Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Kantianism
What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
Kantianism
The right to free expression is a notion central to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. In his eyes, the unrestricted, public articulation of one's ideas is of vital importance: it is a prerequisite for humanity to realize its social and political ends. At the outset, we must be careful not to assume that Kant shares in our modern, liberal conception of this right. We must also refrain from implying a unified interpretation of this freedom among nations where it is constitutionally codified. This would be empirically false: the form and scope of free expression varies widely across liberal democracies. However, a general account might be gleaned by examining the definitions given by well-established international human rights organizations. Article 19 of the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers" (UDHR, 1946). Generally put, freedom of expression is the right to publicly voice one's opinions, especially critical ones, without state interference. There are several exceptions to this principle, including public expression that incites violence, threatens national security, promotes indecency, is libelous, or constitutes hate speech. These restrictions arise from a practical tension between the necessity of free expression and the dangers it poses to society and the state. Kant's view on freedom of expression is no exception. His arguments balance the rational need for guaranteed free expression with our duty to respect the will of civil authorities. Kant's treatment of the freedom of expression is inextricably linked to the project of the European Enlightenment. In his essay "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?," Kant describes the titular epoch, defining it by its motto of "Sapere Aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding” (Kant 1784, 1). The era of Enlightenment constituted an awakening from Europe’s long-held state of "immaturity," in which institutional dogmatism monopolized public thought (Kant 1784, 1). Individuals had historically put their faith in public institutions and authorities, whether political, religious, medical, academic, or otherwise, to shape their beliefs and way of life (Kant 1784, 1). Enlightenment was the end of such dependency; it was the process of learning to use one's own reason or to think for oneself. To Kant, this promulgation of critical thinking was necessary for humanity's social and political progress; without it, humankind threatened to become ideologically stagnant. Kant claims that the sole condition for this awakening is the freedom of expression. In his own words: "nothing is required for this enlightenment, however, except freedom; and the freedom in question is the least harmful of all, namely, the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters" (Kant 1784, 2). Overcoming blind dogmatism demanded that people voice their ideas without legal restriction (Kant 1784, 2). Without this protection, the light of reason could neither spread nor become practically meaningful, as critical thinking only benefits society if it can be publicly communicated. This view constitutes Kant's general conception of freedom of expression, the right to express one's opinion publicly.
However, Kant distinguishes two forms of expression to address the tension between public criticism and civil obedience. Kant is a staunch defender of public reason, but he defines this concept narrowly. Public reason is the "use that anyone as a scholar makes of reason before the entire literate world" (Kant 1784, 2). This contrasts with the "private use of reason," by which Kant means acts of intellectual dissent within a civic bureaucracy, a form of expression he forbids (Kant 1784, 2). For instance, police officers are obligated to enforce laws even if they agree with them, with the only alternative being resignation (Kant 1784, 3). They may criticize the legal system outside their post but must faithfully perform their roles when 'on the job.' Kant argues that for civic institutions to effectively achieve their intended ends (i.e., to preserve the commonwealth, protect rights, and promote collective happiness in accordance with personal freedom), they must not be obstructed by those appointed to operate them (Kant 1784, 3). Qua citizen, critique is healthy and necessary, but qua official, censure both practically obstructs and formally contradicts the very notion of a political appointment (Kant 1784, 3). We see here that freedom of expression has an inherent potential for conflict with public authority, one which Kant hopes to solve by differentiating public and private reason.
Kant takes this concern further by describing the ideal relationship of the sovereign to free expression. To him, a good ruler neither represses discourse nor caves to public opposition. Instead, they follow the policy: "argue as much as you like, but obey!" (Kant 1784, 2). Public reason allows citizens to voice criticisms of a regime, which is essential for a monarch to bring his rule in line with civil freedom and the public good (Kant 1784, 2). However, this does not justify recalcitrant resistance to the government. In his essay “Theory and Practice,” Kant argues that subjects should only exercise the "freedom of the pen… within the limits of esteem and love for the constitution," meaning their criticisms should proceed with respect for both the public good and the sovereign's authority in mind (Kant 1793, 302). In-kind, a ruler must listen to the voice of his subjects but never cede his own interpretation of justice to theirs (unless their appeals convince him) (Kant 1793, 302). The sovereign is a trustee and not a delegate of the people. Even when he errs, obstruction and rebellion are never justified, only the exercise of public reason.
The degree of overlap between Kantian and contemporary conceptions of freedom of expression is difficult to parse. Because Kant never specifically treats freedom of expression vis-a-vis speech, the press, peaceful assembly, petition, and association, we need to extrapolate from his larger argument to infer his views on the matter. Because he expresses no specific restrictions on the mode of expression, freedom of speech, peaceful assembly, press, association, and petition appear permissible as long as they are peaceful and lawful. But other forms of expression less universally accepted as a right, such as conscientious objection, are a more complicated matter. As we have seen, Kant suggests that if a civic worker's duties conflict with his ethical obligations, he must resign. But in the case of conscription, there is no such option: one serves or faces the penalty, creating a conflict between one's political and ethical obligations. Moreover, Kant does not directly discuss the typical restrictions of 'public reason,' when it constitutes a danger to individual safety or national security. Because our modern understanding of these rights is the product of two centuries of evolving political thought, it may be useless to judge precisely what Kant would say of them. But regardless, there is still something to be gained in this comparison. By examining Kant's discussion of "public reason," we can clarify the foundational motivations and conflicts that inform debates surrounding this freedom today: the right to free expression is essential for societal flourishing, yet this must be balanced with the social and political consequences it presents in its extreme forms.
References:
Kant, I., & Wood, A. (1996). On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice (1793). In M. Gregor (Ed.), Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. 273-310). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511813306.011
Kant, I., & Wood, A. (1996). An answer to the question: What is enlightenment? (1784). In M. Gregor (Ed.), Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. 11-22). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511813306.005
United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights.