Right/Privacy Rights/Philosophical Origins
Privacy Rights
History | Legal Codification | Philosophical Origins | Culture and Politics | Conflicts with other Rights | Limitations / Restrictions | Utilitarian / Fairness Assessments | Looking Ahead | Policy Recommendations
What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
Platonism 🖉 edit
As with many of Plato's views, it is challenging to definitively pinpoint his stance on privacy given the variability of his perspectives across different dialogues.
In The Republic, Plato, through Socrates, outlines a vision of an ideal state that significantly diminishes the role of privacy. He advocates for communal living among the guardian class, proposing that women and children be shared among all men and that no parent or child know their biological family (Plato, 457d). Moreover, âthere mustnât be private houses for them, nor land, nor any possession. Instead they must get their livelihood from the others, as a wage for guarding, and use it up in common all togetherâ (Plato, 464c). This communal arrangement is intended to prevent personal ties and conflicts of interest, ensuring that the guardians' loyalty and dedication are solely to the state and its welfare.
This is reinforced in Platoâs The Laws, where the Athenian Stranger asserts that the highest form of state, government, and law is one in which "Friends have all things in commonâ (Moore, 1). He paints an ideal society (Magnesia) where private ownership and individual distinctions are entirely eliminated. Here too communal living is emphasized to the extent that women, children, and property are shared, and things naturally private become common. The Athenian Stranger contends that no state can be truer or more exalted in virtue unless it adopts these principles (Plato, Book V, para 13).
In The Apology and Crito, Plato presents a different view that, according to Konvitz, makes Socrates a pivotal figure in the development of the concept of privacy (Konvitz, 273). In The Apology, Socrates explains that he avoids public political activity because it is fraught with corruption and opposition to just actions. He argues that remaining a private citizen allows him to continue his philosophical mission of questioning, advising, and encouraging others to pursue virtue. Socrates asserts that those who fight for justice should do so privately to preserve their lives and integrity, suggesting that true philosophical work requires a degree of separation from the public sphere (Apology 31d-32a).
Similarly, in Crito, Socrates emphasizes the distinction between the physical body and the true self, which he identifies with the soul (Konvitz, 273). As he faces death, he tells Crito that the true Socrates is not the body that will be buried but the soul that transcends physical death. This conversation highlights Socrates' belief that the essence of a person lies in their inner self, not in their physical presence or public identity. His emphasis on the inner self versus the outer, physical existence underscores a key aspect of the concept of privacy: the idea that there is an inner realm of personal identity and thought that remains separate and protected from public intrusion (Konvitz, 273). By focusing on the soul as the true self, Socrates' philosophy supports the notion of a private, inviolable space where individuals can be truly themselves, free from external influence and societal roles. According to Adam Moore, this concept provided some backdrop for later debates regarding the importance of privacy and personal autonomy (Moore, 1).
These contrasting positions raise the question of how to reconcile Plato's stance on privacy. Some scholars like Adam Moore distinguish between the Socrates in The Republic and The Laws, and the Socrates in The Apology (Moore, 1). He regards the communal living ideas presented in The Republic and The Laws as representative of Plato's stance, which is âopenly hostile towards privacyâ, and the views in The Apology to be representative of Socrates' (Moore,1). Aristotle also critiques âPlato in the Republic,â arguing that both the end and the means of his proposed communal living are flawed: âThe abolition of property will produce, not remove, dissension. Communism of wives and children will destroy natural affectionâ (Aristotle, Book II, Chapter 3). He further contends that the differentiation of functions is a natural law and trying to enforce absolute uniformity is impractical and unnatural.
References
Adam D. Moore, "Privacy," in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 11 Volume Set, 2nd ed., edited by Hugh LaFollette (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2022), accessed July 27, 2024, http://faculty.washington.edu/moore2/IEEP.pdf.
Aristotle. Politics. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Bard College. Accessed July 28, 2024. https://www.bard.edu/library/arendt/pdfs/Aristotle-Politics.pdf.
Milton R. Konvitz, "Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude," Law and Contemporary Problems 31, no. 2 (1966): 272-291, accessed July 26, 2024, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3108&context=lcp.
Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated with an interpretive essay by Allan Bloom. Introduction by Adam Kirsch. New York: Basic Books, 2016.
Plato. Laws. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg, 2008 https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1750/1750-h/1750-h.htm.
Feminist Thought 🖉 edit
VVarious feminist theorists have often been forgotten because of their role as women and the fact that society sees their input as invalid because of the long history of their treatment. However, despite the oppression and the push to exclude them from political conversations, women have entered the conversation claiming that the true problem in life is patriarchy. Their commentary surrounds the involvement of men within the government and how the male-dominated government suppresses women. They can generally agree on most political discussions like the right to privacy, but that is not to say that it does not come without variation as all political theory usually does. The consensus among the feminists is that the private realm maintains the oppression of women and propose the elimination of the private realm to remedy the problem at hand, despite some thoughts on the return to the private realm once the problem has been solved socially first. Most feminist political commentary and theory is centered around the critique of the relationship between the private and the public spheres that inherently treats women as less than compared to their male counterpart. In her political commentary Sexual Personae, Camille Paglia noted that âHe has no personal life. He completely identifies private with public interest. Hence, he is unstoppable. Such men can be political geniuses or monstersâ (Paglia 1990, 214). In fact, Bell Hooks would go as far to claim that men are told to dominate the private sphere despite giving women the belief that the home and the private realm will be theirs to dominate and to rule over (Hooks 1984, 120). Paglia and Hooks both demonstrate the point that the feminists paint a picture where the power of the public outweigh the power of the private and since women are taught that the private will be their realm, they are inherently less important compared to their male counterparts. Paglia also details something important in the fact that the men of society can either help or hurt women because of the power they possess in the public and the private, yet most feminists would argue that they choose to abuse women within their spheres because of the way that Hooks says that they are encouraged to dominate women any way that they can. These sentiments reflect the critiques of the relationship between the private and public spheres that dominates the arguments made by feminists on the matter of the right to privacy and hence why some are skeptical about maintain that right. Susan Moller Okinâs work Justice, Gender, and Family noted that, âIf there were a clear sphere from which the state refrained from intruding, that sphere would have to be defined, and its definition would be a political issue. But in fact, the state has not just "kept out of family life. In innumerable ways, the state determines and enforces the terms of marriageâ (Okin 1989, 129). To Okin, the dichotomy between the private and the public realms is central to her argument for the elimination of the private sphere because of the lack of justice maintained within this sphere. Okin uses this to further the point that there is no separation because of the stateâs involvement in issues like womenâs bodies and marriage that make the separation unrealistic since within the minds of men, the two are automatically linked without any clear distinctions. The feminists use examples of abortion and marriage to further prove that the lines between the state and the home are blurred and often nonexistent because the state makes decisions without consulting women or even acknowledging