Early Modern Rationalism

Early Modern Rationalism

Right	Section	Contents
Freedom of Expression	Philosophical Origins	TThe late seventeenth century was a period of great philosophical advancement. Falling roughly at the close of the Enlightenment movement, the late 1900s and early 1700s saw an expansion in the European discourse on rights and liberties within political society. While rationalists during this time period generally did not deal with specific freedoms of the citizens in their writings, writers like Leibniz and Spinoza do reveal a tendency in the early-modern rational tradition to consider the benefits of citizens’ unrestrained expression. Sources do not indicate that these philosophers were thinking of free expression in terms of right or liberty, but their writings nevertheless reveal shades of support for the concept. Leibniz was a prolific writer who produced a plethora of work spanning a wealth of topics, but some of his most important work relating to freedom and liberty occurred in the field of political philosophy. In his “Reflections on the Common Concept of Justice,” he explains his thoughts on justice within political society and the transfer of right between citizen and state. In response to Hobbes’ argument in Leviathan, Leibniz explains that he thinks it impossible for an individual to transfer all of their freedom unto a sovereign in exchange for membership and security within a state. “In the end,” he writes, “in spite of what Hobbes says, each one has retained his right and his liberty regardless of the transfer to the state, and this transfer will be provisional and limited, that is, it will take place to the degree that we believe our safety is involved” (Leibniz, 573). This does not deal specifically with the right to liberty of expression, but it certainly implies that there are certain freedoms that the citizen retains within the context of wider society. Coupled with his definition of justice as “a constant will to act in such a way that no person has reason to complain of us,” it is not unreasonable to conclude that freedom of expression could be included in the set of liberties that Leibniz believes are not transferred to the sovereign in political society. (Leibniz, 566). Of course, Leibniz never directly argues in favor of the protection of the right to freedom of expression, so it is unclear whether he viewed it as an inalienable, natural right. The idea that certain forms of expression could potentially give a person “reason to complain” of another was certainly familiar to early-modern Europeans; defamation and libel laws had existed in England since the reign of Edward I (Statutes of the Realm). This means that Leibniz would have understood how certain forms of expression could be harmful to political society, and it is possible that he would have viewed certain forms of expression as unjust and therefore unprotected by natural right. Ultimately, Leibniz would have based his views on freedom of expression in his classification of the right itself. If he thought of it as an intrinsic natural right which citizens were incapable of giving up, then he likely would have viewed state restrictions on speech or demonstration as inherently impermissible. Unfortunately, Leibniz does not address specific rights, such as that to freedom of expression, within his discourse. Spinoza, on the other hand, deals somewhat more specifically with the freedom of expression, though he also refrains from advocating for it outright. Spinoza’s support for free expression within society stems from his belief that the state can never truly force belief upon its subjects. He does not address freedom of thought and expression; he sees them as inevitable. In his Theological-Political Treatise, h e discusses the rights and liberties that the individual surrenders to the state when he or she enters into political society under the sovereign. When he considers the state’s ability to impose belief upon its citizens, he concludes that “the individual justly cedes the right of free action, though not of free reason and judgment; no one can act against the authorities without danger to the state, though his feelings and judgment may be at variance therewith; he may even speak against them, provided that he does so from rational conviction” (Spinoza, 195). Elsewhere in the Treatise, he writes that: “I have thus shown:—I.That it is impossible to deprive men of the liberty of saying what they think. II.That such liberty can be conceded to every man without injury to the rights and authority of the sovereign power, and that every man may retain it without injury to such rights, provided that he does not presume upon it to the extent of introducing any new rights into the state, or acting in any way contrary to the existing laws.” (Spinoza, 199) Like Leibniz, Spinoza does not take issue with an individual’s freedom of belief, nor does he see any reason that a citizen’s right to express themself should be restricted. It is important to note that both thinkers limit the citizen’s liberty, whether it relates to speech or not, to action that does not break any of the sovereign’s laws. Neither philosopher believed that a sovereign’s word was always morally just, but both nevertheless took issue with a citizen’s blatant violation of the law. References: Britain., Great. “The Statutes of the Realm : Printed by Command of His Majesty King George the Third, in Pursuance of an Address of the House of Commons of Great Britain. From V.1.” HathiTrust, babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000017915496. Johns, Christopher. “The Grounds of Right and Obligation in Leibniz and Hobbes.” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 62, no. 3, 2009, pp. 551–574. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40387825. Accessed 30 July 2020. “Reflections on the Common Concept of Justice (1702[?]).” Philosophical Papers and Letters, by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Leroy E. Loemker, Kluwer Academic, 1989. Spinoza, Benedictus de, and R. H. M. Elwes. The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza. G. Bell, 1891, oll resources.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1710/Spinoza_1321.01_EBk_v6.0.pdf.
