Limitations - Restrictions
Limitations / Restrictions
| Right | Breakout | Contents |
|---|---|---|
| Freedom of Association | Restricting certain groupings and gatherings that are involved, or likely involved in crimes as was seen with the response to the formation of the Ku Klux Klan as a vigilante association, is a typical exception to the right of freedom of association (Australian Law Reform Commission 2016) . In response to the crimes committed by the organization, Congress passed a Force Act in 1870 and the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871, which authorized the suppression of disturbances to the peace by force (Gruberg). This was in effort to stop terrorist organizations through heavy punishments, such as the suspension of habeas corpus under these acts. These acts were eventually found by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional and were repealed; however, although direct restrictions upon the group (who was behind the 1963 bombing of a black church in Alabama, numerous murders including that of three civil rights workers in 1964 Mississippi, and other criminal efforts to impose white supremacy on the masses and restrict the rights of African Americans) and its freedom of assembly and association have not been able to lawfully prevent such crimes in the name of violations of the freedom of association, modern civil rights laws and increased national surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation have indirectly impacted the KKK’s and other criminally-involved groups’ (such as terrorist groups like ISIL) freedoms of association and assembly. The First Amendment of the US Constitution grants the right to “peaceable assembly,” and any indication of unpeaceable assembly warrants government interference. When also the association infringes upon another group’s freedoms of association, endangers public safety and order, or does not benefit/or harms social need, as can be seen with the efforts of the KKK to restrict black Americans rights to vote and peaceably assemble, necessary limitations are placed upon the right.
In terms of certain limitations on peaceable assembly, the government has the right to limit this freedom based upon “time, place and manner” restrictions: “Time, place and manner restrictions are content-neutral limitations imposed by the government on expressive activity (O'Neill). These restrictions come in many forms including imposing limits on the noise level of speech, capping the number of protesters who may occupy a given forum, barring early-morning or late-evening demonstrations, and restricting the size or placement of signs on government property. ” These limits ultimately regard the facilitation of legitimate regulatory goals, such as preventing traffic congestion or preventing interference with nearby activities. Religious rights often conflict with the right to free association. As observed in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, where a Christian student organization argued their First Amendment right to prohibit non-christians from their group, religious associations have used their rights to religious freedom to restrict certain individuals from associating with them. Though, as the Supreme Court ultimately ruled against the Christian Legal Society, rights to free association were ultimately upheld over contradicting religious rights. A similar issued was observed in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group. Though, in this case, the Supreme Court asserted the right of groups to prohibit membership from individuals whose beliefs do not coincide with the group mission.Furthermore, Hurley exhibited how religious rights can counter rights to free association, as the decision emphasized that certain individuals could be blocked from associating with religious groups on the basis of their identity. Rights to public safety additionally contradict rights to free association. This is often the argument made when prosecuting individuals associating with criminal and terrorist groups. For example in City of Chicago v. Morales, the Supreme Court upheld a Chicago law which criminalized public gang association, asserting that gang members had no constitutional rights to free association (Cole). Exhibited by the court’s decision, individuals are not constitutionally protected to align with criminal groups, as the public’s right to safety against such groups weighs against personal rights to association. In regards to the right to free political association, parties hold a contradicting First Amendment right to limit party membership. Furthermore, while a candidate can identify as associating with a specific political party on a ballot, that party has the ability to disassociate from them (Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School). Through this, a candidate often cannot freely affiliate with the party they associate with, exhibiting a contradiction to the right to free association. | |
| Freedom of Association | In Article 22 of the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the right to freedom of association is granted to all, including joining trade unions (United Nations 1966) . Restrictions can only be placed on this right if the restrictions are prescribed by the state’s law and “are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Similarly, in Europe, derogations are permissible only when “prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” as is stated in Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (European Court of Human Rights 1953, 12). And Article 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights mirrors the decree of the ICCPR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1969) . Regarding the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and its adoption of Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, this body is in place to protect the labor interests of those around the world, and they are prohibited by international law to formulate and/or apply law so as to prejudice against any group (Swepston 1998, 172). | |
| Freedom of Association | The freedom of association is derivative from the First Amendment which guarantees the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition (Hudson 2020) . These freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition all form sub-categories of the freedom of association. Collectively, this right permits a group to act in the collective interest of its members and to maintain private associations and assemblies without government interference. The legal problems regarding its practice have only recently arisen- particularly from the loyalty investigations of the Communist Party membership and a series of other cases in the 1950s and 1960s in relation to the activities of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute 2020) . For example, in 1958, with the case of the NAACP v. Alabama, the right to freedom of association was strengthened and supported by the Supreme Court who ruled in favor of the NAACP’s decision to withhold a list of members in the organization from the government (Hudson 2020) . In response to Brown v. Board of Education 1954, Alabama authorities was closely investigating the NAACP under the foreign corporation law. The NAACP complied with the state’s request of its business records, including its charter and list of organizational officers and staff. They refused, however, to give lists of rank-and-file members due to confidentiality, potential economic reprisal attacks, and potential repression. Giving up the lists, civil rights activists said, would dissuade members and potential recruits from associating with the organization, ultimately violating their right of association.
Prior to this case the Court had supported a stronger suppression of the freedoms of association and assembly regarding organizations that were alleged to be involved in subversive and unlawful activities. In 1928’ s New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman and 1951’ s Dennis v. United States the Court had ruled in favor of government efforts to restrict and limit the rights of assembly and speech of both the KKK and the Communist Party (U.S. Supreme Court 1928, 1951) . In this case, however, the Court said NAACP did not cause harm to government or society, and they had complied with the demands of the Alabama government sufficiently; therefore they were justified and protected by law in their decision to withhold membership lists. Later, in the 1967 case of United States v. Robel in which Eugene Robel, an inactive member of the Communist Party, was charged with violating the Subversive Activities Control Act when he continued his work at the Todd Pacific Shipyards, a location that was deemed by the Secretary of Defense to be a defense facility (U.S. Supreme Court 2020) . Under the Act, his actions was illegal due to his membership to the Communist Party and members of the Party’s legal inability to remain employed at a location deemed a “defense facility”. The Supreme Court ruled that the “defense facility” employment provision was an unconstitutional abridgment of the right of association regardless of its application solely to active Party members. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that the provision was overbroad while Justice William J. Brennan added that the designation of defense facilities being a power given to the Secretary of Defense was unconstitutional because the Act provided no meaningful standards for the Secretary to follow. This case was a milestone because, once tested, the Court upheld the broad freedoms of association and continued the prohibition of government interference and bias towards any individual based upon an affiliated association. Later cases regarding the Bar examine and admission to the bar further backed this right. In 1971’ s Baird v. State Bar of Arizona and Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, the Supreme Court established that the government could only deny admission to the bar if an applicant’s membership in a group advocating overthrow of the government (such as the Communist Party) was legitimately coupled with the specific intent to achieve that end (U.S. Supreme Court 1971) . These cases established that organized groups in association that gather in efforts to advance political, economic, religious, or cultural matters may gather without government interference (and particularly without government knowledge of listed members) unless the group explicitly poses a threat to society or engages in criminal activity. Under American jurisprudence, permissible exceptions to the freedom involve matters of internal affairs such as discrimination cases. In the 1976 case of Runyon v. McCrary, discrimination based upon race was established as a limitation to a body’s freedom of association after two children were denied access to certain private schools in Virginia as a result of the schools’ admitted segregationist school policies (U.S. Supreme Court 1976) . Later, in the Roberts v. United States Jaycees court case of 1984, the court ruled that the Jaycees, an organization of young business leaders that only fully accepted male members and who claimed that the anti-discrimination laws that forced them to accept qualified women was a breach of their freedom of association, lacked “the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women,” ultimately prohibiting their exclusion of women (Bernstein 2020) . Also, if the state has a compelling interest, it can justifiably limit associations’ rights to organizational autonomy (Alexander 2008, 14). Here, the state would be setting limits and requirements for how a group is organizationally run and made up. By giving an organization a quota, the state forces a particular pattern of inclusion that is in the public interest. For example, the US government is permitted to work to create less segregated schools, involving programs like the Moving to Opportunity (MTO). It is permitted to do in efforts to promote certain patterns of inclusion and acceptance within communities and associations (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1992) . | |
| Freedom of Association | Freedom of association is an essential facet of modern democracy, yet it is often overlooked in political discourse on the natural rights and liberties of the citizen. This could be due to the fact that freedom of association and assembly are often so closely related to freedoms of speech and expression, or it could be because it is so difficult for political theorists to decide which association should be allowed and which can be justifiably restricted. Whatever the case, the debate over exceptions to the right of free association continues to change and evolve even in the modern era.
John Locke is one of the earliest proponents of natural right theory; his second “Treatise on Government” famously outlines humankind’s three essential rights to life, liberty, and property (Locke, “Treatise on Government”). He does not specifically mention people’s freedom of association, but scholars point to his writings on religious assembly as an indication of his stance on the right. In a George Mason University publication, Eric Claeys refers to a passage from Locke’s “Letter Concerning Toleration,” which states that a church is simply a “free and voluntary society” (Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration”), saying that “if one reads the same passage from the Letter with an eye toward issues about associational freedom, Locke is making a far more radical point: All private societies, churches and otherwise, deserve a presumption of associational freedom” (Claeys, “The Private Society and the Liberal Public Good in John Locke’s Thought”). In light of Claeys’ assessment, it is easy to observe Locke’s thoughts on the freedom of association in the constitution that he wrote for the Carolina Colony in 1669. For example, Article 103 of this document states that “no person whatsoever shall speak anything in their religious assembly irreverently or seditiously of the government or governors, or of state matters” (Locke, “The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina: March 1, 1669” ). This reveals a reluctance on Locke’s part to allow any association of citizens to gather in opposition of the established government, perhaps because he understands the potential threat that this could pose to political society. His position on the freedom of association is made all the more clear in his 108th Article, which stipulates that “assemblies, upon what presence soever of religion, not observing and performing the above said rules, shall not be esteemed as churches, but unlawful meetings, and be punished as other riots” (Locke, “The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina: March 1, 1669” ). The “above said rules” to which Locke refers consist mostly of provisions to ensure free membership and movement between various religious establishments, but the classification of non compliant assemblies as “unlawful” or “riots” implies a Locke’s hesitation to allow totally free and unrestricted assembly. Subsequent political theorists built upon Locke’s theory of rights and liberties, and a number of them elected to deal with the right to freedom of association more directly. The United States Constitution, much of which rests upon Lockean political theory, is one of the first documents to directly address freedom of assembly in its text. Perhaps the buildup to the American Revolution, in which groups like the Sons of Liberty and the Stamp Act Congress were outlawed and broken up by the British government, affected the Constitutional Convention’s decision to include assembly in the Bill of Rights. The Constitution’s First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances” (The Constitution of the United States of America). The Constitutional Convention, led by prominent statesman James Madison, used the word peaceably to signal that citizens were not entitled to the complete freedom of assembly if such activity could potentially generate violence or unrest (Law Library of Congress, “The Right to Peaceable Assembly”). The Cornell Law Review writes that this guarantee gradually came to protect citizens’ rights to participate in organizations that regularly utilize their members’ constitutional rights to freely assemble and petition the government. It states that over time, “Supreme Court decisions gradually determined that “the right of association is derivative from the First Amendment guarantees of speech, assembly, and petition” (Legal Information Institute, “Right of Association”). While Madison and his colleagues did not directly address freedom of association in the Constitution’s text, they did lay the groundwork for its realization years later. French diplomat Alexis De Tocqueville traveled to the United States in the early 1800s in order to observe the country, and in 1835 he published his findings in his first volume of Democracy in America. In this work the Frenchman sung praise for the American system of government, applauding it for spreading liberty and freedom within its borders. However, even de Tocqueville understood the danger inherent in the guarantee of totally unrestrained freedom of association. Linking the freedom of association to such constitutional rights as the freedom of petition and freedom of the press, he writes that “it cannot be denied that the unrestrained liberty of association for political purposes is the privilege which a people is longest in learning how to exercise. If it does not throw the nation into anarchy, it perpetually augments the chances of that calamity” (De Tocqueville, Democracy in America). De Tocqueville goes on to explain that American association is generally peaceful because citizens tend only to use it to oppose political groups, but he nevertheless must address the danger inherent in the guarantee of unrestricted freedom of association. Even in what he sees as a most ideal form of government, the Frenchman recognizes the risks inherent in unrestricted freedom when it comes to assembly and association. Decades later, John Stuart Mill came to a similar conclusion in his 1859 work, On Liberty. Mill was familiar with the American system of government, as evidenced by his mentions of American religious toleration and prohibition of “fermented” drinks, so it is possible that his thinking was influenced in some way by Madison’s work on the Constitution (Mill, “On Liberty”). In his work, Mill advances the theory that humans band together solely for the purpose of protection, and that therefore we can never have the authority to restrain others’ liberty. However, he notes that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (Mill, “On Liberty”). Later on, he explicitly asserts that “freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived” (Mill, “On Liberty”). Clearly, Mill is aware of the dangers implicit in the creation of total freedom of assembly, and he agrees with the Constitutional Convention that this important right can permissibly be subject to certain regulations and limitations. The political and philosophical debate over freedom and association and its acceptable limitations evolved dramatically in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Writing just over a century after Mill, First Amendment scholar Thomas Emerson produced an article entitled “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,” in which he addresses a number of issues relating to freedom of association by assessing court precedents and the lessons of history. Like the documents from Mill and Madison, Emerson’s article holds that complete freedom of association would be detrimental to society. Using the example of an organization whose sole aim is to perpetrate a successful bank robbery, Emerson points out that “some types of association need, and are entitled to, greater protection than others” (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,”). He goes on to state that “the legal doctrine that protects associational rights must be able to distinguish between them and to afford the required measure of protection in each case” (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression”). Taking into account twentieth-century court decisions, Emerson explains that “the Supreme Court, in recognizing an independent "right of association," has undertaken to give that right constitutional protection primarily through application of a balancing test” (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression”). This balancing test is incredibly important in determining the constitutionality of certain restrictions on citizens’ association because it must avoid violating citizens’ unequivocal right to free expression while still preventing the perpetration of unlawful action (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,”). The case of NAACP v. Alabama is one case in which the Supreme Court attempted to find this balance. This instance in which the NAACP argued that the state of Alabama could not constitutionally require the organization to disclose a list of its members, proved incredibly important to our modern understanding of the right to association. Writing the majority opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan II explained that “it is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (Franklin, “NAACP v. Alabama”). This differed from other contemporary cases, such as New York ex. rel Bryant v. Zimmerman, in which the Supreme Court had ruled in favor of the state’s ability to restrict association related to the Ku Klux Klan. The difference, Harlan explained, was that unlike the KKK, the NAACP did not present a threat to society. For this reason, the organization and the members involved were protected under the First Amendment’s protection of citizens’ freedom to peaceably assemble (Franklin, “NAACP v. Alabama”). Harlan, like Madison, Locke, and Mill, understood the importance of restricting free association in order to preserve the peace in society. The right to free association is famously difficult to address because the general consensus is that association should not be completely free. For that reason, political theorists and philosophers have gone to great lengths over the centuries to define exactly when and why free association should be limited or left alone. The general consensus is that assembly and association are detrimental to society when they lead to violence or unrest, but as with other rights it is difficult for theorists to decide exactly what criteria turn a given gathering from an expression of free assembly into a potential threat to civil society. “John Locke, Two Treatises ( 1689) - Online Library of Liberty,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/john-locke-two-treatises- 1689. Locke, John, “A Letter Concerning Toleration,” trans. William Pope, 1689, accessed at https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/toleration.pdf, 9. Eric R. Claeys, “The Private Society and the Liberal Public Good in John Locke's Thought,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2007, https://doi.org/10. 2139/ ssrn.1027965. “Constitution of the United States of America,” Bill of Rights Institute, October 3, 2019, https://billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/constitution/?utm_source=GOOGLE. 5 “Right to Peaceful Assembly” (Law Library of Congress, 2014) , https://www.loc.gov/law/help/peaceful-assembly/right-to-peaceful-assembly.pdf. John Stuart Mill, “Mill, ‘On Liberty,’” in The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill: On Liberty, ed. Jonathan Reiley (New York, NY: Routledge, 1998) , 45. Thomas I. Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,” The Yale Law Journal 74, no. 1 ( 1964) : p. 1, https://doi.org/10. 2307/ 794804 | |
| Freedom of Association | Philosophers and political theorists generally agree that it is sometimes necessary to curtail free association, but this agreement does not answer questions of which forms assembly and association can permissibly be restricted, how they should be limited, or who should control their regulation. It often falls to the government to decide when to step in during times of popular uprising or violent protest, but history also shows a number of instances in which private actors have curtailed citizens’ right to free association or assembly.
