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The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa was ratified on December 18, 1996. Articles 9, 15, and 31 grant religious freedom, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. Government of South Africa . “The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.” South African Government. Last modified 2003. Accessed July 5, 2022. https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-1996-1#:~:text=The%20Constitution%20of%20the%20Republic%20of%20South%20Africa%2C%201996%2C%20was,the%20provisions%20of%20the%20Constitution. +
The Constitution of the Republic of South Korea was ratified on July 12, 1948. Articles 11 and 20.1 grant religious freedom, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. Article 20.2 declares a separation between church and state. The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea. “Constitution of South Korea .” Last modified 1987. Accessed July 5, 2022. https://korea.assembly.go.kr:447/res/low_01_read.jsp?boardid=1000000035. +
The Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan was ratified on July 9, 2011. Articles 8.2, 14, 23, 29.1, 31.1(e), 122.5(a), 139(d), 169.6, and 190(a) grant religious freedom, equality, and extensively prohibit religious discrimination. Article 8.1 declares a separation between church and state. Constitution Project. “South Sudan 2011 (Rev. 2013) Constitution.” Constitute. POGO, April 27, 2022. Last modified April 27, 2022. Accessed July 5, 2022. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2013?lang=en. +
Spain’s earliest iteration of its constitution was the Bayonne Constitution in 1808. Article 21 of the First Title of the Constitution of 1869 states, “The Nation is obligated to maintain the faith and the ministers of the Catholic religion. The public or private exercise of any other faith is guaranteed to all foreigners resident in Spain, without greater limitations than the universal rules of morality and of the law.” If any Spanish citizen also chooses to exercise a religion that is not Catholic, they also enjoy the same freedoms as foreigners that practice alternative religions. Here, there is freedom of religion but there is not necessarily a separation of church and state.
Sources:
“Northwestern SSO.” n.d. Prd-Nusso.it.northwestern.edu. Accessed June 21, 2024.
https://heinonline-org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/HOL/Page?collection=cow&handle=hein.cow/zzes0128
&id=6&men_tab=srchresults. +
Following its conversion to a republic within the British Commonwealth, Sri Lanka’s 1972 constitution was enacted. Chapter IV, Section 18 outlines the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the government and states, “every citizen shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and the freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.”
Sources:
“Northwestern SSO.” n.d. Prd-Nusso.it.northwestern.edu. Accessed June 21, 2024.
https://heinonline-org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cow/zzlk0078&id=22&collection=cow&index=. +
While ancient Stoics did not explicitly discuss voting rights, some of their concepts and principles offer insights into how it might be perceived. One such concept is the Stoic idea of natural law, which posits that there is a universal moral order inherent in the nature of the universe and human beings (Grayling, 2019, 111-112). Living in accordance with it meant aligning one’s actions with reason, which involved practicing the four cardinal virtues: wisdom (prudence), courage, justice, and temperance (moderation). These virtues, known as aretai (plural of aretē), are always good and beneficial, as opposed to “what can sometimes have value (axia)”, such as wealth, health, and honor (Garrett, 2000; Grayling, 2019, 111). According to Stoic philosophy, though we are naturally predisposed to seek the latter due to our inherent tendency to care for ourselves (oikeiosis), they are not good as such and thus do not lead to true happiness (Grayling, 2019, 111).
Justice, as one of the cardinal values, is a fundamental aspect of Stoic ethics that demands fairness and contributing to the common good. As the Roman Emperor and Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius (2001) states, "to care for all men generally, is agreeing to the nature of a man" (Book 3, Verse 4). It therefore goes beyond mere legalistic fairness and embodies a deeper ethical commitment to the well-being of all human beings. One way that this principle is realized is through active engagement in societal and communal affairs. Such participation allows individuals to practice the virtue of justice by advocating for policies that protect the rights and well-being of others. Voting falls within this realm of engagement, serving as a way for individuals to be involved in the political process.
Other prominent Stoic figures like Cato the Younger and Seneca also highlight the importance of such involvement in the governance of one's community. Cato the Younger, a staunch defender of the Roman Republic, emphasized the importance of participating in government to safeguard one’s happiness and well-being. His words, “Some have said that it is not the business of private men to meddle with government–a bold and dishonest saying...To say that private men have nothing to do with government is to say that private men have nothing to do with their own happiness or misery,” underscore the critical importance he placed on civic engagement for both personal fulfillment and the collective good (DePriest, n.d.). This point is further illustrated by a quote commonly attributed to Seneca: “He who does not prevent a crime when he can, encourages it”. While Seneca's focus here is on the prevention of wrongdoing, it aligns with the Stoic principle of taking proactive steps to address societal issues, which voting facilitates.
Assuming the Stoics would support the practice of voting, the question arises as to whether they would advocate for universal suffrage or impose certain restrictions or eligibility requirements. Their concept of natural law assumes humans to be rational beings that are capable of understanding and participating in the governance of society, suggesting that they might support broad participation in the voting process as a means to achieve just and rational outcomes. They would also emphasize the importance of citizens embodying the cardinal virtues in exercising their voting rights to ensure informed and rational participation in governance. Any further inferences would be speculative, as the Stoics did not write about specific political mechanisms like voting. It may be easier to discuss those on the other end of the voting process, i.e., candidates, as the Stoics have extensive discussions on ethical exemplars that provide more substantial guidance on what they might expect from those in positions of authority. Otherwise, the most that could be said without imposing modern interpretations is that the Stoics were strong proponents of civic participation and would emphasize the importance of virtue and rationality in those who engage in governance.
References:
Grayling, A.C. The History of Philosophy. Penguin Random House UK, 2019, 108-115.
Garrett, Jan. "Values in Classical Stoicism." Last modified August 2000. Accessed July 17, 2024. https://people.wku.edu/jan.garrett/stoa/stovals.htm.
Epictetus. Discourses. Translated by George Long. MIT Classics Archive. Accessed July 17, 2024. https://classics.mit.edu/Epictetus/discourses.1.one.html.
Jennings DePriest. "Naked, Starved, Deceived, and Destroyed: A Stoic’s Guide to Elections." Daily Stoic, accessed July 15, 2024. https://dailystoic.com/stoic-guide-election/.
Marcus Aurelius. Meditations. Translated by J. Boulton. Project Gutenberg. Released June 1, 2001. Last updated March 9, 2021. https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2680/pg2680-images.html#link2H_4_0035.
Articles 4, 41, 43, 48, 56, 62.1, and 66 grant religious freedoms, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. There is no mention of Islam and Sharia Law, which was a corner stone in their previous constitution. Constitution Project. “Sudan 2019 Constitution.” Constitute. POGO, April 27, 2022. Last modified April 27, 2022. Accessed July 5, 2022. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sudan_2019?lang=en. +
The Constitution of the Republic of Suriname was ratified on 30 September 1987. Articles 8.2, 18, and 28 grant religious freedom, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. Constitution Project . “Suriname 1987 (Rev. 1992) Constitution.” Constitute. POGO, April 27, 2022. Last modified April 27, 2022. Accessed July 5, 2022. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Surinam_1992?lang=en. +
The Constitution of Sweden was ratified in 1974, and came into force on January 1, 1975. Chapter 1 Article 2, Chapter 2 Article 1.6, 2, 21, 23, and Chapter 7 Article 4.11 grant religious freedoms, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. Riksdag. “The Constitution of Sweden.” Last modified 2016. Accessed July 5, 2022. https://www.riksdagen.se/globalassets/07.-dokument--lagar/the-constitution-of-sweden-160628.pdf. +
The Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation was ratified on 12 September 1848. Articles 8.2 and 15 grants religious freedom and prohibit religious discrimination. Article 72 leaves the regulation of religion to preserve public peace to the cantons. The Federal Constitution. “Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation.” Last modified February 13, 2022. Accessed July 5, 2022. https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1999/404/en. +
The Constitution of the Syrian Arab Republic was ratified on February 26, 2012. Articles 3 and 33.3 grant religious freedom and prohibit religious discrimination. Article 3 also declares the president must me Islamic and Islam Jurisprudence or Sharia is the main source of legislation. Constitution Project. “Syrian Arab Republic 2012 Constitution.” Constitute. POGO, April 27, 2022. Last modified April 27, 2022. Accessed July 5, 2022. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Syria_2012?lang=en. +
The constitution of The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe was ratified on November 5, 1975. Articles 15.1, and 27 guarantee religious freedom, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. Article 8 creates a separation of church and state; and Article 154(b) declares the state to be secular. Constitution Project. “Sao Tome and Principe 1975 (Rev. 2003) Constitution.” Constitute. POGO, April 27, 2022. Last modified April 27, 2022. Accessed June 28, 2022. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sao_Tome_and_Principe_2003?lang=en. +
The first assertion of the freedom of religion in Tajikistan is the 1994 Constitution post-independence from the Soviet Union. The right is found in article 26 which allows the individual, or group to adhere to any religion or none.