the boundary that should be there. Okin even claims that the boundary is artificial and only created based off the different principles that the men have on these matters. However, she highlights the lack of justice for women due to the difference in principles in men that allow them to abuse their women and belittle them from reaching their full potential within society. Some theorists see the role of the traditional woman with her duties and her obligations to the family as invasive and a problem when it comes to the right to privacy for a woman. Written in 1903, Charlotte Perkins Gilman makes the claim that, âThe motherâpoor invaded soulâfinds even the bathroom door no bar to hammering little hands. From parlour to kitchen, from cellar to garret, she is at the mercy of children, servants, tradesmen, and callers. So chased and trodden is she that the very idea of privacy is lost to her mind; she never had any, she doesn't know what it is, and she cannot understand why her husband should wish to have any "reserves," any place or time, any thought or feeling, with which she may not make freeâ (Gilman 1903, 36). Gilman makes the assertion that the role women have taken on within the home means that there is no such privacy for the woman whatsoever. It is because she has other obligations as a mother, as a wife, as a caregiver that something is always expected from her and that her needs are irrelevant because she ârulesâ the home. She claims that there is also no possibility for individual privacy because there is no specific space for just the individual unless they are living alone. However, within the family, the individual is crowded by those around, and as stated before the role of the woman is to serve everyone and everything according to the standards set by the man. She adds that if the individual was truly private, there would be no scrutiny or judgement because the individual is truly private about their thoughts and their feelings, but this concept of privacy is only applicable to the man who rules the home and is always free to express themselves within the home. It is the woman who is continuously repressed in and out of the home and is in constant contact with the other women and servants of the neighborhood with whom they share and continuously violate the idea of privacy. In Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach by Martha Nussbaum, Nussbaum noted that, âIt goes without saying that in poor families where five or six people share a single room, there is no such thing as the privacy of the individual in the middle-class American sense â although poor people will frequently seek solitude for the purpose of defecation, walking considerable distances from their dwellingsâ (Nussbaum 2000, 259). Nussbaum and Gilman both illustrate the life of the woman in which she is subjected to the needs of the family and expected to run the household without being given the respect that should come with the role. She continues the argument by claiming that individuals have the right to privacy within their decisional liberties, but for women and in general the home limits the space where the individual can carry out their liberties simply because the lack of space. Nussbaum decides to remedy this by claiming that the state should be allowed to intervene so long as they do so to protect only the privacy the individual has in the form of decisional liberties the individual holds. Even though she speaks in broader terms about the individual, she emphasizes the fact, as Gilman points out, that the role of the women is far more extensive than that of the man within the home and therefore, her privacy is severely more limited than that of the man within the home. In the process of the state protecting the liberties of the individual, Nussbaum would claim that the needs of the woman need to be acknowledged and enforced in order to maintain her decisional liberties. Alongside the critique of the public and private spheres mentioned above, theorists propose a reconstruction of the public and private life that would eventually liberate women from the abuse and violence they face. In her book, A Vindication of the Rights of Women with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects by Mary Wollstonecraft, she noted that âTo render women truly useful members of society, I argue that they should be led, by having their understandings cultivated on a large scale, to acquire a rational affection for their country, founded on knowledge, because it is obvious that we are little interested about what we do not understand. And to render this general knowledge of due importance, I have endeavoured to shew that private duties are never properly fulfilled unless the understanding enlarges the heart; and that public virtue is only an aggregate of privateâ (Wollstonecraft 1792, 291). Part of the larger and general feminist argument for privacy is the reconstruction of the private and public realms so that there could possibly be the existence of the private sphere once the problems are addressed. For Wollstonecraft, part of the progression of women is to form the new public sphere around the education of the women in order to maintain the public happiness. Wollstonecraft claims that the means of some private virtue is the same as the public happiness since whatever happens within the private is brought out into the public. For that reason, Wollstonecraft argues that the public and the private are utterly the same since the state already tries to solve the problems that take place within the private space of the home. However, within the home, she notes that the role of the woman is to please the man and because of this she is denied her public and civil duties which again can be rectified by educating women and men about the opinions and the manner which society enforces. The Feminine Mystique by Betty Friedan noted that, âTheir determination betrays womenâs underestimated human strength and their urgent need to use it. But only the strongest, after nearly twenty years of the feminine mystique, can move on by themselves. For this is not just the private problem of each individual woman. There are implications of the feminine mystique that must be faced on a national scaleâ (Friedan 1963, 350-351). Friedan wanted to remedy the inequalities that she saw within the private life, by demolishing the line between the public and the private by exposing the inequalities that the women faced within the private life. In order to reform and reconstruct life to benefit women, her solution was to promote education and find something beyond the self to identify with. Her idea that was if women were able to reimagine themselves, they would be able to overcome the problems and show society the way that women should be treated. Freidanâs concept of the private however was aligned with Gilman and Nussbaum in that the duties of the woman prevent actual privacy, so she proposed another separate space away from the family in which the woman can achieve a sense of privacy. In order to reimagine themselves within the public, Friedan proposed private and public education like Wollstonecraft proposed, and suggested challenging the images of women proposed by the media. When it came to the media specifically, she wanted women to reimagine themselves using their own private image to facilitate what their version of what a woman looked like. Feminists in general proposed their own version of reconstructing the public to change the way women were viewed which usually involved exposing their problems to the public, completely ignoring the idea of the private individual. Despite the constant call for the barrier between the public and the private to be broken, there are some claims to a right to privacy made by the feminists. Catherine MacKinnon noted this in her work Toward a Feminist Theory of the State when she claimed that âThe law of privacy treats the private sphere as a sphere of personal freedom. For men, it is. For women, the private is the distinctive sphere of intimate violation and abuse, neither free nor particularly personal. Men's realm of private freedom is women's realm of collective subordination.â (MacKinnon 1989, 168). Most feminist theorists agree to some sort of concept of the private and what that might look like. Most feminists were skeptical of the private because of all the abuse that took place within this sphere, hence why they wanted the government to intervene in the matters of the private. However, as MacKinnon pointed out, the private provided personal freedom that the public could not provide, hence why it was important to revisit the private sphere once the woman was reimagined and re-envisioned for the better. MacKinnon acknowledged the fact that there were legal protections about privacy for women since there were these protections for men but based on examples surrounding abortion and marriage concluded that even though it was legally available for women, it was not enforced. Specifically, the government rulings on issues like Roe v. Wade gave women the private right to choose, but she recognized that the fact that the government had a say on this matter, was an invasion of the privacy of the women to choose. Even the discussion of whether the government would fund abortions became a matter of government involvement on a womanâs decision to choose. After her discussion of this matter, she established that the right to privacy was necessary and continuously violated by the government in order to maintain control over women. Carole Pateman extends this argument within her work The Sexual Contract when she notes that, âShultz states that there is a strong argument that private contract should not override the criminal law but, she writes, 'the idea of enforceable private agreements concerning violent sexual conduct is less offensive than a state declaration that violent sexual conduct is automatically acceptable in marriage.' Such a response begs the question about limitations to and alternatives to contractâ (Pateman 1988, 185). Pateman specifically notes that the relationship between the government and the people on matters of private and public is something that is important for the safety of women and for the natural liberties for the individual. She notes that what calls the sexual contract is something women are subjected to where their abuse accumulates at home and sometimes within the public. She called for government intervention on matters of legally maintaining womenâs liberties and for intervention when men within the private life continuously abused women. Pateman noted that the line between the public and the private was indefinite and used the system of marriage as an example of how the government was involved. She claimed that because the government had to keep records of marriage contracts between private individuals, marriage could be considered public, despite the specific agreements within the marriage contract is a private matter talked and agreed upon by the different parties. She still notes in the end that the government had some obligation within the private lives to reform the treatment of women and the inequalities that women face within the home, an attitude shared by most of the feminist theorists. The consensus among the feminists is that the private sphere is where women are subjects of abuse and inequalities that need to be exposed out in the public in order to help women overcome the view that men have of them. To these theorists' women face the same treatment within the public sphere as the patriarchy and the government make decisions on their behalf and subject them to the private life where they are expected to take care of the family. The primary role of the woman centers around the idea of the family and the way that the woman is supposed to take care of the family depriving her of her own privacy. Jean Bethke Elshtain adds an interesting perspective to this notion and considers that as women are liberated by their actions, the structure of the family will fall apart. She adds that the family dynamic is also changing as there are more single parent households or same-sex households that change the way the family has been thought of (Elshtain 1981, 323). This is an interesting notion as the thought of the private sphere changes for these women and the way that women are taking more charge within the world continuously challenging the private abuse at the hands of the man. The notion of the right to privacy is something constantly changing as situations change but should be broken down to expose the flaws within the system that negatively affect women.
REFERENCES:
Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought - Second Edition. NED-New edition, 2. Princeton University Press, 1981. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv131bvkg.
Friedan, Betty. The Feminine Mystique. Dell Publishing Company INC. 1973
Gilman, Charlotte Perkins. The Home. New York Charlton Company. 1910
Hooks, Bell. 1984. Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. South End Press
Mackinnon, Catherine A. 1989. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Harvard University Press
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge University Press
Okin, Susan Moller. 1989. Justice, Gender, and the Family. Basic Books Inc.
Paglia, Camille. âShakespeare and Dionysus: As You Like It and Antony and Cleopatra.â In Sexual Personae, 194â229. Yale University Press, 1990. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1bh4bwb.12.
Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract. Stanford University Press, 1988.
Wollstonecraft, Mary. 1792. A Vindication of the Rights of Women with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects. Cambridge University Press
Hobbesian Thought 🖉 edit
The right to privacy is a right that not many think of when they think of their natural rights. Specifically, most forget about this right and what it entitles when it comes to their basic political involvement and contribution to society. Although it is not always explicitly stated, multiple philosophers have had their fair share of commentary on the right to privacy and what this right should look like within their form of government and civil society. Thomas Hobbes, author of The Leviathan, writes about the absolute power the monarch should have over the citizenry, offering commentary on the specific right to privacy within his version of society. Even though, Hobbes outlines some sort of privacy within the state of nature, Hobbes claims that there is no right to privacy on the premise that entering the social contract forfeits certain aspects of privacy in order to contribute to the public conscience and the laws made by the government. Hobbes makes the argument that within the state of nature there is this sense of privacy that allows the people to make judgements and decisions for themselves in the name of self-preservation. Hobbes specifically noted that, âThat every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions.â This is true in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no Civill Lawes; and also under Civill Government, in such cases as are not determined by the Lawâ (Hobbes 1651, 277). Hobbes makes the point that without a government system there is a form of privacy that allows individuals the ability to pass judgement as they please because they are within a state of war where individuals must fight for their own self-preservation. Hobbes then claims that as soon as one enters the social contract in which the people consent to being governed that the privacy is altered because the government is responsible for the preservation of the people. Hobbes hopes that with the emphasis on religion within the conscience, people outside the government can make just decisions for the better of the commonwealth. To Hobbes, once entering the social contract every citizen is responsible for the common good which is only molded when the government can see into the lives of the people and make their decisions for the betterment of society. The state of nature for Hobbes is one of war in which people must be private in order to protect themselves from others and defend their own interests, but since the government will be involved to help protect such people, there is no need for privacy anymore and therefore the government needs to be involved in the peopleâs lives. Furthermore, Hobbes added to this argument claiming that, âThe RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing anything, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereuntoâ (Hobbes 1651, 106). Hobbesâ depiction of the state of nature justifies the reasons why one must be private as it relates to the protection of his life and his pursuits that will in turn ensure his right to life and liberty. As his arguments progress, he will make the argument that the state should be involved in the lives of the people because the government is the greatest representation of the people and their desire for self-preservation. He depicts this point to show that within the state of nature, there are some aspects of life that are necessary for the survival of the individual and then why consenting to the social contract means giving up some of these liberties to the government in exchange for the preservation that people naturally seek in life. To Hobbes, the state of nature is a place individuals need privacy in order to protect themselves from the dangers of those around them, hence why once people enter the social contract, they sacrifice their rights to such privacy as there is no longer a need for it since the government is protecting individual interests. Despite his version of the state of nature calling for some sort of privacy based on self-preservation, once the citizenry has consented to being governed, the sphere of privacy is absent to a certain extent to put the needs of the public first. For example, Hobbes noted that, âFor a mans Conscience, and his Judgement is the same thing; and as the Judgement, so also the Conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject to no Civill Law, sinneth in all he does against his Conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the publique Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but private opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the Soveraign Power, farther than it shall seem good in his own eyesâ (Hobbes 1651, 278). As Hobbes progresses in his argument, he makes the point that the government is to reflect the private sentiments of the people and therefore whatever conscience and thoughts they have, it must already be public since the government is to represent those thoughts and sentiments. However, Hobbes also makes the case that if there are other private sentiments within the public that are not made known, a toxic environment is formed around the privacy of thoughts because the government is unaware of the judgements being made and is therefore not a part of the absolute power over the people. It is for that reason that Hobbes believes that within the social contract there is no aspect of privacy because he believes that the government is the greatest absolute in society and needs to be absolute in order to preserve the people. Hobbes also notes that once entering into the social contract, all people have left is their conscience and judgements because all other private goods are given to the government to control and to protect. Hobbes would also make the point that if the people fail to follow the public conscience which Hobbes calls the law, then there would be a sort of anarchy in which power is no longer consolidated within the government as people rule their lives as they please ignoring the laws in place and possibly violating the rights of the people around them. In addition, Hobbes wrote that, âA private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,) to beleeve, or not beleeve in his heart, those acts that have been given out for Miracles, according as he shall see, what benefit can accrew by mens belief, to those that pretend, or countenance them, and thereby conjecture, whether they be Miracles, or Lies. But when it comes to confession of that faith, the Private Reason must submit to the Publique; that is to say, to Gods Lieutenant. But who is this Lieutenant of God, and Head of the Church, shall be considered in its proper place thereafterâ (Hobbes 1651, 387). Even on matters such as religion, there is no sphere of privacy according to Hobbes because it is the responsibility of the government to care for the people and cater to the liberties of the people. Any time Hobbes discussed the state of religion, the government had some stake in allowing the employment of teachers and ministers according to the standard of the government and what they should and should not allow. The matter of religion to Hobbes was a private matter until entering the social contract in which the government owns the interests of the people including their interests on religion and the matter of salvation. Hobbes further depicts a society in which the government has access to the lives of the people and their interests as a means of protecting such assets and values. Hobbes sees the lack of privacy within the government and the people as a means of preserving the people and their values as they go through society making their own decisions. It is this private conscience that the people have access to, but that Hobbes claims is the least important compared to the public, government conscience. Hobbes does create some sort of private sphere within the silence of the laws and within the home life that the father rules over the family and the servants that does create a minuscule space for privacy. Specifically, Hobbes notes that, âPrivate Bodies Regular, and Lawfull, are those that are constituted without Letters, or other written Authority, saving the Lawes common to all other Subjects. And because they be united in one Person Representative, they are held for Regular; such as are all Families, in which the Father, or Master ordereth the whole Family. For he obligeth his Children, and Servants, as farre as the Law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions, which the Law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the time they are under domestique government, they are subject to their Fathers, and Masters, as to their immediate Soveraigns. For the Father, and Master being before the Institution of Common-wealth, absolute Soveraigns in their own Families, they lose afterward no more of their Authority, than the Law of the Common-wealth taketh from them. Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull, are those that unite themselves into one person Representative, without any publique Authority at all; such as are the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies, the better to order their trade of begging, and stealing; and the Corporations of men, that by Authority from any forraign Person, unite themselves in anothers Dominion, for easier propagation of Doctrines, and for making a party, against the Power of the Common-wealth" (Hobbes 1651, 199). Hobbes then goes on with his argument to explain how the sphere of privacy that may exist within society is within the home and within the family. However, this does not mean that individuals within the home are not subject to the laws that are considered the public conscience. Above all, it is this sphere of the public conscience which the government develops the laws that should not and cannot be ignored by the public even within the private sphere. What should be mentioned as well is Hobbesâ sense of freedom within the silence of the laws which may allow the individual to interpret the laws as they see fit and act based on their own judgement of the laws. Alongside this sentiment however is still the lingering opinion that the absolute government has the utmost and complete control over the people and the people must therefore follow this opinion. Hobbes even notes above that the father might be the head of the household and the reigning authority, but in the end, even the father must follow the wishes of the commonwealth and adhere to the laws put in place by the magistrate and the government. Carrying on the same sentiments, Hobbes wrote that, â...though he be carefull in his politique Person to procure the common interest; yet he is more, or no lesse carefull to procure the private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the publique and private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a Civill warreâ (Hobbes 1651, 157). Hobbes describes the fact that people enjoy the private sphere more than the public and therefore, one would think that the existence of a private sphere is incredibly important. However, Hobbes further explains that within the privacy of thought there is a sense of selfishness that prevents people from making decisions in the best interest of the commonwealth and therefore, there should be no sphere that would allow people to adhere to their selfish policies. Hobbes further describes what would happen if the government were to take this selfish stance in which they would no longer do their job of preserving the population despite that being their only true duty. Furthermore, Hobbes connects the quality of the government to the quality of the public since according to him, the state of the government reflects the level of preservation that the citizenry endures. He uses this point to further the case of using a monarchy rather than a democracy or oligarchy because of the inability of a large body to make quick decisions on behalf of the public interest. Thomas Hobbes was an absolutist to the fullest extent. When it came to writing about government, he believed that the more consolidated the power was in the hands of the leviathan, the better off the population was going to be for making the best decisions for the people they ruled over. This meant, however, sacrificing certain rights to the government to preserve the citizenry to the best of their ability. Specifically, the right to privacy to Hobbes should not exist on the basis that the government needs to be involved in the lives of the people in order to figure out the public conscience and to make their decisions accordingly. By consenting to the government, the government has absolute power and control over the people and the decisions they decide to make and therefore, the government has direct access to the wishes and the lives of the people. The right to privacy to Hobbes is an interesting debate since his views on rights in the first place seem irregular due to the absolute power, he believes that the government has over the people and the way that there is no explicit right to rebel against abusive governments. The right to privacy is a topic to which there is no one answer, yet Hobbes tries to remedy with the solution that proposes the abolition of such a right in order to cater to the needs of the public.
REFERENCES:
Hobbes, Thomas. The Leviathan. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, INC. London: J.M. Dent and Sons Limited, 1950.
Kantianism 🖉 edit
Even though Kant does describe privacy in very vague descriptions, Kantâs idea of the right to privacy is severely limited by the importance of the public sphere and the goals and laws set in place by the government and the public Kantâs idea of the private sphere stems from his emphasis on the moral relationships within the public that create a sense of wellbeing for society and the people there to allow everyone to pursue their own interests. In his essay titled âPerpetual Peaceâ Kant wrote that, âFor in their external relations, they have already approached what the idea of right prescribes, although the reason for this is certainly not their internal moral attitudes. In the same way, we cannot expect their moral attitudes to produce a good political constitution; on the contrary, it is only through the latter that the people can be expected to attain a good level of moral culture. Thus, that mechanism of nature by which selfish inclinations are naturally opposed to one another in their external relations can be used by reason to facilitate the attainment of its own end, the reign of established right. Internal and external peace are thereby furthered and assured, so far as it lies within the power of the state itself to do so. We may therefore say that nature irresistibly wishes that right should eventually gain the upper handâ (Kant 1795, 113). Kantâs emphasis is on the peace of the community and the ways in which community control their own personal morality to maintain the community and avoid the problems that are likely to arise. Due to this, it might be reasonable to assume that Kant would say that the individuals' morals are private since they must sacrifice their ideals for the public standard set by the community, leaving the private realm the only space in which individuals can subscribe to their own ideas of the good life. Specifically, Kant would say that whatever passions people have should be subjected to the private sphere to maintain a certain level of peace and stability within society. Kant even adds that maintaining a private or âinternalâ sphere for selfish interests helps benefit both the public and the private sphere so that there is balance in both spheres and the people maintain the peace. For Kant, the relationship between the public and the private is dependent on the morals people hold to maintain a standard within the community and prolong a state of establishment, which requires creating some sort of separation between the two spheres. However, it should be noted that Kant places an emphasis on the public to suggest that its importance prevails above the importance of matters within the private sphere. Furthermore, Kant said that â we cannot simply conclude by a reverse process that all maxims which can be made public are therefore also just, because the person who has decisive supremacy has no need to conceal his maxims. The condition which must be fulfilled before any kind of international right is possible is that a lawful state must already be in existence. For without this, there can be no public right, and any right which can be conceived of outside it, i.e., in a state of nature, will be merely a private right. Now we have already seen above that a federative association of states whose sole intention is to eliminate war is the only lawfol arrangement which can be reconciled with their freedomâ (Kant 1795, 129). The idea of the âinternalâ is continued in his analysis of the state of nature in which there is only matters of the private sphere. However, when theorists reference the state of nature, they usually provide some remedy because they believe that the state of nature is imperfect and needs to be fixed for the betterment of society. Therefore, it might be reasonable to assume that Kant believes that this state of privacy needed to be fixed by creating a society in which people needed to create more public relations and establish a state that revolves around the public sphere and the interests for the public. This is not to say that he wants to get rid of the idea of privacy altogether, but it further shows his preference for the public sphere rather than the private sphere. When it comes to the government and the private sphere, Kant emphasizes the use of government as public actors acting for the public rather than public actors acting within their own private interests. He believed that the officials of the government are merely public figures that adhere to the morals established by society and because of this again, like most of society, they leave their private reasonings within the public sphere especially when making decisions for the people. Kant does paint some pictures of privacy within the realm of private property, but his idea of private property does not come without exceptions and limits when it comes to the boundaries between the private, the public, and the government. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant said that âthis supreme ownership is only an idea of the civil union, designed to represent through concepts of right the need to unite the private property of all members of the people under a universal public owner; for this makes it possible to define particular ownership by means of the necessary formal principle of distribution (division of the land), rather than by principles of aggregation (which proceeds empirically from the parts to the whole). The principles of right require that the supreme proprietor should not possess any land as private property (otherwise he would become a private person), for all land belongs exclusively to the people it also has a well-authenticated objective reality which can easily be demonstrated from particular instances as they ariseâ (Kant 1797, 147). The reiteration of a private sphere for Kant is reimagined in the form of private property. For Kant, private property is the space in which individuals can live out their personal, private morals they had to leave behind to maintain public moral standards and public peace. The realm of private property is the space in which the government cannot interfere with the people and for Kant something the government cannot and should not acquire for themselves. If the government were to obtain their own private property, the government would become private individuals no longer invested in the public morals or the public peace they are to represent and enforce. It should be noted that Kantâs version of government is a federation of civil societies, reemphasizing the lack of power the government should have. Therefore, it is logical for Kant to believe that the government should not even own property since their role is minimized within the civil society in which the people and the public control most of the affairs. Kantâs decentralized government reinstates the idea that the higher ups within society should not be allowed to interfere with the lives of the people, leaving matters of civil society to the people based upon public morals rather than private interests. This creates a third power within society, namely the civil society that reigns over the government and the private individual as that is where all matters take place and are negotiated among the individuals of society rather than another power. In addition, Kant noted âA third kind of right is necessary for the preservation of the state-the right of inspection (ius inspectionis). This requires that no association which could influence the public welfare of society (publicum), such as an association of political or religious illuminati, may be kept secret; at the request of the police, it must not refuse to disclose its constitution. But only in cases of emergency may the police search anyone's private residence, and in each case, they must be authorised to do so by a higher authorityâ (Kant 1797, 149). Although the government is not as important as civil society as discussed before, it does not mean that Kant believes that it should not have any duties to protect the public peace and the public morals. For this reason, Kant grants the government some powers to protect such interests like the right to inspect or enter private realms. Although this seems contradictory of his ideas discussed earlier, it must be noted that Kant believed that individuals must not interfere with one another and have the liberty to act within their own selfish interests. To maintain this standard, Kant tasked the government with creating laws that would create a sense of freedom in which the individual has the right to do as they please until their actions interfere with others' right to freedom. This therefore is the reasoning behind allowing the government to intrude in the private homes of the individual when there is a reasonable assumption that doing so would benefit the community and its aim for peace. Again, this establishes a boundary between the public and the private realms, implying that the people have this implicit limited right to privacy, but the concept of privacy is subject to the strives towards public peace and individual liberty. Kantâs main emphasis is the peace of society and is willing to put the needs of society above the interests of the private individual to achieve his main objectives of peace and liberty. The lines between the private, the public, and the government are further blurred in his discussion of rights and the public and government punishment for going against the morals set forward by civil society. Again, in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant said that âThe real definition would run thus: âRight in a thing is a right to the private use of a thing, of which I am in possession â original or derivative â in common with all others.