Depends on governance
Is this right exercised in different ways depending on the political governance regime in place (democracy, autocracy, hybrid regime)?
| Right | Breakout | Contents |
|---|---|---|
| Freedom of Association | The United States Supreme Court has recognized two types of associative freedoms protected under the Constitution; expressive and intimate (Congress, Amdt 1.8.1). Expressive association covers an individual’s right to form and join groups or unions that express a collective purpose, while intimate refers to an individual’s right to maintain private associations (Hudson Jr., 2009). Freedom of association is covered under Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The United States Court system has recognized both aspects of freedom of association through multiple court cases such as Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and Roberts v. United States Jaycees (Hudson Jr., 2009). The United Nations Human Rights Office states “Freedom of association is an essential element of democracy that serves as a vehicle for the exercise of many other rights guaranteed under international law, including the right to freedom of expression (UN Human Rights. 2023).
Examples of expressive association include interacting and organizing amongst other citizens to collectively express and promote common interests, as well as the right to form and join trade unions, or work for non-governmental organizations(NGOs). Within the intimate aspect of association, those in democracies have a right to hold private relationships and associations without interference. In major democratic regimes such as the United States and the United Kingdom, freedom of association is respected and protected. In the United States, “officials respect the constitutional right to assembly; laws and practices give wide freedom to NGOs and activists to pursue civic and policy agendas; and federal law guarantees trade unions the right to organize and engage in collective bargaining (Freedom House, 2023).” In the United Kingdom, the freedom to assemble, go on strike, and bargain collectively are also all respected. NGOs may also operate freely, and workers have a right to organize trade unions, and even their own Labour Party. While perfect freedom is not always the case, as seen in examples of police brutality against protesters in the United States, and in the UK with the Police, Crime, Sentencing, and Courts Act of 2022, freedom of association is generally upheld and protected within democratic regimes. However, global democracy is on the decline, and in the 2015 John Hopkins University Press’ Journal of Democracy, Douglas Rutzen discusses how authoritarianism is placing an increasing threat to civil society. He says, “Since 2012, more than 160 laws constraining the freedoms of association or assembly have been enacted or proposed in 60 countries. This trend is consistent with the continuing decline of democracy worldwide(Rutzen, 2015, 30).” Freedom in the World 2023 shows us that 2022 was the 17th consecutive year of a global decline in freedom. As freedom of association is recognized by international law, this is not reflected when exercised within authoritarian regimes. In Countries such as Venezuela, freedom of association is strongly restricted and those who exercise this right can face major consequences. “The government is being investigated for crimes against humanity regarding how they treat opposition protests; Human Rights activists and members of NGOs face harassment, threats, and arrest; and the government has cracked down on labor unions with opposition unions and several labor union leaders have been arrested or killed (Freedom House, 2023)”. The autocratic regime of Kazakhstan also has strict restrictions on those who assemble and protest. Those who fail to follow these restrictions are subject to detainment, torture, and death as seen in the 2022 gas price protests in western Kazakhstan. “NGOs continue to operate but face government harassment when they attempt to address politically sensitive issues. There are extensive legal restrictions on the formation and operation of NGOs…Workers have limited rights to form and join trade unions or participate in collective bargaining. The government is closely affiliated with the largest union federation and major employers, while genuinely independent unions face repressive actions by the authorities. The country’s major independent trade union body was dissolved in 2017(Freedom House, 2023).” Intimate association is also not free within an autocracy as seen in Russia. Although private relationships are allowed, social media is heavily monitored, minority religious groups are often targeted, and political repression has impacted private discussions with cases of citizens reporting others for expressing views or associations in opposition to the government. “The government restricts freedom of assembly. Overwhelming police responses, the excessive use of force, routine arrests, and harsh fines and prison sentences have largely discouraged unsanctioned protests, while pro-Kremlin groups are able to demonstrate freely… The government has also relentlessly persecuted NGOs, particularly those that work on human rights and governance issues. Civic activists are frequently arrested on politically motivated charges(Freedom House, 2023).” Exercising freedom of association within an autocratic regime is heavily restricted and poses a major risk. While sometimes possible to assemble and protest, it is not without registration and approval, being met with police force, or facing other significant consequences. As the middle ground between democracy and autocracy, hybrid regimes recognize freedom of association accordingly. Freedom House ranks countries on a scale of 1-4; democratic regimes typically place at a 3 or 4 regarding freedom of association, whereas autocratic regimes place at a 0 or 1. However, hybrid regimes consistently place at a 1, 2, or 3 depending on the nation. As declared by the European Parliament, Hungary has now transitioned from a deficient democracy, into a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy. (European Parliament Press Release, 2022).” However, according to Freedom House, Hungary exemplifies a true hybrid regime with the possession of liberty and limitations to the freedom of association. The freedom to assemble is constitutionally protected and often respected, scoring a 4/4; however, associations with NGOs that go against the government agenda are subjected to stigmatization, monitoring, and fines placing associative freedom at a 2/4 (Freedom House, 2023). The hybrid regime of Jordan, a constitutional monarchy with an elected lower house in parliament, has a registration system for the formation of associations that must be approved by authority (Makary, 2007). In the International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law’s 10th volume issued in 2007, Marc Makary examines the case studies of Jordan and Lebanon and the guarantees of freedom of association in non-democratic environments. He states “While freedom of association in Jordan is protected by the Constitution, its laws are contrary to the standards for freedom of association set by International Law. Article 16 of the Constitution grants Jordanians the right ‘to establish societies and political parties provided that the objects of such societies and parties are lawful, their methods peaceful, and their by-laws not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.’ While Article 16 seems to provide space for individuals to establish associations, its paragraph (iii) places the establishment of associations and political parties under the control of the law with Jordanian Law N° 33 of 1966 granting absolute discretion to the Minister of Social Affairs or the Minister of Interior to register associations, ban undeclared associations, and establish long and burdensome administrative procedures (Makary’s, 2007). ” Makary’s findings have not changed much since 2007, as the current hybrid regime strictly limits free assembly, heavily monitors and regulates NGO operations in an arbitrary manner, and limits the industries in which unions may form with the limited right to strike (Freedom House, 2023). Hungary was on the more positive end of the spectrum with middle averaging scores, contrary to Jordan with scores of 1/4 and 0/4 regarding freedom of association. Hybrid systems can fluctuate how much freedom they allow for people to associate with each other. Democratic regimes remain at the top levels of ability regarding the right to exercise freedom of association without interference; whether that be through assembly, union membership, expressive group discussion, or intimate association, citizens of democracies face little to no limits. In contrast, Autocratic regimes place heavy restrictions and limits on the exercise of this freedom and often punish those who do. While the actions do not vary much depending on the regime, the ability to do so freely without interference is truly where the differences lie. European Parliament. 2022. “MEPs: Hungary Can No Longer Be Considered a Full Democracy. News. European Parliament.” Www.europarl.europa.eu. September 15, 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220909IPR40137/meps-hungary-can-no-longer-be-considered-a-full-democracy. Freedom House. 2023. “ Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report.” Freedom House. 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/explore-the-map?type=fiw&year=2023 Gorokhovskaia, Yana, Adrian Shahbaz, and Amy Slipowitz. 2023. “Marking 50 Years in the Struggle for Democracy.” Freedom House. 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2023/marking-50-years. Jr, David L. Hudson. 2009. “Freedom of Association.” Www.mtsu.edu. 2009. https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1594/freedom-of-association. Makary, Marc. “Notification or Registration? Guarantees of Freedom of Association in Non-Democratic Environments: Case Studies of Lebanon and Jordan.” n.d. ICNL. Accessed June 19, 2023. https://www.icnl.org/resources/research/ijnl/notification-or-registration-guarantees-of-freedom-of-association-in-non-democratic-environments-case-studies-of-lebanon-and-jordan. Rutzen, Douglas. "Authoritarianism Goes Global (II): Civil Society Under Assault." Journal of Democracy, vol. 26 no. 4, 2015, p. 28-39. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/jod.2015.0071. United Nations Human Rights. 2023. “OHCHR Freedom of Assembly and of Association.” n.d. OHCHR. https://www.ohchr.org/en/topic/freedom-assembly-and-association#:~:text=Everyone%20has%20the%20rights%20to,protests%2C%20both%20offline%20and%20online. United States Congress. Constitution Annotated. Amdt1.8.1 Overview of Freedom of Association. https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-8-1/ALDE_00013139/ | |