An amendment to current law (enforced in January 2018) permits restrictions on religious activity for the sole purpose of ensuring the rights and freedoms of others, as well as banning one religious sect from being state ideology (U.S. Department of State, "2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Tajikistan"). +
The first assertion of the freedom of religion in Tanzania is the 1977 constitution after the unification of the states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar after their independence from the United Kingdom. Article 9, 13, 19, and 39.2 grants religious freedom, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. The preamble and article 3 declare Tanzania to be secular.
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tanzania_2005
THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA Office of The Attorney General. “The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977.” Last modified 2005. Accessed July 5, 2022. https://oagmis.agctz.go.tz/portal/constitutions/eyJpdiI6IkFmY0NLQ1wvQWJsUmliZWUxbWh1MVpnPT0iLCJ2YWx1ZSI6IlIwdWx4VnQ3a3plWnFqb0pjcnlvQlE9PSIsIm1hYyI6ImEwNTQxYzdhNTIxMThlYWJlNzU3Mzc5NzZkMmRiYWJkODc4Nzc1ZjVjYjY0NTQ5OTQxYzg3NmYwMDZlN2Y5ZjkifQ== +
The first assertion of the freedom of religion in Thailand is the 1932 constitution which asserts the freedom of religion in Section 13. Section 13 highlights the freedom of worship and belief but limits the freedom ‘if contrary to the duties of a national or to public order or public morals’.
https://media.bloomsburyprofessional.com/rep/files/thailand-constitution-1932-december.pdf +
The Constitution of The Commonwealth of The Bahamas was ratified on July 10th 1973. Article 22 protects freedom of religion. The preamble does specifically mention Christian values and the supremacy of God. Constitution Project. “Bahamas (the) 1973 Constitution.” Constitute, POGO, 27 Apr. 2022, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bahamas_1973?lang=en.
The Bahamas’ 1973 Constitution contains the first assertion of freedom of religion in the country’s independent history. Article 22 of the document outlines this right.
“Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas.” The Government of the Bahamas. Accessed July 20, 2023. https://www.bahamas.gov.bs/wps/wcm/connect/04fb4632-1bd7-414f-b66e-9c499b382480/Chap+3+Protection+rights+and+freedoms.pdf?MOD=AJPERES +
The Gambia Independence Order of 1965, written on January 29th, 1965, and presented to the British Parliament in the same year, protects and guarantees the right to freedom of religion in Gambia. Article 19 deals with freedom of conscience and its six sections address freedom of religion, granting it to all citizens (“The Gambia Independence Order” 1965). Under the 2020 Constitution of the Gambia Articles 1.3, 4.d, 12, 32, 49, 67, 69, 274.1(d), and 296.2(d) offer extensive religious protections and prohibit religious discrimination, and Articles 88.5(b) and 153.2(b) declare that the president and national assembly may not establish a national religion.