The most common way for private actors can curtail free association is by prohibiting assembly and demonstration on their privately-owned property. In U.S. law, there exists a precedent that protects citizens’ right to free association on public property precisely because the right is not guaranteed when it is practiced on private property. This doctrine was first introduced in 1936, when Jersey City mayor Frank Hague issued an ordinance prohibiting members of the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) from gathering in a public space and distributing “communist” literature (Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,”). The CIO, with the help of the American Civil Liberties Union, successfully argued that the New Jersey ordinance was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Hague appealed to the Supreme Court, which upheld the original decision and struck the ordinance down (Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,”). Justice Owen Roberts justified the decision for Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization by likening public spaces such as streets and parks to public forums, in which the free flow of ideas and discourse must be protected under the First Amendment. He made this ruling because he recognized that private actors retained the right to curtail citizens’ right to association when that association occurred on private property. In order to preserve the right to peaceable assembly, the Court’s decision set the precedent for the “public forum” doctrine, which continues to protect the right to association in public spaces to this day (Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,”). Writing for The First Amendment Encyclopedia, David Hudson writes that “in the Court’s forum-based approach, the government can impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in all three categories of property, but has limited ability to impose content-based restrictions on traditional or designated public forums” (Hudson, “Public Forum Doctrine - The First Amendment Encyclopedia,”). The doctrine specifically aims to protect peaceful association on public property because the right is not guaranteed when assembly occurs on private property. One example of a private actor using its ownership of property to curtail free association can be observed in the 1994 case of Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. In this case, the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida filed a suit against anti-abortion protestors who had been blocking entrances to the building, harrassing abortion patients, and demonstrating outside of staff members’ homes (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). A court order was issued, ordering protestors to refrain from trespassing on Center property, blocking its entrances, and abusing staff and patients. When the court order was violated, the “the court created a 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveways (including the public sidewalk) within which all antiabortion speech was banned. It also prohibited excessive noise and images that patients could see or hear during surgery and recovery” (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). The Supreme Court later upheld the buffer zone rules, but struck down the prohibition of protestors’ practice of showing images to clients. It also ruled that the Florida court’s 300-foot buffer zone that prohibited protestors from approaching clients and staff at the Center and at their homes was too restrictive of First Amendment rights (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). The ruling, according to Chief Justice Rhenquist, sought to preserve protestors’ right to association and assembly while still protecting the patients and clients from intimidation and abuse (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). It also serves as a reminder that private citizens still reserve the right to curtail free association if said association makes them feel unsafe or threatened. Both the Madsen and Hague cases illustrate that judges, in particular, have immense power to determine the breadth of citizens’ right to freedom of association as guaranteed in the First Amendment. For example, in the case of Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court determined that free expression in the form of a rock concert in New York’s Central Park could be subject to volume regulations under the First Amendment (O'Neill, “Time, Place and Manner Restrictions”). This decision, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, led to the creation of a test to determine whether assembly and expression could be restricted. The test asks whether the regulation is “content neutral,” whether it is “narrowly tailored” to fit a specific governmental interest, and whether it still provides ample opportunity for the message to be communicated (O'Neill, “Time, Place and Manner Restrictions”). If a regulation passes all three prongs of this test, then it can legally restrict or control the time, place, or manner in which assemblies like protests are carried out. The Law Library of Congress writes that since Kennedy’s decision, “the Supreme Court has held that it is constitutionally permissible for the government to require that a permit for an assembly be obtained in advance” (“Right to Peaceful Assembly: United States - Law Library of Congress”). Kennedy’s ruling also allows the government to “make special regulations that impose additional requirements for assemblies that take place near major public events” (“Right to Peaceful Assembly: United States - Law Library of Congress”). This legal doctrine has significantly shaped the way in which state and federal governments treat freedom of association and the right to peaceable assembly. While the Supreme Court can hardly be considered a private actor, Justices like Kennedy rely on personal study and private experience to create policy that affects American freedom of association as a whole. Citizens within a political society have the right to free association as long as it is peaceable and does not infringe upon others’ rights or liberties. This principle lends itself to a number of complexities because its parameters for free association are so vague, but over the past few centuries the United States has worked to define when and how private actors can curtail others’ right to free association. The result is that the Supreme Court, and the justices that make it up, have set out precedents that test whether certain forms of association are constitutional and which ones can justifiably be restricted. The definition of public spaces as areas of free association and creation of buffer zones for private properties represent significant steps forward in this effort. References: Lynne Chandler Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,” Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, accessed June 16, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/619/hague-v-committee-for-industrial-organization. David L Hudson, “Public Forum Doctrine - The First Amendment Encyclopedia,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/824/public-forum-doctrine. “Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. - The First ...,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/10/madsen-v-women-s-health-center-inc. Kevin Francis O'Neill, “Time, Place and Manner Restrictions,” Time, Place and Manner Restrictions, accessed June 17, 2020, https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1023/time-place-and-manner-restrictions. “Right to Peaceful Assembly: United States - Law Library of Congress,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/peaceful-assembly/us.php. | |
| Freedom of Association | The right to freedom of association is not an absolute right because it is subject to certain limitations. Political thinkers and legal experts generally agree that assembly and association can be justifiably restricted if it conflicts with other citizens’ security, liberty, or property. Another case in which the right is subject to certain limitations is in a case of emergency or long-run disaster. Recent history shows a number of instances in which the U.S. government has justified the restriction of the right to free association during times of war and natural disaster. Interestingly, it did not effectively curtail citizens’ right to free association during the recent COVID-19 pandemic. Freedom of association most often restricted in the event of war. In his work, “The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly,” Washington University scholar John D. Inazu briefly explores the effect that World War I had on citizens’ right to gather and discuss the country’s affairs. He writes that during the late World War I years, “the freedom of assembly was constrained by shortsighted legislation like the Espionage Act of 1917 (and its 1918 amendments) and the Immigration Act of 1918, and the Justice Department’s infamous Palmer Raids in 1920” (Inazu, “The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly”). William Riggs of the First Amendment Encyclopedia similarly notes that the Vietnam War era, in particular, saw drastic reductions in Americans’ rights to peaceable assembly and association. He writes that “the war in Vietnam quickly became the focus of major protests that resulted in increased government attempts to limit First Amendment protections. These efforts mostly dealt with the right to assemble and what constituted appropriate free speech criticism of the war” (“Vietnam War | |
| Freedom of Association | Freedom of association is a valuable right that encompasses the relationships, organizations, and environments in which a public can manifest other freedoms, such as expression, speech, and assembly. As Tom Kahn, a civil rights activist stated, “Freedom of expression without freedom of association is the right to speak freely in the wilderness” (qtd. in Democracy Web). As such, this freedom grants people power and influence in the government and society around them. In both democratic and authoritarian regimes, government authorities have a variety of reasons why they might restrict freedom of association, including being threatened by the right.
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| Freedom of Expression | In some cases, governments have curtailed freedom of expression for reasons that are not generally seen as permissible by the standards of the United States.
As noted by Professor Jérôme Viala-Gaudefroy, not all types of expression are protected under US law. Those involving “obscenity, fraud, child pornography, harassment, incitement of illegal conduct and imminent lawless action, true threats, and commercial speech such as advertising, copyright or patent rights” (Viala-Gaudefroy 2021) can be restricted, among others. That said, there have been instances within the US where the right was curtailed for a reason not listed above. These justifications, therefore, would be viewed as non-permissible restrictions on freedom of expression. The Minnesota state legislature passed a statute that barred voters and other individuals from wearing political apparel and accessories inside a polling place on election day, which included a “political badge, political button, or other political insignia” (Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky 2018, 1). The legislation was meant to create “an island of calm in which voters [could] peacefully contemplate their choices” (Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky 2018, 11), essentially eliminating disruptions at the polling place. However, the ban was challenged by the Minnesota Voters Alliance (MVA) and other individual plaintiffs, who argued that it violated their first amendment rights “both on its face and as applied to their particular items of apparel” (Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky 2018, 1). The Supreme Court agreed with the general sentiments of the Minnesota law, stating that “casting a vote is a weighty civic act, akin to a jury’s return of a verdict, or a representative’s vote on a piece of legislation. It is a time for choosing, not campaigning. The State may reasonably decide that the interior of the polling place should reflect that distinction (Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky 2018, 11). However, the body ruled in favor of the MVA, explaining that the legislation was too broad and muddled - “the State must be able to articulate some sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out… the unmoored use of the term ‘political’ in the Minnesota law, combined with haphazard interpretations the State has provided in official guidance and representations to this Court, cause Minnesota’s restriction to fail even this forgiving test” (Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky 2018, 12-13). The state’s ban on expression within polling places was thus not deemed permissible. Similar to US law, the European Convention on Human Rights does not protect all types of expression. Article 10 of the document clearly states that the right can be restricted when “necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of reputation or rights of others, for preventing disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary” (Council of Europe 1950, 12). However, what a country believes is a necessary restriction on one of these grounds does not necessarily match up with the opinion of the European Court of Human Rights, which has the final say on what types of expression are permissible. In 2005, journalist Eynulla Fatullayev, an Azerbaijani national, visited Nagorno-Karabakh, a region that has been the subject of a territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan and at the time was controlled by Armenian military forces. Fatullayev interviewed both locals and officials during his visit, as well as some Azerbaijani refugees who had fled the region, which he then published the following year. In his piece, Fatullayev claimed that during the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1992, civilians “had been mutilated by [their] own” (Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan 2010, 4) Azerbaijani forces as they attempted to flee the region, among other statements. Upon reading the article, a group filed a criminal complaint against Fatullayev, asking that he “be convicted of defamation and of falsely accusing Azerbaijani soldiers of having committed an especially grave crime” (Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan 2010, 5). Fatullayev was later convicted of these crimes, as well as of terrorism or the threat of terrorism for another article he had published which appeared to address Iranian-Azerbaijani relations and threaten ethnic conflict. As a citizen of a country that signed the European Convention on Human Rights (hereby known as“the Convention”), Fatullayev was able to appeal his convictions to the European Court on Human Rights (“the Court”) on the grounds that his right to freedom of expression as defined by Article 10 of the Convention had been violated. The Court sided with the applicant, saying that he was presenting a set of opinions in a debate and did not seek to defame or act maliciously towards the victims and actors involved in the war, and thus was not abusing their rights. Additionally, the Azerbaijani government’s interference was not “necessary in a democratic society” or “a pressing social need” (Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan 2010, 22). Therefore, the body concluded “that the statements that gave rise to the applicant's conviction did not amount to any activity infringing the essence of the values underlying the Convention or calculated to destroy or restrict the rights and freedoms guaranteed by it…the applicant's freedom of expression cannot be removed from the protection of Article 10” (Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan 2010, 22). By the Court’s standards, then, Azerbaijan’s attempt to inhibit the applicant’s freedom of expression was unacceptable. References: Council of Europe. 1950. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, Application no. 40984/07, ECtHR judgment of 4 October 2010. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-216685 Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 849 F. 3d 749 (2018). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1435_2co3.pdf Viala-Gaudefroy, Jérôme. 2021. “The Idolization of Free Speech in the United States.” The Conversation, February 22, 2021. https://theconversation.com/the-idolization-of-free-speech-in-the-united-states-155778#:~:text=Free%20speech%20is%20not%20absolute,advertising%2C%20copyright%20or%20patent%20rights | |
| Freedom of Expression | The following country-specific descriptions are from a 2019 US Government Report.
Argentina: Argentina protects the right to free press, without prior restraint. However, it does not explicitly protect other forms of expression, such as free speech. Argentina criminalizes speech likely to incite violence. Additionally, Argentinian penal law contains protections for one’s honor, making it a fineable offense to slander someone, intentionally discredit them, or falsely accuse them of a crime. However, these penalties do not apply in matters of public interest. Although Argentine courts have interpreted limits on free expression narrowly, they have allowed these limits where they are established by law, meet the needs of a democratic society and where the limits are proportional to their goals. Canada: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the right to “thought, belief, opinion, and expression, subject to limits that can be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Courts have interpreted the right to free expression broadly. Courts have made judgements about the constitutionality of limitations through proportionality analysis, taking several factors into consideration. They are more inclined to protect political speech, or speech that serves another social value, such as art or science. Courts are also more willing to accept narrower limits with less extreme penalties (civil versus criminal, for example). They have refused to allow limitations based on the offensiveness or unpopularity of the expression’s content. Their courts ruled unconstitutional a law banning the spread of false news. Despite free expression’s broad protections, courts have upheld anti-hate-speech laws. Additionally, interruptions of public speeches, especially using obscene language, may criminally disrupt the peace. Canada’s equivalent to the FCC has the power to take action against outlets that spread false information, but it has only acted very limitedly on a few occasions. Finally, Canada bans foreign broadcasters from attempting to influence its elections. China: China’s constitution claims to protect free expression, but this is not true in practice. The country’s cybersecurity law bans the online spread of several categories of information, including those that undermine “national security, national honor, and national interests”; that incite “subversion” or those that threaten to “overturn the socialist system”; and that include“violent, obscene, or sexual information.” Similarly, the press cannot publish material that violates constitutional principles; undermine state sovereignty and territorial integrity; endanger national security; incite discrimination; undermine public order; promote obscenity, gambling, or violence; or “endanger public ethics.” The country’s Radio and Television Administration places similar limits on expression. Finally, the country tightly monitors foreign journalists, who must be approved by the government. France: The French Constitution protects the “communication of ideas and opinions.” However, the Constitution also states that speech may not “interfere with the established law and order” or constitute an “abuse of this liberty in the case determined by law.” Though French courts interpret restrictions narrowly, they use proportionality to balance free speech against other public interests. Free speech is sometimes balanced against rights such as privacy and the presumption of innocence, meaning that defamation, which truth does not necessarily preclude, is often not allowed. One whose speech incites criminality may be considered complicit in the act. Hate speech, which “incites discrimination,” is a jailable offense, as is the denial of crimes against humanity, such as the Holocaust. Defamation of public officials and institutions is a fineable offense, although good-faith reporting is exempt. During an event organized by public officials, it is illegal to disrespect the flag or national anthem. French radio and TV broadcasts may be regulated to protect values such as dignity, pluralism, public order, and the well-being of adolescents. The CSA, the French equivalent to the FCC, regulated broadcasts to ensure adherence to French law. Although it does not engage in prior restraint, the CSA may issue cease-and-desist orders and fines. It also may remove foreign broadcasts that undermine French interests. Germany: German Basic Law (constitution) stipulates that free expression (it lists forms of expression but does not use the term) “shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honour.” General laws, as the Constitutional Court articulated, “aim to protect a legal interest per se without regard to a particular opinion.” For example, Germany has a blanket ban on speech inciting “hatred against part of the populace.” There is one notable exception to the General-Law requirement: speech that violates the dignity of victims of the Nazis or glorifies their abuses (although pro-Nazi material and hate speech often overlap). Israel: Though free expression is not explicitly protected in Israeli Basic Law, its courts have protected it, with exceptions for speech with a “near certainty” to cause “real harm” to safety. Israel restricts several types of speech, such as incitements to violence and terrorism and holocaust denial. It uses balancing tests to determine when speech can be restricted, and it sometimes restricts the quality and quantity of speech in ways that do not eliminate the viewpoint completely. Israeli law criminalizes insulting public servants, but courts have ruled that this law can only be enforced in extreme circumstances, where the insult severely harms the servant’s dignity. Israel restricts the rights of foreigners to broadcast. Japan: The Japanese Constitution protects all types of free expression. However, it also states that citizens “shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare.” Japanese courts will consider the type of speech (political speech is especially protected), the necessity of restriction, and the manner of restriction. In Japan, it is illegal to disrupt a political campaign speech. Defamation, insult, and intimidation are forms of criminalized speech in the Japanese Penal Code. Article 231, the “Insult” section of the Penal Code, is broad: “A person who insults another in public, even if it does not allege facts, shall be punished by misdemeanor imprisonment without work or a petty fine.” There are significant restrictions of Japanese broadcasts. They must be politically fair, show as many sides of a political issue as possible, respect “public morals,” and be truthful. Netherlands: The Dutch Constitution automatically incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into law (see the International Agreements Section). The Constitution also allows limitations on expression by act of parliament “without prejudice to the responsibility of every person under the law.” Different expressive freedoms have different level of protection in the Constitution. For example, the press’s protection from prior restraint is absolute, but freedom in performances that may be seen by children is not. New Zealand: New Zealand’s Bill of Rights, a 1990 statute, guarantees free expression, with limits that can be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” It is a jailable offense to act, including to speak, in a way likely to incite someone to disorderly and violent behavior. In a public place, it is a fineable offense to intentionally insult or offend anyone, or to use obscene language. Under a 1993 statute, it is illegal to distribute in writing or broadcast material that is “threatening, abusive, or insulting,” and to use a public place to do the same or to incite ill will against a particular group of people. Broadcasts must adhere to standards of political balance and “the observation of good taste and decency.” Sweden: Sweden’s system protects free speech and press. Interrupting courts, weddings, funerals, or public deliberation is a crime. Disorderly conduct with the intent to agitate is also a crime. For example, someone was convicted for singing and playing music in his home to disrupt a political gathering outside. Sweden’s hate-speech law bans any “statement or other message that is spread and disseminated that threatens, or expresses condescension against, an ethnic group or another group of persons based on race, skin color, national or ethnic origin, faith, sexual orientation, gender, or gender identity or expression.” It is a crime to broadcast without a permit. Sweden requires at least half of its broadcasts to be produced by Europeans. America places these restrictions on speech much less frequently, or not at all. Hate Speech: Foreign countries often do not share America’s aversion to banning hate speech. America is more the exception than the norm; a 2008 EU treaty, for example, mandates that its members develop a mechanism for prosecuting purveyors of hate speech. Blasphemy: About 71 percent of countries have blasphemy laws, generally defined as laws insulting to a particular religion or its adherents, often an established state religion. Blasphemy laws are stereotypically associated with theocratic, authoritarian states. Some unexpected countries have them, however. For example, it is a fineable offense in Italy to “vilify with insulting expressions” religious ideas (it is only a jailable offense if one vandalizes religious items) (End Blasphemy Laws). Political Content: Many countries ban certain forms of political speech, especially that which undermines the government. In China, for instance, it is illegal to post anything online that will “endanger the sovereignty, overturn the socialist system, incite separatism, break national unity, advocate terrorism or extremism, advocate ethnic hatred and ethnic discrimination, . . . [and] create or disseminate false information to disrupt the economic or social order.” Public Deliberations: It is often illegal to interrupt public deliberations, especially by a governing body. In Sweden, for example, one cannot legally interrupt events such as religious ceremonies, marriages, or court proceedings (contempt of court is also a crime in the US). In Japan, it is illegal to disrupt a speech that is part of an election campaign. Proportionality Analysis: Courts abroad are much more likely than American courts to use proportionality in determining whether infringement on a right is allowable. This requires weighing the evil of infringing on free expression against the objective the state was trying to achieve. In hate speech, for example, this means weighing a lessening of free speech against the goal of maintaining a tolerant society. References: US Free Speech Cases: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/landmark-cases/freedom-of-speech-general/ RAV v. St. Paul: https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/270/r-a-v-v-st-paul Imminent lawless action: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/970/incitement-to-imminent-lawless-action Free press cases in the US: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/landmark-cases/freedom-of-the-press/ Island School District v. Pico: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-2043 Info on broadcast TV and radio, which includes descriptions of all relevant cases: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/broadcast-radio-and-television Article on German Bill: https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-government-approves-hate-speech-bill/a-52433689 Article on EU hate speech: https://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134239713/France-Isnt-The-Only-Country-To-Prohibit-Hate-Sp eech Blasphemy internationally: https://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/special-reports/respecting-rights-measuring-the-world-s-bl asphemy-laws Blasphemy in Italy: https://end-blasphemy-laws.org/countries/europe/italy/ US Government Report on Free Expression Abroad (info on China, for example): https://fas.org/irp/eprint/lloc-limits.pdf Japanese Penal code: http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1960&vm=04&re=02 | |
| Freedom of Expression | Universal Declaration of Human Rights: This was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948.
