Reformation Christianity

Reformation Christianity

Right	Section	Contents
Freedom of Association	Philosophical Origins	As mentioned above (section 1), John Locke’s 1689 “Letter Concerning Toleration” is widely believed to be the first written source to address, albeit indirectly, the right to freedom of association. While it is true that no source written prior to 1689 specifically explores the right in its entirety, there were a number of Reformation-era thinkers whose work formed the basis for Locke’s belief in the benefits of granting the right to free religious association. These sources were primarily English, written by such philosophers as Richard Hooker and Thomas More, though there is some evidence that Locke drew on themes from John Calvin as well. Among Locke’s most prominent sources of inspiration and guidance is Richard Hooker’s influential work, The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. This book, much of which was published posthumously in the late 1590s, was Hooker’s attempt to defend the fledgeling Anglican Church against attacks from the growing population of English Puritans. It explores a number of religious topics, one of which is the concept that all Churches, including those of “Rome, Corinth, Ephesus, England, and so the rest...are public Christian societies. And of such properties common unto all societies Christian, it may not be denied, that one of the very chiefest is Ecclesiastical Polity” (Hooker, 178). This idea that religious groups could be considered a “society” of people is advanced in Locke’s “Letter,” which takes the work one step further by examining one’s freedom to belong to these various religious societies. Hooker also explores this idea to some extent when he writes that “we rather incline to think it a just and reasonable cause for any Church, the state whereof is free and independent if in these things it differ from other Churches, only for that it doth not judge it so fit and expedient to be framed therein by the pattern of their example, as to be otherwise framed than they” (Hooker, 275). In this passage Hooker essentially argues that different sects of Christianity ought to be allowed to practice their preferred faith in peace, provided they similarly respect other branches’ rights to believe and associate. Perhaps is not a surprising statement to find in a defense of the Anglican Church after it broke away from Catholicism, but Hooker’s conviction that “Churches are rather in this case like divers families than like divers servants of one family” nevertheless seems to have profoundly influenced Locke’s work in the same area (Hooker, 277). In addition to this conceptual framework, Locke also seems to draw on Hooker for an interpretation of John Calvin’s teaching. Hooker’s Fourth Book of Laws quotes Calvin, who supposedly writes that, “Yea, sometime it profiteth and is expedient that there be difference, lest men should think that religion is tied to outward ceremonies. Always provided that there be not any emulation, nor that Churches delighted with novelty affect to have that which others have not.” (Hooker, 276). This, Hooker says, provides a basis of acceptability for different religious sects to profess their religions differently. By arguing in favor of different churches practicing differently, Hooker also implies a support for citizens’ right to belong to various churches according to how they wish to worship. It is possible that Hooker was referring to Calvin’s statement in The Institutes of the Christian Religion, which says that that “it is a well-known doctrine, and one as to which all the pious are agreed,—that the right consideration of signs does not lie merely in the outward ceremonies, but depends chiefly on the promise and the spiritual mysteries, to typify which the ceremonies themselves are appointed.” (Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Chapter 16, 2). Calvin’s work then proceeds to explain the parallels between circumcision in the Jewish faith and Baptism in the Christian ones, before concluding that “Baptism has been substituted for circumcision (Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Chapter 16, 4). While this does not mean that Calvin believed in one’s right to belong to the association or religion of one’s choice, its influence on Hooker’s statement is apparent. In concert with Hooker and a number of other influences, Calvin’s philosophy guided Locke in his exploration of religious freedom and, by extension, freedom of association. Locke’s “Letter” also displays some degree of influence from the writings of Thomas More, another Reformation-era thinker whose work addresses the citizen’s role in various religious associations. More’s famous work, Utopia, tells of a fictional country in which society is ordered and governed according to the way that More believed was best. Included in these guidelines are the principles of religious freedom, which likely had some influence on Locke’s thoughts on free association. Sanford Kessler’s “Religious Freedom in More’s ‘Utopia’” notes that “Locke's work contains arguments that are remarkably similar to More’s,” and explains that “In Utopia, religious freedom checked the threat of religious conflict by transforming a plethora of squabbling sects into tolerant, stable supporters of the government” (Kessler, “Religious Freedom”). The actual text of More’s work states that the founder of the mythical society in Utopia had “left matters open, making each person to follow his own beliefs,” (More, 110). While this does more to imply More’s support for religious freedom than for freedom of association, the idea that citizens should be able to belong to whichever religion they choose is certainly evident in Locke’s work on toleration. Freedom of association was not directly addressed prior to Locke’s work on toleration, but it is clear that Reformation-era philosophers influenced his work. Hooker’s thoughts on religious freedom and the relationship between religious societies shaped the way that Locke thought about religious toleration, and ideas from Calvin and More also influenced his work. References: Calvin, Jean, and Henry Beveridge. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Christian Classics Ethereal Library,1845, http://www.ntslibrary.com/PDF%20Books/Calvin%20Institutes%20of%20Christian%20 Religion.pdf, www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html. Hooker, Richard. Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. George Routledge and Sons, 1998, https://prydain.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/the_laws_of_ecclesiastical_polity_books_i-i V.pdf. Kessler, Sanford. “Religious Freedom in Thomas More's ‘Utopia.’” The Review of Politics, vol. 64, no. 2, 2002, pp. 207–229. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1408764. Accessed 8 July 2020. More, Thomas. Utopia. Translated by Dominic Baker-Smith, Penguin Classics, 20012.
