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A religious, philosophical, and literary movement; Transcendentalism emphasized true freedom
through individual discovery by “rejecting materialism and confining religious doctrines, and instead
embracing intuition, spirit, and self (Baratta, 2012).” The movement also introduces the idea that finding
truth through individual experience and self-revelation provides the sincerest form of religion and
liberates us from the worldly bounds of organized faiths. Freedom of religion can be found within the
core of the transcendentalist movement; being born of men who left their religion as they felt that the
principles and laws of their church did not fulfill what they knew to be more.
Ralph Waldo Emerson, resigning from his ministry in 1832, felt that people should have “a
religion through [personal] revelation, and not through history and tradition,” and “demand their own
works and laws and worship (Atkinson, 1940, 6).” Emerson began to share his thoughts and encourage
others to do the same, thus marking the birth of Transcendentalism. The ideas that Emerson expressed for
others to understand his logic of this individual journey, showed emphatic value on truth and ultimate
freedom. “Emerson always adhered to a basis for religious truth that answered to the reality of a spiritual
realm (Hurth, 2003, 484).” Hurth analyzes his sermon, The Last Supper, and concludes that Emerson’s
thoughts on “the reliance of religious self-consciousness liberated religion by appeal, not to worthless
‘forms’ in a historical embodiment from biblical revelation; but rather referring to a man’s sense of the
inwardness of faith (Hurth, 2003, 486).” In The Last Supper, Emerson tells us that “I am not engaged to
Christianity by decent forms, or saving ordinances…What I revere and obey in it is its reality… and the
persuasion and courage that come from it to lead me upward and onward [is that] freedom is the essence
of this faith. It has for its object simply to make men good and wise. Its institutions then should be as
flexible as the wants of men. (Atkinson, 1940, 117).” Emerson tells us here that the principles of freedom
found within this organized faith should allow men to be free to find their own religious beliefs, however,
the historical and traditional concepts within the faith take away the freedom as man must adhere to the
laws of the church that Emerson chose to move away from.
Also leaving behind his church membership, Emerson’s mentee, Henry David Thoreau, became
another contributing voice to the founding of transcendentalism. Both men, still being considered
religious and spiritual, viewed God in a non-traditional sense and each found a connection to religion
through freedom away from the church. To both men, divinity, and relation to a higher power can be
found by connecting with the natural world. However, where Emerson sought to look beyond nature,
Thoreau actively immersed himself in it and chose to look within. “To Thoreau ‘the realm of spirit is the
physical world, which has a sacred meaning that can be directly perceived. Accordingly, he seeks “to be
always on the alert to find God in nature’” (Furtak, 2023).” The differences between the two men’s ideas
support the individualistic emphasis within transcendentalism; finding one’s own religious beliefs.
However, similar to Emerson, Thoreau rejected the traditional doctrines of Christianity and found that the
purpose of organized religion and its teachings was to “foster allegiance and conformity (Hodder, 2003,
96).” Also like Emerson, Thoreau’s emphasis on facts and reality led him to look outside of the traditional
forms of worship. In his famous works of Walden, Thoreau states, “Let us settle ourselves, and work and
wedge our feet downward through the mud and slush of opinion, and prejudice, and tradition, and
delusion, and appearance, that alluvion which covers the globe… through church and state, through
poetry and philosophy and religion, till we come to a hard bottom and rocks in place, which we can call
reality, and say, ‘This is.’ If you stand right front and face to face to a fact, you will see the sun glimmer
on both its surfaces, as if it were a cimeter, and feel its sweet edge dividing you through the heart and
marrow, and so you will happily conclude your mortal career. Be it life or death, we crave only reality.
(Thoreau, 1971, 97)”
Therefore, the values of truth, goodness, reality, and self are the emphasized concepts behind
transcendentalist freedom, used to encourage the finding of one’s own divine connection. These concepts
feed into the overarching idea of ultimate religious freedom, instead of through the traditional binds of
organized religion. The lives and works of Emerson and Thoreau showcase how transcendentalism allows
anyone the autonomy to explore and construct their own relationship with God, thus making freedom of
religion a fundamental concept to the religious beliefs of transcendentalism.
Atkinson, Brooks. & Emerson, Ralph Waldo. “The Complete Essays and Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson.” Random House Inc. 1940. https://somacles.files.wordpress.com/2018/07/ralph-waldo-emerson-the-complete-essays-and-other-writings-of-ralph-waldo-emerson-the-modern-library-1950.pdf.