Article 29 stipulates that the rights found in this document, including free expression, “shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” European Convention on Human Rights: This treaty was ratified by most of Europe in 1953 (it is unrelated to the EU). It is enforced in the European Court of Human Rights. From Article 10: The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Depending on the case, the court has ruled that hate speech is not protected under Article 10. For example, in Aksoy v. Turkey (2000), it held that “remarks aimed at inciting racial hatred in society or propagating the idea of a superior race can not claim any protection under Article 10 of the Convention” (Flauss 2009, 838). It has refused to protect “revisionist language” (837), that which denies certain notorious historical truths. For example, Holocaust denial may not be protected under Article 10. Finally, the court has ruled that Article 10 does not protect speech likely to lead to violence (840). In Ceylan v. Turkey (2000), the court ruled on Turkey’s conviction of a columnist who opposed Turkey’s policies toward Kurds. The court used proportionality analysis to determine that the infringement on free expression outweighed the security risk of the piece, which did not directly call for violence. In a concurring opinion, one judge argued that the court should use a clear-and-present-danger test. American Convention on Human Rights: This human-rights framework was created in 1969, and over the ensuing decades, has been ratified, at least in part, by nearly all of Central and South America. There exists a corresponding inter-American Court of Human Rights. From Article 13: The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure: a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. “Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence.” “Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action against any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.” Article 11 of the convention guarantees a right to privacy, which includes protections against attacks on one's honor, dignity, and reputation. As such, the court must balance these two considerations, as occurs in cases of libel, slander, and defamation (Posenato 2016, 64). The exceptions for national security, public health, public order, and morals have been interpreted narrowly, so as not to allow authoritarian restrictions on free speech (65). Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam: This 1990 document was ratified by 45 states in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. There is no relevant court. Article 22: (a) Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would not be contrary to the principles of the Shari'ah. 1. Everyone shall have the right to advocate what is right, and propagate what is good, and warn against what is wrong and evil according to the norms of Islamic Shari'ah. (c) Information is a vital necessity to society. It may not be exploited or misused in such a way as may violate sanctities and the dignity of Prophets, undermine moral and ethical Values or disintegrate, corrupt or harm society or weaken its faith. (d) It is not permitted to excite nationalistic or doctrinal hatred or to do anything that may be an incitement to any form or racial discrimination. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: This is a UN treaty from 1966. Under certain circumstances, it may be enforced by the International Court of Justice, but the ICJ generally only hears disputes between countries. Article 19: Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (order public), or of public health or morals. African Charter on Human and People’s Rights: This charter, with 54 signatories, came into effect in 1986. Article 9 guarantees the right to free expression, although no exceptions are enumerated. The African Court of Human and People’s Rights has repeatedly protected free expression, but not without limit. For example, in Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. The Republic of Rwanda (2017), the court held that minimizing a genocide need not be protected because it could disturb public order and peace. References: Universal Declaration of Human Rights: https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ European Convention of Human Rights: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf American Convention: https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/basic3.american%20convention.htm Posenato: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/295244849_THE_PROTECTION_OF_THE_RIGHT_ TO_FREEDOM_OF_EXPRESSION_A_PANORAMA_OF_THE_INTER-AMERICAN_COU RT_OF_HUMAN_RIGHTS_CASE_LAW_A_PROTECAO_DO_DIREITO_A_LIBERDADE_ DE_EXPRESSAO_UM_PANORAMA_DA_JURISPRUDENCIA_DA_COR/link/56e9708808a edfed7389909f/download International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx Article about whether and how the ICJ enforces human-rights law: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=njih r Flauss: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1124&context=ilj Cairo Declaration: http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/cairodeclaration.html African Charter: https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=49 Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza v. The Republic of Rwanda (2017), https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/african_courts_decisions_final_eng_1.pdf | |
| Freedom of Expression | Clear and Present Danger: As the Supreme Court ruled in Schenck v. US (1919), speech can be curtailed when it poses a “clear and present danger.” This case arose when a defendant was accused of violating the Espionage Act by distributing leaflets encouraging people to dodge the draft. As the majority held, the defendant’s ability to undermine the war effort constituted such a danger, akin to yelling “fire” in a crowded theatre.
Fighting Words: In a doctrine similar to the clear-and-present-danger test, the Supreme Court ruled in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) that the First Amendment does not protect “fighting words” - words that, as the court argued, “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Though this doctrine exists today, it has been undermined, especially by the court’s rulings protecting “hate speech” (see RAV v. St. Paul). O’Brien Test: In US v. O’brien (1968), the Supreme Court developed a four-pronged test for determining whether the government could justifiably limit expression. “We think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” In this case, the Supreme Court held that a ban on burning draft cards did constitute a substantial government interest. Speech in schools: In general, public schools have greater leeway to curtail free speech, although the court’s attitudes have changed repeatedly. In Tinker v. Des Moines (1965), the Supreme Court voided suspensions on students wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War, holding that limited speech must “materially and substantially interfere” with school activities. In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988), the court gave considerable leniency to schools restricting student speech in a school-sponsored platform (in this case, a school newspaper), allowing it to censor an article because it was “inconsistent with the shared values of a civilized social order.” In Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986), the court allowed a public school to suspend a student for using sexual innuendo at a speech at a school assembly because such speech undermined “fundamental values of public school education.” the Supreme Court ruled similarly in Morse v. Frederick (2007), holding that schools could limit speech advocating drug use. Imminent Lawless Action: In Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), the Supreme Court elaborated on the clear-and-present-danger test. To lack protection, certain speech must incite “imminent lawless action.” This means that the mere advocacy of violence is not enough; the speech must actually incite it. It was on these grounds that the court ruled that offensive, inflammatory speech from a klansman was protected because it did not imminently incite violence. This test has generally replaced clear and present danger, although clear and present danger is still the test used in military courts. Obscenity: The Supreme Court adopted a three-pronged test in Miller v. California (1973) to determine whether material is legally obscene (and therefore not protected). The prongs are as follows: “whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Pornography is often not legally obscene. Libel: Standards for what constitutes libel differ between private citizens and public figures (who can include political figures but also celebrities, business tycoons, etc). Libel against a public person requires a statement to have been false and made negligently. Libel against a public figure, does not include good-faith mistakes that may be considered negligent. Rather, it requires material to be false, and to have been published with “actual malice” (Hustler v. Falwell, 1988). Intellectual property: For example, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting (1977), the court ruled that the First Amendment does not protect the right of a television station to air an entire performance without the consent of the performers. Unlawful assembly: Authorities may restrict assemblies as long as the restrictions are reasonable, narrowly tailored to a specific public interest while limiting rights as little as possible, and are not content-based. For example, a city may require a permit for holding a large assembly. In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, the Supreme Court ruled that a permitting authority could not vary its demonstration permit fees based on the anticipated cost of maintaining public order. As the court held, making such a determination would require the government to differentiate its treatment toward demonstrations based on the content of their messages. References: US Free Speech Cases: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/landmark-cases/freedom-of-speech-general/ Fighting words: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/293/chaplinsky-v-new-hampshire US v. Obrien: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/709/united-states-v-o-brien#:~:text=In%20United %20States%20v.,of%20an%20anti%2Dwar%20protester. RAV v. St. Paul: https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/270/r-a-v-v-st-paul Tinker v. Des Moines: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1968/21 Bethel v. Fraser: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1667 Morse v. Frederick: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-278 Imminent lawless action: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/970/incitement-to-imminent-lawless-action Libel info: https://www.freedomforum.org/libel/ Hustler v. Falwell: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1278 Free press cases in the US: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/landmark-cases/freedom-of-the-press/ Info on assembly: https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/criminal/the-right-to-gather-has-some-restrictions.html#:~:t ext=No%20First%20Amendment%20rights%20are,raises%20a%20%E2%80%9Cclear%20and %20present Info on broadcast TV and radio, which includes descriptions of all relevant cases: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/broadcast-radio-and-television | |
| Freedom of Expression | Yes. The most famous defense of the freedom of expression principle is written by John Stuart Mill, who did include exceptions to this protection. Mill believed that freedom of expression should be curtailed when the circumstances of the message are intended to instigate violence or criminal activities. Mill also claims that this exception stems from the government's duty to protect others from harm, which is more broadly known as the "harm principle." This, Mill claims, is the only context in which power can be "rightfully" executed over others (On Liberty 13). Mill uses the example of a corn-dealer, who is starving the poor. When this fact or opinion is published through the press, it is entirely permissible under Mill's doctrine. However, when this opinion is advertised to a large and unruly mob, expression of such sentiment should be curtailed because, if shared, it could cause immediate harm and instigate criminal or violent activities (On Liberty 52). Mill's threshold for regulation of expressions is extremely narrow; it could be argued that he does not exempt hate speech because it does not cause immediate harm to others. While Mill states that only the harm principle should be applied to regulations of freedom of expression, Joel Feinberg believes that the harm principle is not sufficiently broad enough to account for hate speech. He stipulates that an "offense principle" is also needed. Feinberg believes that the harm principle is too high of a standard and that the government has the right to censure some speech if they deem it too offensive. Since the offense principle lowers the standard for censure of free speech, so too should the punishments be lowered. Feinberg defines offense to be a "negative mental state" (Simpson 237). Feinberg justifies the offense principle by stating that being offended, or being in a negative mental state, actually impedes on an individual's liberty because being offended impedes on his/her daily activities (Simpson 238).
References: Mill, JS On Liberty Simpson, Robert Mark. “Regulating Offense, Nurturing Offense.” Politics, philosophy & economics 17, no. 3 (2018): 235–256. | |
| Freedom of Expression | Freedom of expression exists at the core of the United States of America and the freedoms it guarantees to its people. Beyond a core tenet in America, freedom of expression holds a defining place in democracies around the world, shaping their culture and development. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the United Nations in December 1966, explains how freedom of expression “shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice” (U.N. General Assembly 1966, art. 19). With such importance, infringement upon this freedom can be extremely contentious. In US history, this context has resulted in the development of the State Action Doctrine as delivered by the Supreme Court. According to the State Action Doctrine, “the US Constitution in general, and its individual rights in particular, apply only to state action, not to private action” ("State Action" 2017). In understanding the question of whether private actors curtail freedom of expression, the State Action Doctrine responds with a definite yes. This understanding has been developed through a series of court cases, creating a precedent that allows for private actors to breach free expression.
In United States v. Cruikshank, the Supreme Court ruled “the 14th Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses applied only to state action, and not to violations of civil rights by individual citizens.” (United States v. Cruikshank, 1875). This landmark decision took place following the Colfax Massacre wherein “300 white Democrats, many of them former Confederate soldiers,” were hoping “to dislodge an armed cadre of 150 freedmen and white Republicans who had barricaded themselves inside” in order to protect an election (Pusey 2021, 72). Due to the absence of civil rights protections in Louisiana, where the Colfax Massacre occurred, the state bore no responsibility and could not prosecute individuals for violating others' rights. This case is relevant to understanding how freedom of expression can be curtailed by private actors. It set a precedent that allowed private actors to infringe upon others' rights, such as voting, because of the state's lack of responsibility. While legal precedents focus on the ability to discriminate, freedom of expression remains relevant because the freedoms “of speech, of the press, of association, of assembly and petition,” that comprise expression can be subject to that discrimination (ACLU, 2002). Further legal contributions exist along with social media usage statistics that present high percentages of US adults using various platforms. A Pew Research report found that 83% of US adults reported they ever used Youtube, 68% used Facebook, and 47% used Instagram (Pew Research Center, 2024). The private actors that run social media companies are able to curtail freedom of expression aided by Section 230 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. This provided “immunity to those that screened or removed offensive or indecent material that was posted on their sites by third parties” (First Amendment Encyclopedia, s.v. "Communications Decency Act and Section 230"). Originally created to “prevent minors from gaining access to sexually explicit materials on the internet,” the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has granted media platforms the ability to tailor violations of freedom of expression. Instagram, a social media platform used by just under 50% of Americans, explains their terms for content removal within their community guidelines (Pew Research Center, 2024) They “may remove entire posts if either the imagery or associated captions violate their guidelines,” some of those violations being nudity, promoting hate speech, and bullying amongst others (Instagram Help Center, n.d.). With laws and legal precedents to support infringement and equal opportunity and anti-discrimination policies protecting people’s freedoms, private actors are certainly able to curtail freedom of expression, but with limitations.
References ACLU. 2002. “Freedom of Expression.” American Civil Liberties Union. March 1, 2002. https://www.aclu.org/documents/freedom-expression. "Communications Decency Act and Section 230." First Amendment Encyclopedia. Accessed June 24, 2024. https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/communications-decency-act-and-section-230/#:~:text=To%20encourage%20internet%20service%20providers,their%20sites%20by%20third%20parties. Instagram Help Center. s.v. "Privacy Settings." Accessed June 24, 2024. https://help.instagram.com/477434105621119#. Pusey, Allen. "Colfax Massacre Convictions Tossed: March 27, 1876." ABA Journal 107, no. 1 (February-March 2021): 72. Gale Academic OneFile. Accessed June 20, 2024. https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A653471522/AONE?u=anon~c9675132&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=4c07453e. Pew Research Center. "Social Media Use in 2024." Pew Research Center. January 31, 2024. Accessed June 24, 2024. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2024/01/PI_2024.01.31_Social-Media-use_report.pdf. "State Action." Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law. Last modified February 2017. https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law-mpeccol/law-mpeccol-e473#:~:text=The%20state%20action%20doctrine%20of,action%2C%20not%20to%20private%20action. U.N. General Assembly. 1966. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx. United States v. Cruikshank. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). | |
| Freedom of Expression | Freedom of expression can be limited in times of crisis, most notably in wartime. This was first enacted in the late 1790s, with the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Sedition Act most markedly affected freedom of expression and freedom of the press by making it illegal to speak against the government or president ("Alien and Sedition Acts"). These limitations were consistently applied in times of war until World War I, when its legality was cemented by the Supreme Court with Schenck vs. United States (Emerson 1968). In Schenck v. US, the Court ruled that the standards for regulation of freedom of speech were lower in wartime ("Schenck v. United States"). It also established, for the first time, the "clear and present danger" test, clarifying that "the First Amendment does not protect speech that approaches creating a clear and present danger of a significant evil that Congress has power to prevent ("Schenck v. United States"). During the Vietnam War, freedom of expression was upheld in New York Times v. United States by saying freedom of the press was "was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government" (Hudson). In states of emergency, such as the national one declared at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the president is granted special troubles that include infringements on freedom of the press/expression. One such power is the ability to shut down radio stations during a time of "public peril." This ability is cemented in section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934 (Rottman 2020). Since the law was passed in 1934, it did not include other forms of news publication, such as websites and TV news stations. There is a fear, however, that the government could broaden the law to include these types of news dissemination (Rottman 2020). In the COVID-19 pandemic, states and counties have declared media companies as essential services, thus exempting them from quarantine and shelter-in-place limitations (Rottman 2020).
War may justify limitations on expression. This has long been true in the US; as Justice Holmes wrote in Schenck v. US (1919), a case over anti-draft publications, “when a nation is at war, many things that might be said in times of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.” During the Civil War, President Lincoln prohibited the publishing of information of troop movements, and government officials censored newspapers critical of the Union. During WWI, the US passed legislation such as the Sedition Act, which sought to eliminate speech “urging any curtailment of the war with intent to hinder its prosecution.” The Supreme Court has at times limited the wartime justification for restrictions. This occurred in New York Times v. US (1971), where the government was not allowed to censor publication of the Pentagon Papers, which contained information about the Vietnam War (Hudson). Contemporary jurisprudence would likely not justify some restrictions that have been allowed in the past. Schenck was decided using the clear and present danger test, which has been superseded by the more stringent imminent lawless action test (Parker). Had the newer test been used, Schenck may have been decided differently; the dissent argued that speech should be restricted only when it “imminently threaten[s] immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purpose of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country” (Parker). The COVID-19 pandemic has caused press crackdowns in various countries, often to downplay the outbreak’s severity. Egypt and Iran, for example have systematically curtailed reporting on the epidemic (Egypt guarantees freedom of expression in its Constitution, though this has long not been the case in practice (“Egypt). Iran guarantees free press subject to derogation in the national interest or under “Islamic criteria”). Honduras went so far as to suspend the clause in its constitution guaranteeing free speech. South Africa has curtailed free speech, albeit not to promote a rosy view of the pandemic. Rather, it has criminalized misinformation (Simon 2020). Responses to the pandemic provide insight into potential restrictions during other disasters. If a large part of Egypt or Iran were leveled by an earthquake, their governments might restrict free speech to ensure that only positive information about the recovery effort surfaces. Similarly, the South Africans who support criminalizing pandemic misinformation may also support criminalizing hurricane-safety misinformation if such a storm barrelled toward South Africa (putting aside whether this is meteorologically possible). As is argued in a report by the organization Article 19, free expression may be of even greater importance than normal during an emergency. Citizens need complete access to the truth so that they can make decisions about their safety (6). Free expression is an excellent way to ensure this truth comes out. References: Hudson: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1597/free-speech-during-wartime#:~:text=Freedo Parker: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/898/clear-and-present-danger-test m%20of%20speech%20often%20suffers,backseat%20to%20security%20and%20order.&text=In %20other%20words%2C%20the%20Supreme,than%20in%20times%20of%20peace. Simon: https://www.cjr.org/analysis/coronavirus-press-freedom-crackdown.php Egyptian Constitution: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf “Egypt”: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/egypt-unprecedented-crackdown-on-freedom-o f-expression-under-alsisi-turns-egypt-into-openair-prison/ Iranian Constitution: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ir/ir001en.pdf Article 19 Report: https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/freedom-of-information-humanitarian-disa sters.pdf | |
| Freedom of Expression | At times, states have felt intimidated by different instances and types of expression.
