press in the Assembly, as Marx states, “seem to enjoy a complete existence even in the absence of any freedom of the press,” (Rheinische Zeitung No. 125, Supplement May 5 1842).
Following Marx’s opening critique of the debates themselves, he provides a complete rebuttal to the claims made by the speaker of the knightly estate who argued in favor of censorship. Throughout his argument, the speaker insinuates a dissonance between the Assembly as an internal faction of the population that should, at least for the interim, be insulated by the external forces of the provinces. This, Marx believes, is contradictory to the creation of the Assembly itself: “Nothing is more contradictory than that the highest public activity of the province is secret, that in private lawsuits the doors of the court are open to the province, but that in its own lawsuit the province has to remain outside,” (Rheinische Zeitung No. 130, Supplement May 10 1842). This specific claim stems from the lack of accessibility given to the press to report and discuss the decisions and actions pursued by the Assembly. Marx finds it staggering, to say the least, that the public may involve itself in private proceedings and less important legal dealings but is barred from inquiring about decisions made by the Assembly–decisions that clearly impact the lives and welfare of the constituents of each province. However, the speaker does not make his claim without making an argument to support it: “Precisely for that reason [the members of the Assembly] are most of all able to appreciate the value of our words, and do so the more frankly as we allow ourselves to be less subject to external influences, which could only be useful if they came to us in the form of well-meaning counsel, but not in the form of a dogmatic judgment, of praise or blame, seeking to influence our personality through public opinion," (Rheinische Zeitung No. 130, Supplement May 10 1842). This “obtrusively emotional” reasoning does not truly prioritize the safety of an effective Assembly rather it promotes the “Parliamentary freedom” that innately reinforces the hierarchical separation between the ruling class and the provinces. Censorship only further reinforces this “antithesis of the Assembly as something internal and the province as something external,” (Rheinische Zeitung No. 130, Supplement May 10 1842).
These publications are what inspired and propelled Marx to actively argue in favor of the freedom of the press. Marx justifies freedom of the press as “an embodiment of freedom, a positive good, whereas censorship is an embodiment of unfreedom… it has a merely negative nature,” (Rheinische Zeitung No. 132, Supplement May 12 1842). This definition explicitly ties Marxism to the promotion of freedom of the press. With that being said, Marx also claims that censorship “is not an end in itself,” rather the unjustified means to an unjustified end. He calls it “a bad police measure, for it does not achieve what it intends, and it does not intend what it achieves,” (Rheinische Zeitung No. 132, Supplement May 12 1842). Marx concluded that censorship actually augments any “forbidden piece of printed matter” to an “event” and “martyr” to its believers. In other words, censorship works against itself and against those who believe there is something to be gained from it. In this specific publication, Rheinische Zeitung No. 132, Marx finalizes his concerns and frustration in a poetic denouncement of censorship in favor of freedom of the press: “You think it barbaric to blind nightingales, but it does not seem to you meaningless at all barbaric to put out the eyes of the press with the sharp pens of the censorship. You regard it as despotic to cut a free person's hair against his will, but the censorship daily cuts into the flesh of thinking people and allows only bodies without hearts, submissive bodies which show no reaction, to pass as healthy!” (Rheinische Zeitung No. 132, Supplement May 12 1842).
Sources:
“On Freedom of the Press Proceedings of the Sixth Rhine Province Assembly Debates on Freedom of the Press and Publication of the Proceedings of the Assembly of the Estates.” 2000. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/Marx_On_freedom_of_the_Press.pdf.
Article 2 of Mauritania’s 1959 Constitution contains the first assertion of freedom of religion in the country’s independent history. The document also states that “the religion of the Mauritanian people is the Muslim religion.”
Mauritania’s 1991 constitution was adopted on 12 July of that year. The preamble and Article 1 guarantee equality under the law, however it does not include religion as a distinct protected class. Article 5 declares that Islam is the state religion.
“Islamic Republic of Mauritania Constitution of 22 March 1959.” World Constitutions Illustrated, Heinonline. Accessed July 27, 2023. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.cow/zzmr0017&i=3
Constitution Project. “Mauritania 1991 (Rev. 2012) Constitution.” Constitute. POGO , April 27, 2022. Last modified April 27, 2022. Accessed June 21, 2022. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mauritania_2012?lang=en. +
The Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius was ratified on 12 March 1968. Articles 11 and 14.1 grant religious freedom, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination.
Mauritius National Assembly. Mauritius National Assembly. Mauritius Government, May 2018. Last modified May 2018. Accessed June 21, 2022. https://mauritiusassembly.govmu.org/.