â For this is the one condition under which it is alone possible that I can exclude every others possessor from the private use of the thing (jus contra quemlibet hujus rei possessorem). For, except by presupposing such a common collective possession, it cannot be conceived how, when I am not in actual possession of a thing, I could be injured or wronged by others who are in possession of it and use itâ (Kant 1797, 49). Kantâs main emphasis is the liberty one must do as they please without limiting the liberty those around him have as well. For that reason, Kant defines ârightâ or liberty above as a private matter because it is his to do whatever he wants with it. It is his and no one else to determine what an individual does or thinks so long as it does not interfere with the liberty of the people around him. This is a broad interpretation of privacy especially since Kant emphasizes the needs and the wishes of the public above the individual which contradicts the very idea of the individual having the right to do as he pleases. Other than private property, every human has the private possession of this right without interference from anyone else around him. However, Kant makes it known that there are limitations to these rights in the form of adhering to the public standards of morality and upholding the peace of civil society. It is in these instances that the idea of privacy is questioned and limited because it directly contradicts the actions and the intentions of the public and the government. Besides this private right Kant describes, he wrote that, âThe right of administering punishment is the right of the sovereign as the supreme power to inflict pain upon a subject on account of a crime committed by him. The head of the state cannot therefore be punished; but his supremacy may be withdrawn from him. Any transgression of the public law which makes him who commits it incapable of being a citizen, constitutes a crime, either simply as a private crime (crimen), or also as a public crime (crimen publicum). Private crimes are dealt with by a civil court; public crimes by a criminal court. Embezzlement or speculation of money or goods entrusted in trade, fraud in purchase or sale, if done before the eyes of the party who suffers, are private crimes. On the other hand, coining false money or forging bills of exchange, theft, robbery, etc., are public crimes, because the commonwealth, and not merely some particular individual, is endangered thereby. Such crimes may be divided into those of a base character (indolis abjectae) and those of a violent character (indolis violentiae). Judicial or juridical punishment (poena forensis) is to be distinguished from natural punishment (poena naturalis), in which crime as vice punishes itself, and does not as such come within the cognizance of the legislatorâ (Kant 1797, 104-105). Within the discussion of the right to privacy in relation to civil society, Kant discusses the ways in which the government are allowed and permitted to interact with the community. He thus concludes that when it comes to the concept of punishment, when the crime is committed in which there are no victims, the civil society will decide a punishment and in the cases in which more than one individual is involved, the state will decide a punishment. This again subjects the individual to another power, namely civil society, in which the individual not only sacrifices his own morals to, but also determines the standards for society and punishments as they see fit. This distinction between the public and the government creates another relationship between what is considered public to society and what is considered public to the government. Kantâs ideas suggest that the individual may be private from the government, but the individual cannot be private from the public in which they report to. Individuals can keep their morals private from the public, but in the end, the interests and the actions of the individual are public and subject to judgement from civil society. Compared to the relationship between the government and the people, the relationship between civil society and the private individual shows that the public is more important since it is invested in the life of the individual and since the individual is expected to subject itself to the morals established by the public. Kantâs emphasis on the public sphere and the clear difference between the public, the government, and the private sector reinstate the point that although the right to privacy is stated and valued to keep the government out of personal affairs, there are exceptions to this rule crucial for restoring justice within society.
REFERENCES:
Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Mary Gregor. Cambridge University Press. 1996.
Kant, Immanuel. Kant Political Writings. Edited by Hans Reiss. Cambridge University Press. 1970.
Lockean Thought/English Empiricism 🖉 edit
The issue of the right to privacy within the United States is a relatively new phenomenon following the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut in which the right to privacy was clearly established by the Supreme Court. However, it might be suggested that its origins and foundations can be traced back to the late 1600s when John Locke introduced the private sphere when it came to the conversation of religious tolerance. John Locke wrote âLetter Concerning Tolerationâ in 1689 that describes the way in which the right to privacy originates from the idea that the people can and should be separate from the government in certain aspects. Locke introduces the idea of a private sphere or the right to privacy when he discusses issues like religion since its discussion creates more problems preventing society from working efficiently. Locke recognizes that there are very divisive issues that prevent people from working together effectively within society. Specifically referring to spreading religious beliefs, he wrote that âIf by these means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and the erroneous convinced, there remains nothing further to be done but that such stubborn and obstinate persons, who give no ground to hope for their reformation, should be cast out and separated from the societyâ (Locke 1689, 30). Locke claims that the divisions within the public sphere over religion can be remedied by the complete separation of such matters from the state since religion is its own society. Religion dividing society is evident throughout history as nations and their people fought wars over their competing religious values and beliefs. For Locke the separation between the two and separating the state from religion was a way to avoid conflict within a nation and come to the general agreement that not everyone is going to agree on the matter of religion. However, Locke challenges his own idea of religious tolerance by saying that all religions except Atheists, Unitarians, and Catholics deserve tolerance because these groups prioritize religious law rather than political law. Locke recognizes the fact that a lot of the political issues revolve around religion and to focus on the commonwealth, matters of religion need to be subjected to the individual rather than being a concern of the state. Furthermore, upon the creation of the private sphere â...it will be urged still that civil assemblies are open and free for anyone to enter into, whereas religious conventicles are more private and thereby give opportunity to clandestine machinationsâ (Locke 1689, 51). Locke develops the idea that all religions must be tolerated within the government in the best interest of the commonwealth, leaving the political conversation open for political conversation as to how the government should be run. If the state sphere should interfere with the individual sphere, Locke claims that greater problems would arise as the government wields a seemingly tyrannical power. Locke proposes this idea of the private sphere in order to avoid problems within the political sphere, but alongside this proposal, he builds the foundation for a right to privacy that is valued so much today. The rest of his arguments include the point that there is a realm of privacy in which the individual makes decisions that they believe will best benefit them. It was from Lockeâs separation between the state and the individual that the right to privacy came to life off the premise that there is a place within society where the government should not be involved in the matters of the people. Locke continues for the advocation of a private sphere by claiming that, âIn private domestic affairs, in the management of estates, in the conservation of bodily health, every man may consider what suits his own convenience and follow what course he likes bestâ (Locke 1689, 34). Throughout his letter of toleration, and through the rest of his theory, he is critical of government intervention in the affairs of the people and emphasizes this private sphere as a place to escape government intervention. This sort of foundation and sentiment expressed by Locke gave the people the perspective that the state is going to act within their own self-interest which might mean being involved in the actions of the people. Locke again remedies this problem with the private sphere as a space where the government cannot get involved in the choices of the individual when it comes to their lives. Specifically, Locke subtly turns the conversation slightly away from religion and into the idea of affairs, property, and health in general as a part of the private sphere that the government should not be a part of. To the rest of society, the