| Freedom of Expression | The right to freedom of expression is not necessarily qualified as a protected human right in each country or sovereign government. Rather, it is a global human right, as stated in Act 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” (Civic, 1997, pg. 129). Within this declaration, a few key factors are revealed that are related to how the freedom of expression is exercised as a legally recognized right. First, expression is acknowledged as being equal to opinions; they are both very imperative when it comes to human rights and the exercise of freedom of expression. Without the acknowledgment of the inherent significance of freedom of expression in a group context or collective capacity, such as protections under the Constitution, the full exercise of the right will not be achieved without an elevated form of protection placed on it. “Therefore, naked freedom of expression, without some common sense or good community sense infused into it, ultimately will fail to protect the individual as a member of the community, by its total disregard for the needs of the society… Thus, while freedom of expression is essential to human dignity, additionally, for the ultimate good of the individual as a member of society, such freedom must be exercised responsibly and with a recognition of the integral relationship the autonomous self has with the greater society.” (Civic, 1997, pg.143). Although many different governments and nations recognize the significance of freedom of expression, they may not agree with the outcome of fully exercising this right for all citizens. Along those lines, when protections for freedom of expression are not present within a country or society, the full capacity for citizens to freely express their ideas and thoughts in an individual or community context will subsequently be stifled. The difference between protections of ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘freedom of speech’ is determined by the way that somebody voices or expresses an idea or opinion. Protections under the freedom of speech may be determined by the words themselves that are used, but the expression is conveyed through action, and moreover what a person is trying to show with that action. “The terms ‘expression’ and ‘action’ are functional ones, rooted in the fundamental character of a system of free expression and in the factors necessary to maintain its effective operation. Hence it is clear that the term ‘expression’ must include more than the mere utterance of words or other forms of communication. It must embrace a surrounding area of conduct closely related to the making of the utterance or necessary to make it effective.” (Emerson, 1964, pg. 24-25). Thomas Scanlon analyzed the theoretical significance of how freedom of expression is positioned between protected acts and the consequences of exercising this right. “The most common defense of the doctrine of freedom of expression is a consequential one. This may take the form of arguing with respect to a certain class of acts, e.g., acts of speech, that the good consequences of allowing such acts to go unrestricted outweigh the bad. Alternatively, the boundaries of the class of protected acts may themselves be defined by balancing good consequences against bad, the question of whether a certain species of acts belong to the private genus being decided in many is not all cases just by asking whether its inclusion would, on the whole, lead to more good consequences than bad.” (Scanlon, 1972, pg. 204-5). Within this analysis, the reflection of the significance of intention comes to light, where there is negative or malicious intent, protections remain absent under freedom of expression. One cannot use freedom of expression to instill violence, or suppression, but rather as a way to exude an opinion or idea that does not push these limitations under legal precedent. “However, since acts of expression can be both violent and arbitrarily destructive, it seems unlikely that anyone would maintain that as a class they were immune from legal restrictions. Thus the class of protected acts must be some proper subset of this class. It is sometimes held that the relevant subclass consists of those acts of expression which are instances of ‘speech’ as ‘opposed to action’.” (Scanlon, 1972, pg. 207). Freedom of speech differs inherently from the freedom of expression based on an action directive, a person can say something that goes against the government’s prerogative and not face legal consequences, but upon acting to overthrow or dismantle that government, the protection of expression does not extend to ‘fighting’ actions or malicious acts. This theorizing under the freedom of expression justly points out the differences between American protections of expression under democracy, versus a more autocratic regime that aligns itself with dictatorships or communist ideologies. For example, in the People’s Republic of China, a socialist democracy under the legal definition, the government chooses to remain neutral upon expression protections unless they conflict with the individualistic ideology of communal support. “The Communist perspective on free speech, by contrast, assigns absolute priority to the well-being of the community, and in so doing, sacrifices individual freedom of expression.” (Civic, 1997, pg. 127). Under the People’s Republic of China’s legal provisions, freedom of expression is intertwined with freedom of speech. “Speech and other forms of expression must be internally, as well as externally, restrained to serve all of the people [under the ideology of Communism]…Thus, the Chinese perception of free speech in particular, and human rights in general, is propelled by Communist ideology which emphasizes the interests of the community at the expense of individual interests. Finally, the ‘rights’ of the individual are defined relative to his duties to the community, and are subjected to qualification, restriction, and repression for community interests, as defined by the Communist Party elite.” (Civic, 1997, pg. 128). The gray area that is ‘freedom of expression’ within the ideology of Communism conflicts with the obvious reality of actually having protections of freedom of expression. Where there is no protection, there is a lack of freedom to act upon an idea or opinion. Although the freedom of expression is distinguishable from the freedom of speech, they are communally intertwined under the Communist ideology. Freedom of expression must serve to fit the relative overall needs of the community in the PRC through their freedom of speech, otherwise, it does not qualify legally as protection of freedom of expression.