“Mauritius 1968 (rev. 2016).” Constitute. Accessed July 27, 2023. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mauritius_2016 +
The concept of freedom of religion in Jewish philosophy initially seems to be a modern innovation, especially since the term does not appear in Jewish holy texts. At the same time, however, there is some sense of a freedom of religion in Jewish thought, in a way that could be said to prefigure the secular conception of that idea.
Fundamentally, Judaism teaches that all people are made in God’s image, and its holy texts emphasize the value of tolerance in multiple places. Perhaps most well-known is Leviticus 19:18, which says “love your neighbor as yourself.” Even more prescriptive is Leviticus 19:34, which commands to the people of Israel that “the stranger who resides with you shall be to you as one of your citizens; you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.” These lines formed the basis for one of the most famous anecdotes in Judaism, where Rabbi Hillel (active in the first century BCE) summed up all of Jewish teaching as “that which is hateful to you, do not do unto your fellow. That is the entire Torah, the rest is commentary” (Shurpin n.d.).
Hillel’s dictum is often referred to as the Golden Rule, which is found in one form or another in every other world faith, but his precise wording is unique. The Golden Rule is typically stated as some variation of “treat others the way you want to be treated,” but Hillel inverts this by giving a negative formulation – i.e., how not to treat others. This phrasing is very revealing when it comes to a Jewish freedom of religion: from this, it is easy to see that one should not mistreat others because of their religious beliefs, because one would not want be treated that way by others.
As with any faith that aims to guide people’s spiritual lives, Judaism necessarily tells its adherents what they should believe, so total freedom of religion (the freedom to believe whatever one wants) is not possible within the faith. Judaism holds that anyone born to a Jewish mother is Jewish, so one doesn’t stop being a Jew if, for example, one declares that one doesn’t believe in God, but such a belief would traditionally be considered incompatible with being a “good” Jew. Possibly the single most foundational Talmudic scholar of the Middle Ages, Moses Maimonides (died 1204), outlined thirteen fundamental principles of the Jewish faith, and all concern different aspects of believing in God and other beliefs; they are customarily recited in the format “I believe…” (Chabad n.d.).
Nevertheless, a fundamental idea of freedom of thought can be seen in traditional Jewish philosophy. As far back as the medieval period, Jewish scholars sampled from as wide a range of schools of thought as possible, including classical, Christian, and Muslim thought, in their pursuit of the ultimate truth. Since the greatest intellectual centers of the medieval Jewish world were Muslim-ruled Spain and the Middle East, Jewish philosophers were especially heavily influenced by their Islamic contemporaries, and by extension, by classical Greek texts that they encountered via Arabic translations. One particularly revealing example is Saadya Gaon, who was active in the Middle East over a century before Maimonides’ birth: “Saadya was not committed to any particular philosophical school. Existing philosophical schools were the heritage of a non-Jewish culture, the rich influence of which Saadya did not try to reject. But being a Jew [in contrast to his Muslim contemporaries], he felt free to collect material gleaned from various sources” (Stroumsa 2003, 80). Evaluations of Saadya Gaon’s body of work suggest an overarching commitment to reason over dogma; to the conviction that “the praiseworthy wise person is he who makes reality his guiding principle and bases his belief thereon,” and that “the reprehensible fool … is he who sets up his personal conviction as his guiding principle, assuming that reality is patterned after his beliefs” (Stroumsa 2003, 76). To him, this free inquiry was unquestionably compatible with Judaism. Another example of this intellectual diffusion is the Jewish Neoplatonists, foremost among them Isaac Israeli (Saadya Gaon’s contemporary) and Solomon ibn Gabirol, who both drew from and refuted the pagan worldview that the original Neoplatonist school promoted (Pessin 2003, 91-106). Maimonides himself may have been more discriminating about drawing from non-Jewish traditions, but the profound influence of Aristotelian philosophy on his thought is nevertheless widely acknowledged: even in the many places where Maimonides disagreed with Aristotle, his “philosophical starting point is Aristotle, and it is from Aristotle that he develops his own philosophical positions” (Frank 2003, 145).
Moreover, a major difference between Judaism and other Abrahamic religions is that Judaism is largely unconcerned with what non-adherents believe, and thus affords a strong degree of freedom of religion to those outside the faith. In contrast to both Christianity and Islam, where it has traditionally been considered incumbent upon those faiths’ adherents to work for the conversion of people of other faiths, Judaism is decidedly not a proselytizing religion, so much so that many modern Jews regard trying to convert others to the faith as inappropriate and disrespectful. Conversion to Judaism is deliberately a difficult and drawn-out process, meant to ensure that those who seek to convert are doing so out of genuine belief.