government has always been involved in the lives of the people, so to have this idea proposed that people can and should be independent of government intervention changed the way the people saw the government and the power they had over the lives of the people. In addition, Locke then claims that when the magistrate makes laws, â...a private person is to abstain from the action that he judges unlawful, and he is to undergo the punishment which it is not unlawful for him to bearâ (Locke 1689, 48). Locke paints a picture that the people can make decisions about the laws within this private realm that adds another dimension to the idea that the people have more power within their private space than they thought. Historically, the governments were involved in all affairs of the people, leaving them little room for voluntary actions that they wanted to pursue for themselves, and Lockeâs sentiments provides them the space to become free thinkers outside of the government. Although his writings are in specific reference to religion being in the private sphere, the later sentiments expand to other areas of life that would be affected had religion been placed within the private sphere. This allows the people to believe that other aspects of their life that have been controlled by the government can enter the private sphere where the government will not have any control over the efforts of the people themselves. This created a life where the people had private lives, where the government was not involved in the lives of the people and where the people made decisions for themselves. As people saw the potential for the private sphere, the right to privacy became more prevalent as a boundary between the state and the people developed, despite the boundary between the public and the private being unclear sometimes. Although this line is imprecise, Lockeâs notion of the private sphere when it comes to politics introduces the idea of the line in the first place and introduces a new level of understanding about the relationship between the people and the government. Locke created the idea of the private sphere based on the premise that doing so might help prevent a lot of the conflict that had been around during the time that created the bad relationship between the state and the people. However, by proposing this idea he shines light on the paradox on the relationship between rights in general and the government. It is the duty of the government to act within the interest of the people by providing them access to their rights regardless of what they are, but at the same time the government also wants to act within their self-interest to maintain law and order within society and therefore might see rights as an obstacle to their end goal. Furthermore, Locke writes about this topic in a time period where the legal framework looks incredibly different from what is present today and therefore writes from the perspective that religion causes these huge wars within nations and between major parties. All these factors contribute to the idea that the right to privacy has existed throughout history and throughout theory as criticism of government is an ongoing conversation that has many different perspectives and points of view. Lockeâs writings about creating a private sphere for religion only reflect the sentiments known today as the right to privacy that has changed the way that people have viewed the relationship between the people and the government.
REFERENCES:
Locke, John. 1983. âA Letter Concerning Tolerationâ, edited by James H. Tully. Hackett Publishing Company Inc.
Millian Utilitarianism 🖉 edit
When it comes to the rights and liberties bestowed upon an individual, there are some that seem inherent according to societyâs standards like the freedom of speech and religion, especially since some of these values are rooted in texts that have helped found the country. However, as time has progressed, there are new issues that expand the publicâs definition of rights and liberties and gives them a new vision as to what they may or may not have a right to. One of these rights is the right to privacy, a right in which there are various opinions, all of which are relatively new, yet there is a hindrance of commentary on these issues. John Stuart Mill has written various pieces including but not limited to On Liberty and The Subjection of Women in which he writes about the rights people inherently have and the values that people should have within society. Although it could be assumed that Mill creates a private realm in which individuals pursue their higher faculties away from society, Millâs view of privacy is extremely limited and whatever private realm there might be is subjected to teaching morals and values. Based off an initial reading of Mill, it might be assumed that a private sphere might exist in order to develop higher faculties away from the public. For example, Mill notes that, âA person whose desires and impulses are his ownâare the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own cultureâis said to have a character...Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through the newspapersâ (Mill 1859, 67). From here the reader reasonably infers that Mill would advocate for individuals to remove themselves from the public in order to reach their higher faculties since if one is not in the public sphere, the conclusion is that they are in the private sphere. However, as Mill goes on to describe his argument, he uses various examples to explain his philosophy and how the issue of the private and public spheres should be addressed. In the end, he turns to uses his own harm principle to argue that the state and the government should intervene in instances where the decisions one makes affect the prospects and the lives of the people around them. Due to this belief, he argues that the private sphere is severely limited by the governmentâs interest to protect the people from otherâs personal desires. Furthermore, Mill notes that âThat, this being supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavoring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartialâwho have a direct personal interest on one side, and that side the one which the State believes to be wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objects onlyâ (Mill 1859, 110). Alongside this argument, Mill describes several examples where government intervention is allowed when the decisions of the individual interfere with the lives and the decisions of other people. With that being said, there can be no existence of a private sphere for the government needs to protect individuals from the impulses they have that in Millâs philosophy warrant punishment by the government. The problem with the discussion of Mill and the private sphere is that he does not make any explicit claim about the right to privacy because of the necessity of government intervention from his point of view. Mill further describes this limited aspect of privacy in which the government is allowed to intervene so long as there is reason to intervene for the good of the rest of the population. For example, Mill writes that âThe State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over othersâ (Mill 1859, 116). This statement alone, despite not referring to the topic at hand, states clearly where he would stand on the issue of the right to privacy. One might claim that there could still be a private sphere especially since Mill does not dismiss the idea all together, but what is important to mention is that the state cannot intervene in matters of right and wrong without letting the individual be somewhat public. He names another example in which he claims âIf the government would make up its mind to require for every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of providing one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer class of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for themâ (Mill 1859, 116-117). In these matters, Mill claims that the government can control and regulate the way that children pursue their higher faculties through education since it is their liberty and goal to reach these faculties for the betterment of their character and overall well-being. Mill maintains this point of view that every individual has the right to live their best life, which he believes is attainable so long as people make decisions for themselves only and the state makes decisions to make sure that others cannot infringe on the lives of others. He recognized the ways that peopleâs individual private actions could injure one another, despite operating within this realm of personal liberty. He saw the way that life needed regulation based on the harm principle which allowed the government to intervene on private matters and push for a stronger public sphere to share ideas. Mill by no means wanted the government to control every aspect of the life of the individual, he wanted to merely hold the individual accountable for the way their decisions affected those around them. Mill continues within his other works to paint a picture as to what he wants society to look like and describes the ways in which having a private or domestic sphere can create a form of the right to privacy. Within The Subjection of Women Mill notes that, âAs regards the relations of private life it may be said generally, that their influence is, on the whole, encouraging to the softer virtues, discouraging to the sterner: though the statement must be taken with all the modifications dependent on individual characterâ(Mill 1861, 565-566). Millâs main emphasis is on the morally correct and doing the necessary things in order to achieve