Baratta, Christopher. “Mountaintops and Riverbanks as Pulpits: A Transcendental Return to Nature” Transcendental Ideas: Religion. Binghamton University, NY. 2012. Vcu.edu. 2012. https://archive.vcu.edu/english/engweb/transcendentalism/ideas/baratta.html.
Hodder, Alan D. 2003. “Thoreau’s Religious Vision.” Ultimate Reality and Meaning 26, no. 2 (June): 88–108.
https://doi.org/10.3138/uram.26.2.88.
Furtak, Rick Anthony, "Henry David Thoreau", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/thoreau/>.
Hurth, Elisabeth. “Between Faith and Unbelief: Ralph Waldo Emerson on Man and God.” Amerikastudien / American Studies, vol. 48, no. 4, 2003, pp. 483–495, http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.vt.edu/stable/41157889.
Thoreau, Henry. 1854. “Walden, Or, Life in the Woods. by Henry David Thoreau.” Gutenberg.org. 2018.
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/205/205-h/205-h.htm.
The first assertion of Religious Freedom is in the 1976 Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago in Chapter 1, Part 1, Article 4, Point H. This article asserts multiple human rights and guarantees equality regardless of religion, as well as the protection of freedom of conscience and religious belief and observance.
The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre. Laws of Trinidad and Tobago. Constitution of 1976. https://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Trinidad_and_Tobago/TT_Constitution.pdf +
Under Chapter I, Article 5, Freedom of religion is asserted in the Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia. Article 5 specifically guarantees fundamental freedoms and human rights, covering Freedom of religion and conscience in the last point made, “provided it does not not disturb public order."
Constitute Project. 1959 Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2008 +
In the 1961 Constitution of The Turkish Republic, Freedom of religion is asserted as Freedom of thought and faith, under Section II, Part IV, Article 19. This Article protects citizens from being compelled to worship, and also guarantees them the choice of faith and practices of worship. It also mentions “no person shall be reproached for his religion or faith; and no person shall be allowed to exploit and abuse religion for the purpose of political or personal benefit.”
1961 Constitution of the Turkish Republic. https://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf +
In the 2008 Constitution of the Turkish Republic, Freedom of Religion is covered under Section I, Article 12. This constitution established the state as secular, and guaranteed equality regardless of religion, separation of church and state, and the right to declare any religion or none under Article 12.
Constitute Project. Constitution of Turkmenistan 2008. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkmenistan_2008 +
The assertion of religious freedom is covered within the first constitution of Tuvalu, Under Part II, Division 3, Article 23, upon gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1978. This article guarantees freedom of belief, including religion, and articulates the responsibilities and rights of religious groups and education, protection from conformity, as well as circumstantial provisions of this freedom.
International Labour Organization. Constitution of Tuvalu 1978. 2008 rev. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/3899/95791/F656430737/TUV3899.pdf +
In the 1962 Constitution of Uganda, Freedom of Religion is asserted in Chapter III, Article 25. Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion are all covered under this Article, and also the freedom to change belief and religion. This the first constitution of Uganda following their independence in 1962.
World Statesman. Uganda Constitutional Instruments and Independence Order. 1962. https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Uganda-const-1962.pdf +
Under Title II, Article 35, Freedom of religion is first asserted in the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine. This Article addresses guaranteed protection of choice and practice of worship, separation of church and state, and asserts alternatives in the case of conscientious objection to military service.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Constitution of Ukraine. 1996. https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ukr127467E.pdf +
In the 1971 Constitution of the United Arab Emirates, under Part Three, Article 32, freedom to exercise religious worship is guaranteed as long as it is in accordance with established customs and does not conflict with public policy or morals. Equality regardless of religion is asserted under Article 25, however, islam is declared the official religion under Article 7.
Ref World. Constitution of the United Arab Emirates 1971. https://www.refworld.org/docid/48eca8132.html +
The Toleration Act of 1689 allowed nonconformist religions, with the exception of Roman Catholicism, to practice. However, social penalties still persisted (U.K. Parliament, "Catholics and nonconformists"). The Human Rights Act of 1998 established the fundamental rights of citizens within the UK, including freedom of religion (Equality and Human Rights Commission, "The Human Rights Act," Article 9). +
Article 1 of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution establishes freedom of religion and its expression. Article 1 also prevent congress from declaring an official religion. United States Senate . “Constitution of the United States of America.” Last modified 2021. Accessed July 6, 2022. https://www.senate.gov/civics/resources/pdf/US_Constitution-Senate_Publication_103-21.pdf. +
The Constitution of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay was ratified in 1830. Article 5 grants freedom of religion. Article 5 declares the state supports no religion.