According to Rabbi Reuven Firestone of Hebrew Union College, the Jewish aversion to proselytization came about by necessity, to protect their communities throughout the long history of Jews living as a persecuted minority in Christian and Muslim states. Starting under the Roman Empire and continuing throughout the medieval period, entire communities could be severely punished for proselytizing to the majority faith: “The rule of survival in each context required that Jews not proselytize, upon pain of death. … Such a length of time [as a minority faith] can deeply acculturate an aversion to engaging in an act that could easily bring death and destruction to the community. So proselytism, while not forbidden anywhere in Judaism, came to feel foreign and strange” (Firestone 2019).
Although only Jews are obligated to follow Jewish law, Judaism does have a separate injunction for non-Jews, known as the Noachide Laws (Korn n.d.). Believed to have been given by God to Noah after the Great Flood, the Talmud regards these as universal laws that are binding on all of Noah’s descendants (all of humanity), thus making them the only instance where Judaism claims to prescribe the behavior of non-adherents.
Five of the seven Noachide Laws concern actions and not beliefs – the command to establish courts to uphold the law, and the prohibitions on murder, theft, sexual immorality, and eating the flesh of a living animal. The remaining two, which prohibit blasphemy and idolatry, are potentially problematic when it comes to respect for foreign religious beliefs: while traditional Jewish philosophy would not have regarded blasphemy and idol worship to be genuine religious expressions, the practical definitions of those terms can easily expand to encompass the sincerely held beliefs of other people and their cultures.
However, it is still very notable that non-Jews who abide by the Noachide Laws are thought to have a share in the World to Come, the closest thing Judaism has to heaven, despite not believing in the Jewish God or following any of the Jewish commandments (Korn n.d.). Therefore, at least implicitly, Judaism recognizes that other faiths also can guide a person to live a good and virtuous life – that action is ultimately more determinative of personal morality than belief – and this idea can also be found in medieval thought. Particularly interesting is the apologia commonly known as The Kuzari, by Spanish Jewish polymath Judah Halevi (died 1141), which is framed as an account of a Khazar king convening a dialogue between practitioners of different faiths. (The Khazars were an Eastern European empire whose ruling class converted from paganism to Judaism for uncertain reasons; Halevi’s account, written centuries after their conversion, purports to tell how it happened).
In Halevi’s narrative, the king describes his spiritual crisis following a dream where an angel told him that “his intentions were pleasing to God, but his actions were not” (Kogan 2003, 112). Subsequently, the king tries to “make a more zealous effort to observe the rites of his pagan religion than before,” but the angel keeps returning with the same message (Kogan 2003, 112). Eventually, the king realizes “that God was commanding him to seek out those actions that would be pleasing,” and so he gathers representatives of all the different religions for counsel (Kogan 2003, 112). It is the Jewish response (no doubt a stand-in for Halevi’s view) that he ultimately finds the most convincing, thus spurring his conversion. In his advice to the king, the Jewish philosopher seems almost unconcerned with what belief system the king follows, but only that he act with reason and justice: “the philosopher urges the king, in general terms, to purify his soul of doubts and pursue knowledge of the true realities, while keeping to the path of justice… if he still wishes, he may either create a religion for himself or follow one of the intellectual nomoi [Greek for laws or conventions] of the philosophers” (Kogan 2003, 113). Overall, Halevi defends tolerance of other beliefs as a Jewish value. With the Reconquista and the Crusades as the backdrop of his life, Halevi seems to have felt the rising anti-Jewish persecution of his time deeply – the full title of The Kuzari is Book of Refutation and Proof on Behalf of the Despised Religion.
Although Jewish thought has not had to contend with a notion of freedom of religion, as such, until relatively recently, traces of the idea can be found going back to the medieval period. While ultimately it is hard to argue that unbounded freedom of religion can exist in Judaism, especially when it comes to freedom of religion within Judaism (as is the case for any belief system), Judaism does stand out in its tolerant attitude toward the beliefs of other religions. More broadly, a certain freedom of thought, including a freedom to hold nonconforming religious opinions, can be found in some of the most renowned Jewish scholars’ commitment to rational and diverse inquiry, and overarching emphasis on action over belief.