Historical concerns about expression have been documented as far back as ancient Rome, where laws were put in place that made offenses against state leaders and the country in general a criminal act. Later, this legislation evolved to enact severe punishments on those who caused offense to the sovereign, whether through verbal or other attacks (“Lese Majesty”). In Medieval England, heretics - those that expressed sentiments and performed acts contrary to the Church of England and its teachings - were prosecuted and burned at the stake for threatening religious authority (Statutes of the Realm, 2:12S-28: 2 Henry IV). Centuries later in 1798, the US government made it illegal for any citizen to print, state, or distribute words about the government or its members that were considered to be spiteful and untrue by passing the Sedition Act. Those who were prosecuted for such crimes were largely Democratic-Republican Journalists, indicating that the ruling Federalist party passed the legislation to suppress opposition figures whose speech threatened their authority (“Alien and Sedition Acts ” 1798). In the current era, studies evaluating freedom of expression suggest that the right continues to be viewed as a threat to many national governments. In fact, according to the 2023 Freedom in the World report, the number of countries that are classified as having the lowest possible score in terms of freedom of expression have doubled. Additionally, statistics show that 109 countries approved some sort of legislation that restricted this same right in the year 2022 (Gorokhovskaia, Shabaz, and Slipowitz 2023). In many cases, both recently and in the past, regimes of all types have justified limitations on the freedom of expression as actions meant to protect public interests in some way, shape, or form. Governments may demonstrate that they feel threatened by free expression through police crackdowns or legal actions. As an example, in 2022 Iranian authorities began to violently crack down on citizens protesting the death of Mahsa Amini, a young woman who had perished at the hands of the country’s morality police. Demonstrations grew, with many opposing the Islamic republic’s policies, including mandatory veiling. As a result, authorities reacted by employing internet blackouts, arrests, imprisonments, and more (Ziabari 2023). President Ebrahim Raisi justified these repressive actions and threatened further crack down on dissidents, stating that they were opposing Iran’s “security and tranquility” (The Guardian 2022), making it necessary to curtail freedom of expression. Fears that freedom of expression may compromise public security have also been demonstrated in countries such as the United States. A primary example is the Supreme Court case Brandenburg v. Ohio, decided in 1969. The proceeding was based around a Ku Klux Klan leader who had spoken at a rally for the organization, “advocat[ing]... the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform” (Brandenburg v. Ohio 1968, 444-445), according to prosecutors. As a result of this reasoning, the plaintiff was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute, a decision that was later appealed to the Supreme Court on the grounds that it violated freedom of speech and expression as defined by the 1st Amendment of the US Constitution. This piece of legislation was described by the court as a way to prevent the teaching “of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence” (Brandenburg v. Ohio 1968, 448), indicating that Ohio’s state government had produced the law due to concerns that certain types of expression could lead to public corruption or insurrection. Ultimately, the Supreme Court deemed the state’s Criminal Syndicalism statute unconstitutional, widening the scope of freedom of expression in the United States (Brandenburg v. Ohio 1968, 448-449). The interests and values of a majority group often play a contentious role in governments’ feelings and responses to certain expressive acts. Offending a dominant religion, ethnicity, or other social group tends to be perceived as a threat to the government, which can be viewed in the 2005 case heard by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), İ.A. v. Turkey. The applicant, a citizen of Turkey who was referred to throughout the case as Mr. İ.A., owned and directed a publishing house which had released the novel “Yasak Tümceler”, which discussed various religious and philosophical issues. Turkish prosecutors deemed the book an offense to Islam and charged him with blasphemy against the nation’s dominant religion based on Article 175 of Turkey’s Criminal Code (İ.A. v. Turkey 2005, 1-2). As a result, Mr. İ.A. appealed to the ECHR, saying that his conviction infringed upon the right to freedom of expression as defined by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. For their part, the Turkish government insisted that “the book had fallen short of the level of responsibility to be expected of criticism in a country where the majority of the population were Muslim” (İ.A. v. Turkey 2005, 4), and thus freedom of expression had to be limited. The ECHR eventually sided with the Turkish government, agreeing that “as paragraph 2 of Article 10 recognises, the exercise of that freedom carries with it duties and responsibilities. Among them, in the context of religious beliefs, may legitimately be included a duty to avoid expressions that are gratuitously offensive to others and profane” (İ.A. v. Turkey 2005, 5). Given this reasoning, the court confirmed that the limitations authorities placed on the applicant’s freedom of expression were justified and a “pressing social need” (İ.A. v. Turkey 2005, 5-6). The Turkish government’s actions and legislation to protect the religious majority’s feelings from an expression that abused it, backed by the ECHR. In some cases, freedom of expression can be viewed by the government as a threat to public morality. This justification for limiting the right can be viewed in another ECHR case, Handyside v. The United Kingdom, which, similar to İ.A. v. Turkey, was based around the publishing of a book. The applicant, Mr. Handyside, owned a publishing company that bought the British rights to a work titled The Little Red Schoolbook, aimed towards school-aged audiences and including a section that discussed sexual matters (Handyside v. The United Kingdom 1976, 3-6). After it was released in the UK, many complaints about the book’s contents were made, with authorities eventually convicting Handyside of possessing obscene books for publication for gain under the Obscene Publications Acts of 1959 and 1964 (Handyside v. The United Kingdom 1976, 5), as well as confiscated the copies found in his office. Mr. Handyside then appealed these convictions to the ECHR on the grounds that the United Kingdom’s actions violated his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and breached several other rights laid out in the same document (Handyside v. The United Kingdom 1976, 13). However, the British government argued that they were justified in their actions, explaining that the limitations on expression were “necessary in a democratic society… for the protection of… morals” (Handyside v. The United Kingdom 1976, 16). This sentiment was backed by the ECHR, which found “that the 1959/1964 Acts have an aim that is legitimate under Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2), namely, the protection of morals in a democratic society” (Handyside v. The United Kingdom 1976, 16). References: “Alien and Sedition Acts (1798)”. n.d. National Archives. Accessed June 7, 2023. https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/alien-and-sedition-acts#sedition Gorokhovskaia, Yana, Adrian Shahbaz, and Amy Slipowitz. 2023. “Freedom in the World 2023: Marking 50 Years in the Struggle for Democracy.” Freedom House. The Guardian. 2022. “Protests Spread in Iran as President Raisi vows to crack down.” September 29, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/24/protests-spread-in-iran-as-president-raisi-vows-to-crack-down Handyside v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 5493/72, ECtHR judgment of 7 December 1976. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57499 İ.A. v. Turkey, Application no. 42571/98, ECtHR judgment of 13 December 2005. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-70113 “Lese Majesty.” The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, Columbia University Press, 2013, https://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/lese+majesty. Accessed 7 June 2023. Parliament of the United Kingdom. Obscene Publications Act 1959. 7 & 8 Eliz. 2. c.66 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Eliz2/7-8/66/section/1 Statutes of the Realm, 2:12S-28: 2 Henry IV Supreme Court Of The United States. U.S. Reports: Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444. 1968. Periodical. https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep395444/. Ziabari, Kourosh. 2023. “Iranian Protests and the Crisis of Free Speech.” Arab Center Washington DC. February 23, 2023. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/iranian-protests-and-the-crisis-of-free-speech/ | |
| Freedom of Religion | Under international human rights law, freedom of religion is a fundamental and generally protected right, with exceptions. Though states have their own rules and regulations curtailing the right to freedom of religion, they often fall under reasons that are generally viewed as legitimate by the international community, with those that do not being subject to scrutiny. There are a small, but prominent number of states that, despite this international pressure from intergovernmental organizations and other nations, restrict freedom of religion for reasons that do not fall under that category, most notably those with an authoritarian style of government (Majumdar and Villa 2020) . The UN’s Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief has also noted that there are governmental authorities that obstruct freedom of religion under the pretense of using generally accepted limitations, such as public safety, without clear evidence, using the “excuse to limit the rights of persons belonging to a religion or belief community that it finds inconvenient” (United Nations Human rights Council 2023, 27). While the majority of nations curtail freedom of religion for reasons that are widely viewed as permissible, there are various instances where these reasons are abused and the actions taken exceed international norms, with a small number of states consistently restricting the right for reasons regarded as unjustified. Article 1 of the United Nation’s Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance sets the international standard for permissible limitations to the right to freedom of religion as those that “are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” (UN General Assembly 1981,
3). The United Nations further clarified these restrictions in paragraph 12 of the Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/40 and paragraph 14 of the Human Rights Council resolution 6/37, stating that these limitations must be “applied in a manner that does not vitiate the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,” only being applied for its intended purpose, in a proportionate manner. The Pew Research Center (PRC), a nonpartisan American think tank, produces annual reports analyzing the extent to which governments and societies around the world impinge on religious beliefs and practices, including countries that curtail the right for reasons not justified under international human rights law. It noted that “the global median level of government restrictions on religion – that is, laws, policies and actions by officials that impinge on religious beliefs and practices – [has] continued to climb” since PRC began tracking the data in 2007. It labeled 56 countries as having “high” or “very high” levels of government restrictions, or “28% of the 198 countries and territories included in the study” (Majumdar and Villa 2020, 5). The report looked at government laws, policies, and actions, as well as acts of religious hostilities by private individuals, organizations, or group societies, finding that “most of the 56 countries with high or very high levels of government restrictions on religion are in the Asia-Pacific region (25 countries, or half of all countries in that region) or the Middle East-North Africa region (18 countries, or 90% of all countries in the region)” (Majumdar and Villa 2020, 3-6). The scores states received depended in part on a series of questions that determined how governmental authorities handled religious freedom, including whether they were discriminatory towards certain religions in law and/or practice, used physical force, or passed laws that impeded the right. The 56 countries designated as having high or very high levels of governmental restrictions were found to curtail freedom of religion excessively, often for reasons that are not viewed as permissible under international human rights law, such as accusing religious practitioners of inciting dissent, engaging in blasphemy, or practicing an unpopular religion in the state, among others (Majumdar and Villa 2020, 10-11). The Pew Research Center’s report, titled "In 2018, Government Restrictions on Religion Reach Highest Level Globally in More Than a Decade, named China and Iran as having the highest level of government restriction on religion. In China’s case, the report cited the government’s continued “detention campaign against Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs and other Muslims in Xinjiang province, holding at least 800,000 (and possibly up to 2 million) in detention facilities ‘designed to erase religious and ethnic identities,’ according to the U.S. State Department,” as well as its prohibition of certain religious practices (Majumdar and Villa 2020, 8). The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom further denounced the Chinese government’s implementation of its “sinicization of religion” policy which demands that “religious groups support the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) rule and ideology,” punishing those that did not (United States Commision on International Religious Freedom 2022, 1). Iran was similarly criticized for its persecution of religious minorities, including the Iranian government’s continued usage of “antisemitic rhetoric to incite intolerance against Jews”, the sentencing of Christian “on national security grounds”, and repression of Sunni Muslims for arbitrary reasons (United States Commision on International Religious Freedom 2022, 27). These acts have received international backlash, drawing the concern from intergovernmental agencies like the UN, as well as other nations. The other 54 states listed as having high or very high governmental restrictions followed similar trends, making up 28% of the states and territories that were included in the study. While a minority of governmental authorities actively curtail the right to freedom of religion for reasons that are not viewed as permissible by the international community, there is a larger number of states that do so for generally acceptable reasons but apply it in a manner inconsistent with international human rights law. The UN’s Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief delivered a report to the UN General assembly raising the concern that “the precise extent of such limitations in specific circumstances has become a salient topic in many countries,” with many governmental authorities obstructing freedom of religion under the pretense of using generally accepted limitations (United Nations Human rights Council 2023, 27). The Special Rapporteur recognized the “need to protect public safety and public order” but warns “there is a risk that States will cite them to justify restrictions on [freedom of religion or belief] imposed for reasons tantamount to national security interests, by arguing that a [religious or belief] group is engaged in political activities that endanger public safety and order” (Special Rapporteur 2018, 8). The report asserts that “laws on apostasy or blasphemy, which are often framed as ‘anti-incitement legislation’, [and] exist in at least 69 States, reflect the idea that the expression of certain views within a society may create ‘discontent’, subvert ‘national unity’ or undermine public order and public safety” (Special Rapporteur 2018, 9). They further mention that some “states have also adopted measures to address concerns that some religious publications (both online and off), including sacred texts, may constitute a threat to peace and security”, which can lead government authorities to ban or censor certain religious materials (Special Rapporteur 2018, 9). Critics have recently accused France of engaging in such activity, citing the “controversial Reinforcing Republican Principles Bill, also known as the Anti-Separatism Law,” passed by the National Assembly in 2021 (Freedom House 2022). Freedom House, a nonprofit organization that conducts research, reported that “claiming to combat ‘religious separatism,’ the law allows the government to dissolve religious organizations, increases the surveillance of mosques and Muslim associations, and requires the latter to sign a contract of ‘respect for Republican values’ when applying for state subsidies. Critics have warned that it particularly stigmatizes Muslims and could increase Islamophobic sentiment” (Freedom House 2022). Though the state’s reasoning for limiting religious freedom may be viewed as permissible (national security concerns, public safety, etc.), these same limitations may become overextended and used in an oppressive manner. Freedom of religion is protected under international human rights law, which allows for exceptions when limitations are needed to “protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” (UN General Assembly 1981, 3) . Most states curtail the right for these reasons, however, there is a smaller percentage of countries that do not do so, acting in a more restrictive manner. Additionally, there are states that use the reasons that are generally viewed as permissive but apply it in a manner inconsistent with international human rights law. References: Freedom House."France: Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report." 2022. Majumdar, Samirah, and Virginia Villa. "In 2018, Government Restrictions on Religion Reach Highest Level Globally in More Than a Decade." Pew Research Center, 2020. Special Rapporteur. "Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief." United Nations General Assembly, 2018. UN General Assembly. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. OHCHR, 1981. United Nations Human rights Council. "Rapporteur"s Digest on Freedom of Religion or Belief" United Nations. 2023. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Religion/RapporteursDige stFreedomReligionBelief.pdf. United States Commision on International Religious Freedom. "2022 Annual Report." 2022. | |
| Freedom of Religion | Government Favortism of Religions: Often, a government will claim a favored religion (“A Closer Look”), and this may come at the expense of other groups’ freedom. For example, Greece has an anti-proselytism law designed to protect the Greek Orthodox religion.
Registration: Many countries require religious groups to register with a relevant agency to operate (“A Closer Look 2019”). National Security: In 2017, Israel banned Muslim men under 50 from visiting the Western Wall (there is some conflicting reporting as to whether the ban extended to non-Muslim men as well). Israel has similarly restricted other sites during times of tension, such as Jerusalem’s Aqsa mosque (Baker 2014). Given that the Western Wall is a sacred site to Muslims, restricting access should be considered a restriction on Muslim practice. The ban still restricted the ability of people to freely worship even if it extended to non-Muslims. Expression in Public: For example, many European countries ban religious dress in public places (“A Closer Look 2019”). Blasphemy: 71 countries, spread between the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Europe, have anti-blasphemy laws (Bandow 2018). REFERENCES: Luke Baker, “Muslim men over 50 pray at Jerusalem's Aqsa mosque amid tight security”, October 31, 2014: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-palestinians-israel/muslim-men-over-50-pray-at-jerusalems-aqsa-mosque-amid-tight-security-idUSKBN0IK0PR20141031 Doug Bandow, “Anti‐Blasphemy Laws Are Blasphemous,” American Spectator (Online), June 24, 2018. “A Closer Look” https://www.pewforum.org/2019/07/15/a-closer-look-at-how-religious-restrictions-have-risen-around-the-world/ | |
| Freedom of Religion | Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The UDHR provides for exceptions to human rights “determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” American Convention on Human Rights: Article 12-3 of the convention states that religious practice may “be subject only to the limitations prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others.” The relevant court has “recognized that a state can limit the exercise of free religious expression when there is a conflict with other rights or when such expression constitutes a threat to society or political stability” (Gomes 2009, 98). European Convention on Human Rights: Article 9-2 states that “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted a right not to have one’s religious views insulted by the public and has condoned state action against blasphemy (Koev 2019). In Valsamis v. Greece (1996), the court ruled against a defendant seeking a religious a religious exemption from a school-sponsored activity (Koev 2019).
In Eweida and others v. UK (2013), the court ruled against civil servants who refused to register same-sex marriages (Koev 2019). In Sahin v. Turkey ( 2004), the court upheld restricts on beards and headscarves for Muslim university students to “reconcile the interests of various groups” (Koev 2019, 188). In SAS v. France, the court upheld a ban on public face coverings because the face coverings would intrude on concepts of secularism and liberty (because, the court argued, face coverings symbolize subservience). REFERENCES: Evaldo Xavier Gomes, “The Implementation of Inter-American Norms on Freedom of Religion in the National Legislation of OAS Member States,” BYU Law Review, 2009, Issue 3 Article 5, 9-1-2009 Dan Koev (2019) Not Taking it on Faith: State and Religious Influences on European Court of Human Rights Judges in Freedom of Religion Cases, Journal of Human Rights, 18:2, 184-200, DOI: 10.1080/14754835.2019.1588715 Universal Declaration of Human Rights: https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ | |
| Freedom of Religion | The Supreme Court ruled in Employment Division v. Smith (1990) that the First Amendment does not provide for religious exemptions to a generally applicable law. In the case, a Native American was fired from his job and denied unemployment benefits for using Peyote, a substance sometimes smoked during religious ceremonies. The court had previously ruled in Sherbert v. Verner (1963) that the First Amendment does provide for that type of exception unless there is a compelling reason to enforce the law anyway (Munoz 2008, 1083). However, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal (2006) appears to undermine this ruling. In that case, a religious group claimed the right to use a drug called hoasca. The Supreme Court held that, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the government is obligated to grant religious exemptions to general laws unless the government can demonstrate a compelling state interest in regulating the drug’s religious use (“Gonzales v. Centro”). Pandemic: The COVID-19 pandemic has caused many governments to limit religious gatherings. For example, at the outset of the pandemic, Maryland banned gatherings of more than ten people, including religious services (Pitts 2020). Ensuring Success of a Government Operation: In Goldman v. Weinberger (1986), the court upheld an Air Force ban on headgear, which was challenged by an Orthodox Jew seeking to wear a yarmulke while on duty. The court found that the Air Force had a legitimate interest in ensuring obedience and conformity (“Landmark”). Non-Discrimination Law (a notable non-exception): In a landmark case, Masterpiece Cake Shop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission ( 2017), the Supreme Court decided that Colorado anti-discrimination law could not compel a baker to violate his religious beliefs by baking a cake for a same-sex wedding (“Masterpiece”).
REFERENCES: Evaldo Xavier Gomes, “The Implementation of Inter-American Norms on Freedom of Religion in the National Legislation of OAS Member States,” BYU Law Review, 2009, Issue 3 Article 5, 9-1-2009 Muñoz, Vincent Phillip, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress (2008). Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 1083-1120, 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1150780 “Landmark”: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/cases/ “Gonzalez v. Centro”: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1084 “Masterpiece”: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-111 | |
| Freedom of Religion | The conflict of civil and religious rights has presented several exceptions to the right to free religious exercise. Specifically, stemming from the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of marriage equality in 2015, many anti-discrimination laws have passed, restricting the right to unfettered religious exercise. Several scholars have argued in favor of these exceptions. In discussing the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Suzanne Goldberg states, “After many years of battles in which the religious right had hammered the message that gay people were somehow seeking “special rights” when advocating for laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, the court added its authoritative view that the “special rights” rhetoric was meaningless” (Keen and Goldberg, 236-237). Emulated by Goldberg, as civil rights, such as marriage equality, are not “special rights", they must be protected equally to the First Amendment right to free religious exercise. Ultimately, Goldberg conveys the sentiment that within American jurisprudence, the right to free religious exercise is prima facie, and thus can be subject to numerous exceptions.
Additionally, in regards to criminal law violations, William P Marshall of the University of Chicago Law Review supports the need for exceptions to the Free Exercise Clause. Furthermore, Marshall condemns the belief that religious activity, as protected by the Free Exercise Clause, should be exempt from criminal laws. In defending the Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith decision, which confirmed the state’s ability to withhold unemployment benefits from workers fired for using illegal drugs for religious purposes, Marshall argues that if the Supreme Court were to permit religious exemptions to criminal laws, strengthening First Amendment Rights, they would have to engage in dangerous “constitutional balancing” (Marshall, 311). As explained by Marshall, this balancing would force the court to weigh the interests of religious groups against the interests of states, resulting in inconsistent rulings. Thus, presenting a clear exception to freedom of religion, Marshall argues that First Amendment rights, specifically the right to free religious exercise, do not exempt one from criminal prosecution. Between the positions of Marshall and Goldberg, lies Ira C. Lupu of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. While Lupu dismisses the Smith decision, claiming religious rights should have been accommodated in that particular case, he still argues for limitations on religious expression, claiming, “every person may pursue religious freedom to the extent that it is fully compatible with the equal pursuit of religious freedom by others” (Lupu, 558). Similar to Goldberg, Lupu asserts that religious expression can be curtailed when it restricts the liberties of others. Thus, Lupu emphasizes that although certain religious practices should be exempt from the law, such as the peyote drinking incident in Smith, religious expression should not be left legally unrestricted. REFERENCES: Keen, Lisa., and Suzanne B. Goldberg. Strangers to the Law : Gay People on Trial. University of Michigan Press, 1998. Lupu, Ira C. “Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion.” University of Pennsylvania law review 140, no. 2 (1991): 555–612. Marshall, William P. “In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism.” The University of Chicago Law Review 58, no. 1 (1991): 308–28. https://doi.org/10.2307/1599906. | |
| Freedom of Religion | Private companies have often been found to institute policies that restrict employees’ rights to religious freedom. Such policies directly violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, a provision meant to bolster religious freedom by prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of religion (EEOC).
