Source/Freedom of Expression

History

What is the oldest source in any country that mentions this right?

The ancient Greeks within the Athenian Democracy, using the words “parrhesia” and “isegoria” (dating back to the fifth century BCE) were the first to emphasize the freedom to speak candidly and to "say what one pleased" a subset of freedom of the future declaration of freedom of expression (Bejan 2019, 97). The freedom of expression is imperative to democracy as it “refers to the ability of an individual or group of individuals to express their beliefs, thoughts, ideas, and emotions about different issues free from government censorship” (Freedom Forum Institute 2020). From the ancient Greeks, “Parrhesia” specifically describes the freedom to say whatever one pleased, and a similar idea describing freedom of expression, “isegoria,” describes the right of citizens to publicly address and debate against the democratic assembly (Lu 2017, 4). “Isegoria” is derived from the root word “agora” which translates to marketplace, and thus the meaning of this version of freedom of expression addresses that of public speech. This right to “isegoria” was more heavily based in the ideas of equality of all men to have access to the government than for the principles of freedom (Bejan 2017, 99). On the other hand, “parrhesia” held a broader meaning. This idea is more about the right to speak freely or frankly. This word implies a willingness of the speaker to be open, honest, and courageous in dealing with the consequences of the sometimes controversial truth which he spoke while those who listened had to tolerate any offense taken from the speaker. Because of the courage and privilege necessary in truly enjoying “parrhesia,” it describes a form of licensed privilege. After the collapse of the Athenian democracy, however, the fundamental ideas of “parrhesia” are the more common and practiced bases of freedom of expression today in documents such as the American Constitution. “Isegoria” on the other hand took on the form of freedom of speech and debate within the legislative houses of government such as British Parliament and American Congress.

However, regarding modern history, the first legal document to declare these rights to freedom of expression was the English Bill of Rights in 1689 by William III and Mary II after the Glorious Revolution. This document outlined civil and human rights that were to be enjoyed by all men, and the document gave Parliament power over the monarch, increasing the amount of power given to the people.

What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right? BUILD IN COLLAPSE EXPAND TOGGLE

Argentina

National Constitution (1853)

Australia

The Constitution does not explicitly protect freedom of expression, but in 1992 the High Court of Australia ruled in favor of political expression, setting a precedent and implying freedom of expression

Brazil

Brazil’s seventh Constitution (1988)

Canada

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982)

China

The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982)

France

Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789)

Germany

Weimar Constitution of 1919

India

The Constitution of India Bill (1895)

Israel

Loosely defined by the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel and rulings by the Israel Supreme Court

Italy

Constitution of 1948

Japan

1947 Constitution

Kenya

1963 Constitution

Mexico

Mexican Constitutions of 1857 and 1917

Nigeria

Federal Republic of Nigeria constitution (1958)

Peru

Constitution of 1993

Philippines

1987 Constitution

Poland

The Little Constitution of 1992

Somalia

National Communications Act of March 2012

South Africa

South African Bill of Rights of the Constitution (1996)

South Korea

Constitution of 1948

Spain

Constitution of 1978

United States

Declaration of Independence (1776)

Is there another noteworthy written source from the past that mentions this right?

This right is mentioned in several historical noteworthy written sources, some of which include John Locke's extremely influential and fundamental Second Treatise of Government. Along that same vein, noted philosophers have written commentaries on laws, freedoms, and political theory; these include works by Michael Foucault, particularly in his lecture series at Berkeley, Montesquieu in his commentary the Spirit of the Laws, Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, and John Stuart Mill's noteworthy work On Liberty.

Many international treaties, charters, and conventions also work to avidly incorporate the freedom of expression in its foundations. The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Legal Codification

Is this right protected in the Constitutions of most countries today?

The right to free expression is upheld by most countries’ constitutions (World Population Review), though the degree of liberty that comes with entitlements to free expression may differ. Furthermore, a Free Expression Index generated by Pew Research Center demonstrates one method for comparing the strength of free expression internationally (Pew Research Center). In developing the index, Pew surveyed 38 countries on eight questions pertaining to free expression. Pew proceeded to then rank the countries on a scale of zero to eight-eight meaning the country fully supported free expression. From their results, the United States and Canada demonstrated the highest levels of free expression, with scores of 5.73 and 5.08 respectively, while Senegal and Burkina Faso showed the lowest levels of free expression, with scores of 2.06 and 2.94, respectively. Thus, demonstrated by the Pew Research index, while many countries may support free expression within their constitutions, the degree to which free expression is practiced and enforced often varies.