References:
Chabad. “The Thirteen Principles of Jewish Faith.” n.d. Accessed July 5, 2023. https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/332555/jewish/Maimonides-13-Principles-of-Faith.htm
Firestone, Reuven. “Why Jews Don’t Proselytize.” Renovatio. June 12, 2019. Accessed July 5, 2023. https://renovatio.zaytuna.edu/article/why-jews-dont-proselytize
Frank, Daniel H. “Maimonides and Medieval Jewish Aristotelianism.” In The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, edited by Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman, 136-156. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Kogan, Barry S. “Judah Halevi and his use of Philosophy in The Kuzari.” In The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, edited by Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman, 111-135. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Korn, Eugene. “Noachide Covenant: Theology and Jewish Law.” Boston College Center for Christian-Jewish Learning. n.d. Accessed July 5, 2023. https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/research_sites/cjl/texts/cjrelations/resources/sourcebook/Noahide_covenant.htm
Pessin, Sarah. “Jewish Neoplatonism: Being above Being and Divine Emanation in Solomon ibn Gabirol and Isaac Israeli.” In The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, edited by Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman, 91-110. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Shurpin, Yehuda. “Is Hillel’s Teaching the same as the Golden Rule?” n.d. Accessed July 5, 2023.
https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/5410546/jewish/Is-Hillels-Teaching-the-Same-as-the-Golden-Rule.htm
Stroumsa, Sarah. “Saadya and Jewish Kalam.” In The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, edited by Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman, 71-90. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
The Political Constitution of the Mexican United States was ratified on 5 February 1917. Articles 1, 3.2(c), 24, 27.2, 130(b-d) grant religious freedom, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. Article 130 declares a separation of church and state; and that religious minister cannot promote candidate, nor attack national symbols.
Article 24 of Mexico’s 1917 Constitution, which is still in use today, contains the first assertion of freedom of religion in the country’s post-revolutionary history. However, prior to the 1910 Revolution, the first amendment to the country’s 1859 Constitution (also known as the Law of September 25, 1873) did state that the legislature should not adopt any law that established or forbid a religion.
Constituent Congress of 1917. “Koxtitusion Poríitika Mejikopo Nesaweme Constitución ... - Senado.gob.mx.” Senate of the Republic. Mexican Government, 2005. Last modified 2005. Accessed June 21, 2022. https://www.senado.gob.mx/comisiones/puntos_constitucionales/docs/CPM_INGLES.pdf.
“Constitution.” World Constitutions Illustrated, Heinonline. Accessed July 27, 2023. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.cow/zzmx0010&i=1
“Mexico 1917 (rev. 2015).” Constitute. Accessed July 27, 2023. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mexico_2015 +
John Stuart Mill’s widely read philosophical essay On Liberty uses Utilitarianism to analyze politics and civil society. Of the will of the nation, or the nation’s people, Mill says: “Let the rulers be effectually responsible to it, promptly removable by it, and it could afford to trust them with power of which it could itself dictate the use to be made.” In other words, Mill shares Bentham’s belief that a nation’s leadership must be responsive to the needs of its citizenry. Broad suffrage ensures that ineffective leaders are punished by a democratic removal from power. On Liberty indicates Mill’s endorsement of democratic ideals generally but says relatively little about which members of society should have the right to vote. Some of his later work, however, sheds more light on the subject.
Mill addresses the issue of gender inequality head-on in The Subjection of Women. He begins with the blanket statement that “The legal subordination of one sex to the other – is wrong in itself, and now one of the chief hinderances to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality.” Mill demands proof from those arguing that the legal subjugation of women is somehow beneficial to society. He elaborates on his own reasoning in saying: “By leaving them the free choice of their employments, and opening to them the same field of occupation and the same prizes and encouragements as to other human beings, would be that of doubling the mass of mental faculties available for the higher service of humanity.” Mill’s Utilitarian outlook can be followed here, as he argues for social and legal changes that would maximize both pleasure of productivity throughout society. The piece, published in 1869, goes on to discuss the suffragette movement that had been occurring in England throughout that decade. Mill remarks that “recently many thousands of them, headed by the most eminent women known to the public, have petitioned Parliament for their admission to the Parliamentary Suffrage.” Mill did not only contribute to the movement through his writing, but took had taken a more active role in 1867 when he spoke to the House of Commons on the suffragettes’ behalf. While women’s suffrage was unpopular among most English men of his day, Mill argued boldly: “There is nothing to distract our attention from the simple question, whether there is any adequate justification for continuing to exclude an entire half of the community, not only from admission, but from the capability of being ever admitted within the pale of the Constitution.” John Stuart Mill’s written works and his advocacy in British Parliament demonstrates his commitment to the expansion of suffrage.
References:
Mill, John Stuart. 1867. “On the Admission of Women to the Electoral Franchise.” Women’s Suffrage and the Media. May 20, 1867.
Mill, John Stuart. 1859. On Liberty. London: John W. Parker and Son, West Strand.
Mill, John Stuart. 1869. The Subjection of Women. London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer.