Civic, Melanne Andromecca. "Right to Freedom of Expression as the Principal Component of the Preservation of Personal Dignity: An Argument for International Protection within All Nations and across All Borders." In Hybrid, vol. 4, p. 117. 1997 Emerson, Thomas I. "Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression." The Yale Law Journal 74, no. 1 (1964): 1-35. Scanlon, Thomas. "A theory of freedom of expression." Philosophy & Public Affairs (1972): 204-226 ( 1972) : 204-226 | |
| Freedom of Religion | Regime type affects all facets of political life within a country, and the exercise of religious freedom is no exception. As might be expected, governments and societies in democratic states like New Zealand and Canada tend to show greater levels of respect for religious freedom than states with different regime types. Citizens living in states controlled by hybrid regimes tend to still experience some level of religious freedom, but this right is severely restricted by government-required registries and heavy oversight of religious practice. Autocracies, predictably, are the regime type that shows the least respect for their citizens’ right to religious freedom.
The right to religious freedom is expressed openly and without fear in the world’s most democratic states. Countries like New Zealand and Canada, both of which are listed among the most democratic states in the word, both stipulate in their constitutions that citizens shall enjoy total freedom of faith, belief, and religion. A 2018 U.S. State Department report on religious freedom in Canada mentions a constitutional guarantee that citizens shall enjoy “freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression, and the right to equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination based on religion” (U.S. State Department, “Canada,” 2018, 1). New Zealand’s constitution makes a very similar guarantee, and both countries are reported to enjoy high levels of religious liberty. Discrimination on the basis of religion is usually outlawed in democratic states, and while religious intolerance may sometimes be observed in the form of citizen anti-semitism or vandalism, democratic governments as a whole work to limit any religious injustice within their borders. Even democracies with obvious religious majorities like Italy tend to allow the free exercise of religious practices, though most do require religious organizations to register with the government in order to receive tax exemptions (U.S. State Department, “Italy,” 2018, 1). Hybrid regimes usually exert more significant influence over the exercise of religious freedom within their borders. Egypt, for example, is a state governed by limited democracy which also shows clear autocratic tendencies. In Egypt, “The constitution states that ‘freedom of belief is absolute’ and ‘the freedom of practicing religious rituals and establishing worship places for the followers of divine (i.e. Abrahamic) religions is a right regulated by law’” (U.S. State Department, “Egypt,” 2018). However, U.S. State Department reports show that these freedoms are subject to a number of restrictions. It mentions that Muslim citizens are prohibited from converting to a new relition under Egyptian law, and it notes that the Ministry of Interior Religious Affairs Department has the power to deny religious groups official recognition if they are determined to pose a threat to the nation (U.S. State Department, “Egypt,” 2018). A U.S. State Department report on religious freedom in Russia reveals a similar willingness within the Russian government to restrict religious practices if they are deemed “extremist” or “dangerous” (U.S. State Department, “Russia,” 2018). In hybrid regimes like Russia and Egypt, religious practice is protected but heavily regulated. Autocratic regimes are generally the most restrictive of religious freedom. China, perhaps the world’s most powerful autocracy, shows the lack of respect that it has for its citizens’ religious convictions in its treatment of Muslims, in particular. The constitution of the People’s Republic of China allows for the free practice of approved religions, but a Forbes article from 2019 reports that “China is participating in the practice of forced conversion whereby Muslims are forced to ‘eat pork and drink alcohol’” (Ochab, “Is China Conducting a Crackdown On Religion?” 2019). A U.S. State Department report from 2018 similarly notes that “there continue to be reports of deaths in custody and that the government tortured, physically abused, arrested, detained, sentenced to prison, or harassed adherents of both registered and unregistered religious groups for activities related to their religious beliefs and practices” (U.S. State Department, “China,” 2018). Belarus, which is ruled by an authoritarian dictatorial regime, imposes similar restrictions on the free practice of religion. Like China, North Korea, and a number of other autocratic nations, Belarus guarantees religious freedom within its constitution but fails to guarantee this right for its citizens. However, a State Department report notes that Belarusian law “prohibits religious activities directed against the sovereignty of the state, its constitutional system, and ‘civic harmony’” (U.S. State Department, “Belarus,” 2018). It states that the Belarusian regime bans all religious activity by unregistered groups, and explains that there are a number of administrative and legal obstacles that prevent most religious organizations from being officially recognized (U.S. State Department, “Belarus,” 2018). Regime type plays a significant role in determining the extent to which a government protects the exercise of religious freedom. In general, the more democratic a regime is, the more likely it is to guarantee and respect its citizens’ right to freedom of religion. REFERENCES: United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. IRAN 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IRAN-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FRE EDOM-REPORT.pdf. United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, XINJIANG, HONG KONG, AND MACAU) 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CHINA-INCLUSIVE-2018-INTERNATIONAL-R ELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf. Ochab, Ewelina U. “Is China Conducting A Crackdown On Religion?” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 20 Apr. 2019, www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2019/04/20/is-china-conducting-a-crackdown-on-religion/. United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. ITALY 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ITALY-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FR EEDOM-REPORT.pdf. United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. IRAN 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IRAN-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FRE EDOM-REPORT.pdf. United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK) 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/KOREA-DEM-REP-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RE LIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf. United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. RUSSIA 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/RUSSIA-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-F REEDOM-REPORT.pdf. U.S. Mission Egypt, 23 June, 2019, Topics: News. “2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Egypt.” U.S. Embassy in Egypt, 27 June 2019, eg.usembassy.gov/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom-egypt/. United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. BELARUS 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/BELARUS-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS -FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf. United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. CANADA 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CANADA-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS- FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf. United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. NEW ZEALAND 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/NEW-ZEALAND-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELI GIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf. | |
| Freedom of the Press | Freedom House called freedom of the press “a cornerstone of global democracy” and others have deemed it crucial (Abramowitz, 2017, 2; Whitten-Woodring, 2009, 595). But does that mean regime affects how this right is exercised? Regime affects the institutions and framework around the media and freedom of the press (Stier, 2015, 1273) . Democracy, government legitimacy, and free press are generally connected as there are easier ways to criticize, advocate for change, and hold leaders accountable (Whitten-Woodring, 2009, 596). Research backs this up. In a study of states from 1948- 1995, 82% of democracies had free press and 88% of autocracies had controlled press; The correlation between free or controlled media and regime type is 0.74, a moderately strong score (Whitten-Woodring, 2009, 602, 619). A 1993- 2010 study found a correlation between these variables as well (Stier, 2015, 1273) . Most argue that this is due to the increased legitimacy, transparency, and accountability – all things necessary in a healthy democracy. There were notable exceptions in these trends: Mexico, Uganda, and Turkey.
Democracies Turkey, a multi-party democracy for almost 70 years, ranked highly on Freedom House’s democracy scale from 1993- 2004, has heavily censored media since a 2016 coup attempt (Repucci, 2019) . News outlets have closed, the internet has become restrictive and government-censored, and traditional media platforms have become unavailable (Repucci, 2019) . There is still local press, but accessibility has declined, requiring the use of workarounds, such as VPNs and social media rather than traditional local news sources, such as newspapers (Repucci, 2019) . In Germany, board members of news outlet ZDF were supportive of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party, but their Editor-in-Chief was not (Stier, 2015, 1277) . ZDF is Germany’s national public broadcaster and is “a leading source of information,” providing a comprehensive view of the state (Facts and figures about ZDF, 2021) . The board did not renew his contract, likely because he was critical of the government and a talented investigator, leading him to uncover instances that were not politically advantageous for the CDU. This claim that an Editor-in-Chief did not have a contract renewed for holding different political views isn’t great for the free press narrative, especially when nearly half of the council works for the government (Facts and figures 2020, 2020) . Autocracies Autocracies control media to ensure the survival of the regime. Thus, there are two prevailing media policies in autocratic states with controlled press: prevent discussion regarding the exercise of power and strictly control opposition organizations and efforts (Stier, 2015, 1277) . Under these policies, controlled media can also help promote the government’s rule and agenda (Whitten-Woodring, 2009, 601). There are, however, instances of strategic censorship, in which autocracies allow minimal elements of media freedom. These policies have a similar goal as one-party states holding elections – achieving a look of democracy (Stier, 2015, 1278) . When this control is relinquished too quickly, it can have unintended consequences. In a well-known instance, Mikhail Gorbachev implemented freer press and expression in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s with his glasnost policy (Stier, 2015, 