Freedom of Expression	Philosophical Origins	The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sparked new discussions about mankind’s freedom of the conscience, belief, and to some extent, expression. Reformers from all over Europe produced writings on these freedoms, but they generally thought about these rights as they related to questions of theology. As a result, Reformation discourse focused more on a Christian’s freedom of conscience than on the citizen’s right to express their beliefs. The right to freedom of expression was explored, but much less broadly. English philosophers Thomas More and Thomas Wilson are two of the only Reformation-era thinkers to directly address the right, but their work influenced England’s political development regarding free speech over the next several centuries. Wilson’s support for the Reformation guided his views on the necessity of free expression, while More’s views were less religiously-motivated. More, who would eventually be martyred for his refusal to renounce Catholicism, made his most significant contribution to the English discourse on the right to free expression before the Anglican Reformation even began. In 1523, eleven years before English King Henry VIII announced a split from the Catholic Church, his newly-appointed Speaker of the House of Commons made a petition for freedom of speech within Parliament. The Speaker was none other than Sir Thomas More, who would later oppose Henry’s Anglican Reformation at the cost of his own life. He argued that Parliament could not be expected to form effective policy if its members were not allowed to speak honestly, saying that “it may therefore like your most abundant Grace, our most benign and godly King, to give to all your Commons here assembled your most gracious licence and pardon, freely, without doubt of your dreadful displeasure, every man to discharge his conscience, and boldly in everything incident among us to declare his advice, and whatsoever happen any man to say” (More, 1523). More’s insistence on the value of free speech within a legislative body is far removed from advancing the citizen’s right to freedom of expression, but it reveals that English Reformation-era thinkers were beginning to reconsider the permissibility of magisterial censorship as early as the 1520s. While More was ultimately executed for remaining loyal to the Catholic Church during the Anglican Reformation, his conviction that one ought to be able to speak their mind without fear of legal retribution endured. About twenty years after More’s speech, Thomas Wilson made a similar statement about freedom of expression in his 1553 work, The Arte of Rhetorique. Wilson was an English writer whose Protestant views led Catholic Queen Mary I of England to summon him out of his mid-sixteenth century exile in Italy to stand trial for heresy, and his Protestant tendencies seem to have guided his thoughts on freedom and liberty. In an introduction to The Arte of Rhetorique, George Herbert Mair asserts that “there is no mistaking [Wilson’s] zeal for the Reformation. It shines through everything he wrote, and the reader of the Logike and the [Rhetorique] will have no cause to wonder at the papal persecution of his works” (Mair, 1908). Perhaps this avid support for the Reformation movement influenced his thoughts on freedom, not only of the conscience but also of speech itself. A passage from The Arte states that “Freeness of speech is when we speak boldly and without fear, even to the proudest of them, whatsoever we please or have list to speak. Diogenes, herein did excell..this world wants such as he was” (Wilson, 1553). Like More, Wilson understood the value of free speech. Though he does not speak in this passage of a citizen’s right to freedom of expression, he was at least aware of the potential benefits that this liberty could have within political society. In fact, according to a 1981 article in The Sixteenth Century Journal, Wilson advanced the discourse on freedom of speech by “claiming that freedom of speech is a generally acknowledged duty to be exercised by anyone, not restricted to parliamentary debate” (Parkin-Speer, “Freedom of Speech in Sixteenth Century English Rhetorics”). Both More and Wilson made important contributions to the Reformation-era discourse on freedom of expression, but neither would live to see England’s official legislation of the right to freedom of speech within Parliamentary debate. This only occurred after the Glorious Revolution, in which William, Prince of Orange and newly crowned King of England, signed the English Bill of Rights in 1689. The Bill reflected England’s newfound stability within the European religious community by declaring the country a “Protestant Kingdom” and forbidding any Catholic from taking the throne or marrying into the royal family (English Bill of Rights). It also became the first early-modern