At first glance, the idea of freedom of religion seems tangential to modern capitalist philosophy. They are of course intuitively compatible, since under a system of free enterprise there is no reason why one shouldn’t have freedom of faith as well. Undoubtedly, capitalism became closely linked to freedom of religion in the political discourse of the Cold War, to draw a contrast with the suppression of religion under communism. Nevertheless, capitalism is fundamentally an economic philosophy, and most arguments for it are in economic terms, with a positive argument for freedom of religion apparently regarded as not essential to a capitalist value system. As Ludwig von Mises wrote, “one does not refute socialism by attacking the socialist stand on religion, marriage, birth control, and art” (von Mises 1990, 16).
That said, even if freedom of religion is not absolutely necessary to the capitalist model, leading capitalist philosophers have interacted with it in unique ways, ultimately showing that freedom of religion can be defended in terms of the free market. Precursors to this connection can be found even before modern capitalism had fully developed, as when Voltaire described how commerce fosters religious tolerance in his famous commentaries on English society: “Take a view of the Royal Exchange in London, a place more venerable than many courts of justice, where the representatives of all nations meet for the benefit of mankind. There the Jew, the Mahometan, and the Christian transact together, as though they all professed the same religion, and give the name of infidel to none but bankrupts. There the Presbyterian confides in the Anabaptist, and the Churchman depends on the Quaker’s word” (National Constitution Center 2023).
Milton Friedman, the preeminent modern philosopher of capitalism, would build on this idea by discussing how the underlying principles of capitalism naturally work to promote respect for freedom of religion. In his book Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman specifically highlighted the principles of free association and private enterprise, emphasizing that they have relevance to society in realms other than the economic: “By relying primarily on voluntary cooperation and private enterprise, in both economic and other activities, we can insure that the private sector is a check on the powers of the governmental sector and an effective protection of freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought” (Friedman 2002, 3). Elsewhere in his book, Friedman pointed to the importance of competition: “[T]he preserves of discrimination in any society are the areas that are most monopolistic in character, whereas discrimination against groups of particular color or religion is least in those areas where there is the greatest freedom of competition” (Friedman 2002, 109).
For Friedrich Hayek, the capitalist system was crucial in enabling free exchange of ideas that are in demand by the public, just as it enables the free exchange of goods and services. To Hayek, capitalism (in a broader sociopolitical sense rather than strictly in an economic sense) facilitates freedom, of which freedom of religion is necessarily a part. As he wrote in The Constitution of Liberty, “the man of independent means is an even more important figure in a free society when he is not occupied with using his capital in the pursuit of material gain but uses it in the service of aims which bring no material return” (Hayek 1960, 125). Among these aims are “the propagation of new ideas in politics, morals, and religion” (Hayek 1960, 125). Hayek subsequently emphasizes how the principle of competition necessitates religious pluralism, analogously to John Stuart Mill’s marketplace of ideas: “[T]here should be no monopoly here but as many independent centers as possible able to satisfy such [spiritual] needs… representatives of all divergent views and tastes should be in a position to support with their means and their energy ideals which are not yet shared by the majority” (Hayek 1960, 125). That said, Hayek noted that freedom of religion, like any freedom, cannot be absolute: “Since there is no kind of action that may not interfere with another person's protected sphere, neither speech, nor the press, nor the exercise of religion can be completely free. … Freedom does mean and can mean only that what we may do is not dependent on the approval of any person or authority and is limited only by the same abstract rules that apply equally to all” (Hayek 1960, 155). Even so, Hayek evidently did not regard such limitations as so significant as to curtail freedom of religion; they did not represent a conflict between freedom of religion and the capitalist model.
Other philosophers, however, were not so accepting of the role of religion in the capitalist system. Von Mises did, in some parts of his work, express a view similar to Friedman and Hayek, as when he wrote, “the freedom that the market economy grants to the individual is not merely ‘economic’ as distinguished from some other kind of freedom. It implies the freedom to determine also all those issues which are considered as moral, spiritual, and intellectual” (von Mises 1990, 9). On the other hand, he also apparently considered religion (or at least the institutions of organized religion) inimical to the development of capitalism. As von Mises said, “it would seem that only a negative answer can be made to the question [of] whether it might not be possible to reconcile Christianity with a free social order based on private ownership in the means of production. A living Christianity cannot, it seems, exist side by side with Capitalism. Just as in the case of Eastern religions, Christianity must either overcome Capitalism or go under” (Glahe and Vorhies 1989).