Constitution Project. “Uruguay 1966 (Reinst. 1985, Rev. 2004) Constitution.” Constitute. POGO, April 27, 2022. Last modified April 27, 2022. Accessed July 5, 2022. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uruguay_2004?lang=en. +
The first assertion of religious freedom within Uzbekistan was in the 1992 Constitution, under Part Two, Chapter 7, Article 31. This article protects the right to profess or not profess any religion, and declares any compulsory imposition of religion impermissible.
United Nations. The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Uzbekistan to the United Nations. Constitution of the United Nations. 1992. https://www.un.int/uzbekistan/uzbekistan/constitution-republic-uzbekistan +
Freedom of Religion is asserted in the 1980 Constitution of Vanuatu under Chapter 2, Part I, Article 5, Subject 1.F. This article covers multiple fundamental rights and freedoms, and guarantees equality regardless of religion. Subject 1.F specifies freedom of conscience and worship.
Constitute Project. 1980 Constitution of Vanuatu. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Vanuatu_2013 +
Venezuela’s first constitution was officially written in 1811 which included the “Declaration of Rights, by the Supreme Congress of Venezuela” which affirmed the Catholic Apostolic Religion as the only religion allowed to be practiced in the country. In 1864, the Constitution of the United States of Venezuela allowed religious freedom under the condition that, “only those belonging to the Roman Catholic Apostolic religion can perform public worship outside of the churches.” The 1881 Constitution of the United States of Venezuela subsequently altered the assertion of the right with Chapter III, Article 13 stating, “Religious liberty.” This phrasing was used until the adoption of the 1904 constitution that guarantees, “Religious freedom according to the laws and under the Supreme inspection of the President of the Republic,” which connotes certain limits on religion. It was only until the adoption of the 1961 Constitution of the Republic of Venezuela that the freedom “to profess his religious faith and to practice his religion privately or publicly” was added to the preceding canon.
Sources:
“Northwestern SSO.” n.d. Prd-Nusso.it.northwestern.edu. Accessed June 23, 2024.
https://heinonline-org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/HOL/Page?collection=cow&handle=hein.cow/zzve0005
&id=5&men_tab=srchresults.
“Northwestern SSO.” n.d. Prd-Nusso.it.northwestern.edu. Accessed June 23, 2024.
https://heinonline-org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/HOL/Page?collection=cow&handle=hein.cow/zzve0007
&id=7&men_tab=srchresults.
“Northwestern SSO.” n.d. Prd-Nusso.it.northwestern.edu. Accessed June 23, 2024.
https://heinonline-org.turing.library.northwestern.edu/HOL/Page?collection=cow&handle=hein.cow/zzve0135&id=11&men_tab=srchresults.
The Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was ratified on December 19, 1999. Articles 21.1, 59, and 89.5 grant religious freedom and prohibit religious discrimination. Article 119 protect the religious rights of indigenous people.
Constitution Project. “Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1999 (Rev. 2009) Constitution.” Constitute. POGO, April 27, 2022. Last modified April 27, 2022. Accessed July 5, 2022. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Venezuela_2009?lang=en.
Freedom of religion is covered in the 1946 Constitution of Vietnam. Equality regardless of religion is guaranteed in the preamble, and in Chapter I, Article 1. Chapter 2, Article 10 grants (iv) the freedom of belief to all Vietnamese citizens.
Bloomsbury Professional Media. Vietnam Constitution 1946. https://media.bloomsburyprofessional.com/rep/files/vietnam-constitution-1946x.pdf +
Regarded as one of the founders of the field of sociology, the influence of Max Weber (1864-1920) on contemporary thinking about politics and society has been immense. Throughout an extensive body of work, perhaps the main theme of Weber’s thought is the rapid political and economic evolution that European society was undergoing in his lifetime, and the question of how freedom can still exist in this increasingly rationalized and bureaucratized new order.