“The Gambia Independence Order” 1965. Citizenshiprightsafrica.org
http://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Gambia-Constitution-1965.pdf
Constitution Project “Gambia (the) 2020 Constitution.” Constitute. POGO, April 27, 2022. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Gambia_2020D?lang=en#:~:text=Gambia%20(The)%202020%20Constitution%20%2D%20Constitute. +
Freedom of religion, as one understands it today, is a relatively modern concept that arose from the work of Enlightenment philosophers in the 17th and 18th centuries. However, despite its relative modernity, theoretical arguments related to freedom of religion in its most simplified sense (i.e., the right to accept or deny faith in any sense) have existed for centuries. Medieval Europeans did not enjoy freedom in choosing or refusing religion, as ecclesiastical structures were employed and amended to bolster political systems. Symbiotic relationships between church and state were a key characteristic of Medieval Europe and were seen to be a natural continuation of their respective roles in society. In analyzing the extent to which freedom of religion was respected or restricted in the Medieval period, one cannot expect to find evidence for the clear pro or contra argument in texts and sources. One can, however, apply modern logic and understanding of what freedom of religion constitutes to theoretically comprehend how Medieval theologians would have viewed and treated freedom of religion. By analyzing the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Francisco de Vitoria from the 13th and 16th centuries, respectively, one can see the theoretical beginnings of freedom of religion as a natural right to be enjoyed by all peoples.
Thomism refers to the teachings and beliefs of Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), a prominent Catholic theologian and philosopher whose works were heavily influenced by classical Greek and Roman thought. Much of Thomas’ work is based on a reconciliation of faith and reason to obtain true knowledge of the world and, if employed properly, of God. Freedom of religion was a nonexistent concept during the period Aquinas lived through. Despite this, one can see that spiritual arguments of the 13th century were focused on personal interpretation versus the organizational doctrine of Christianity. His magnum opus, Summa Theologica, is a systematic theological tome of what Aquinas believed to be the sum of all known learning. He employs Aristotelian logic processes to explain the relationship between God and man and how man can use faith and reason to understand God's natural world and workings.
It is important to note that while Aquinas forms his arguments for a Christian audience, he does offer insight into broader faith-centered topics, like how to define heresy and man’s right to a free conscience. To Aquinas, heresy was something that only Christians could commit, as “heresy is the species of unbelief that belongs to those who profess the Faith of Christ but corrupt its dogmas” (Summa Theologica II-II, q. 11, a. 1). Those who are not Christian cannot be heretics, based on the definition of heresy being inherent to the Christian faith. Aquinas explains further that “it is irrelevant to the corruption of the Christian Faith if someone holds a false opinion in matters that do not belong to the Faith, e.g., in geometrical matters or others of this sort, which cannot in any way pertain to the Faith. Rather, it is relevant only when someone has a false opinion with respect to the things that belong to the Faith” (ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2). Therefore, through omission, Aquinas acknowledges that peoples of other faiths are not contrary (or heretical) to Christianity, but rather believers of something else entirely. This is not to be confused with unbelief, which according to Aquinas, is a sin since that implies unbelievers are completely “without faith” (ST II-II, q. 10, a. 1).
If we can infer from the Summa that only Christians are capable of heresy, where does that leave Thomist views of freedom of religion? As established earlier, freedom of religion in our modern sense was not understood in the same way by Medieval Europeans. However, it is important to establish that Aquinas believed in a moral order that “is prior to and superior to the legal order; and this moral order is what he calls the ‘natural law’" (Thiry, 174). Humans can't act contrary to this human or natural law, as Aquinas “conceived of human beings as… possessing natural liberty in terms of self-mastery, or natural dominium” (Cornish, 559). In synthesizing Aquinas’ arguments, he “contended that all human beings, Christian or not, had a moral obligation to follow even an erroneous conscience. This principle applied to everyone never previously exposed to the Christian message… [however] it did not apply… to Christian defectors—heretics and apostates—who… should be punished” (Little). Therefore, we can conclude that while not a proponent of freedom of religion per se, Saint Thomas Aquinas did believe in the idea of a free conscience that man was obliged to follow, so long as he was not committing Christian heresy or living with an absence of faith.