In The Ethics of Liberty, Murray Rothbard denied the very existence of freedom of religion as a separate right, under his conception that all rights are fundamentally property rights. As he wrote, “the concept of ‘rights’ only makes sense as property rights. For not only are there no human rights which are not also property rights, but the former rights lose their absoluteness and clarity and become fuzzy and vulnerable when property rights are not used as the standard” (Rothbard 1998, 113). For Rothbard, every right is a right to ownership (of one’s body, speech, beliefs, etc.); any other account of rights creates inevitable conflicts when one person’s right interferes with the rights of others. He believes that due to such conflicts all rights must be acknowledged as not absolute, and thus (in contrast to Hayek’s view) they become abridged. Using the example of the right to freedom of speech, or “the right of everyone to say whatever he likes,” Rothbard argued that “the neglected question is: Where? Where does a man have this right? He certainly does not have it on property on which he is trespassing” (Rothbard 1998, 113). Therefore “there is no such thing as a separate ‘right to free speech’; there is only a man's property right: the right to do as he wills with his own [property] or to make voluntary agreements with other property owners” (Rothbard 1998, 113). The same would thus be true for freedom of religion as a discrete right; presumably, it should likewise be subordinated to the interests of, and subsumed into, the capitalist right to property.
The most obvious real-life application of Rothbard’s stance seems to be in workplace accommodations for religious practice. In the United States, the courts have in fact rejected his view by recognizing a separate right to practice one’s religion as it relates to employment; this goes as far back as the 1963 case Sherbert v. Verner, where the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a woman who had been denied unemployment benefits after being fired due to her Seventh-Day Adventist faith. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, religion is likewise a protected category when it comes to employment discrimination, in areas like hiring, firing, or advancement. Under the adversarial view described above, however, a business owner’s property is theirs to do with as they see fit, and they cannot be made to change the way they use their property to accommodate anyone’s beliefs; if the requirements of the job are intolerable to an employee’s religion, the business owner has no obligation to keep employing them. While the employee has the right to ownership of their beliefs, that does not extend to the right to practice those beliefs on someone else’s property.
In the thought of the leading philosophers of modern capitalism, one can find divergent views on the relationship that religion, and specifically the right to freedom of religion, has with capitalism. Nonetheless, these philosophers certainly had to contend with issues of religion, and from their writings it can be seen that freedom of religion has more relevance to a discussion of modern capitalist philosophy than may initially be apparent.
References:
Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom, 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
Glahe, Fred, and Frank Vorhies. “Religion, Liberty, and Economic Development: An Empirical Investigation.” Public Choice, 62, no. 3 (1989): 201-215.
Hayek, Friedrich. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.
National Constitution Center. “Letters Concerning the English Nation (1733).” 2023. Accessed July 14, 2023. https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/historic-document-library/detail/voltaireletters-concerning-the-english-nation-1733
Rothbard, Murray. The Ethics of Liberty. New York: New York University Press, 1998.
von Mises, Ludwig. “Human Action.” In Economic Freedom and Interventionism: An Anthology of Articles and Essays, ed. Bettina Bien Greaves, 12-19. Courtesy of the Online Library of Liberty, Liberty Fund, Inc., 1990.
von Mises, Ludwig. “The Freeman.” In Economic Freedom and Interventionism: An Anthology of Articles and Essays, ed. Bettina Bien Greaves, 3-11. Courtesy of the Online Library of Liberty, Liberty Fund, Inc., 1990.
Constitution of the Republic of Moldova was ratified on 27 July 1994. Articles 10.2, 31, 32.3, and 35.8 grant religious freedom, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. The preamble declares secular aspirations for the state of Moldova.
Parliament of the Republic of Moldova. “Constitution of the Republic of Moldova .” Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova . Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova , 2022. Last modified 2022. Accessed June 21, 2022. https://www.constcourt.md/public/files/file/Actele%20Curtii/acte_en/MDA_Constitution_EN.pdf. +
Article 10 of Monaco’s 1911 Constitution contains the first assertion of freedom of religion in the country’s history. The document was then heavily revised in 1962 and remains in use to this day. In the 1962 Constitution, Article 23 grants religious freedom. Article 9 declares Catholicism the official state religion.
“Constitution of Monaco.” World Constitutions Illustrated. Accessed July 27, 2023. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.beal/connat0002&i=474
Prince Rainer III and National Council of Monaco. Princely Government of the Principality of Monaco . Princely Government of the Principality of Monaco , 2002. Last modified 2002. Accessed June 21, 2022. https://en.gouv.mc/Government-Institutions/Institutions/Constitution-of-the-Principality#eztoc1036069_1. +
According to Chapter 1, Article 3(f) of the 1924 Constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic, "In order to secure for the toilers real freedom of conscience, the Church is separated from the State, and it is declared that religion is the private concern of each citizen."
Freedom of religion was later guaranteed in Article 81 of the 1940 Constitution of the Mongol People's Republic: "In the Mongol People's Republic religion is separated from the state and the school. Citizens of the Mongol People's Republic have freedom of religion and of antireligious propaganda."