1279) . Under the communist autocracy in place and with significantly fewer media regulations, this new freedom aided a rapid decline within the state as government mismanagement became revealed (Stier, 2015, 1279) . Generally, free press happens accidentally; this was the case in Mexico and Uganda. In the 1980s , Uganda media began asserting independence against the US in a partisan way against the new government, prompting a “media war” (Whitten-Woodring, 2009, 601). In the mid- 1980s , the Moseveni government came into power. This government was liked better by the media, but when the new Moseveni government began human rights violations, the media still reported it. Moseveni tried to shut them down, but the media retained their independence (Whitten-Woodring, 2009, 601). Under Mexican autocratic rule in the 1990s , the media began to criticize the government and assert independence (Whitten-Woodring, 2009, 614). This trend accelerated in the late 1990s with more aggressive media tactics, with journalists putting themselves at risk (Whitten-Woodring, 2009, 614). On the other hand, Stier ( 2015, 1280) acknowledges that long-lasting, autocratic regimes, such as monarchies, have the benefit of being prosperous and well-liked. These characteristics, along with a strong military presence, limit the chance of being overthrown and can lead to more press freedoms (Stier, 2015, 1280) . Accordingly, autocratic characteristics that are associated with fewer media freedoms are communism and one-party systems (Stier, 2015, 1281) . References: Abramowitz, M. (2017, Apr.). Freedom of the press 2017. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/FOTP_2017_booklet_FINAL_April28_1.pdf Facts and figures 2020. (2020). ZDF. https://www.zdf.de/zdfunternehmen/factsandfigures-100.html Facts and figures about ZDF (2021, April. 20). ZDF. https://www.zdf.de/zdfunternehmen/factsandfigures-100.html Repucci, S. (2019). Freedom and the media 2019. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-and-media/2019/media-freedom-downward-spiral. Stier, S. (2015). Democracy, autocracy and the news: the impact of regime type on media freedom. Democratization, 22(7), 1273-1295. https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.964643 Whitten-Woodring, J. (2009). Watchdog or lapdog? Media freedom, regime type, and government respect for human rights. International Studies Quarterly 53, 595-625. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00548.x ZDF. (2021, Aug. 21). Wikipedia. Retrieved Sept. 7, 2021, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ZDF | |
| Privacy Rights | Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly ( 1986) describe six regime types: liberal, minimal, traditionalist, communist, corporatist (authoritarian), and developmental. When comparing regime type to the ‘valuation of privacy,’ liberal regimes are ranked highly, and minimal regimes are ranked very highly (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 814). The other regime types, all communitarian regimes rather than individualistic, were ranked low or very low regarding privacy (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 814). At their cores, communitarian regimes do not have privacy because it can be argued, as Howard and Donnelly ( 1986, 211) do, that the allowance of freedoms may lead to self-destruction. Thus, privacy is ignored (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 211). Fatos Lubonja agrees with this sentiment, writing that privacy did not exist in Albania under the totalitarian regime, and cites his experience in Albanian prisons as an example (Lubonja, 2001) . He also admitted to self-censorship in the private diaries which originally got him arrested, supposing many others had censored themselves in the same way (Lubonja, 2001, 247).
Resources Howard, R.E., & Donnelly, J. ( 1986, Sept.) Human dignity, human rights, and political regimes. The American Political Science Review 80(3), 801-817. https://doi.org/10. 2307/ 1960539 Lubonja, F. ( 2001) . Privacy in a totalitarian regime. Social Research 68(1), 237-254. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4097 1449 | |
| Voting Rights and Suffrage | The type of regime governing a state often influences the level of voting rights people have and the way in which those rights are exercised. According to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), most countries regardless of regime type legally have universal suffrage, and most have an age requirement of over eighteen years old or a similar age (CIA). Some other common notes on suffrage statuses included a citizenship or residency year requirement and the exclusion of military and police force members from voting. These voting requirements and restrictions are not exclusive to democratic versus autocratic regimes. France, Mali, Thailand, and Afghanistan (countries encompassing a wide range of democracy levels) have universal suffrage for all citizens, but one must reside in the country for five years in order to become a citizen. However, countries leaning more autocratic commonly have longer or unknown residency requirements to become naturalized and therefore able to vote, such as Bhutan (ten years), Cambodia (seven years), China (unspecified residency and extremely difficult naturalization process), Oman (unknown), Kuwait (twenty years), and Venezuela (ten years except for applicants from a specified set of countries) (CIA). Additionally, more than half of all countries and territories have compulsory voting (Shumacher and Connaughton, 2020). There is no visible trend, however, about regime types that employ compulsory voting, as both democratic and autocratic states require it, including but not limited to Belgium, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Greece, North Korea, and Luxembourg (CIA).
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