Privacy Rights/Limitations - Restrictions/Private curtailment
Is this right at times curtailed by private actors?
Privacy Torts
Privacy violations under tort law was how Warren & Brandeis originally developed the right in 1890 (Citron, 2010, 1805) . These violations, usually unwanted intrusions or disclosures can result from negligent or intentional actions and result in civil lawsuits rather than questions of constitutional legality (Citron, 2010, 1806; Tort, n.d.). Violations are hard to define as they change with technology (the original call for privacy was in relation to the ‘instant photograph’), which creates more and more opportunities for violations (Citron, 2010, 1809; Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 195). However, the law changes slower than technology creating some disconnect in legal remedies for new technology (Citron, 2010, 1810) .
Constitutional Privacy
Constitutions only protect people from government actors and international covenants only affect the laws and regulations which governments put in place (Hudson, 2018; Dunn, 2009) . Even so, most allowances of government invasions of privacy in the United States have evolved because the government mimicked the actions of private actors, placing private conduct at the baseline of privacy expectations (Kamin, 2004, 101, 115).
At a basic level, once information is willingly given to someone other than oneself, the courts have continuously ruled that there is no longer the expectation for privacy. This holds true with information that is given to both private companies and individuals (Kamin, 2004, 101). The Katz decision somewhat demonstrates this curtailment of privacy by creating the plain view doctrine. If something is in plain view, even in a private space, it is not private (Kamin, 2004, 104). This decision extrapolates on the theory that as long as someone else may reasonably have that information, it is an unprotected area under the Fourth Amendment (Kamin, 2004, 104). So, by letting someone into one’s home or publishing information online, one is inherently limiting their Fourth Amendment protections. As such, authorities can ask private companies to perform searches or subpoena these actors rather than those they are investigating, depending on the company’s privacy policies (Kamin, 2004, 102, 137).
In United States v. Jacobsen (1984) privacy protections were tested when officials were able to open a package that FedEx had damaged and opened for insurance purposes (Kamin, 2004, 99, United States v. Jacobsen, 1984) . Upon its opening, FedEx employees suspected the package contained cocaine (Kamin, 2004, 99; United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.). Had federal officials gotten to it first, it would not have been able to be searched, even if it was damaged, but the information provided by FedEx from the private search was enough to imply the plain view doctrine thus permitting a warrantless search by the DEA (Kamin, 2004, 100; United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.; US v. Jacobsen, 1984) . The Supreme Court upheld the granting of the search and subsequent arrest warrant which was obtained because the DEA confirmed the contents were cocaine based on the ‘tip’ from private actors (United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.). The Court said that “[w]hether those invasions were accidental or deliberate, and whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of their private character” (US v. Jacobsen, 1984) . Kamin (2004) goes as far as to say that “[t]he fact that the private actor did something the government would not have been permitted to do simply did not covert the subsequent, otherwise reasonable, police conduct into a search that implicated the Fourth Amendment” (100-101). That is to say, after the package was opened due to the damage by a non-governmental party, privacy could no longer be expected, despite that it is reasonable to expect privacy during shipping (Kamin, 2004, 100).
Resources
Citron, D.K. (2010, Dec. 1). Mainstreaming Privacy Torts. California Law Review 98(6). https://www.jstor.org/stable/25799956 Dunn, C. (2009, Apr. 28). Applying the Constitution to private actors (New York Law Journal). NYCLU ACLU of New York. https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/column-applying-constitution-private-actors-new-york-law-journal Hudson, D.L. (2018, Oct. 20). In the age of social media, expand the reach of the First Amendment. Human Rights Magazine 43(4), n.p. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/the-ongoing-challenge-to-define-free-speech/in-the-age-of-socia-media-first-amendment/ Kamin, S. (2004, Dec. 1). The private is public: The relevance of private actors in defining the Fourth Amendment. Boston College Law Review 46(1), 83-147. https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2293& context=bclr Tort. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 15, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort United States v. Jacobsen. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1983/ 82-1167
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 US 109 (1984) . https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/466/109
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215% 294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C