Several decades after Aquinas’ death and prompted by the actions of the insurgent French King Philip, Pope Boniface VIII issued the Papal bull, Unam Sanctam, or “One Holy.” In the theoretical context of the extent of freedom of religion in Medieval Europe, this declaration put square limitations on the operational ability of political capabilities when challenged by spiritual controls. While the Unam Sanctam changed little for the average European Christian, it marks a turning point in the way in which organized religion interacted with temporal structures. Boniface explained that:
"We are informed by the texts of the gospels that in this Church and in its power are two swords; namely, the spiritual and the temporal. For when the Apostles say: ‘Behold, here are two swords‘ [Lk 22:38] that is to say, in the Church, since the Apostles were speaking, the Lord did not reply that there were too many, but sufficient. Certainly the one who denies that the temporal sword is in the power of Peter has not listened well to the word of the Lord commanding: ‘Put up thy sword into thy scabbard ‘[Mt 26:52]. Both, therefore, are in the power of the Church, that is to say, the spiritual and the material sword, but the former is to be administered for the Church but the latter by the Church; the former in the hands of the priest; the latter by the hands of kings and soldiers, but at the will and sufferance of the priest" (Papal Encyclicals Online).
Here for the first time in Christian history, the pope ordained that the political and temporal “sword” should be squarely subordinated and at the mercy of the Catholic church. In concluding his bull, Boniface stated, "Furthermore, we declare, we proclaim, we define that it is absolutely necessary for salvation that every human creature be subject to the Roman Pontiff" (Papal Encyclicals Online). Every human creature, regardless of race, creed, location, or language, was now to be governed by the spiritual (and political through subjugation) sword of the pope in Rome. While this bull was issued after Thomas Aquinas lived, this document would prove to be an instrumental point of contention for neo-Thomists in the late-Medieval period when the question of freedom of religion ceased to be purely theoretical and began to have practical implications due to the colonization of the New World.
Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546) was a crucial figure in the Spanish Scholasticism movement and a founder of the School of Salamanca, a neo-Thomist school of thought that produced innovative analyses and teachings on Spanish colonialism, Catholic superiority, and natural rights of all peoples. While Vitoria and Aquinas are formidable religious theorists, their philosophies emerged within different social, political, and religious contexts. While neo-Thomist in nature, Vitoria's works were heavily influenced by the social and political issues created by Spanish colonialism and its interactions with indigenous (non-Christian) Americans.
Drawing on Thomist beliefs in freedom of conscience and the superiority of human (or natural) law to temporal powers, Vitoria was a staunch advocate for respecting the inherent humanity of those that the Spanish encountered in the New World. Vitoria “treated [the] law as made by ‘reason and enlightenment’, not just the will. Natural law, derived from eternal law by reason, was binding on all humanity; its principles applied to mutable situations and different peoples. God was the indirect cause of human laws, which were binding on the conscience of individuals” (Izbicki et al., 2019). So, despite the different faiths of the Spaniards and indigenous Americans, human law was omnirelevant in neo-Thomist philosophy.
The second part of Vitoria’s theoretical argument focuses on the limitations of the Pope as the head of Christendom and the spiritual and temporal controls available to him. Vitoria’s arguments were set directly against what was laid out in the Unam Sanctum of 1302; he argued that the Pope did not enjoy infallible temporal and spiritual power over non-Christians. Vitoria was keen to point out that “…the Pope 'has no temporal power over the Indians or over other unbelievers’” … because “Christ had no temporal power, and so neither can his representative [i.e., the Pope] on earth’” (Ruston, 11). Unlike the two-sword metaphor used to explain the powers available to the Pope in the early 14th century, Vitoria draws the line to exclude “unbelievers” and removes them from the Pope’s jurisdiction. Here again, we see the vital importance of man’s free conscience and the role of natural law in rudimentary accounts of freedom of religion. However, Vitoria did not believe that temporal power was superior to spiritual, just that Christian laws from the Pope did not bind all humanity equally (Izbicki et al., 2019). Vitoria was a Christian and a contemporary of Saint Thomas Aquinas by two and a half centuries. Still, he was able to remove personal religiosity from his political and social opinions in a way that did not become conventional until much later in history. Vitoria took Thomist beliefs of human law and free will one step further than Aquinas in his practical arguments related to the protections indigenous Americans should enjoy in the face of the Spanish conquistadors exploring the New World.