Consequently, there are still several countries that restrict free expression in their laws. For example, in South Korea, The National Security Law prohibits sharing sympathies towards North Korea (Kolick, Alli; Dehague, Tyler; and Leick, Amber). Additionally, while Afghanistan’s constitution does protect freedom of expression, it does not firmly protect speech when related to “ ‘public spirit’, ‘security’, and ‘public interest’ ” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Islamic Republic of Afghanistan). India’s free expression laws likewise are not comprehensive, as the right to free press is not explicitly stated in the Indian Constitution (Kolick, Alli; Dehague, Tyler; and Leick, Ambe). Therefore, while most countries do have some form of free expression within their constitutions, not all free expression clauses clearly outline the rights of citizens; rather, many constitutions explicitly restrict forms of free expression.

Is it contained in the US Constitution?

The right to free expression is not stated verbatim in the United States constitution. Though, it is universally accepted to be covered by the First Amendment (American Civil Liberties Union). Furthermore, the First Amendment asserts, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Specifically, the listed rights to free speech, press, assembly, and petition are broadly viewed as Americans’ rights to free expression. Though, the nature of free expression, as enshrined by the Constitution, has been heavily debated. Some believe that only political speech is protected by the First Amendment (Legal Infornation Institute, Cornell Law School). Others assert that the individual freedoms outlined by the First Amendment should not be grouped together as Americans’ general freedoms to expression. Rather, these individuals argue that the individual freedoms entitled by the First Amendment ought to be addressed as distinct rights (Bogen). Consequently, in 1799, John Hay, in criticizing the Sedition Act, argued that freedom of speech, as entitled by the First Amendment, protects all forms of expression. Specifically, using freedom of the press as an example, Hay asserts that the same degree of freedom is applied to each First Amendment right, stating “To ascertain what the "freedom of the press" is, we have only to ascertain what freedom itself is. For, surely, it will be conceded, that freedom applied to one subject, means the same, as freedom applied to another subject.” Ultimately, Hay’s argument developed the belief in Americans’ general right to free expression, which is still commonly accepted today to be protected by the First Amendment

Has it been interpreted as being implicit in the US Constitution?

Given that freedom of expression is often used as a blanket term for the numerous rights enshrined by the First Amendment, free speech, press, petition, and association, its parameters are implicit. For example, while the First Amendment does assert the right to free speech, it does not go into detail about the nature or degree of free speech. For this reason, what counts as protected “expression” is implicit. Demonstrated by exceptions, summarized in "Are there any exceptions in American law to this right?", to the First Amendment, the implications of the right to free expression are often determined by the Supreme Court’s decisions. Furthermore, cases such as Schenk v. United States, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, Miller v. California, New York Times Company v. Sullivan, and Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York, have created precedents making the parameters of free expression increasingly explicit, as each case demonstrates how certain forms of expression are or are not protected by the First Amendment.

Are there any exceptions in American law to this right?

Several Supreme Court cases have placed restrictions on the right to free expression, creating exceptions to the First Amendment. For example, in Schenk v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that free expression is not constitutionally protected when it will “create a clear and present danger that they will bring about substantive evils that the government has a right to protect.” The qualifications for limiting dangerous speech were later established by Brandenburg v. Ohio, which ruled speech could be prohibited if it was "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" or was “likely to incite or produce such action.”

Additionally, there is a legal exception for “fighting words”, in that words that “would likely make the person to whom they are addressed commit an act of violence” are not shielded by the First Amendment. This was decided by the Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire decision, where the court upheld that it was illegal for Walter Chaplinsky to call a police officer “a damned Fascist.”

Another exception to the First Amendment is obscene language. In Miller v. California, the court clarified what qualifies as obscene language, which was described as speech that “To the average person, applying contemporary community standards, appeal to the prurient interest; Depict or describe, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct, as specifically defined by the applicable state law, and taken as a whole, lack any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Therefore, expression that falls under these standards may be regulated.