document to legislate freedom of expression when its text guaranteed “that the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament” (English Bill of Rights). The document went into effect near the end of the Anglican Reformation movement, over a century after Wilson’s death, so it is unclear to what extent he or More influenced its creation. While The Arte of Rhetorique w as known in academic circles, its call for freedom of speech was not fully answered by the Bill, which only guaranteed that right within Parliamentary debate. The Bill’s text more closely resembles More’s 1523 speech, which specifically refers to freedom of speech within Parliamentary debate. Scholarship has yet to establish a direct link between the Bill and either of the two documents, but it is nevertheless important to note the importance of both writers’ work in advancing English discourse on the right to freedom of expression. REFERENCES: Avalon Project - English Bill of Rights 1689, avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp. More, Thomas. “Thomas More Petition for Free Speech, 1523.” The Center for Thomas More Studies, www.thomasmorestudies.org/docs/Thomas%20More%20Petition%20for%20Free%20Sp eech.pdf. Parkin-Speer, Diane. “Freedom of Speech in Sixteenth Century English Rhetorics.” The Sixteenth Century Journal, vol. 12, no. 3, 1981, pp. 65–72. JSTOR. Wilson, Thomas. “The Arte of Rhetorique, with ‘Introduction.’” Edited by George Herbert Mair, The Art of Rhetoric, Renascence Editions, www.luminarium.org/renascence-editions/arte/arte.htm.
Freedom of Religion	Philosophical Origins	Freedoms of expression, religion, and conscience were not formally addressed in Reformation Christian thought, but discourse on rights and liberties relating to speech, press, and belief are apparent in Reformation thinkers’ writings and speeches. Leading figures in the Lutheran and Calvinist movements began to explore the permissibility of disagreement with Catholic dogma and the Pope himself. This usually arose, not from a discussion of rights and liberties, but rather from the idea that one ought not to be compelled to profess a faith in which they do not believe. The right to freedom of religion, often referred to as one’s “freedom of conscience” in early modern texts, is partially rooted in the writings of Martin Luther during the early decades of the Protestant Reformation. Luther’s “Open Letter to the Christian Nobility” provides the basis for the Lutheran doctrine of the “priesthood of all believers,” which explains that all Christians have the capacity to understand and interpret God’s messages without the need of ordained Church officials. In his “Letter” Luther writes that “all Christians are truly of the ‘spiritual estate,’ and there is among them no difference at all but that of office” (Luther, 1520). This idea that all Christians have the right to decide for themselves what to believe about their faith was important to the Reformation movement because it was used to justify the vast expansion of different religious denominations that formed over the next few centuries. If Christians were free to believe what they felt was true, then they would have no problem forming new religious communities based on various interpretations of sacred texts. Later in his life Luther would rein in the “priesthood of all believers” doctrine as various beliefs sprang up which he considered heretical, but the doctrine survived to influence subsequent thinkers’ ideas about religious freedom and the rights of believers. Luther further affected the discourse on religious freedom when he faced down the Catholic authorities against whom he had written in his “Letter.” He famously expressed an unwillingness to retract a heretical statement in the face of Catholic scrutiny at the Diet of Worms. The Diet was called in order to determine whether or not the German monk had broken Church law in the creation of his ninety-five theses, and it ultimately found Luther’s work heretical and asked him to revoke his statements. In response, Luther declared that, “if I were to revoke what I have written on that subject, what should I do but strengthen this [pope’s] tyranny, and open a wider door to so many and flagrant impieties? Bearing down all resistance with fresh fury, we should behold these proud men swell, foam, and rage more than ever!” (Luther, 1521) The idea that Luther could strengthen the pope’s unjust authority by revoking statements that he believed to be true imply his belief that in a just society, a person should be able to profess their beliefs without fear of punishment. While Luther’s speech did not propose any theory of inalienable liberty or right to freedom of belief, it did contribute to a discourse addressing the permissibility of religious restriction. Interestingly, Luther’s disagreement with traditional church dogma also led some of his opponents to