Freedom of Religion	Philosophical Origins	The early-modern rationalist tradition has its roots in the European Enlightenment movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Though famous philosophers like Kant and Descartes came to define the era through their work on method and idealism, thinkers like Spinoza and Leibniz were also influential in their writings on metaphysics, religion, and political philosophy. Both thinkers’ works contributed to a developing discourse on the rights and duties of the sovereign within political society. It is important to note that the early-modern definition of a “right” differs significantly from its modern meaning. Leibniz’s work, for example, was influential in his time because of his conviction that “right” implies an intrinsic moral permissibility in an actor to complete an action that does not negatively impact society. In an article entitled “The Grounds of Right and Obligation in Leibniz and Hobbes,” Christopher Johns explains that “for Leibniz right (jus) is a permissive power, that is, the power of doing whatever is consistent with public utility” (Johns, 2009). Ultimately, Leibniz is especially significant because his works of political philosophy are some of the first to assert that a sovereign’s “right” to do something does not necessarily imply moral justification. In his “Reflections on the Common Concept of Justice,” the German philosopher writes that “the error of those who have made justice depend upon power comes in part from their confusion of Right with law. Right cannot be unjust; this would be a contradiction. But law can be, for it is power which gives and maintains law; and if this power lacks wisdom or good will, it can give and maintain very bad laws” (Leibniz, 564). This idea that a sovereign is not justified in all of its actions clashes with that of earlier theorists like Thomas Hobbes, and both Leibniz and Spinoza use it to imply that the sovereign ought not to wield unmitigated power over its subjects. Leibniz asserts this idea as a general theory which can apply to religious freedom, though his near-contemporary Benedictus de Spinoza dealt more specifically with the issue. While Spinoza also generally refrains from arguing against the sovereign’s right to do as it pleases, his writings do imply an understanding that a sovereign’s ability to dictate laws to its citizens is not entirely justified. In fact, his Theological-Political Treatise reveals his strong support for religious toleration. Spinoza’s exploration of the intersection between faith and sovereignty within this work leads him to first conclude that no sovereign entity can claim to rule a society simply by religious right. This is because humans are so prone to disagreement within religious discourse, meaning “the rights of the state would be dependent on every man’s judgment and passions” if sovereignty based its authority in divine right (Spinoza, 163). Through an analysis of the Biblical Hebrew state he further proposes that: “We may now clearly see from what I have said:— I. How hurtful to religion and the state is the concession to ministers of religion of any power of issuing decrees or transacting the business of government: how, on the contrary, far greater stability is afforded, if the said ministers are only allowed to give answers to questions duly put to them, and are, as a rule, obliged to preach and practise the received and accepted doctrines.” (Spinoza, 182) In addition to laying out one of the earliest arguments in favor of the separation of church and state, this Spinoza passage lays the groundwork for his assertion that the state ought not to compel its citizens to follow any one religion. Near the end of his discourse he states that though the government may have the “right” (or at least, the ability) to dictate whatever terms it pleases to its subjects, “a government would be most harsh which deprived the individual of his freedom of saying and teaching what he thought; and would be moderate if such freedom were granted” (Spinoza, 195). Ultimately, both Spinoza asserts the impermissibility of a sovereign’s use of power to force belief or faith upon its subjects. Taken together, writings from early-modern rationalists like Leibniz and Spinoza present interesting arguments about the rights of sovereign and citizen as they relate to religious freedom. Leibniz’s declaration that the sovereign’s laws are not necessarily just opens the door for a discussion about the permissibility of lawbreaking, while Spinoza’s conclusion that rulers err when they attempt to dictate religion to their citizens give philosophers license to question state-enforced religious homogeneity. Though neither philosopher states unequivocally that a citizen has an innate right to practice whatever religion they choose, both seem to have agreed that the state is not morally justified in all of its attempts to control certain aspects of its citizens’ lives. Leibniz argues this point very generally, while Spinoza speaks specifically to the dangers of religious influence over a sovereign within political society. References: Britain., Great. “The Statutes of the Realm : Printed by Command of His Majesty King George the Third, in Pursuance of an Address of the House of Commons of Great Britain. From V.1.” HathiTrust, babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000017915496. Johns, Christopher. “The Grounds of Right and Obligation in Leibniz and Hobbes.” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 62, no. 3, 2009, pp. 551–574. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40387825. Accessed 30 July 2020. “Reflections on the Common Concept of Justice (1702[?]).” Philosophical Papers and Letters, by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Leroy E. Loemker, Kluwer Academic, 1989. Spinoza, Benedictus de, and R. H. M. Elwes. The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza. G. Bell, 1891, oll-resources.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1710/Spinoza_1321.01_EBk_v6.0.pdf.