The Fundamental Law of Mongolia was ratified on 13 January 1992. Articles 14, 16.15, and 19.2 grant religious freedom, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. Article 9 declares that the state may not engage in religious activities.
References:
1924 Constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic: British and Foreign State Papers (1931) https://heinonline-org.proxygw.wrlc.org/HOL/Page?collection=cow&handle=hein.cow/bfsprs0134&id=1244&men_tab=srchresults
“Constitution of the Mongol People’s Republic.” World Constitutions Illustrated, Heinonline. Accessed July 27, 2023. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.cow/cososnat0002&i=735
The People's Great Khural. “The Constitution of Mongolia.” Constitutional Court of Mongolia . Constitutional Court of Mongolia , 2022. Last modified 2022. Accessed June 21, 2022. https://www.conscourt.gov.mn/?page_id=842&lang=en.
“Mongolia 1992 (rev. 2001).” Constitute. Accessed July 27, 2023. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mongolia_2001 +
According to Article 208 if the 1905 Constitution: "Liberty of conscience is unlimited. The recognized religious confessions are free and protected by the law in so far as the exercise of their cult does not offend public order and morals."
In the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro, Articles 11, 34, 43, 67, 70, 74, and 76 grant extensive religious freedom, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. Article 11 declares separation of church and state. In Montenegro’s Constitution of 2007, Article 46 specifically describes the freedom of religion, which is also alluded to in Article 14.
1905 Montenegro Constitution: English translation from the French text of the original Constitution of 1905 "Part 14: The Constitutional Rights of Montenegrin Citizens," Constitution of 6/19 December 1905. (1905): 426-427: https://heinonline-org.mutex.gmu.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cow/zzmb0013&id=20&collection=cow&index=
The Assembly of the Republic of Montenegro. “Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro.” Government of Montenegro. Ministry of Justice, January 30, 2004. Last modified January 30, 2004. Accessed June 21, 2022. https://www.gov.me/en/documents/d7f0c262-dfa2-448b-a2c3-1e5ba628f2bb.
“Montenegro 2007.” Constitute. Accessed July 27, 2023. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Montenegro_2007 +
Freedom of religion is protected in Morocco in tandem with the establishment of a state religion. Article 6 of the first Moroccan constitution of 1962 determines that Islam is the religion of the state while also protecting “the free exercise of beliefs [cultes]” for all (Hein Online). This right is still protected today under Article 3 of the current constitution (constituteproject.org).
"Fundamental Principles." Constitution of Morocco, pp. 562-563. HeinOnline, https://heinonline-org.uc.idm.oclc.org/HOL/P?h=hein.cow/zzma0011&i=1.
“Morocco 2011 Constitution.” Constitute. Accessed July 26, 2023. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Morocco_2011. +
Freedom of religion was first noted in Article 33 of Mozambique’s 1975 constitution which stated that “[i]n the People’s Republic of Mozambique the State guarantees the freedom of citizens to practice or not to practice a religion” (Hein Online).
The current Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique was ratified on December 21, 2004. Articles 12.3, 12.4, 35, 39, 54, 71.1, 251, and 286 grant religious freedom, equality, and prohibit discrimination. Articles 12.2 and 292.1(c) create a separation between religion and the state. Article 54 of Mozambique’s constitution states that “[a]ll citizens shall have the freedom to practice or not to practice a religion. Nobody shall be discriminated against… or benefit from or be exempt from duties, on the grounds of his faith or religious persuasion or practice” (constituteproject.org).
"Section II: Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens ." Official English Translation, The Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique, 1975, pp. 5-6. HeinOnline, https://heinonline-org.uc.idm.oclc.org/HOL/P?h=hein.cow/zzmz0011&i=6.
“Mozambique 2004 (Rev. 2007) Constitution.” Constitute. Accessed July 26, 2023. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mozambique_2007. +
Freedom of religion was first conditionally protected under Article 21(b) of the 1947 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma which states that Burmese citizens “shall enjoy the right to profess their religion… provided the enjoyment of any such freedom does not offend the laws or the public interest” (Hein Online).
The current Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar was ratified on 29 May 2008. Articles 34, 348, 352, 354(d), 363, and 368 grant religious freedom, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. Article 362 recognizes Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Animism as religions in the country. Article 34 of Myanmar’s current constitution protects freedom of religion for its citizens. It states: “Every citizen is equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess and practise religion subject to public order, morality or health and to the other provisions of this Constitution” (constituteproject.org).
"Chapter II: Basic Principles." The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, 1974, pp. 4-7. HeinOnline, https://heinonline-org.uc.idm.oclc.org/HOL/P?h=hein.cow/zzmm0005&i=8.