think about the utility of religious discourse between opposing viewpoints. In a famous exchange of ideas in a series of open letters, Northern Renaissance thinker Desiderius Erasmus engaged Luther in a debate on human free will. The contents of the debate did not themselves have much to do with the origins of the right to religious freedom, but Erasmus’ words in his opening letter imply that the Dutchman at least supported the free exchange of ideas among religious groups. When opening his letter Erasmus writes that “I do not consider Luther himself would be indignant if anybody should find occasion to differ from him, since he permits himself to call in question the decrees, not only of all the doctors of the Church, but of all the schools, councils, and popes” (Erasmus, 1524). This passage, which at first glance seems nothing more than a jab at Luther, takes on new meaning when Erasmus subsequently proposes that the two men “pursue the matter without recrimination, because this is more fitting for Christian men, and because in this way the truth, which is so often lost amid too much wrangling, may be more surely perceived” (Erasmus, 1524). By framing the debate as a mutually beneficial effort to find religious truth rather than a contest between opposing religious viewpoints, Erasmus implies a support for the free exchange of religious belief, if nothing else. His words do not betray any innate support for religious pluralism or toleration, but the appeal to debate as “the way to truth” nevertheless went on to influence subsequent scholars such as Locke and Voltaire, both of whom championed ideas of toleration and religious pluralism. Three decades after Luther initially resisted the Church’s attempts to censor him, Theodore Beza began to explore ideas of rights and responsibilities as they relate to magistrates and subjects. Beza was a French theologian living in Geneva during the Reformation, and historians widely view him as the pseudo-successor to John Calvin. His work, On the Rights of Magistrates, explains his views on tyranny and a subject’s responsibility to resist it. While Beza’s work does not specifically mention a citizen’s right to freedom of religion it further advances the idea that a regime cannot justifiably restrict its citizens’ expression or belief. After explaining that magistrates should not be able to restrict citizens’ faith in Chapter Ten of Rights, Beza writes that “if [a magistrate] acts otherwise I declare that he is practicing manifest tyranny; and with due allowance for the observations made above, (his subjects) will be all the more free to oppose him as we are bound to set greater store and value by the salvation of our souls and the freedom of our conscience than by any other matters however desirable” (Beza, 1574). While this “opposition” according to one’s freedom of conscience does not specifically refer to a subject’s ability to practice religion against the ruler’s wishes, it does imply a certain level of basic freedom to express one’s beliefs in the face of tyranny. Like Luther, Beza saw Catholic dogma and papal absolutism as an expression of such tyranny, which both reformers felt a responsibility to resist. Luther, Erasmus, and Beza all explored the idea that one might justifiably hold beliefs that conflict with religious authorities or regimes. While they certainly proposed this idea in the hopes of preserving their own doctrines and beliefs, their effort provided a base upon which subsequent thinkers could expand theories of free conscience and religious practice. This would not be integrated into the rhetoric of rights and liberties for another century or so, but these sources reveal that the modern right to freedom of religion can trace certain roots all the way back to Reformation Christianity. References: Beza, Theodore. Theodore Beza, On the Rights of the Magistrates. Edited by Patrick S. Poole. Translated by Henry-Louis Gonin, constitution.org/cmt/beza/magistrates.htm. More, Thomas. “Thomas More Petition for Free Speech, 1523.” The Center for Thomas More Studies, www.thomasmorestudies.org/docs/Thomas%20More%20Petition%20for%20Free%20Sp eech.pdf. Luther, Martin. Martin Luther’s Speech at the Imperial Diet in Worms (18 April 1521). San Jose State University, www.sjsu.edu/people/james.lindahl/courses/Hum1B/s3/Luther-Speech-Worms-1521. Luther, Martin. An Open Letter to The Christian Nobility by Martin Luther (1483-1546).Translated by C. M. Jacobs, www.projectwittenberg.org/pub/resources/text/wittenberg/luther/web/nblty-03.html. “On the Freedom of the Will: A Diatribe or Discourse by Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam.” Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation, by Martin Luther et al., Westminster Press, Philadelphia, pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4318/ff6f297d5fe96224fa4d89cd6fb3c9c0608b.pdf. Accessed 7 July 2020.