Such discriminatory policies were observed in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores. Furthermore, the case revealed Abercrombie’s “Look Policy”, which involved discriminatory hiring procedures towards Muslim individuals (Oyez). Affirmed by the Supreme Court, this policy was a direct violation of the Civil Rights Act, Justice Scalia upholding Title VII claiming, “An employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions” (Justia Law). Demonstrated by the court’s decision, one’s entitlements to religious freedom in the workplace, as upheld by Title VII, are curtailed by discriminatory hiring practices such as the “Look Policy”. In addition to violating their Title VII entitlements, many individuals argue that their employers’ practices restrict their First Amendment rights to free religious exercise. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, Adell Sherbert argued that her firing due to her refusal to work Saturdays, her Sabbath day, was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment (Oyez). The Supreme Court concurred with Sherbert, emphasizing that the firing restricted Sherbert’s ability to freely practice her religion. Emphasized by the case, firing someone on the basis of their religion, in addition to likely being a violation of the Civil Rights Act, is a direct breach of the First Amendment. Thus, witnessed by instances such as those that precipitated Sherbert, First Amendment religious rights are often infringed upon by employment policies. REFERENCES: EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-86 EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/575/14-86/ Sherbert v Verner, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1962/526 | |
| Freedom of Religion | In the United States, certain religious practices have been limited during times of disease. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, limitations on free religious exercise have been visibly witnessed, demonstrating how the right is subject to restrictions during a health crisis. This was observed in the beginning of the pandemic, when many houses of worship challenged their closures by state governments, arguing that such actions violated their rights to free religious exercise. Thus, witnessed through the closing of churches as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, a disaster can alter the Supreme court’s constitutional interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused many governments to limit religious gatherings. For example, at the outset of the pandemic, Maryland banned gatherings of more than ten people, including religious services (Pitts 2020). Terrorism has justified bans on Muslim veils in public places, a restriction on the free exercise of religion. From a 2019 piece by the London Schools of Economics’ Stuti Manchanda and Nilay Saiya: “Proponents of restrictions on Muslim veils make three main arguments. First, they claim that enveloping Islamic veils present a physical security threat, insofar as Muslim women might use these traditional Islamic garments to conceal weapons or explosives. ‘You could carry a rocket launcher under your veil,’ as the former President of Latvia, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, put it. Similarly, Paul Nuttall, former leader of the UK Independence Party, justified banning the burqa on similar physical security grounds: ‘Obviously we have a heightened security risk at the moment and for CCTV to be effective, in an age of heightened terror, you need to be able to see people’s faces.’ Finally, British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, compared Muslim women in veils to letter boxes and bank robbers.” Israel has restricted Muslim practices to respond to terrorism. In 2017, due to a recent incident, Israel banned Muslim men under 50 from visiting the Western Wall (there is some conflicting reporting as to whether the ban extended to non-Muslim men as well). Israel has similarly restricted other sites during times of tension, such as Jerusalem’s Aqsa mosque (Baker 2017). Given that the Western Wall is a sacred site to Muslims, restricting access should be considered a restriction on Muslim practice. The ban still restricted the ability of people to freely worship even if it extended to non-Muslims. Certain US anti-terror policies, though stopping short of restricting Muslim religious practices, have significantly impacted Muslims. In Response to 9-11, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act. The act’s provisions included those designed to facilitate search warrants on suspected terrorists, enable increased surveillance, and prevent terrorists from exploiting the immigration system. These provisions and post-attack suspicion of Muslims have led law-enforcement agencies to disproportionately target them. A 2006 piece by Xavier University’s Kam C. Wong referred to Muslim-Americans’ situation as a “virtual internment camp” (194). Wong cites staggering data on Muslim-Americans between 2001 and 2005; using conservative estimates, 90,000 had been detained, raided, or questioned by the FBI. Similarly, the NYPD ran a controversial program after 9-11 surveilling Muslims. According to the ACLU, its methods included undercover officers in Muslim communities, tracking individuals who had changed their name, and recording information on people who attended Muslim services. The ACLU even claims that the program interfered with Muslim practice by instilling fear that religious doctrine may be misinterpreted by law enforcement (“Factsheet”). From the report: “The NYPD’s suspicionless surveillance has forced religious leaders to censor what they say to their congregants, for fear anything they say could be taken out of context by police officers or informants. Some religious leaders feel they must regularly record their sermons to defend themselves against potential NYPD mischaracterizations. Disruptions resulting from unlawful NYPD surveillance have also diverted time and resources away from religious education and counseling. Muslims have reported feeling pressure to avoid appearing overtly religious, for example, by changing their dress or the length of their beards. REFERENCES: Luke Baker, “Muslim men over 50 pray at Jerusalem's Aqsa mosque amid tight security”, October 31, 2014: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-palestinians-israel/muslim-men-over-50-pray-at-jerusalems-aqsa-mosque-amid-tight-security-idUSKBN0IK0PR20141031 “Factsheet: The NYPD Muslim Surveillance Program” https://www.aclu.org/other/factsheet-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program Stuti Manchada and Nilay Saiya, “Why veil restrictions increase the risk of terrorism in Europe,” 12/17/2019: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2019/12/17/why-veil-restrictions-increase-the-risk-of-terrorism-in-europe/ Jonathan M. Pitts, “Houses of worship ‘in no rush’ to reopen as Maryland eases restrictions on indoor gatherings,” Baltimore Sun, Jun 06, 2020: https://www.baltimoresun.com/coronavirus/bs-md-ci-churches-reopening-20200606-mgrlkn2kdjd77ealcnnu5lmsoe-story.html Kam C. Wong, The USA Patriot Act: A Policy of Alienation, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 161 (2006). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1111&context=mjrl | |
| Freedom of Religion | Government authorities have often viewed freedom of religion as a threat.
In the modern era, it is generally agreed that all people should be able to practice religion freely, as the liberty is enshrined in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, governments continue to restrict certain aspects of the right if they find it to be intimidating. In many cases, legislation has pointed to a government feeling uneasy about aspects of religious freedom; in France for example, the legislature passed Act No. 2010-1192, which banned face coverings in public places. According to writer Heraa Hashmi, this targeted Muslim women who wore the niqab or burqa in an attempt to protect public order and to ensure others’ rights and freedoms,” (Hashmi 2022) pointing to the government’s concerns about religious expression. In other cases, simply refusing to protect religious rights, or doing so in an extremely selective manner, can indicate that a government authority is threatened by a certain faith and/or its expression. According to the US Embassy in Saudi Arabia, the country’s laws contain “no legal recognition or protection of freedom of religion” (US Embassy to Saudi Arabia 2021). However, blasphemy of Islam has been criminalized, and the Basic Law states that “the duty of every citizen is to defend Islam,” (US Embassy to Saudi Arabia 2021). In addition, scholars have argued that “where [Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman] has truncated the power of the religious establishment, it is to consolidate power into the central state and specifically, to boost his own control” (Hoffman 2022). On top of that, there is “a comprehensive effort by the state to eliminate all independent or dissenting religious voices capable of challenging MbS’s desired monopoly on Islam in Saudi Arabia” (Hoffman 2022). This would indicate that Saudi leadership is heavily connected to Sunni Islam, and therefore the existence of other religions is viewed as a threat. In some cases, states may see freedom of religion as a threat due to negative impacts on public health. In California, the state legislature passed Senate Bill No. 277, which eliminated exceptions to mandatory vaccinations based on personal beliefs. This decision was made based on the findings of a government report which had shown that “when belief exemptions to vaccination guidelines are permitted, vaccination rates decrease” (Brown v. Smith 2018, 5) leading to difficulty controlling the spread of contagious viruses. While it is worth noting that the idea of “personal belief exemptions” are not exclusively related to religion, and thus the elimination of such exemptions are not specifically targeting faiths, some California parents understood this law as a restriction on their religious freedoms due the the fact that they “describe themselves as Christians” who were therefore “opposed to the use of fetal cells in vaccine” (Brown v. Smith 2018, 11). Other parents saw the law as suppression of their “sincerely held philosophic [and] conscientious…beliefs” (Brown v. Smith 2018, 6), and allied with those opposing the Bill based on their faith, eventually taking their complaints to the California Court of Appeals. While the coalition of parents eventually won the case, it was not based on violations of religious freedom. The Court quoted previous case law discussing faith and health such as Prince v. Massachusetts, which explained that “the right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death” (Brown v, Smith 2018, 11). This indicates that freedom of religion is not all-encompassing in the United States; there are limitations. As a result, if a group such as the plaintiffs in Brown v. Smith refuses to comply with laws such as Senate Bill No. 277, they are threatening the interests of the state to protect public health and safety. Governments have also felt threatened by religious freedom when it is perceived as hazardous to public safety and or morality. In Iran, state authorities have restricted the rights of the Baha’i faith group, as well as other religious minorities, for these reasons. According to reports from the US State Department, in 2022 many such individuals were systematically jailed and accused of having membership in organizations that “disrupt national security,” or “agitating the public consciousness” (US Department of State 2022, 22). Independent media outlet Iranwire has also reported that several Baha’i preschool teachers were detained by Iranian intelligence officers and accused of being spies, a charge that has been leveled against members of the faith for years (Sabeti 2022). According to the news outlet Reuters, Iranian authorities have also been carrying out “propaganda missions to propagate Baha’i teachings” and “infiltrat[ing] various levels of the education sector” (Reuters 2022). Members of the faith are punished and restricted from religious expression because the government feels that they threaten national security and disseminate incorrect teachings. Government obligations to protect a state’s majority religion have also caused regimes to see the practice of minority faiths as a threat. In Sri Lanka, the constitution states that “The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while assuring to all religions the rights granted by Articles 10 and 14(1)(e)” (Constitution of Sri Lanka 1978, art. 9), which include the freedom of conscience, religion, and thought, as well as “the freedom, either by himself or in association with others, and either in public or in private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching” (Constitution of Sri Lanka 1978, art. 14(1)(e)). In practice, this has meant that the government has limited the actions of religious minorities. For example, in 2003 a Roman Catholic Order submitted a request to incorporate to the government of Sri Lanka, which was enacted by passing it into law. This bill allowed the Order to “to spread knowledge of the Catholic religion” and “to impart religious, educational and vocational training to youth,” (UNCHR 2004, 4). However, a private citizen claimed that this statute was unconstitutional given that it allowed the Order to proselytize and did not sufficiently protect Buddhism. The case was eventually taken to the Sri Lankan Supreme Court, which sided with the objector and stated that “the propagation and spreading Christianity as postulated in terms of clause 3 [of the Bill] would not be permissible as it would impair the very existence of Buddhism or the Buddha Sasana” (UNCHR 2004, 5). The judicial body thus limited the ability of Catholics to express their faith and proselytize in order to protect the majority religion; however, the United Nations Human Rights Committee objected to this reasoning in Sister Immaculate Joseph v. Sri Lanka, claiming that it violated the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UNCHR 2004, 11). References Brown v. Smith (2018) 24 Cal. App. 5th 1135. https://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/2018/b279936.html Constitution of Sri Lanka (Rev. 2015), 1978. Art. 9. https://www.parliament.lk/files/pdf/constitution.pdf Hashmi, Heraa. 2022. “Niqab and the Religious Freedom Violations in France.” UC Davis Journal of International Law and Policy. March 9, 2022. https://jilp.law.ucdavis.edu/blog/posts/niqab-and-the-religious-freedom-violation-in-france.html#:~:text=In%202010%2C%20France%20passed%20a,particularly%20impactful%20for%20many%20people. Hoffman, Jon. 2022. “The Evolving Relationship Between Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia.” Arab Center Washington D.C. April 20, 2022. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-evolving-relationship-between-religion-and-politics-in-saudi-arabia/ Reuters. 2022. “Iran arrested Baha’i citizens, accuses them of Israel links - state media.” August 1, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-arrested-bahai-citizens-accuses-them-israel-links-state-media-2022-08-01/ Sabeti, Kian. 2022. “Baha’is Arrested for Instigating ‘Sedition’ and Protests.” Iranwire. October 18, 2022. https://iranwire.com/en/politics/108702-bahais-arrested-for-instigating-sedition-and-protests/ UNHRC, Communication No. 1249/2004, Sister Immaculate Joseph v. Sri Lanka, UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1249/2004 United States Department of State. 2022. 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Iran. https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/iran/#:~:text=Since%201999%2C%20Iran%20has%20been,redesignated%20Iran%20as%20a%20CPC. US Embassy in Saudi Arabia. 2022. 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom for Saudi Arabia. https://sa.usembassy.gov/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom-for-saudi-arabia/#:~:text=Since%202004%2C%20Saudi%20Arabia%20has,severe%20violations%20of%20religious%20freedom. | |
| Freedom of the Press | In international human rights law, freedom of the press is outlined in the International Bill of Human Rights, which encompasses the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These documents include the rights protected as well as exceptions, or derogations, if they are applicable. The UDHR is not a treaty, so states are not legally bound to it (Australian Human Rights Commission). Still, the document serves as a foundation for international human rights legislation. Article 19 of the UDHR protects the right to “receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Article 29(2) briefly states general derogations for the rights laid out in other articles:
“In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society” (United Nations General Assembly, 1948). Unlike the UDHR, the ICCPR is legally binding to the states that ratify it. The ICCPR contains similar language in paragraph 2 of Article 19 relating to freedom of the press, but goes farther in the following paragraphs to mention restrictions. These acceptable restrictions “shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: For respect of the rights or reputations of others; For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals” (United Nations General Assembly, 1966). Additionally, Article 20(1) prohibits war propaganda, which is often distributed by means of government and independent news media and involves the strategically crafted systems of gathering and distributing information as to incite war support (Miller, 2004, 8). Freedom of the press includes the media’s right to freely publish information, but also includes the people’s right to receive accurate information, especially during times of political tension, such as war or elections when this right may be jeopardized. The 2009 Joint Declaration of the United Nations, Organization of American States, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and African Commission on Human and People’s Rights emphasized the importance of people’s access to accurate, impartial information (UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression et al., 2009). Because freedom of the press includes the ability to both receive and impart information, prohibiting war propaganda can be seen both as the protection of people’s right to receive impartial news and the limitation of the press from spreading inaccurate or violence-inciting media. Miller argues that war propaganda includes not only outward attempts to garner war support through the media, but also subtle manipulation of the media by the state to prevent effective dissent, resulting in “information dominance” by the state so they may further their military agendas (Miller, 2004, 14). Article 20(2) of the ICCPR prohibits advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that incites discrimination or violence, which applies but is not limited to freedom of the press. The Article 4 of the ICCPR also includes measures for states of emergency and highlights the rights and articles from which states cannot derogate, including the right to life (Article 6), protection against torture (Article 7), protection against slavery (Article 8), protection against debt imprisonment (Article 11), protection against punishment for a crime that was not illegal at the time it was committed (Article 15), the right to recognition before the law (Article 16), and the right to religion and freedom of conscience (Article 18). The specified list of rights to be protected during emergencies does not include freedom of the press, meaning states are permitted to restrict the press under the conditions “that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion, or social origin” and that states inform the United Nations of the right from which they derogated, the reasons they derogated, and the date on which the derogation will end (United Nations General Assembly, 1966, Article 4(1), Article 4(3)). Hafner-Burton, Helfer, and Fariss argue that the processes outlined in derogation clauses of human rights law allow derogators to take the necessary actions during an emergency situation and signal to the international community that those actions will be temporary and carried out in a lawful manner (2011, 673-674). The United Nations includes the descriptive conditions and processes by which states can derogate from rights such as freedom of the press because otherwise states may be hesitant to ratify human rights treaties in the first place, and therefore not protect those rights at all. According to Siehr, “The common task of emergency clauses in human rights instruments is to cope with the challenge of finding a middle course between the recognition of the legitimate right of sovereign States to defend their constitutional, democratic order and the prevention of misuse of the tool of emergency rights” (Siehr, 2004, 546). This can prove to be difficult, as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the primary body for monitoring freedom of the press and information, reported “that perpetrators of internet shutdowns often try to justify them as a ‘precautionary measure’ or as a matter related to ‘national security,’ ‘public safety,’ or ‘hate speech,’ when the underlying motivations appear strongly correlated with moments of political instability, protests, communal violence, or elections” (UNESCO, 2022, 51). To ensure that derogations from freedom of the press, specifically those in the name of disinformation campaigns, are necessary, lawful, and transparent, UNESCO has recommended: that state restrictions freedom of the press include input from a variety of independent groups, civil society organizations, and research specialists (UNESCO, 2020, 14); that UNESCO partner with other United Nations bodies to guarantee that derogations from freedom of the press are ethical and do not violate the right more than necessary (12); that relevant media actors increase the capacity of independent press councils in their monitoring efforts (217). References: Australian Human Rights Commission. 2007. “What is the Universal Declaration on Human Rights?” Accessed July 5, 2024. https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/commission-general/projects/what-universal-declaration-human-rights Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Laurence Helfer, Christopher Fariss. 2011. “Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties.” Cambridge University Press 65, no.4. 673-707. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831100021X Miller, David. 2004. “Information Dominance: The Philosophy of Total Propaganda Control?” in War, Media, and Propaganda: A Global Perspective, edited by Yahya Kamalipour and Nancy Snow. 7-16. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=IyQeVFowLnwC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=war+propaganda+mediums&ots=ld3JH7kqKU&sig=HmizgQAGnNbDQew_MLGqn3h9_QU#v=onepage&q&f=false Siehr, Angelika. 2004. “Derogation Measures under Article ICCPR, with Special Consideration of the War against International Terrorism.” German Yearbook of International Law, 47. 545-593. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/gyil47&id=1&collection=journals&index= United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, International Telecommunication Union, Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development. 2020. “Balancing act: countering digital disinformation while respecting freedom of expression: Broadband Commission research report on ‘Freedom of Expression and Addressing Disinformation on the Internet'” https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000379015.locale=en United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. 2022. “Press Freedom in Times of Crisis and Transformation.” UNESCO Global Report 2021/2022: Journalism is a Public Good. 44-81. https://doi.org/10.18356/9789210015424c006 United Nations General Assembly. 1948. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Accessed July 5, 2024. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights United Nations General Assembly. 1966. “International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights. Accessed July 5, 2024. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the ACHPR Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information. 2009. “Joint Statement on the Media and Elections.” Joint Declarations of the representatives of intergovernmental bodies to protect free media and expression, 2013. 53-56. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/5/99558.pdf | |
| Freedom of the Press | Early American history was characterized by hostility to the common law of seditious libel, which restricted political speech. Legal objections sought to restrict the law's oppressive implementation, as in the Zenger case in 1735 (Rabban 1985, 799). English authors like Trenchard and Gordon (under the alias Cato) defended the truth and disregarded the notion that language's "bad tendency" might be used as a form of seditious libel (Rabban 1985, 799). Theoretical defenses of free speech highlighted its importance in limiting governmental authority and fostering good governance. The notion that free speech and the press were necessary for a free society and individual liberty was well-known in both America and England (Rabban 1985, 802). These ideas about the right to free speech were prevalent even before the Sedition Act of 1798 and had a significant impact on how the First Amendment was interpreted (Rabban 1985, 802).