Defamation, “a statement that injures a third party’s reputation” (Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School), is an additional exception to freedom of expression in the United States. The standards for defamation were established in New York Times Company v. Sullivan, which claimed that in order to sue a news outlet for defamation, one must have proof that the outlet was aware of their false claims prior to publishing.

Lastly, commercial speech may be regulated in order to protect consumers. Furthermore, the standards for commercial speech regulation were created by Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York, which created a four part test for determining whether or not the government could limit commercial speech. According to the court, commercial speech is may be regulated only if,

speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading; 2. the asserted governmental interest must be substantial. If the first two parts are established, then it must also be determined that: 3. the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and 4. the regulation is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

Ultimately, demonstrated by these numerous cases, although the United States Constitution upholds freedom of expression, there are various exceptions to the First Amendment.

Is this right enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties?

For European countries, the right to free expression is entitled by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, though it is not an absolute law. According to the article, freedom of expression can be restricted if it incites crime or jeopardizes natural security, public health, personal reputations or the authority of the judiciary. Additionally, In Africa, both the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression assure members of the African Union the right to free expression. In Mexico and South America, the American Convention on Human Rights, also referred to as the Pact of San Jose, upholds the right to free expression. Internationally, the United Nations lists numerous treaties that uphold the right to free expression. Most predominantly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) enshrine the right to free expression. Through these various treaties, freedom of expression is upheld by international law.

Limitations / Restrictions

What are the typical exceptions or limitations placed on this right?

The following country-specific descriptions are from a 2019 US Government Report.

Argentina: Argentina protects the right to free press, without prior restraint. However, it does not explicitly protect other forms of expression, such as free speech. Argentina criminalizes speech likely to incite violence. Additionally, Argentinian penal law contains protections for one’s honor, making it a fineable offense to slander someone, intentionally discredit them, or falsely accuse them of a crime. However, these penalties do not apply in matters of public interest. Although Argentine courts have interpreted limits on free expression narrowly, they have allowed these limits where they are established by law, meet the needs of a democratic society and where the limits are proportional to their goals.

Canada: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the right to “thought, belief, opinion, and expression, subject to limits that can be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Courts have interpreted the right to free expression broadly. Courts have made judgements about the constitutionality of limitations through proportionality analysis, taking several factors into consideration. They are more inclined to protect political speech, or speech that serves another social value, such as art or science. Courts are also more willing to accept narrower limits with less extreme penalties (civil versus criminal, for example). They have refused to allow limitations based on the offensiveness or unpopularity of the expression’s content. Their courts ruled unconstitutional a law banning the spread of false news. Despite free expression’s broad protections, courts have upheld anti-hate-speech laws. Additionally, interruptions of public speeches, especially using obscene language, may criminally disrupt the peace. Canada’s equivalent to the FCC has the power to take action against outlets that spread false information, but it has only acted very limitedly on a few occasions. Finally, Canada bans foreign broadcasters from attempting to influence its elections.

China: China’s constitution claims to protect free expression, but this is not true in practice. The country’s cybersecurity law bans the online spread of several categories of information, including those that undermine “national security, national honor, and national interests”; that incite “subversion” or those that threaten to “overturn the socialist system”; and that include“violent, obscene, or sexual information.” Similarly, the press cannot publish material that violates constitutional principles; undermine state sovereignty and territorial integrity; endanger national security; incite discrimination; undermine public order; promote obscenity, gambling, or violence; or “endanger public ethics.” The country’s Radio and Television Administration places similar limits on expression. Finally, the country tightly monitors foreign journalists, who must be approved by the government.

France: The French Constitution protects the “communication of ideas and opinions.” However, the Constitution also states that speech may not “interfere with the established law and order” or constitute an “abuse of this liberty in the case determined by law.” Though French courts interpret restrictions narrowly, they use proportionality to balance free speech against other public interests. Free speech is sometimes balanced against rights such as privacy and the presumption of innocence, meaning that defamation, which truth does not necessarily preclude, is often not allowed. One whose speech incites criminality may be considered complicit in the act. Hate speech, which “incites discrimination,” is a jailable offense, as is the denial of crimes against humanity, such as the Holocaust. Defamation of public officials and institutions is a fineable offense, although good-faith reporting is exempt. During an event organized by public officials, it is illegal to disrespect the flag or national anthem. French radio and TV broadcasts may be regulated to protect values such as dignity, pluralism, public order, and the well-being of adolescents. The CSA, the French equivalent to the FCC, regulated broadcasts to ensure adherence to French law. Although it does not engage in prior restraint, the CSA may issue cease-and-desist orders and fines. It also may remove foreign broadcasts that undermine French interests.