The arguments presented by Saint Thomas and Francisco de Vitoria have surprisingly modern applications in examining their theoretical applications to contemporary understandings of human rights and freedoms. As expressed earlier, because it would be impossible to draw a straight conclusion to support or contradict how they viewed freedom of religion within the social, political, and religious climates of Medieval Europe, we must analyze their works from a theoretical perspective. Suppose we can take the (neo-)Thomist emphases on the importance of free conscience as the primary basis of freedom of religion and man’s right to have a clear conscience. In that case, we can conclude “that when a government seeks to delimit the range of free behavior so that religious beliefs and practices regarding God are excluded or suppressed, the state necessarily acts against the very structure of deliberative human freedom itself, with respect to both its deepest initial inclinations and its ultimate transcendent horizon" (White, 1159). While Thomas and Vitoria would not have shared our contemporary understanding of freedom of religion, their appreciation for the necessity of free conscience over that of ecclesiastical or political restrictions translates well to modern arguments for freedom of religion as a natural and inalienable right to be enjoyed by everyone.
References:
Aquinas, Thomas. New English Translation of St. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae (Summa Theologica). Translated by Alfred Freddoso. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2023. https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/TOC.htm.
Cornish, Paul J. “Marriage, Slavery, and Natural Rights in the Political Thought of Aquinas.” The Review of Politics 60, no. 3 (1998): 545–61. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1407988.
Gundacker, Jay, and Noah Rosenblum. “Historical Context of Thomas Aquinas.” Historical Context of Thomas Aquinas; The Core Curriculum. Accessed June 20, 2023. https://www.college.columbia.edu/core/content/historical-context-thomas-aquinas.
Izbicki, Thomas and Matthias Kaufmann, "School of Salamanca", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/school-salamanca/>.
Keys, Mary M. “Aquinas’s Two Pedagogies: A Reconsideration of the Relation between Law and Moral Virtue.” American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 3 (2001): 519–31. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669236.
Little, David. “Christianity and Religious Freedom in the Medieval Period (476 – 1453 CE).” Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs. Accessed June 20, 2023. https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/christianity-and-religious-freedom-in-the-medieval-period-476-1453-ce.
O’Neill, Taylor Patrick. “Self-Destruction and the Sin of Heresy.” Church Life Journal, November 26, 2020. https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/to-choose-where-there-is-no-choice-self-destruction-and-the-sin-of-heresy/.
Pagden, Anthony. “Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe’s Imperial Legacy.” Political Theory 31, no. 2 (2003): 171–99. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3595699.
Pope Boniface VIII. “Unam Sanctam (1302).” Unam Sanctam One God, One Faith, One Spiritual Authority, April 27, 2017. https://www.papalencyclicals.net/bon08/b8unam.htm.
Ruston, Roger. “Justice, Peace and Dominicans 1216-1999: IV—Francisco Vitoria: The Rights of Enemies and Strangers.” New Blackfriars 80, no. 935 (1999): 4–18. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43250200.
Sarmiento, Edward. “HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE THOUGHT OF VITORIA.” Blackfriars 27, no. 319 (1946): 378–87. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43701441.
Thiry, L. “The Ethical Theory of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Interpretations and Misinterpretations.” The Journal of Religion 50, no. 2 (1970): 169–85. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1201784.
White, Thomas Joseph. “The Right to Religious Freedom: Thomistic Principles of Nature and Grace.” Nova et Vetera 13, no. 4 (2015): 1149–84. https://www.academia.edu/27787560/The_Right_to_Religious_Freedom_Thomistic_Principles_of_Nature_and_Grace.
The first assertion of the freedom of religion in Togo would be the Constitution de la République Togolaise, 5 mai 1963 (5th of May, 1963).
https://www.loc.gov/resource/amedscd.2008700247/?sp=7&r=-1.395,-0.017,3.789,1.703,0 +
The first assertion of religious freedom is seen under Part I, Article 5, in the 1875 Constitution of Tonga. This article protects the freedom of worship. Under Article 6, is also the protection to keep the Sabbath Day holy.
Constitute Project. 1875 Constitution of Tonga. (rev. 2013) https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tonga_2013 +