Early cases like the Bradford case (1694) added to the Zenger case’s questioning of the common law's long-standing definition of seditious libel. They brought up arguments that the jury should decide whether a publication was seditious and challenged the notion that true remarks might constitute libel (Rabban and Levy 1985). This demonstrated the widespread resistance to the idea of seditious libel in eighteenth-century England and colonial America. Levy however find that these early cases and thinkers such as Cato did not go far enough in their libertarianism regarding Freedom of the Press (Rabban 1985, 802). These arguments were accompanied by theoretical defenses of political expression rights. Different individuals asserted that freedom of speech and the press were crucial for limiting governmental power and upholding a free society, both in England and the American colonies. There is a grand shift between freedom of expression, seditious libel, and freedom of the press before and after the American Revolution (Rabban 1985, 804). The press enjoyed less actual freedom in the years leading up to the American Revolution than it did during the majority of the colonial period. Speaking out against the cause of the Revolution was silenced by those in favor of independence, which curbed freedom of expression (Rabban 1985, 805). Following the Revolution, many states continued to pursue seditious libel cases, and grand juries were more inclined to recommend indictments—especially in light of the Sedition Act of 1798. Seditious libel was not often challenged by libel victims in this era (Rabban 1985, 805). However, in modern-day America, most restrictions of freedom of expression, including that of the press, are limited. Slander, obscenity, pornography, sedition, incitement, fighting words, violation of copyright, trade secrets, food labeling, non-disclosure agreements, the right to privacy, public safety, and perjury are examples of common restrictions on the press. Outside of that, there are no other limits on the Press (Cornell Legal Information Institute). However, 57% of U.S. journalists are either extremely or very concerned about the freedom of the press as of 2023 (Pew Research 2023). More than 50 journalists were arrested or jailed in the US in 2021 while performing their jobs (Freedom Tracker). In 2022, reporters covering the school shooting in Uvalde were threatened with arrest, as well as prevented access from reporting in certain areas (Hernández and Farhi 2022). Journalists have been on high alert regarding potential future suppression of media in the U.S. Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, the print media tends to act mostly self-regulatory and functions without many statutory restrictions. Everyone including the media has the right to freedom of expression in the UK, according to the Human Rights Act (HRA). However, this right "may be subject to formalities, conditions, restrictions, or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society." (Murray et al. 2022). However, libel in the UK functions differently in the US for the press. Britain actually has stricter regulations on freedom of the press. Since the country's libel rules have historically made suing for libel an easy pursuit, oligarchs and other wealthy foreigners and businesses have utilized British courts to sue journalists for news they don't like (Global Campaign for Free Expression 2023). It is far easier to sue these journalists in the UK. In contrast to the US' constitutional tradition, laws in the UK penalizes speech critical of public officials. The UK allows for greater ability to protect one’s public image and reputation (Global Campaign for Free Expression 2023). In comparison to the aforementioned libel cases in the US, the limits of the media are far stricter. In conclusion, there is a complicated and developing narrative to be found in the history of press freedom and early American democracy. The harsh use of seditious libel laws was vigorously resisted in early American history, with examples like the Zenger trial questioning accepted notions of libel. The theoretical foundations of free speech as a defense against excessive political power were well-established, laying the groundwork for the First Amendment's interpretation. While there are certain limitations on the freedom of speech and the press in modern America, they are often only applicable to situations involving slander, obscenity, provocation, and issues related to public safety. However, recent instances of journalists receiving threats, being detained, and having their access restricted underscore growing worries about press freedom in the United States. The UK's libel rules albeit more relaxed have had a history of being exploited by companies upset by the media. The appropriate balance to strike in this dynamic environment between defending free speech and attending to valid concerns is still up for discussion. It is clear that while the concepts of free speech are fundamental to democratic societies, how these concepts are actually put into practice can differ greatly, with repercussions for the media, public discourse, and individual liberty. In the ever-changing world, it is crucial to be attentive to defending and upholding the core ideals of freedom of expression and the press as these difficulties are negotiated (Global Campaign for Free Expression 2023). Bibliography Cornell Legal Information Institute. “First Amendment.” LII / Legal Information Institute. Accessed September 22, 2023. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first_amendment. Freedom Tracker. “More than 50 Journalists Arrested or Detained While on the Job in the US in 2021.” U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. Accessed September 22, 2023. https://pressfreedomtracker.us/blog/arrests-of-journalists-remain-a-threat-to-a-free-press/. Global Campaign for Free Expression. 2023. “Media Regulation in the United Kingdom.” September 2023. https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/uk-media-regulation.pdf. Hernández, Arelis R., and Paul Farhi. 2022. “Journalists in Uvalde Are Stonewalled, Hassled, Threatened with Arrest.” The Washington Post, June 28, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/media/2022/06/28/we-were-seen-enemies-journalists-uvalde-threatened-by-police/. Murray, Calum, Fergus Nolan, Jessica Withey, Joanna Conway, and Katie Major. 2022. “Spotlight: Free Speech and Media Freedom in United Kingdom.” Deloitte Legal, November 21, 2022. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=91802897-644e-4932-b0fc-eea0e84ed037. Pew Research. 2023. “Most U.S. Journalists Are Concerned about Future Press Freedoms.” Pew Research Center. May 2, 2023. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/05/02/most-u-s-journalists-are-concerned-about-press-freedoms/. Rabban, David M. 1985. “The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History.” Stanford Law Review 37, no. 3 (February): 795-805. https://doi.org/10.2307/1228715. | |
| Freedom of the Press | The Constitutional right to a free press is not absolute, and certain exceptions exist for this right as they do for other civil liberties such as free speech and free exercise. A series of landmark decisions dating back to the early Twentieth Century has gradually clarified the limits to freedom of the press, with exceptions for libel, obscenity, and imminent lawless action. Furthermore, the government’s ability to exercise prior restraint (i.e. preventing the publication of certain materials prior to their release) has been severely limited by the courts, but not entirely prohibited. In many instances, holdings for cases that do not specifically concern freedom of the press have been extended to impose new limitations (or privileges) for the press, by virtue of the content in question and the similarities that exist between the press and free speech.
Written material that is found to be libelous or defamatory is not protected by the First Amendment. The threshold for proving defamation can be strenuous, however, and especially difficult for public figures. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court took a major step in limiting the ability of government officials to sue for defamation. Following the publication of an advertisement in the New York Times that criticized the behavior of police officers in Montgomery, Alabama, the Montgomery police commissioner filed suit, alleging that the critical nature of the advertisement constituted defamation. Ruling against Montgomery, the Court asserted that “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials” are nevertheless protected by the First Amendment. Furthermore, the justices established the Actual Malice test, contending that public officials cannot bring libel cases unless they can prove that a defendant published defamatory material with “reckless disregard” for its accuracy (Justice Brennan, 1964). The Actual Malice Test was later affirmed in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989), in which plaintiff Daniel Connaughton filed a defamation claim against a local newspaper that ran negative articles about his campaign for local office in Hamilton, Ohio. Ruling for Connaughton, the Court affirmed Sullivan while asserting that the publication in question failed to verify its source material while ignoring obvious indications of its falsity (Justice Stevens, 1989). It should be noted, however, that this case represented an affirmation—rather than an extension—of the Sullivan test, as the justices largely limited themselves to criticizing material that displays a “reckless disregard for the truth” in the Connaughton decision. Finally, The Court expanded the Sullivan test to include both public officials and public figures in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Following a libel suit against Hustlers Magazine by conservative commentator and Moral Majority founder Jerry Falwell Sr., the Court extended the Sullivan standard to satirical speech, given the latters’ “prominent role in public and political debate” in spite of inaccuracies that are obvious to the reasonably-minded reader. The criminalization of obscene material was largely derived from the Hicklin test in English Common Law, a premodern system of judicial decision-making that would later influence legal proceedings in the United States. This is evidenced by the contemporary legal definition of obscenity, which largely centers around speech or actions that are sexually explicit. The Supreme Court never established a firm view on obscenity, however, until its decision in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The Court ruled against Samuel Roth, an author who was charged with violating a federal obscenity statute due to his dissemination of obscene books in public. In light of the sexually explicit nature of the books he sold, the justices asserted that speech that is “utterly without redeeming social importance” is not protected by the First Amendment, which was never meant to give “absolute protection for every utterance” to begin with (Justice Brennan, 1957). Given the ambiguous interpretation of obscenity in Roth, the Court would later revisit the issue and craft a more succinct definition in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). California businessman Marvin Miller disseminated explicit content through postal advertisements, and was subsequently arrested and charged under a state obscenity statute. Ruling for California, the Court reaffirmed that the distribution of obscene material without “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” did not violate the Speech or Press Clauses of the First Amendment. In superseding Roth, the justices succeeded in creating a concrete definition for obscene material that can also be employed for issues pertaining to the Press Clause. Written or spoken words that prompt some form of public disorder are not necessarily protected under American jurisprudence. The current threshold for proving the illegality of this conduct is exceptionally high, however, due to the Imminent Lawless Action test established in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Prior to this decision, the Court adhered to the Clear and Present Danger test adopted in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), and the Bad Tendency test adopted in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). In both cases, the justices took firm positions against the permissibility of views deemed as offensive by the U.S. Government while failing to articulate a test that did not amount to the targeting of certain unpopular viewpoints by the judiciary. The Court successfully remedied this approach in Brandenburg by overturning the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan member in Hamilton County, Ohio, who was charged under a state criminal syndicalism statute following his incendiary remarks at a Klan rally. Ruling for Brandenburg, the justices asserted that speech or press material can only be criminalized if it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” or “likely to incite or produce such action”—a threshold that Brandenburg’s remarks, however incendiary and offensive they were, failed to clear (Per Curiam, 1969). The Imminent Lawless Action test was later affirmed in Hess v. Indiana (1973), in which an antiwar protestor was charged with disorderly conduct after exclaiming “we'll take the [explicative] street later” in response to a crackdown by campus police at Indiana University Bloomington. Ruling for Hess, the Court dismissed the aggressive nature of his comments towards law enforcement officers as “not directed to any person or group in particular,” given that the Brandenburg test required offending language to mention a target, time, or method for prospective activities (Per Curiam, 1973). Despite Hess and Brandenburg directly addressing spoken words rather than written material, it should be noted that each decision applies equally to the Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment, thereby making written threats of imminent lawless action and verbal threats equally illegal. With few exceptions, prior restraint has largely been ruled unconstitutional in several landmark decisions that remain in force today. Prior to New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), which is often regarded as the most notable case on this subject, the Court had already denied the constitutionality of prior restraint in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), in which the justices contended that the societal harms often caused by “miscreant purveyors of scandal” (In this case, a Minnesota Newspaper that regularly engaged in antisemitic commentary in violation of a state public nuisances law) do not provide a compelling reason for government actors to impose prior restraint on the publications in question, especially when no overarching national security implications are relevant to the issue at hand (Justice Hughes, 1931). In retrospect, the establishment of exceptions for national security issues in Near likely gave hope to the Nixon Administration in its attempt to halt the publication of the Pentagon Papers, which culminated in New York Times Co. v. United States. Ruling for the New York Times, the justices acknowledged the “heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of [prior restraint]” (Per Curiam, 1971), while arguing that issuing an injunction against various media outlets would represent a “flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment (Concurring Opinion by Justices Black and Douglas, 1971).” Following this decision, the imposition of prior restraint was largely relegated to several unique and (relatively) unpublicized issues (see Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) or Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), which allowed prior restraint for information gained in closed-door legal proceedings and for the conduct of a student-run news publication, respectively). Following New York Times, no significant and publicized enactment of prior restraint has earned judicial approval. References Epstein, McGuire, and Walker, 2021. Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties, and Justice. Thousand Oaks, California: Cq Press, An Imprint Of Sage Publications, Inc. Justia. 2019. “Justia: Free Law & Legal Information for Lawyers, Students, Business and the Public.” https://www.justia.com/ New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/376/254/ Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/491/657/ Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/485/46/ Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/354/476/
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/395/444/ Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/249/47/ Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/268/652/ Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/414/105/ New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/713/ Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/283/697/ Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/467/20/ Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/484/260/ | |
| Freedom of the Press | Freedom of the press long been shaped by state actors that often in times of emergency see individual rights as second to state interests. Emergency situations such as war, natural disaster and disease typically has allowed governments to restrict this right on the basis of emergency, national security, or fear. Though this restriction can vary on duration, emergency event, country and government type, restrictions of the freedom of the press in emergency situations has a precedent.
In the United States context, in times of war there has been legislation passed to restrict public discourse with government on the basis of national security. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, passed as the United States prepared for war against France, restricted speech and press critical to government which allowed for the Federalist held government under John Adams to weaken the Republican party’s effect in politics. Under this act, politicians, editors, and writers were arrested and given jail time because of their publishing against the United States government (Stone, pg. 1663). During the Civil War, President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeus corpus and allowed military officials to enact martial law. This allowed for over 300 newspapers to be shut down for publications that were sympathetic to the confederacy. President Wilson, during World War I, enacted the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 which stifled those who opposed his policies during wartime. “In effect, these two laws made it unlawful for any person to write or publish any statement that criticized the President, the Congress, the government, the Constitution, the war, the draft, the military, or the uniform of the military of the United States.” (Stone, pg. 1666). These two acts essentially brought back the Alien and Seditions Acts of 1798 which restricted publications opposing government during times of war. During World War I the United States government prosecuted nearly 2000 people under these acts and essentially suspended the freedom of the press concerning government accountability, opposing government, and questioning policy (Stone, pg. 1666). By the time the Vietnam War came, a significant switch in opinion came concerning the freedom of the press during times of war. Mass protests, newspaper publications, news outlets, and other forms of press opposing the Vietnam War were condoned and even backed by judicial case. The publishing of the Pentagon Papers was backed by Supreme Court decision where the court ruled that the national security threat was not clear, or grave enough to restrict the first amendment right of free press. (Stone, pg. 1668). This stance has remained as opposition publications concerning the Korean War and occupation of Iraq have not been restricted and the freedom of the press has not seen any significant restrictions during wartime on the basis of national security in the more modern (post-World War II) context. With respect to the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been numerous international examples of the restriction of the freedom of the press. Jordan has strengthened the censorship program present, allowing all publications to be subject to censorship concerning the pandemic. Israel has enhanced surveillance on journalists because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the effects publications can have in causing fear. In Hungary, new punishments allowing for the imprisonment of members of the press for publishing anything the government deems to be false information on the basis of starting public panic. Many countries like Greece, Japan, and Ukraine have imposed new laws allowing government to restrict what the media can do and have access to concerning public health. In Cambodia and Vanuatu, legislation has been passed that puts in place a censorship program on the basis of emergency to prevent unrest and fear. These laws prohibit publishing without government approval essentially allowing for government censorship of publications concerning the COVID-19 pandemic. Countries such as Russia, Kyrgyzstan, South Africa, Indonesia, Botswana, Algeria, and Zimbabwe have placed prison sentences as deterrents for journalists and news outlets for publishing anything the government deems untrue or could spark fear. In Liberia, Romania and Myanmar, the government has closed down news sites for publishing information that the government has deemed untrue. These were mainly ethnic minority sites (Selva 2020). A study published in 2018 by Kodai Kusano and Markus Kemmelmeier looked into the effect natural disasters have on socio-political rights and the freedom of the press, among other things. They concluded that natural disasters cannot predict the level of freedom of the press as other economic factors have a stronger causal relationship. There was no support for their hypothesis that natural disasters will lead to lower levels of socio-political freedoms and freedom of the press (Kusano and Kemmelmeier, 2018). It is nearly impossible to define limitations of free speech because of a given emergency as each example varies on a number of different aspects concerning, regime type, government stability, economic factors, and emergency type. Though typically when it comes down to granting the freedom of the press or regime stability, regime stability will prevail, and freedom of the press will be restricted. References: Geoffrey R. Stone, "Freedom of the Press in Time of War," 59 SMU Law Review 1663 (2006). Kusano K and Kemmelmeier M (2018) Ecology of Freedom: Competitive Tests of the Role of Pathogens, Climate, and Natural Disasters in the Development of Socio-Political Freedom. Front. Psychol. 9:954. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00954 Selva, Meera. “Healing Words: How Press Freedom Is Being Threatened by the Coronavirus Pandemic.” Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford, 7 Apr. 2020, reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/risj-review/healing-words-how-press-freedom-being-threatened-coronavirus-pandemic. | |
| Freedom of the Press | An example of why freedom of the press may appear threatening to those in power is because of the speed at which information moves, and the way it can shape critical events, like elections. Oftentimes it may seem like the news outlets have a bias, for example, “cable organizations are labeled as liberal or conservative instead of just news. Information flows on social media and Internet sites at lightning-fast speed with no way to verify accuracy” (Wermiel, 2019).
In 1798, Congress passed the Sedition Act which allowed for people to be prosecuted when they “brought the president of the government into disrepute and ridicule” (Wermiel, 2019). So, freedom of the press can also appear to be threatening because it allows people to voice their concerns about the decisions of the US government. However, government officials may pass laws to ensure this doesn’t happen. This act was created because President Wilson and Congress wanted to eliminate people speaking out about their opposition to the involvement of the United States in the war (This Day in History). Freedom of the press may be perceived as threatening to government authorities when the media is able to uncover the wrongdoings or abuse of the government because it could prevent citizens from fully trusting the government in its ability to do things in the best interest of its citizens. For example, “Watergate” is “synonymous with political crime and corruption” (Watergate). President Nixon was not a big fan of freedom of the press; according to William Robinson, who worked for the New York Herald Tribune, he believed that it was a “handy refuge for subtle as well as overt character assassination” (Farell, 2014). However, even if some people in government positions may view freedom of the press as threatening, the Supreme Court has upheld the press’ right to report on anything they deem important. For example, in the Supreme Court case New York Times Company v Sullivan, the “actual malice” test was created, which requires that a public figure demonstrates that someone knew the information they were reporting was false, but proceeded to use it anyway (Oyez). So, while news outlets can post whatever they want, they run the risk of being sued for libel (the publication of false information). In order to cover up anything that government authorities may not want known, they have “made explicit attempts to silence critical media voices and strengthen outlets that serve up favorable coverage” (Repucci, 2019). It may appear that some government officials want to be seen in a positive light, and they could attempt to remove any media that depicts them in a way that’s different from that.
History.com Editors. 2019. “U.S. Congress Passes Sedition Act.” HISTORY. July 29, 2019. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/u-s-congress-passes-sedition-act. FBI. “Watergate.” Federal Bureau of Investigation. https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/watergate. Farrell, John Aloysius. 2014. “When Nixon Met the Press.” POLITICO Magazine. https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/08/nixon-and-the-media-109773/. Oyez. 2018. “New York Times Company v. Sullivan.” Oyez. 2018. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1963/39. Repucci, Sarah. 2019. “Media Freedom: A Downward Spiral.” Freedomhouse.org. Freedom House. 2019. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-and-media/2019/media-freedom-downward-spiral. | |
| Privacy Rights | Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) presents exceptions to the right to privacy. Privacy is granted “except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” ( 1950) . The Universal Declaration on Human Rights ( 1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 1996) allow for reasonable, non-arbitrary searches. These exceptions allow privacy to be breached with a court-issued warrant. Most exceptions stem from these documents and it should be noted that the United Nations extended the right to privacy to online spheres (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013, I§5). Additionally, the European Union implemented the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which prevents the sharing of personal data with outside sources (Wolford, n.d.). The GDPR applies to any companies operating in or with the EU causing it to have international implications (Wolford, n.d.).