Germany: German Basic Law (constitution) stipulates that free expression (it lists forms of expression but does not use the term) “shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honour.” General laws, as the Constitutional Court articulated, “aim to protect a legal interest per se without regard to a particular opinion.” For example, Germany has a blanket ban on speech inciting “hatred against part of the populace.” There is one notable exception to the General-Law requirement: speech that violates the dignity of victims of the Nazis or glorifies their abuses (although pro-Nazi material and hate speech often overlap).

Israel: Though free expression is not explicitly protected in Israeli Basic Law, its courts have protected it, with exceptions for speech with a “near certainty” to cause “real harm” to safety. Israel restricts several types of speech, such as incitements to violence and terrorism and holocaust denial. It uses balancing tests to determine when speech can be restricted, and it sometimes restricts the quality and quantity of speech in ways that do not eliminate the viewpoint completely. Israeli law criminalizes insulting public servants, but courts have ruled that this law can only be enforced in extreme circumstances, where the insult severely harms the servant’s dignity. Israel restricts the rights of foreigners to broadcast.

Japan: The Japanese Constitution protects all types of free expression. However, it also states that citizens “shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare.” Japanese courts will consider the type of speech (political speech is especially protected), the necessity of restriction, and the manner of restriction. In Japan, it is illegal to disrupt a political campaign speech. Defamation, insult, and intimidation are forms of criminalized speech in the Japanese Penal Code. Article 231, the “Insult” section of the Penal Code, is broad: “A person who insults another in public, even if it does not allege facts, shall be punished by misdemeanor imprisonment without work or a petty fine.” There are significant restrictions of Japanese broadcasts. They must be politically fair, show as many sides of a political issue as possible, respect “public morals,” and be truthful.

Netherlands: The Dutch Constitution automatically incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into law (see the International Agreements Section). The Constitution also allows limitations on expression by act of parliament “without prejudice to the responsibility of every person under the law.” Different expressive freedoms have different level of protection in the Constitution. For example, the press’s protection from prior restraint is absolute, but freedom in performances that may be seen by children is not.

New Zealand: New Zealand’s Bill of Rights, a 1990 statute, guarantees free expression, with limits that can be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” It is a jailable offense to act, including to speak, in a way likely to incite someone to disorderly and violent behavior. In a public place, it is a fineable offense to intentionally insult or offend anyone, or to use obscene language. Under a 1993 statute, it is illegal to distribute in writing or broadcast material that is “threatening, abusive, or insulting,” and to use a public place to do the same or to incite ill will against a particular group of people. Broadcasts must adhere to standards of political balance and “the observation of good taste and decency.”

Sweden: Sweden’s system protects free speech and press. Interrupting courts, weddings, funerals, or public deliberation is a crime. Disorderly conduct with the intent to agitate is also a crime. For example, someone was convicted for singing and playing music in his home to disrupt a political gathering outside. Sweden’s hate-speech law bans any “statement or other message that is spread and disseminated that threatens, or expresses condescension against, an ethnic group or another group of persons based on race, skin color, national or ethnic origin, faith, sexual orientation, gender, or gender identity or expression.” It is a crime to broadcast without a permit. Sweden requires at least half of its broadcasts to be produced by Europeans.

America places these restrictions on speech much less frequently, or not at all.

Hate Speech: Foreign countries often do not share America’s aversion to banning hate speech. America is more the exception than the norm; a 2008 EU treaty, for example, mandates that its members develop a mechanism for prosecuting purveyors of hate speech.

Blasphemy: About 71 percent of countries have blasphemy laws, generally defined as laws insulting to a particular religion or its adherents, often an established state religion. Blasphemy laws are stereotypically associated with theocratic, authoritarian states. Some unexpected countries have them, however. For example, it is a fineable offense in Italy to “vilify with insulting expressions” religious ideas (it is only a jailable offense if one vandalizes religious items) (End Blasphemy Laws).