When describing his fears for the survival of freedom in the modern world, Weber refers to “individually differentiated conduct” and “individualistic freedom” being curtailed by the process of rationalization (Levine 1981, 16). Since expressing oneself and one’s sentiments is what individualized (i.e., unique to and illustrative of one’s personal qualities) conduct fundamentally consists of, Weber’s concern for individual autonomy can be translated as a concern for freedom of expression. However, one significant difference between Weber and other philosophers of freedom, from John Locke to John Rawls, is that Weber does not think of freedom in terms of rights that one is entitled to. For Weber, freedom of expression is akin to the agency to express ideas and bring them to fruition: it is less a right everyone has simply by virtue of being born, and more a quest to fulfill.
Not only that, but Weber’s ultimate focus is on the state rather than the individual: while his goal is the realization of individual expression, he regards this goal as something to be achieved through developments on a national or societal level, instead of on a personal one. Politics, for him, is “a uniquely human activity, one with the potential both to create and to manifest the responsibility and dignity of individuals in an increasingly secularized world” (Warren 1988, 31).
In his 1919 address “Politics as a Vocation,” Weber begins his exploration of how politics functions in the modern day with his famous formulation that a state is defined by its monopoly on the legitimate use of force: “the modern state is a compulsory association which organizes domination” (Weber 1919, 4). This view certainly lacks the idealism of theories grounded in the idea that the state is under a social contract with its people to uphold their rights. Nevertheless, what is often missed is that Weber’s theory requires not just for the state to be more powerful than any competitors who might also seek to exert force, but for it to exercise power in a way that is (or at least widely recognized as) normatively legitimate.
This discussion of state legitimacy would, it should be noted, have felt particularly prescient to audiences in Weber’s native Germany. Weber delivered his address only a year after the end of World War I, when the monarchy of Kaiser Wilhelm II had been broadly discredited by the devastating loss of the war, and the German people had found themselves living in a vaguely democratic republic that many on both the right and left felt had no grounds to claim their allegiance. In “Politics as a Vocation,” Weber presents three possible sources of legitimate authority: one based on tradition, one on a system of rules or laws, and one on a leader’s “extraordinary and personal gift of grace (charisma)” (Weber 1919, 2). It is this last one that is of most interest concerning how freedom of expression fits into Weber’s views. According to Weber, charismatic legitimacy consists of “absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual leadership.” Historically, it has been displayed by “the elected war lord, the plebiscitarian ruler, the great demagogue, or the political party leader” (Weber 1919, 2).
Charismatic legitimacy is, therefore, most relevant to Weber’s vision of the fulfillment of freedom of expression through the state – one where both leaders and those under them interact with politics as a vocation, or (per his term) a calling, a word with distinctly religious connotations. Weber further defines a calling by distinguishing between ‘occasional’ and vocational political engagement: “we are all ‘occasional’ politicians when we cast our ballot or consummate a similar expression of intention, such as applauding or protesting in a ‘political’ meeting, or delivering a ‘political’ speech, etc. The whole relation of many people to politics is restricted to this” (Weber 1919, 5). Political expression requires politicians or other politically engaged people to approach politics as a vocation – as a spiritual mission that one lives to fulfill.
However, to Weber, charismatic leadership alone is insufficient for the popular will to be expressed. Although Weber is cognizant of the problems of bureaucracy, he recognizes that a charismatic leader ultimately needs an effective state apparatus to carry out their promises. To him, “the bureaucratic state order is especially important; in its most rational development, it is precisely characteristic of the modern state” (Weber 1919, 4). The seeming contradiction can potentially be resolved if one considers that throughout his works Weber invokes two distinct types of freedom, each of which interact differently with the inescapable process of the rationalization and bureaucratization of society. One is ‘situational’ freedom, referring to external constraints on one’s movements or actions; the other is freedom in the much more expansive sense of autonomy, or “the condition in which individual actors choose their own ends of action” (Levine 1981, 16). While it is easy to imagine how the rise of factory jobs and big government would restrict situational freedom, Weber believes that the modern state’s effect on personal autonomy is actually positive. This conception of autonomy can be more broadly defined as the ability to be guided by one’s own ideas; Weber calls it “a series of ultimate decisions through which the soul…chooses its own fate” (Levine 1981, 21). It can thus be said that to have autonomy, by Weber’s definition, is to have freedom of expression.
