Privacy Rights/Fundamentally accepted

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When was it generally accepted as a fundamental, legally-protectable right?

The recognition of privacy rights as fundamental and legally-protectable can be traced back to seminal writings, key legal cases, and the growing awareness of the impact of technological advancements on personal privacy. The conceptualization of privacy has been widely debated and has undergone significant evolution over the past century. While deeply rooted in historical principles of ancient and common law, the concept of privacy has been continually redefined to address the challenges posed by technology and changing social landscapes. It has often been associated with personal freedom and dignity.

Earlier protections afforded to the inviolability of the home and correspondence made the privacy of property acceptable. These rights, enshrined in many constitutions during the 1800s, laid the groundwork for the modern concept of privacy. For example, the seminal 1789 “Declaration of the Rights of Man” stated, “Since property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on condition that the owner shall have been previously and equitably indemnified” (Declaration of the Rights of Man 1789). The inviolability of the home protected individuals from unwarranted intrusions by the state, recognizing a private sphere free from governmental interference. Similarly, the protection of correspondence remained confidential, safeguarding the privacy of individual expression.

Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 1890 article “The Right to Privacy” served as a catalyst in the movement to legally recognize privacy rights. They argued for the necessity of recognizing privacy as a distinct legal right, separate from existing protections of person and property under existing law. Additionally, the conceptualization of privacy was needed to respond to the modern era: “This development of the law was inevitable. The intense intellectual and emotional life, and the heightening of sensations which came with the advance of civilization, made it clear to men that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical things. Thoughts, emotions, and sensations demanded legal recognition” (Brandeis & Warren 1890, 193). Furthermore, they highlighted the inadequacies of existing legal frameworks to address the non-physical aspects of privacy, emphasizing the need for the evolution of the law in response to changing social and technological landscapes. In particular, the right “to be let alone” is a fundamental aspect of privacy to Warren and Brandeis in the modernizing world (Warren & Brandeis 1890, 194).

Despite Warren and Brandeis’s popular arguments, early 20th-century legal developments were slow to incorporate a broad conception of privacy rights. A notable example is the 1928 Supreme Court case Olmstead v. United States, where the Court held that wiretapping a person’s home telephone did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it did not involve a physical trespass (Solove 2008, 1101). However, legal decisions began to shift in the mid-20th century, starting with the 1965 Griswold v. Connecticut case. The Court ruled that a right to privacy could be inferred from several amendments in the Bill of Rights, thereby preventing states from making the use of contraception by married couples illegal (Griswold v. Connecticut 1985). This established privacy as a constitutionally protected right and laid the groundwork for subsequent decisions that expanded privacy protections.

Correspondingly, further landmark cases and bills recognized privacy rights. Katz v. United States in 1967 overruled the Olmstead decision; the Privacy Act of 1974, created in response to the Watergate scandal, aimed to regulation the collection and use of personal information by federal agencies; the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 was passed by Congress in response to a court case that held that individuals had not property interest in their bank records (Solove 2008, 1146; Regan 1995, 366).

Internationally, many institutions influenced the development of privacy rights. Early on, Europe enacted several pieces of legislation to protect privacy. Article 8 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights explicitly recognized the right to respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence (Bygrave 2014, 12). This right has been one of the most frequently contested in case law and has influenced the development of privacy laws in Europe and across the globe. In fact, the United Nations Human Rights Committee stated, “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks upon his honour and reputation” in Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Bygrave 2014, 57).

In the 21st-century, significant advancements in digital technology make the protection of privacy rights challenging. The explosion of digitized information and the rise of new media forms raise complex questions regarding the adequacy of existing privacy laws. William Prosser’s influential work on privacy tort law, while providing a foundational framework, has been criticized for its limitations in addressing contemporary privacy issues (Richards & Solove 2010, 1187). In response, David Lyon and William Staples have discussed the implications of surveillance for privacy in modern society, highlighting the need for pinging vigilance and adaptation of privacy protections in response to evolving technological and social landscapes (Lyon 2001, 222).

Overall, the recognition of privacy rights as fundamental and legally-protectable has been a dynamic and evolving process. From the early arguments of Warren and Brandeis to the landmark Supreme Court cases and legislative action, the concept of privacy has continually adapted to new challenges and contexts. These actions were all in response to the changing nature of privacy threats and to ensure legal protections could continue to evolve to these new challenges.


References Bygrave, L. A. (2014). "Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective." Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199675555.001.0001. Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789). https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/381/479/. Penfold, R. (2002). [Review of Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life; Everyday Surveillance: Vigilance and Visibility in Post Modern Life, by D. Lyon & W. Staples]. The British Journal of Criminology, 42(1), 222–224. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23638774 Regan, P. M. (1995). "Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy." University of North Carolina Press. Richards, N. M., & Solove, D. J. (2010). "Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy." California Law Review, 98(6), 1887-1924. https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2104&context=faculty_publications. Solove, D. J. (2008). "Understanding Privacy." Harvard University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/3481326. Warren, S.D., & Brandeis, L.D. (1890). “The Right to Privacy.” Harvard Law Review, 4(5), 193-220. https://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/articles/privacy/Privacy_brand_warr2.html.