Political Content: Many countries ban certain forms of political speech, especially that which undermines the government. In China, for instance, it is illegal to post anything online that will “endanger the sovereignty, overturn the socialist system, incite separatism, break national unity, advocate terrorism or extremism, advocate ethnic hatred and ethnic discrimination, . . . [and] create or disseminate false information to disrupt the economic or social order.”

Public Deliberations: It is often illegal to interrupt public deliberations, especially by a governing body. In Sweden, for example, one cannot legally interrupt events such as religious ceremonies, marriages, or court proceedings (contempt of court is also a crime in the US). In Japan, it is illegal to disrupt a speech that is part of an election campaign.

Proportionality Analysis: Courts abroad are much more likely than American courts to use proportionality in determining whether infringement on a right is allowable. This requires weighing the evil of infringing on free expression against the objective the state was trying to achieve. In hate speech, for example, this means weighing a lessening of free speech against the goal of maintaining a tolerant society.

Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?

Clear and Present Danger: As the Supreme Court ruled in Schenck v. US (1919), speech can be curtailed when it poses a “clear and present danger.” This case arose when a defendant was accused of violating the Espionage Act by distributing leaflets encouraging people to dodge the draft. As the majority held, the defendant’s ability to undermine the war effort constituted such a danger, akin to yelling “fire” in a crowded theatre.

Fighting Words: In a doctrine similar to the clear-and-present-danger test, the Supreme Court ruled in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) that the First Amendment does not protect “fighting words” - words that, as the court argued, “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Though this doctrine exists today, it has been undermined, especially by the court’s rulings protecting “hate speech” (see RAV v. St. Paul).

O’Brien Test: In US v. O’brien (1968), the Supreme Court developed a four-pronged test for determining whether the government could justifiably limit expression. “We think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” In this case, the Supreme Court held that a ban on burning draft cards did constitute a substantial government interest.

Speech in schools: In general, public schools have greater leeway to curtail free speech, although the court’s attitudes have changed repeatedly. In Tinker v. Des Moines (1965), the Supreme Court voided suspensions on students wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War, holding that limited speech must “materially and substantially interfere” with school activities. In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988), the court gave considerable leniency to schools restricting student speech in a school-sponsored platform (in this case, a school newspaper), allowing it to censor an article because it was “inconsistent with the shared values of a civilized social order.” In Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986), the court allowed a public school to suspend a student for using sexual innuendo at a speech at a school assembly because such speech undermined “fundamental values of public school education.” the Supreme Court ruled similarly in Morse v. Frederick (2007), holding that schools could limit speech advocating drug use.

Imminent Lawless Action: In Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), the Supreme Court elaborated on the clear-and-present-danger test. To lack protection, certain speech must incite “imminent lawless action.” This means that the mere advocacy of violence is not enough; the speech must actually incite it. It was on these grounds that the court ruled that offensive, inflammatory speech from a klansman was protected because it did not imminently incite violence. This test has generally replaced clear and present danger, although clear and present danger is still the test used in military courts.

Obscenity: The Supreme Court adopted a three-pronged test in Miller v. California (1973) to determine whether material is legally obscene (and therefore not protected). The prongs are as follows: “whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Pornography is often not legally obscene.

Libel: Standards for what constitutes libel differ between private citizens and public figures (who can include political figures but also celebrities, business tycoons, etc). Libel against a public person requires a statement to have been false and made negligently. Libel against a public figure, does not include good-faith mistakes that may be considered negligent. Rather, it requires material to be false, and to have been published with “actual malice” (Hustler v. Falwell, 1988) (Nott).

Intellectual property: For example, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting (1977), the court ruled that the First Amendment does not protect the right of a television station to air an entire performance without the consent of the performers.

Unlawful assembly: Authorities may restrict assemblies as long as the restrictions are reasonable, narrowly tailored to a specific public interest while limiting rights as little as possible, and are not content-based. For example, a city may require a permit for holding a large assembly. In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, the Supreme Court ruled that a permitting authority could not vary its demonstration permit fees based on the anticipated cost of maintaining public order. As the court held, making such a determination would require the government to differentiate its treatment toward demonstrations based on the content of their messages.

Under international human rights laws, what permissible exceptions (often called derogations) exist?

Universal Declaration of Human Rights: This was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948.

Article 29 stipulates that the rights found in this document, including free expression, “shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”

European Convention on Human Rights: This treaty was ratified by most of Europe in 1953 (it is unrelated to the EU). It is enforced in the European Court of Human Rights. From Article 10:

The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

Depending on the case, the court has ruled that hate speech is not protected under Article 10. For example, in Aksoy v. Turkey (2000), it held that “remarks aimed at inciting racial hatred in society or propagating the idea of a superior race can not claim any protection under Article 10 of the Convention” (Flauss 2009, 838). It has refused to protect “revisionist language” (837), that which denies certain notorious historical truths. For example, Holocaust denial may not be protected under Article 10. Finally, the court has ruled that Article 10 does not protect speech likely to lead to violence (840).

In Ceylan v. Turkey (2000), the court ruled on Turkey’s conviction of a columnist who opposed Turkey’s policies toward Kurds. The court used proportionality analysis to determine that the infringement on free expression outweighed the security risk of the piece, which did not directly call for violence. In a concurring opinion, one judge argued that the court should use a clear-and-present-danger test.

American Convention on Human Rights: This human-rights framework was created in 1969, and over the ensuing decades, has been ratified, at least in part, by nearly all of Central and South America. There exists a corresponding inter-American Court of Human Rights. From Article 13:

The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure:

a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or

b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals.

“Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence.”

“Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action against any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.”

Article 11 of the convention guarantees a right to privacy, which includes protections against attacks on one's honor, dignity, and reputation. As such, the court must balance these two considerations, as occurs in cases of libel, slander, and defamation (Posenato 2016, 64). The exceptions for national security, public health, public order, and morals have been interpreted narrowly, so as not to allow authoritarian restrictions on free speech (65).

Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam: This 1990 document was ratified by 45 states in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. There is no relevant court. Article 22:

(a) Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would not be contrary to the principles of the Shari'ah.

1. Everyone shall have the right to advocate what is right, and propagate what is good, and warn against what is wrong and evil according to the norms of Islamic Shari'ah.

(c) Information is a vital necessity to society. It may not be exploited or misused in such a way as may violate sanctities and the dignity of Prophets, undermine moral and ethical Values or disintegrate, corrupt or harm society or weaken its faith.

(d) It is not permitted to excite nationalistic or doctrinal hatred or to do anything that may be an incitement to any form or racial discrimination. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: This is a UN treaty from 1966. Under certain circumstances, it may be enforced by the International Court of Justice, but the ICJ generally only hears disputes between countries. Article 19: Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (order public), or of public health or morals.

African Charter on Human and People’s Rights: This charter, with 54 signatories, came into effect in 1986. Article 9 guarantees the right to free expression, although no exceptions are enumerated. The African Court of Human and People’s Rights has repeatedly protected free expression, but not without limit. For example, in Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. The Republic of Rwanda (2017), the court held that minimizing a genocide need not be protected because it could disturb public order and peace.

Have political theorists or philosophers discussed the permissibility of exceptions to this right?

Yes. The most famous defense of the freedom of expression principle is written by John Stuart Mill, who did include exceptions to this protection. Mill believed that freedom of expression should be curtailed when the circumstances of the message are intended to instigate violence or criminal activities. Mill also claims that this exception stems from the government's duty to protect others from harm, which is more broadly known as the "harm principle." This, Mill claims, is the only context in which power can be "rightfully" executed over others (On Liberty 13). Mill uses the example of a corn-dealer, who is starving the poor. When this fact or opinion is published through the press, it is entirely permissible under Mill's doctrine. However, when this opinion is advertised to a large and unruly mob, expression of such sentiment should be curtailed because, if shared, it could cause immediate harm and instigate criminal or violent activities (On Liberty 52). Mill's threshold for regulation of expressions is extremely narrow; it could be argued that he does not exempt hate speech because it does not cause immediate harm to others. While Mill states that only the harm principle should be applied to regulations of freedom of expression, Joel Feinberg believes that the harm principle is not sufficiently broad enough to account for hate speech. He stipulates that an "offense principle" is also needed. Feinberg believes that the harm principle is too high of a standard and that the government has the right to censure some speech if they deem it too offensive. Since the offense principle lowers the standard for censure of free speech, so too should the punishments be lowered. Feinberg defines offense to be a "negative mental state" (Simpson 237). Feinberg justifies the offense principle by stating that being offended, or being in a negative mental state, actually impedes on an individual's liberty because being offended impedes on his/her daily activities (Simpson 238).