References: European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. ( 2014, June 30). The right to privacy in the digital age. A/HRC/27/37. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf United States Constitution. 1787. https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/ | |
| Privacy Rights | Like many rights, privacy is not absolute (Siddiky, 2011, 224). It conflicts with and is compromised in the presence of other fundamental rights and democratic norms.
Speech The right to privacy notably conflicts with the First Amendment’s right to free speech. In some cases, the right to privacy becomes limited and less protected, but, in others, it remains protected. This protective line between speech and privacy is thin. For instance, speech protections extend to allow employers, including the government in its capacity as an employer, to be able to restrict the speech of employees in certain matters (Volokh, 2000, 1095) . However, in Connick v. Meyers ( 1983) , the United States Supreme Court decided that, while working for the government, matters of public concern are protected and private while intraoffice grievances are not (Connick v. Meyers; Volokh, 2000, 1095) . As Warren & Brandeis suggested in The Right to Privacy in 1890, the right to privacy conflicts with the First Amendment rights. In their writings about what is now known as ‘tort privacy’ (different from ‘constitutional privacy’), they advocate for the prevention of disclosures of private affairs to the public (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 195). This distinction is still maintained today, allowing for the publishing of ‘newsworthy’ stories about public figures (Volokh, 2000, 1088; Richards, 2010, 1307) . However, the courts have not defined what constitutes newsworthy and have even left the definition to juries (Volokh, 2000, 1089) . Privacy has also been limited by the Supreme Court, despite being the institution that created the protection of the right. In Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union ( 1937) , Senn had chosen to not join the labor union and the union members began picketing around him, beginning a labor dispute and causing Senn to call for his right to privacy (Richards, 2010, 1332- 1333) . In this case, Justice Brandeis wrote in the opinion’s footnote, Senn was not able to invoke his right to privacy against the union’s right to publicity (Richards, 2010, 1334) . In essence, in the commercial sphere between competitors, the right to privacy became inapplicable in the interest of consumers (Richards, 2010, 1334) . On the other hand, privacy has remained protected in other instances. In Cohen v. Cowles Media, the Supreme Court ruled that people can contract away their right to speech (Volokh, 2000, 1057) . Volokh ( 2000) posits this privacy extends to implied contracts, especially in professions in which privacy can be reasonably expected. Thus, the federal laws requiring confidentiality have simply allowed for repercussions to be implemented, rather than creating a new area in privacy rights ( 1058) . In publishing, the actions of private people are protected (Richards, 2010, 1307; Volokh, 2000, 1055) . Volokh ( 2000) posits this protection extends beyond actions to embarrassing photos or stories which exhibit a lack of dignity ( 1094) . Generally, this protection is expressed as the public concern test, in which privacy is granted to a party as long as the public is not affected (Volokh, 2000, 1097) . This general protection of the right to privacy is consistent with Richards’ ( 2010) conclusion from Brandeis’ writings: that privacy protections allow for new ideas to be formed through development in private conversations ( 1347) . Right to Public Trial The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution directly conflicts with the implicit right to privacy by granting the right to a public trial. It is argued that the use of this court structure allows for the expression of public concern and prevents corruption while increasing public confidence in the system (Siddiky, 2011, 229). Despite the right to a public trial, the juvenile justice system was created to protect the identity of minors who committed crimes in the hopes that this protection will allow them to become contributing members to society without the judgment of a criminal past (Siddiky, 2011, 207, 241). Even with this intention, there are exceptions to this privacy. First and foremost, juveniles’ privacy has previously been limited in favor of granting other constitutional rights, including 14th Amendment due process (Siddiky, 2011, 213, 227). Privacy may also be removed if they are charged as an adult, which requires meeting varying statutory criteria depending on the jurisdiction (Siddiky, 2011, 214). Additionally, there has been some movement surrounding the reform of juvenile courts which may remove their anonymity because of perceived coddling and the high recidivism rates among teens, potentially suggesting the need for different consequences (Siddiky, 2011, 215, 217). Outside of juvenile courts, privacy is compromised more often for the sake of public trials. Something, though, the right to privacy prevails as a judge allows a party in a suit to file anonymously (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1009) . These exceptions are rare and are not entrenched in the Federal Rule of Civil Procedures, but the United States Supreme Court has allowed anonymous suits to be decided (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1023) . Most notably, anonymity was granted in Roe v. Wade in which ‘Jane Roe’ was allowed to remain anonymous as pregnancy was considered to be a very private matter. Juries have also been allowed to be anonymous (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1009) . Property Rights The right to be left alone seems like it would go hand in hand with property rights. Your property, your privacy. However, it is easy to learn who owns a piece of real estate through public records (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 355). While this has benefits mostly related to the ease of buying or selling real estate, there are few-to-no processes in place to confirm the validity of deed filings or liens, especially in the United States (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 359). However, many involved in the industry have interests in limiting privacy in this area for their professional ease (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 374). In Europe, the only people that can file these records are notaries, but the US does not offer similar protections (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 372). These infringements on the right to privacy have become more accessible with digitized records, though this is not limited to this industry (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 375). Additionally, it is probably possible to buy a house anonymously, though there is limited academic literature on how. Political Preferences While one has the right to cast a vote in private and not tell anyone who they voted for, that doesn’t stop people from figuring out one’s political tendencies. With party alignment shrinking, the importance of micro-targeting has grown in campaigns. As such, political parties and candidates have gathered information on voters to determine who is a supporter, who could be persuaded, and who is not likely to be a supporter (Bennett, 2015, 372). At first, parties and candidates begin by looking at state and local party registration lists (Bennett, 2015, 372). From there, they use a variety of factors, such as social media, letters to elected officials, and campaign donations, to determine issues of importance to each voter (Bennett, 372, 2015, 378). While most of this is already public information or has been willingly put out on the internet by individuals, it is not being used in the intended way, and some of the information gathered is private (Bennett, 2015, 372; 11 CFR § 102.17(c)(4)). As such, this approach is illegal in Europe, though it has become prominent in other western nations beyond the United States, such as Canada (Bennett, 2015, 373). References 11 FCR § 102.17(c)(4). ( 2021). https://www.fec.gov/regulations/102-17/ 2021- annual-102#102-17-c-4 Bennett, C.J. ( 2015). Trends in voter surveillance in western societies: Privacy intrusions and democratic implications. Surveillance & Society 13(3/4), 370-384. https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v13i3/4.5373 Connick v. Myers. 461 US 138 (1983). Oyez. Retrieved September 28, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/ 1982/ 81- 1251 Rastgoufard, B. ( 2003). Pay attention to that green curtain: Anonymity in the courts. Case Western Reserve Law Review 53(4), 1009- 1040. https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1512& context=caselrev Richards N.M. ( 2010, Oct.). The puzzle of Brandeis, privacy, and speech. Vanderbilt Law Review 63(5) 1293- 1352. https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol63/iss5/3/ Roscoe, E. & Szypszak, C. ( 2017, Summer). Privacy and public real estates records: Preserving legacy system reliability against modern threats. The Urban Lawyer 49(3), 355-391. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44648036 Siddiky, L. ( 2011) . Keeping the court room doors closed so the doors of opportunity can remain open: An argument for maintaining privacy in the juvenile justice system. Howard Law Journal 55(205), 204-246. Volokh, E. ( 2000, May). Freedom of speech and information privacy: The troubling implications of a right to stop people from speaking about you. Stanford Law Review 52(5), 1049- 1124. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1229510 Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. ( 1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%281890 1215% 294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C | |
| Privacy Rights | Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) presents exceptions to the right to privacy – “except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” ( 1950) . The Universal Declaration on Human Rights ( 1948, Art. 12) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ( 1996, Art. 17) only prevent arbitrary and unlawful searches, allowing for reasonable searches.
References: European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights | |
| Privacy Rights | While the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is in place to protect people’s privacy, a fact continuously recognized by the Supreme Court, it continues to leave people vulnerable to the decisions of authorities due to a lack of clarity and accountability provided by the courts (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The Fourth Amendment is explicit in that it prevents unreasonable search and seizure (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). However, it is hard to determine what is reasonable and the Supreme Court has claimed that the reasonableness of a search is situationally dependent (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1202) . Various rules and exceptions to the right to privacy have been established.
Under the Exclusionary Rule, lots of searches are carried out which are later found to be unconstitutional by a court, at which point there is little that can be done to rectify the violation of privacy rights (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). These instances are not permissible exceptions, but rather instances in which it becomes clear after the fact that privacy was violated (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted in ways that cause the government’s regulatory interests to be placed over an individual’s interests (US GPO, 1992, 1204) . These interpretations have created exceptions, creating situationally specific instances in which privacy is not necessarily protected. For instance, during the execution of a search warrant, if it does not include a search clause for those occupying the location, they may not be searched, but they can be detained (US GPO, 1992, 1227) . For whatever reason, the courts have viewed detainment as less intrusive than a search, so it has become allowed, though it has been debated if it is a reasonable and permissible exception without a warrant (US GPO, 1992, 1227) . This debate starts with the Court’s opinions in Terry v. Ohio ( 1968) and United States v. Mendenhall( 1980) that state seizure is either restraining liberty or the belief that one is not at liberty to leave (US GPO, 1992, 1231) . The Terry decision was important in other ways as well, creating another standard for search and seizure without a warrant and probable cause - authorities may stop and frisk individuals if there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (US GPO, 1992, 1230) . Recently, this standard has been applied less restrictively and more often, creating some tension between the right to privacy and public safety (GPO, 1992, 1231) . Exceptions don’t just result from court rulings. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 permitted information sharing between law enforcement agencies without notice, leading many to believe more privacy violations were occurring (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). However, some scholars argue while privacy is more elusive under the presence of this law, privacy is not hindered as most of us remain unconcerned about the information that may or may not be collected about us resulting in little or no behavioral change (Rubel, 2007, 148-149). At the same time, however, “lack of privacy bears upon how we act,” as does the knowledge that others may have access to our information, so the right becomes less protected under the PATRIOT Act (Rubel, 2007, 142, 153). References: Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: Exclusionary Rule. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 9, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/enforcing-the-fourth-amendment-the-exclusionary-rule Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.) Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm Rubel, A. ( 2007, Mar.). Privacy and the USA Patriot Act: Rights, the value of rights, and autonomy. Law and Philosophy 26(2), 119-159. https://doi.org/10. 1007/ s10982-005-5970-x US Government Publishing Office (US GPO). ( 1992, June 29). Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure (S. Doc. 103-6). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CONAN- 1992/ GPO-CONAN- 1992- 10-5/summary Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. ( 2001) . https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/3162 | |
| Privacy Rights | The Fourth Amendment states “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” ( 1791) . While this amendment protects the right to privacy from the government, it also brings forth exceptions: reasonable search and seizure as well as infringements allowed by court-issued warrants seeking specific items or people. Other amendments used to extend privacy by the Supreme Court, namely the First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth, do not have notable exceptions regarding privacy.
Limitations of Reasonability Defining what constitutes a reasonable search has proven to be difficult. In Katz v. United States ( 1967) the Supreme Court ruled the Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places” and created the Katz test to determine where it is reasonable to expect privacy from law enforcement and a warrant is needed (Katz v. United States, 1967) . This test examines whether the information was meant to be kept private and if it had been disclosed (Hu, 2018, 129). Prior to the Katz test, the court used the trespass test, a common-law approach to the Fourth Amendment in which physical intrusion can violate the Fourth Amendment. Fifty years after Katz, the Court again relied on the trespass test in United States v. Jones (Hu, 2018, 130; United States v. Jones, 2012) . In doing so, the court claimed while the Katz test extended the right to privacy to people, it did not revoke the traditional common-law protections (United States v. Jones, 2012) . Hu, citing Justices Sotomayor and Alito, feels that the Katz test ends before cyber-surveillance begins and recognizes the need for change (Hu, 2018, 139, 141). In analyzing Fourth Amendment Supreme Court rulings, Orin Kerr found that four general models have been used to decide privacy cases ( 2017, 524). These models vary in scale (micro or macro) and normativity (normative or descriptive) and consider one of the following: how public the information is, what information was found, the actions that were taken, or whether or not government conduct should be regulated (Kerr, 2017, 506, 524). Kerr claims the last of these considerations was the basis for the Katz ruling ( 2017, 519). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has used all four of these models to both protect and deny privacy and has not provided clear guidance as to what is a reasonable search (Ker, 2017, 507, 508). Kerr concludes by suggesting there is no one size fits all test or model because of the importance of case facts ( 2017, 525). As such, Kerr would rather see many definitive models so that the limitations of reasonability are clear and contextualized for future court decisions at all levels ( 2017, 542). Privacy Violations by a Non-Government Entity The Supreme Court has rarely ruled on notable cases in which the privacy offender was not a government entity. However, in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union ( 1937) the Court ruled that Senn could not invoke his privacy in work against the right to publicity of the union’s picketing (Richards, 1334) . In the opinion of the Court, Justice Brandeis held that because it was a commercial dispute and affected the competition for customers, the right to privacy was not applicable (Richards, 1334) . He also protected counter-speech in this opinion (Richards, 1334) . References Hu, M. ( 2018) . Cybersurveillance intrusions and an evolving Katz privacy test. American Criminal Law Review 55(1), 127-152. https://www.law.georgetown.edu/american-criminal-law-review/in-print/volume-55-issue-1-winter- 2018/ cybersurveillance-intrusions-and-an-evolving-katz-privacy-test/
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| Privacy Rights | Hobbes
Thomas Hobbes grappled with varying different situations of privacy. In Leviathan, it was mostly concerning places in which privacy and the public overlap. Generally, the public and commonwealth rights overtake those of an individual, especially in times of war, but there are some exceptions (Hobbes, 1651/ 1965, 130). For instance, one had the right to protect themselves with their private strength without being a threat to the commonwealth (Hobbes, 1651/ 1965, 138). Additionally, men could own private property and goods without interference from the Church of England and hold their own beliefs, as long as they didn’t go against the Church (Hobbes, 1651/ 1965, 250, 345). In De Cive (On the Citizen), Hobbes presents an interesting dilemma – once the people form a state, the people no longer exist and instead become subjects (Hobbes, 1642/ 1651, 39-40). He suggests this leaves the ruler of the state with no responsibility to the subjects, able to harm them as there is no direct contract between the ruler and subjects (Hobbes, 1642/ 1651, 40). Without obligation, there is certainly little to prevent the ruler from imposing on subjects and revoking their privacy. Locke In 1689, John Locke discussed privacy in his Letters on Toleration. In this essay, Locke discusses privacy in relation to the Church of England. Generally, there is no privacy from the Magistrate in matters relating to the Church, however, in some instances, privacy is afforded to private matters (Locke, 1689/ 2010, 43, 46). For instance, Locke claims that one may take care of one’s health without much interference at all and prevents people from telling others what to believe in unless they are a clergyman (Locke, 1689/ 2010, 46. 129). Additionally, if one perceives an order by a magistrate to be unlawful, they can abstain from that law, and the magistrate cannot use their private judgment to impose laws but must refer back to God’s laws (Locke, 1689/ 2010, 58-59). Kant Immanuel Kant talks a lot about Enlightenment and the formation of states. Inherently, in the creation of these states, some rights are taken away to “[harmonize] with the freedom on everyone else” (Kant, 1970, 47, 55, 73). However, these rights that are given up usually have specific limitations (Kant, 1970, 45). The government in these societies could prevent some actions but, much like Warren & Brandeis later, felt that free-thinking and reasoning were of utmost importance in developing new ideas, and suggested they be protected (Kant, 1970, 59). However, Kant also suggests limiting the right to reason because it can still “expand to its fullest” while it is limited (Kant, 1970, 59). In Warren & Brandeis’s terms of “the right to be let alone,” Kant, in his Theory and Practice, instead proposes the right to coercion, meaning all who are a part of the state are held to the same standard (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193; Kant, 1970, 75). This coercion is imposed uniformly on all subjects, but not the ruler (Kant, 1970, 75). As long as one was conforming to the laws, there was no reason to interrupt their actions, but once conformity was broken, there was a chance to impose and alter someone’s actions (Kant, 1970, 80). Kant recognizes that Hobbes feels differently, writing directly against Hobbes’ views as put forth in De Cive, in that the ruler has no obligations to the people and may treat them how he wishes – implying no right to be let alone (Kant, 1970, 84; Hobbes, 1651, 40). Sieyes In his essay titled Views of the Executive Means Available to the Representatives of France in 1789, Emmanuel Sieyes claims rights are inherent to a person. However, in What is the Third Estate, Sieyes claims that states may use the rights it was granted by the constitution and positive law to preserve the nation and community (Sieyes, 1788/ 2003, 136). In terms of privacy, these statements seem to imply that privacy may sometimes be taken away from some in the interests of the public. It is important to note, though, that these impositions may not go beyond the scope of the constitution in place (Sieyes, 1788/ 2003, 137). Mill John Stuart Mill, an English thinker, recognizes that English laws tended to interfere with privacy (Mill, 1859/ 2011, 15). However, Mill felt that separating church and state (“spiritual and temporal authority”) prevented more interferences of law within private life, somewhat facilitating what Warren & Brandeis would later call “the right to be let alone” (Mill, 1859/ 2011, 24; Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193). References: Hobbes, T. ( 1651) . De cive (T. Hobbes, Trans.). UK Public Library. (Original work published 1642) . http://www.public-library.uk/ebooks/27/57.pdf Hobbes, T. ( 1965) . Leviathan. Liberty Fund. (Original work published 1651) . http://files.libertyfund.org/files/869/0161_Bk.pdf Kant, I. ( 1970) . Kant: Political writings (R.S. Reiss, Ed., 2003 ed.). Cambridge University Press. Locke, J. ( 2010) . A letter concerning toleration and other writings (M. Goldie, Ed.). Liberty Fund. (Original work published 1689) . http://files.libertyfund.org/files/ 2375/ Locke_ 1560_ EBk_v6.0.pdf Mill, J.S. ( 2011) . On liberty. Project Gutenberg. (Original work published in 1859) . https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm#Page_1 Sieyes, E. ( 2003) . Political writings (M. Sonenscher, Ed.). Hackett Publishing Company. (Original work published in 1788) . Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. ( 1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%281890 1215% 294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C | |
| Privacy Rights | Privacy Torts
Privacy violations under tort law was how Warren & Brandeis originally developed the right in 1890 (Citron, 2010, 1805) . These violations, usually unwanted intrusions or disclosures can result from negligent or intentional actions and result in civil lawsuits rather than questions of constitutional legality (Citron, 2010, 1806; Tort, n.d.). Violations are hard to define as they change with technology (the original call for privacy was in relation to the ‘instant photograph’), which creates more and more opportunities for violations (Citron, 2010, 1809; Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 195). However, the law changes slower than technology creating some disconnect in legal remedies for new technology (Citron, 2010, 1810) . Constitutional Privacy Constitutions only protect people from government actors and international covenants only affect the laws and regulations which governments put in place (Hudson, 2018; Dunn, 2009) . Even so, most allowances of government invasions of privacy in the United States have evolved because the government mimicked the actions of private actors, placing private conduct at the baseline of privacy expectations (Kamin, 2004, 101, 115). At a basic level, once information is willingly given to someone other than oneself, the courts have continuously ruled that there is no longer the expectation for privacy. This holds true with information that is given to both private companies and individuals (Kamin, 2004, 101). The Katz decision somewhat demonstrates this curtailment of privacy by creating the plain view doctrine. If something is in plain view, even in a private space, it is not private (Kamin, 2004, 104). This decision extrapolates on the theory that as long as someone else may reasonably have that information, it is an unprotected area under the Fourth Amendment (Kamin, 2004, 104). So, by letting someone into one’s home or publishing information online, one is inherently limiting their Fourth Amendment protections. As such, authorities can ask private companies to perform searches or subpoena these actors rather than those they are investigating, depending on the company’s privacy policies (Kamin, 2004, 102, 137). In United States v. Jacobsen ( 1984) privacy protections were tested when officials were able to open a package that FedEx had damaged and opened for insurance purposes (Kamin, 2004, 99, United States v. Jacobsen, 1984) . Upon its opening, FedEx employees suspected the package contained cocaine (Kamin, 2004, 99). Had federal officials gotten to it first, it would not have been able to be searched, even if it was damaged, but the information provided by FedEx from the private search was enough to imply the plain view doctrine thus permitting a warrantless search by the DEA (Kamin, 2004, 100; US v. Jacobsen, 1984) . The Supreme Court upheld the granting of the search and subsequent arrest warrant which was obtained because the DEA confirmed the contents were cocaine based on the ‘tip’ from private actors. The Court said that “[w]hether those invasions were accidental or deliberate, and whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of their private character” (US v. Jacobsen, 1984) . Kamin ( 2004) goes as far as to say that “[t]he fact that the private actor did something the government would not have been permitted to do simply did not covert the subsequent, otherwise reasonable, police conduct into a search that implicated the Fourth Amendment” (100-101). That is to say, after the package was opened due to the damage by a non-governmental party, privacy could no longer be expected, despite that it is reasonable to expect privacy during shipping (Kamin, 2004, 100). References: Citron, D.K. ( 2010, Dec. 1). Mainstreaming Privacy Torts. California Law Review 98(6). https://www.jstor.org/stable/25799956 Dunn, C. ( 2009, Apr. 28). Applying the Constitution to private actors (New York Law Journal). NYCLU ACLU of New York. https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/column-applying-constitution-private-actors-new-york-law-journal Hudson, D.L. ( 2018, Oct. 20). In the age of social media, expand the reach of the First Amendment. Human Rights Magazine 43(4), n.p. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/the-ongoing-challenge-to-define-free-speech/in-the-age-of-socia-media-first-amendment/ Kamin, S. ( 2004, Dec. 1). The private is public: The relevance of private actors in defining the Fourth Amendment. Boston College Law Review 46(1), 83-147. https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 2293& context=bclr Tort. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 15, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort United States v. Jacobsen, 466 US 109 ( 1984) . https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/466/109 Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. ( 1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%281890 1215% 294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C | |
| Privacy Rights | Privacy protections are typically limited in times of emergency, but the type of emergency seems to dictate its limitations.