In “Politics as a Vocation,” Weber identifies a state bureaucracy as ultimately critical for the state to enable citizens’ political aspirations to come to fruition – for citizens to have autonomy, in the sense of choosing their own fates. Weber expounds on this idea in other writings on bureaucracy, as in his statements that bureaucratic organization “has usually come into power on the basis of a leveling of economic and social differences,” and that it “inevitably accompanies mass democracy” (Gerth and Mills 1946, 224). This is because mass democracy necessitates “the characteristic principle of bureaucracy: the abstract regularity of the execution of authority” (Gerth and Mills 1946, 224). Weber further elaborates on this with phrases like “‘equality before the law’ in the personal and functional sense,” the “horror of ‘privilege,’” and “the principled rejection of doing business ‘from case to case’” (Gerth and Mills 1946, 224). In today’s terms, this concept might be summarized as the rule of law: having institutions in place to ensure the state effectively and consistently carries out its functions. Weber certainly seems right that a bureaucracy in this sense would be a precondition for popular expression. As an example, in “Politics as a Vocation,” he approvingly cites the 1883 Civil Service Reform Act as creating a professional bureaucracy in the United States, replacing the “spoils” system where successive administrations distributed offices based on political allegiance (Weber 1919, 7).
Nonetheless, Weber’s account of freedom of expression, where the effective operation of the state serves as the avenue for expression of public sentiments, still seems lacking in other ways. Under Weber’s conception of the state, the people’s voice is only expressed indirectly: “the demos itself, in the sense of an inarticulate mass, never 'governs' larger associations; rather, it is governed, and its existence only changes the way in which the executive leaders are selected and the measure of influence which the demos, or better, which social circles from its midst are able to exert upon the content and the direction of administrative activities by supplementing what is called 'public opinion'” (Gerth and Mills 1946, 225).
Then again, this may not have been as much of a concern for Weber. For Weber, political expression entails a progression towards political maturity; the realization of the people’s aspirations is more of a responsibility on their part than a right. Indeed, throughout his body of work, Weber displays a deep pessimism about the political capacities of the German people. According to him (as he wrote in the 1890s), if there is any hope, it lies in the economically ascendant but politically unassertive bourgeoisie: the decaying aristocracy can no longer be trusted with power, while the working classes are led by those who “have no organic connection with the class they claim to represent” and whose “revolutionary posture in fact acts against the further advancement of the working class towards political responsibility” (Giddens 1972, 17).
Giddens goes on to explain Weber’s viewpoint thus: “Weber saw as the principal question affecting the future of Germany [as] that of whether the economically prosperous bourgeoisie could develop a political consciousness adequate enough to undertake the leadership of the nation. … there could be no question of refounding German liberalism upon a 'natural law' theory of democracy. He rejected, moreover, the classical conception of 'direct' democracy, in which the mass of the population participate in decision-making.” Ultimately, “in the modern state, leadership must be the prerogative of a minority: this is an inescapable characteristic of modern times. Any idea 'that some form of democracy’ can destroy the ‘domination of men over other men’ is ‘utopian’” (Giddens 1972, 18).
Perhaps an even bigger problem with Weber’s freedom of expression is that he necessarily views the expression of the popular (which is to say, majority) will as entailing the expression of the individual will. In his address, he never considers situations where they might not, in fact, be one and the same – where an individual might dissent from the majority. Weber’s inattention to the protection of minority views is a consequence of his lack of discussion of individual rights, or indeed of any other limits on government power (like independent legislative and judicial branches, or even regular competitive elections). He may have died before he could see them, but the 20th century would provide numerous examples of how the unfettered state is anything but conducive to freedom, by any definition of the term. While the aim of “Politics as a Vocation” may just be to explain how the state functions and acquires legitimacy, its failure to consider any substantial limits on what the bureaucratic state can do is ultimately a second reason why it is lacking as an account of freedom of expression.
In his book, Mommsen describes Weber’s view thus: “Max Weber considered the natural-law justification of democracy and the liberal constitutional state to be outmoded and an insufficient basis for a modern theory of government. The ‘rights of mankind’ were… ‘extremely rationalized fanaticisms.’” Weber acknowledged that the principle of human rights had done much good, but felt its value was limited in the modern reality: “[Weber] believed that he believed that the axioms of natural law were no longer providing clear directions for a just social order under the conditions of higher capitalism. He also felt that ‘the old individualist principles of inalienable human rights’ had lost much of their power of persuasion under the conditions of modern industrial society. He did not hesitate, on occasion, to set them aside” (Mommsen 1984, 392-393).