Is this right at times curtailed by private actors?

In many European countries (Germany, France, Austria, etc.), Holocaust denial is illegal and approximately 80 Facebook posts per year are blocked. Zuckerburg, in a 2018, interview stated that he found Holocaust denials to be deeply offensive, but does not believe that warrants censorship. Zuckerburg seems to follow the harm principle, stating that "unless individuals are trying to organize harm against someone, or attacking someone," content should not be censored (Rosenberg 2018). Facebook's Community Standards (also includes Instagram) are intended to guide freedom of expression on the site through rules such as preventing offline harm related to Facebook content through "consider[ing] the language and context in order to distinguish casual statements from content that constitutes a credible threat to public or personal safety." The community standards prohibit the presence of terrorist groups on Facebook. The standards also "prohibit people from facilitating, organizing, promoting, or admitting to certain criminal or harmful activities targeted at people, businesses, property or animals." With hate speech, although the community standards are clear, their implementation is vague--"We define hate speech as a direct attack on people based on what we call protected characteristics — race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, caste, sex, gender, gender identity, and serious disease or disability." The community standards do not account for politic speech. In a speech at Georgetown University, Zuckerburg articulated his position for political censorship: "I don’t think it’s right for a private company to censor politicians or news in a democracy" (Ghaffary 2020). Although Twitter has extremely similar policies to Facebook, they have dramatically different applications. In early May, Twitter fact-checked President Trump's tweets regarding voting by mail by placing links to a fact-checking page that debunks the president's tweets. Twitter announced that it would place labels on tweets containing false or misleading information in response to misinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic (Ghaffary 2020). Previously, Twitter had resisted such a move because the president is a world leader and considered his tweets as "noteworthy" and, as such, exempted them from their standards policy (Ghaffary 2020). Facebook has a similar conduct policy, but enacts it much differently. In response to the move, Zuckerburg stated that Facebook should not, nor is, an "arbiter of truth" (Ghaffary 2020). Twitter again used its new policy on the president's tweet about protests, saying that his "when the looting starts, the shooting starts" violated Twitter's policy of glorifying violence (Ghaffary 2020). Facebook, on the other hand, defended its position of not censoring the same statement by saying "didn’t violate Facebook’s policies about inciting violence. He said the company saw it 'as a warning about state action,' and that 'people need to know if the government is planning to deploy force” (Ghaffary 2020).

Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question?

Freedom of expression can be limited in times of crisis, most notably in wartime. This was first enacted in the late 1790s, with the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Sedition Act most markedly affected freedom of expression and freedom of the press by making it illegal to speak against the government or president ("Alien and Sedition Acts"). These limitations were consistently applied in times of war until World War I, when its legality was cemented by the Supreme Court with Schenck vs. United States (Emerson 1968). In Schenck v. US, the Court ruled that the standards for regulation of freedom of speech were lower in wartime ("Schenck v. United States"). It also established, for the first time, the "clear and present danger" test, clarifying that "the First Amendment does not protect speech that approaches creating a clear and present danger of a significant evil that Congress has power to prevent ("Schenck v. United States"). During the Vietnam War, freedom of expression was upheld in New York Times v. United States by saying freedom of the press was "was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government" (Hudson). In states of emergency, such as the national one declared at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the president is granted special troubles that include infringements on freedom of the press/expression. One such power is the ability to shut down radio stations during a time of "public peril." This ability is cemented in section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934 (Rottman 2020). Since the law was passed in 1934, it did not include other forms of news publication, such as websites and TV news stations. There is a fear, however, that the government could broaden the law to include these types of news dissemination (Rottman 2020). In the COVID-19 pandemic, states and counties have declared media companies as essential services, thus exempting them from quarantine and shelter-in-place limitations (Rottman 2020).