Natural Disasters A Wilson Center report from 2013 outlines various times in which natural disasters have elicited temporary easing of privacy rules to aid in searching for missing persons. The first examples were from Australia after the 2002 Bali earthquake and the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami. During the Bali earthquake, many governmental agencies had to spend time creating their own missing persons reports (Reidenberg, Gellman, Debelak, Elewa, & Liu, 2013, 12). This was recognized as a waste of resources in light of the disaster and the importance of timeliness (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 12). The 2004 tsunamis renewed this sentiment (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 12). In response to these impeded disaster responses, Australia passed Part VIA to the Australian Privacy Act in 2006 (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13). Part VIA allows for sharing of otherwise protected information through a government emergency declaration if “(1) the entity reasonably believes that the individual may be involved in the disaster; and (2) the collection, use or disclosure of personal information is for a permitted purpose related to the disaster” (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13, 14). It also has stipulations on how long these special provisions can be in place and works for events both in and out of Australian borders while specifically preventing disclosure to media outlets (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13-14) . Despite New Zealand’s comprehensive privacy laws, similar actions were taken in New Zealand after the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. There were stipulations in the Privacy Act to permit the sharing of information in some circumstances, it was unclear if they directly applied to natural disaster emergencies (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 15). This lack of clarity was impeding rescue efforts and the Privacy Commissioner, who is granted some discretion through the Privacy Act, took steps to allow temporary authorization of information sharing concerning the emergency at hand (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 16). Incidentally, many realized that this liberation of privacy issues reassured a variety of sectors’ information sharing in their emergency response (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 17). These reassurances caused the Privacy Commissioner to propose and pass the Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code in 2013, allowing for these different privacy stipulations to be counted on during emergency planning (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 19). The United States notoriously lacks privacy law. However, there is regulation in the medical field – Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1966 (HIPAA). HIPAA was somewhat suspended after Hurricane Katrina in light of nine of the eleven New Orleans hospitals incapacitated and people fleeing to surrounding states to receive medical attention (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 19-21). It prioritized providing treatment over payment and aided in locating missing persons by publishing facility directories (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 21). This privacy law alteration was less comprehensive than those in New Zealand and Australia after natural disasters, but it shows that the response regarding privacy exceptions is dependent on need. All of these disasters culminated in the creation of the Missing Persons Community of Interest (MPCI), in which non-government actors collaborated to create standardized missing persons databases after disasters (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 25). At the time the report was written, there were five interlocking systems to record who was missing and try to connect these people with worried family (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 27). These systems were used multiple times from 2006 to 2012 when this report was written (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 27). The systems all have varying balances of access and privacy and, interestingly, one of these services is run by the International Committee of the Red Cross out of Geneva, Switzerland and is explicitly exempt from the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 29, 35). Additionally, in 2011, the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners on Data Protection and Major Natural Disasters asked countries to review their privacy laws to make sure they were flexible in the event of a major natural disaster (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 73). Disease Rothstein ( 2020) suggests the following be considered when creating policy exceptions and interventions to health information during disease outbreaks: (1) necessity and effectiveness, (2) proportionality and minimal infringement, (3) purpose limitations, and (4) justice ( 1374) . Policies that become altered during the outbreak should remain monitored for continued justification of the alteration and should discontinue at the end of the outbreak (Rothstein, 2020, 1375) . During the COVID-19 pandemic, Canada realized the conflict between the creation of a public health database and data privacy law. Data privacy laws vary by province (some have legislation, others default to federal law), sector (public and private), and profession (i.e., healthcare data is strictly regulated) (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 454-455). Generally, data cannot be shared between provinces, though this is debated based on local and federal laws, nor used for purposes other than for which it was collected (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 455). However, all these limits can be loosened during public health emergencies. There are legislative carve-outs for combating health risks, and during COVID-19 the Privacy Commissioner allowed officials to forgo consent from each individual, a privilege that is repealed after the emergency (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 455). War McDonald ( 2020) describes privacy as a social good and notes there is a trade-off between privacy and national security, claiming these rights are dependent on context (380). As such, these privacy limitations can be toward individuals or society, but they usually come to light ex parte (McDonald, 2020, 385, 380). However, it is unclear who dictates when this trade-off between privacy and security begins, ends, or how invasive it is as war surveillance is largely unregulated; there is no law of war regarding privacy (McDonald, 2020, 385, 386). It seems feasible violations can be committed by both one’s own country and the opposition. By one’s own country in the sense that they don’t want traitors, resulting in actions similar to how the United States placed Japanese Americans into internment camps during WWI or passed the Sedition Act of 1798 (Share America, 2015) . Alternatively, the opposition can somewhat feasibly be expected to also survey those they are at war against, especially when attacking and trying to avoid civilian injury (McDonald, 2020, 381). Enemies may also invade privacy through espionage and intelligence which isn’t necessarily legal under international law though it is not limited to wartime (Pun, 2017, 360-361, 364; McDonald, 2020, 384). References: Bernier, A. & Knoppers, B.M. (2020, June 26). Pandemics, privacy, and public health research. Canadian Journal of Public Health 111(4), 454-457. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7318908/pdf/41997_2020_Article_368.pdf McDonald, J. (2020). Information, privacy, and just war theory. Ethics & International Affairs 34(3), 379-400. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679420000477 Pun, D. (2017, Summer). Rethinking espionage in the Modern Era. Chicago Journal of International Law 18(1), 353-391. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol18/iss1/10/ Quinton, A. (1988, Autumn). Plagues and morality. Social Research: An International Quarterly 55(3), 451-462. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40970516 Reidenberg, J.R., Gellman, R., Debelak, J., Elewa, A., & Liu, N. (2013). Privacy and missing persons after natural disasters. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Commons Lab. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/privacy-and-missing-persons-after-natural-disasters Rothstein, M.A. (2020, Aug. 12). Public health and privacy in the pandemic. American Journal of Public Health 110(9), 1374-1375. https://www.doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2020.305849 Share America. (2015, Apr. 6). Civil liberties in wartime. United States Department of State. Retrieved October 18, 2021, https://share.america.gov/civil-liberties-wartime/ | |
| Privacy Rights | The Fourth Amendment has rarely been fully realized in its long history. While the Fourth Amendment guarantees privacy in search and seizure, the states originally did not want it to apply to their procedures and noted that it had yet to be applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1260) . As such, lots of cases came forward to the Supreme Court, and the Exclusionary Rule was established (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The Exclusionary Rule prevents trials from using improperly collected evidence, but it does not fully apply the Fourth Amendment and prevent searches (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The rule has gone through a couple of iterations based on the amendments from which it is derived by the Court. It was originally established in Boyd v. US ( 1886) , based in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, then evolved with Weeks v. US ( 1914) , which claimed derivation from the Fifth Amendment but appeared to be based in the Fourth. Its current state results from Mapp v. Ohio ( 1961) when the Court held that the Fourth Amendment was an essential feature of privacy and decided that the standards of evidence collection should be consistent between federal and state jurisdictions (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1262) . However, authorities can collect whatever evidence they wish and are not held to a legal standard unless they wish to have permissible evidence in the likely-upcoming judicial proceedings (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). Additionally, there are currently many cases that have developed in which a warrant is not needed, causing even Congress, via the Government Publishing Office, to admit there has been an expansion of power given to authorities (US GPO, 1992, 1208- 1209) . Beyond this expansion, it is known that authorities who perform acts that are not permitted by law are rarely reprimanded, especially with search and seizure and the ability to use the “good faith” defense (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1258) . These facts prevent the right to privacy from being perceived as threatening to government authorities.
References: Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: Exclusionary Rule. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 9, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/enforcing-the-fourth-amendment-the-exclusionary-rule US Government Publishing Office (US GPO). ( 1992, June 29). Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure (S. Doc. 103-6). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CONAN- 1992/ GPO-CONAN- 1992- 10-5/summary | |
| Voting Rights and Suffrage | Limitations are typically placed on the right to vote on the basis of citizenship, competence, or punishment. Citizenship is usually required in order to vote in any country, and likewise language can be a factor. In terms of competence, restrictions on the right to vote are often determined by age and mental health. Certain countries disenfranchise people with mental disabilities, suggesting that they are not competent to vote, and some go so far as to disallow those under guardianship to vote. Governments also commonly restrict the right to vote in cases where a citizen is imprisoned or has committed a felony. These types of restrictions are usually outlined in a country's constitution (Kirshner).
As seen in the United States, citizens above the age of 18 are eligible to vote. However, in certain states, some people with felony convictions are ineligible to vote. In some states, a felon is ineligible to vote indefinitely, and in other states, the felon may eventually regain the right (USAGov). There is debate surrounding whether or not convicted criminals should be disenfranchised, and therefore, it is typically decided according to the state legislature. Those who do not think that criminals should lose their right to vote often suggest that disenfranchisement could cause racial imbalances because ethnic minorities are more likely than others to be incarcerated in the United States. It is also argued that not being able to vote makes it more difficult to rejoin and participate in society following punishment. In opposition, those who think that criminals should lose their right to vote suggest that criminals have proven to have poor judgement and that criminal punishment must entail a loss of societal privileges and freedom (Goldring, K., 2020). Furthermore, following the 2010 U.S. election, certain mechanisms have been used in states that make it more difficult for citizens to vote. These mechanisms include strict photo ID requirements, cutting back on early voting, making it more difficult to register to vote, and attempting to restrict absentee voting (Brennan Center for Justice). Introducing bills and laws that make voting more difficult stem from a fear of election fraud, with proponents of such measures suggesting they are necessary to protect the integrity of U.S. elections. These measures are disproportionately affecting African American voters (Amy Gardner, K. R., 2021). Historically, women have also been denied the right to vote. For instance, in India women were first granted the right to vote in 1935, however, their right to vote was contingent on them being married to a male voter or possessing certain literary skills. Many countries such as Iceland also originally set the minimum voting age to be higher for women than men (Schaeffer, K, 2021). Women in Pakistan did not gain the right to vote until 1947, and women in China were unable to vote until 1949, following a civil war. It was not until the end of the 1960s that most of Africa enfranchised women, and many European countries did not enfranchise women until the 1970s. Many Middle Eastern countries denied women suffrage until the 21st century, with women voting for the first time in Saudi Arabia in 2015. Women continue to face barriers to voting in Middle Eastern countries. Additionally, there can be barriers to voting in countries following conflict. If many people are displaced because of the conflict, voter registration can be especially difficult. Countries may no longer have their voting lists or many displaced people may no longer be able to locate their personal documents, including their proof of citizenship. Women are typically more likely to be displaced during a conflict, and it is common for them to be hesitant to register to vote following a conflict for they fear losing access to assistance for them and their family. Likewise, following conflict, citizens may fear intimidation from their government and therefore not register to vote (United Nations). References: Amy Gardner, K. R. (2021, March 11). How GOP-backed voting measures could create hurdles for tens of millions of voters. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2021/voting-restrictions-republicans-states/ Aspinall, G. (2021, March 8). Here Are The Countries Where It's Still Really Difficult For Women To Vote. Grazia. https://graziadaily.co.uk/life/real-life/countries-where-women-can-t-vote/. Goldring, K. (2020, February 24). Should convicted criminals have the right to vote? theperspective.com/. https://www.theperspective.com/debates/politics/convicted-criminals-right-vote/. Kirshner, A. (n.d.). The International Status of the Right to Vote. Democracy Coalition Project. New Voting Restrictions in America. Brennan Center for Justice. (n.d.). https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/new-voting-restrictions-america. Schaeffer, K. (2021, April 28). Key facts about women's suffrage around the world, a century after U.S. ratified 19th Amendment. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/05/key-facts-about-womens-suffrage-around-the -world-a-century-after-u-s-ratified-19th-amendment/. United Nations. (n.d.). Chapter 4. United Nations. https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/wps/publication/Chapter4.htm. Who Can and Can't Vote in U.S. Elections. USAGov. (n.d.). https://www.usa.gov/who-can-vote. | |
| Voting Rights and Suffrage | The fundamental right to vote has remained resilient during both state and national emergencies. Voting access in the United States is primarily governed by state law. Federal laws prohibit a range of restrictions of this right, as has been a historical commitment. As noted in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona (2013), the Supreme Court described Congress’s federal election regulation power as “paramount,” emphasizing that it “may be exercised at any time, and to any extent which [Congress] deems expedient” (National Constitution Center, 2024). Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution does not grant the President the power to postpone or alter elections, clearly delineating their authority (Congress.gov, 2024). In 1845, Congress established the federal election day as “the Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered year” (Legal Information Institute, 2024). This framework has provided a longstanding structure for U.S. elections.
Chapter 68 of Title 42 U.S.C. § 5122 defines an emergency as “any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States” (“42 USC 5122: Definitions,” 2018). Similarly, Chapter 34 of Title 50 in the U.S. Code states, “With respect to Acts of Congress authorizing the exercise, during the period of a national emergency, of any special or extraordinary power, the President is authorized to declare such national emergency” (“50 U.S. Code Chapter 34 – National Emergencies,” 2024). Elections have continued to be held during times of war. For example, President Lincoln was elected during the Civil War, and President Franklin Roosevelt was re-elected during World War II (Best Best & Krieger LLP, 2024). The specific measures to mitigate the impact of emergencies on elections are determined at the state level. During times of war, if a national or state emergency is declared, states may adjust their election processes accordingly, upholding accessibility to voting to the best of their ability. In Kansas, for example, K.S.A. § 25-622 states that “The secretary of state can adopt alternative methods for distributing ballots in a time of war, equipment failure, or disaster that makes it impossible for voters in an area to obtain ballots” (“25-622,” 2024). States such as Idaho, Kentucky, New York, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah have policies in place to delay or reschedule elections in the event of an emergency (“Election Emergencies,” 2024). This holds during emergencies relating to severe weather. Severe weather emergencies are understood under Title 42 as “any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby” (“42 USC 5122: Definitions” 2018). For example, in South Dakota, “Local election boards can delay an election (except for primary or general elections) for 1 week due to weather” (“Election Emergencies” 2024). A governor can request the President to issue a declaration of a major disaster or emergency under this chapter upon "finding that [a] disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments and that Federal assistance is necessary” (“42 USC 5122: Definitions” 2018). References “A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use.” 2018. Brennan Center for Justice. December 5, 2018. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/guide-emergency-powers-and-their-use. Best Best & Krieger LLP. "Postponing a Presidential Election and the Law." Accessed August 1, 2024. https://bbklaw.com/resources/postponing-a-presidential-election-and-the-law. Congress.gov. "Browse: Article II, Section 2." Accessed July 28, 2024. https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/article-2/section-2/#:~:text=The%20President%20shall%20have%20Power,End%20of%20their%20next%20Session. “Election Emergencies.” 2024. Ncsl.org. 2024. https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/election-emergencies#election. Legal Information Institute. "2 U.S. Code § 7 - Time of Election." Accessed July 27, 2024. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/2/7. National Constitution Center. "Elections Clause." Last modified 2024. Accessed July 28, 2024. https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/articles/article-i/clauses/750. Oyez. "Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona." Accessed August 1, 2024. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-71. “25-622.” 2024. Ksrevisor.org. 2024. https://www.ksrevisor.org/statutes/chapters/ch25/025_006_0022.html. “42 U.S. Code § 5122 - Definitions.” 2015. LII / Legal Information Institute. 2015. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/5122. “42 USC 5122: Definitions.” 2018. House.gov. 2018. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-1999-title42-section5122&num=0&edition=1999#:~:text=%2D%22Major%20disaster%22%20means%20any. “50 U.S. Code Chapter 34 - NATIONAL EMERGENCIES.” 2024. LII / Legal Information Institute. 2024. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/chapter-34. |