Another review describes these shortcomings in Weber’s vision of freedom of expression as less flaws in Weber’s reasoning, and more “symptoms of real challenges for democratic theory” (Warren 1988, 31). Weber may very well have been correct in his preoccupation with the inadequacies of democracy in modern society. Nonetheless, as Warren puts it, “these conflicts would have been less had Weber elaborated his liberal commitments in substantially democratic directions rather than the elitist direction he in fact chose” (Warren 1988, 32). As the world learned from bitter experience, the problems of democracy can only be addressed by expanding democratic participation and rights, to as wide a range of people as possible, and not by restricting them.
There is much in Weber’s political thought that is insightful, and even prescient. In his warnings of the dangers that a hyper-rationalized society posed to freedom of expression, Weber stands out from the Enlightenment thinkers who came before him, for whom rationalization must invariably lead to freedom by liberating humanity from the tyranny of dogma and superstition (Levine 1981, 5). That being said, even if it may have seemed reasonable at the time and much of the criticisms of it come with the benefit of hindsight, his account of freedom of expression is incomplete, in that it only envisions an indirect political expression for the vast majority of citizens, and neglects to recognize the need to protect dissenting voices from the state through robust limits on state power.
References:
Gerth, Hans H., and C. Wright Mills. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
Giddens, Anthony. Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber. London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1972.
Levine, Donald. “Rationality and Freedom: Weber and Beyond.” Sociological Inquiry, 51, no. 1 (1981): 5-25, https://claremont.illiad.oclc.org/illiad/pdf/668358.pdf
Mommsen, Wolfgang. Max Weber and German Politics, 1890-1920. Translated by Michael Steinberg. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
Warren, Mark. “Max Weber’s Liberalism for a Nietzschean World.” The American Political Science Review, 82, no. 1 (1988): 31-50, https://www-jstor-org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/stable/pdf/1958057.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab0b313bfe50f0c00080b3af5edb29a18&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1
Weber, Max. 1919. “Politics as a Vocation.” In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited and translated by Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 77-128. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, http://fs2.american.edu/dfagel/www/class%20readings/weber/politicsasavocation.pdf
In the 1991 Constitution of Yemen, Islam is declared the state religion. Freedom of religion is not mentioned explicitly, however article 27 asserts that all citizens are equal and shall not be discriminated against regardless of religion.
Human Rights Library. Constitution of Yemen 1991. http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/yemen-constitution.html +
Freedom of Religion is asserted in the 1964 Constitution of Zambia under Chapter III, Section 13, Article 21. This article asserts freedom to choose a religion, worship in a group or private setting, and manifest or propagate his religion and its practices. It also prevents forced religious instruction in schools and prohibits prevention of practice.
The current Constitution of Zambia was ratified on January 5, 2016. The preamble asserts the protection of freedom of religion, while also declaring Zambia a Christian Republic. Articles 8(d), 118.2(a), and 173.3(a) prohibit discrimination and article 266 defines discrimination to include religious discrimination.
World Statesman. Constitution of Zambia 1964. https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Constitution-Zambia1964.pdf
Parliament of Zambia . “Government of Zambia Act -.” Last modified January 5, 2016. Accessed July 6, 2022. https://www.parliament.gov.zm/sites/default/files/documents/amendment_act/Constitution%20of%20Zambia%20%20(Amendment),%202016-Act%20No.%202_0.pdf. +
In the 1964 Constitution of Rhodesia, freedom of religion is asserted in Part 2, Chapter VII, Article 72. When Zimbabwe became an independent state in 1980, The Constitution asserted religious freedom Under Chapter III, Article 19. The current Constitution of Zimbabwe was ratified on 16 March 2013. Articles 5(ciii), 56.3, and 60 grant religious freedoms, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination.
World Statesman. Constitution of Rhodesia. 1965. https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Rhodesia_1965.pdf
Refworld. Constitution of Zimbabwe. 1980. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b5720.html
Parliament of Zimbabwe . “Constitution of Zimbabwe.” Last modified August 9, 2021. Accessed July 6, 2022. https://parlzim.gov.zw/download/constitution-of-zimbabwe-amendment-no-20-14-05-2013/. +