“Myanmar 2008 (Rev. 2015) Constitution.” Constitute. Accessed July 26, 2023. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Myanmar_2015. +
Constitution of the Republic of Namibia was ratified on 09 February 1990. Articles 10.2, 14.1, 19, 21, and 97 grant religious freedom, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. The preamble and Article 1.1 declare Namibia a secular state. Freedom of religion is protected for Namibian citizens under Article 21 Section 1c which states that “[a]ll persons shall have the right to… freedom to practise any religion and to manifest such practice…” (constituteproject.org).
Hishoono, Naita. “THE Constitution in the 21st Century Perspectives on the Context and Future of Namibia’s Supreme Law.” CMS. Namibia Institute for Democracy (NID) and the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), 2011. Last modified 2011. Accessed June 23, 2022. https://cms.my.na/assets/documents/p1a3o3rq6r1ci1ma2ld714vmtm1.pdf.
“Namibia 1990 (Rev. 2014) Constitution.” Constitute. Accessed July 26, 2023. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Namibia_2014. +
Article 11 Section 1 of Nauru’s 1968 constitution protects freedom of religion for its citizens. It states: “A person has the right to freedom of conscience, thought and religion, including freedom to change his religion or beliefs and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest and propagate his religion or beliefs in worship, teaching, practice and observance” (constituteproject.org).
“Nauru 1968 (Rev. 2015) Constitution.” Constitute. Accessed July 26, 2023. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nauru_2015. +
Freedom of religion was mentioned in Nepal’s first constitution of 1948 in Article 4 which stated that “[s]ubject to the principles of public order and morality, this Constitution guarantees to the citizens of Nepal… freedom of worship…” (Hein Online). Freedom of religion is now protected under Article 26 Section 1 of the current constitution which states that “[e]ach person shall be free to profess, practice, and preserve his/her religion according to his/her faith” (constituteproject.org).
“Nepal 2015 (Rev. 2016) Constitution.” Constitute. Accessed July 26, 2023. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nepal_2016.
"Part III: The Executive." Constitution of Nepal. Katmandu, 26th January, 1948., 1948, pp. 658-660. HeinOnline, https://heinonline-org.uc.idm.oclc.org/HOL/P?h=hein.cow/zznp0020&i=3. +
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA) of 1990 was ratified on 28 August 1990; the Human Rights Act of 1993 was ratified 10 August 1993. Articles 13, 15, and 20 of the NZBORA and Articles 21.1(c), 21.1(d), 25.1(ai), 26, 27.2, 28, 39.1, 55, and 58.1 of the HRA grant religious freedom, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. Article 13 of the 1990 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act states that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief, including the right to adopt and to hold opinions without interference” (constituteproject.org).
Parliament of New Zealand. “Human Rights Act 1993.” New Zealand Legislation. The Parliamentary Counsel Office, 2021. Last modified 2021. Accessed June 23, 2022. https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0082/latest/whole.html#DLM304490.
Parliament of New Zealand. “New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.” New Zealand Legislation. Parliamentary Counsel Office, 2011. Last modified 2011. Accessed June 23, 2022. https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1990/0109/latest/whole.html#DLM224792.
“New Zealand 1852 (Rev. 2014) Constitution.” Constitute. Accessed July 26, 2023. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/New_Zealand_2014. +
Free practice of religion was prohibited in the first Nicaraguan constitution of 1826, with Title 4 Chapter 2 Article 46 establishing that “[t]he Religion of the State is the Catholic, Apostolic, Roman, with the exclusion of the public exercise of any other” (Hein Online, 1826). Freedom of religion was first protected in the 1838 constitution under Article 53 which established Catholicism as the state religion, but stipulated that “the public exercise of the other religions is not prohibited” (Hein Online, 1838).
The current Constitution of Nicaragua was ratified on January 1, 1987. Articles 27, 29, 49, 69, 82.1, 124, and 180 grant religious freedom, equality, and prohibit discrimination. Article 14 declares that Nicaragua has no official religion. Article 29 states: “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of conscience and thought and to profess or not profess a religion” (constituteproject.org).
"Chapter 1: General Provisions." Constitution of the State of Nicaragua 8 April 1826, 1826, pp. 7-8. HeinOnline, https://heinonline-org.uc.idm.oclc.org/HOL/P?h=hein.cow/zzni0038&i=7.
"Chapter V: Of the Government and of Religion." Political Constitution of the Sovereign, Free and Independent State of Nicaragua 12 November 1838, 1838, pp. 8-8. HeinOnline, https://heinonline-org.uc.idm.oclc.org/HOL/P?h=hein.cow/zzni0040&i=8.
“Nicaragua 1987 (Rev. 2014) Constitution.” Constitute. Accessed July 26, 2023. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nicaragua_2014. +