this moral good, especially since he believes that the society around him is declining due to the lack of morality and tendency for people to avoid pursuing their higher faculties. Since women are subjected to the household and are not given a role within the public sphere, it could be argued that women then are responsible for what would have been the private sphere since the home is their responsibility to maintain. It could be asserted that there is a private sphere in which the women or those at home are responsible for the moral development of the children and those living within the home. Within his writing about the home, the government plays no role in dictating how the morals are taught, therefore alluding to this right to privacy based on the premise that the home is a private space in which the government cannot intervene. In addition, Mill adds that âThere is no country of Europe in which the ablest men have not frequently experienced, and keenly appreciated, the value of the advice and help of clever and experienced women of the world, in the attainment both of private and of public objects; and there are important matters of public administration to which few men are equally competent with such women; among others, the detailed control of expenditureâ (Mill 1861, 580). Here, Mill describes the full capacity of women within the public sphere and particularly within the government but understands that the standards that society have during his time leave no space for women publicly. He uses this line to reference the power and influence that women already have over the private sphere despite societyâs perception of women. However, it should be noted that acting within their realm of liberty, they had this explicit right to privacy that allowed them to hold themselves accountable, therefore keeping the government out of their private lives. Therefore, Mill could take on the belief that if a private sphere should exist to develop and teach morals to children who then enter the public sphere and hopefully act within their best interests to pursue their higher faculties without intervening in the lives of others. What might be something to keep in mind about Mill and his idea of the right to privacy is the sense of Victorian morality that he writes about and his overall response to rights of any kind. He writes both works from the Victorian moral point of view which in turn is reflected in the way that he believes that society should be run and would agree about the way that life would be instructed upon these morals. It is this sense of morality that would go against most things that one might believe is not the concern of the public and Mill would want to spread his single version of morality because everyone should be morally upright according to the same standard. Despite this observation, Mill would also claim that holding oneself accountable is necessary to maintain this moral standard because individuals do not and should not depend on one another. Other than the right to privacy, his perspective on rights aligns with those of earlier philosophers so long as they fall within the utilitarian model and therefore benefit most of the people. However, this creates somewhat of a dilemma since any action or inaction could be seen to benefit the majority. The government could infringe on the inherent rights one has and claim that it be for the betterment of society that they control religion, speech, and property despite these being protected by many other philosophers. In that sense, it is hard to define from the Mill point of view what people do and do not have the right to within their system of government. The right to privacy from Millâs perspective is one that is hard to define and comes with various limitations that allow the government to intrude on the lives of the people.
REFERENCES:
Mill, John Stuart. âOn Liberty.â In John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray. Oxford Worldâs Classics, 1991.
Mill, John Stuart. âThe Subjection of Women.â In John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray. Oxford Worldâs Classics, 1991.
Postmodernism 🖉 edit
Postmodernists believe that societyâs expectations and norms of society are merely products of the capitalistic marketplace and the aesthetics that are formed around them rather than looking at the historical foundations of popular culture. These theorists typically are very skeptical of these norms because of the problems they have caused within society and believe that a simple solution can fix all problems, as most modernists propose. Therefore, postmodernists simply describe the standard for privacy that society currently holds and do not propose any true remedies to the problems they might have with the notion of privacy. Specifically, Jean-Francios Lyotard, Frederic Jameson, and Michael J. Shapiro all describe the aesthetics of privacy that society currently accepts and identifies how unrealistic privacy is within the capitalistic marketplace. They remain skeptical about how private individuals can be private in the modern world by creating marketplaces that are designed to invade the private sphere to pursue their capitalistic interests. Postmodernists like Lyotard, Jameson, and Shapiro claim that the idea of privacy does not truly exist due to the monopolization of personal information by corporations and used to maintain power; therefore, the existence of a private realm is unnecessary. Postmodernists take the position that privacy within society might not exist due to the monopolization of information by corporations to pursue their interests. For example, in the book Inhuman by Jean-Francios Lyotard, the author notes that âThrough innovation, the will affirms its hegemony over time. It thus conforms to the metaphysics of capital, which is a technology of time. The innovation 'works'. The question mark of the Is it happening?' stops. With the occurrence, the will is defeated. The avant-gardist task remains that of undoing the presumption of the mind with respect to time. The sublime feeling is the name of this privationâ (Lyotard 1988, 107). Lyotardâs observation proves that with the existence of information, whether it be private or public, corporations have been able to monopolize such information and use it to their advantage. Privatizing all information solidifies the power dynamic between those in power and those who feed into their power since such information is used to pursue their interests. Lyotard would also argue that there might not be such an idea of private information in general since general information is already public, and anyone or company can have access to this information to again use it for themselves. Due to this, he challenges the idea of the private realm even existing because of the way that information is easily accessible. However, Lyotard might also point out that the only privacy that exists within society is the privacy of the corporations that take all public entities and claim them and privatize them. He points out that culturally significant objects are also privatized by corporations, who then profit off of the nationâs sp. Lyotard would conclude that privacy only exists for the corporations who use the personal information around them to turn profits for themselves and their interests. Furthering this sentiment, Frederic Jameson wrote âThe definitive answer will come, of course, with the conception of a "logic of naturalism" that informs the other half of his title. For the moment there remains the nagging feeling that all this does come down to the "self" after all, and that the desperate or passional fantasies of productionism, romance, slavery, masochism, the gold standard, and hoarding or spending are all somehow attempts to square the circle and come to terms with the antinomy of the self as private property. This is nowhere affirmed as such, yet the theoretical or interpretive void in the endless chain of homologies somehow draws the reading mind toward what we may call the existential (if not the psychoanalytic) solution: the ontological priority of explanations in terms of the self over all the other levels. This is, in general, the fate of philosophies without "content" (in the Hegelian sense of the word), and in particular of philosophies that seek to exclude content as such: a kind of Lacanian "foreclusion" in which content is reintroduced back from the outside in the form of some compensatory and generally psychoanalytic bottom line (as in Tel Quel and some places in Derrida), the materials of the "self" proving more serviceable in the completion of a formalist system than the materials of history or the socialâ (Jameson 1997, 198-199). Like Lyotard, Jameson is skeptical of the private condition of the individual and whether it is a true institution within society or there for the aesthetic that society has created behind it. Unlike Lyotard, Jameson would say that the idea of the private is created for the formation of the âselfâ, prioritized and valued because of societyâs significance. Jameson claims that the concept of the âselfâ is not as important as people have made it out to be, and so it feeds back into the aesthetic of society rather than having any real significance. Jameson also claims that this sense of privacy stems from the media that pushes it forward to accommodate corporations pursuing their own interests. This sense of self is further broken down by society in which people are categorized and assigned labels that again have no meaning and disregard any sense of privacy and self that society values so deeply. Jameson would also claim that the increase in media technology makes any sense of privacy difficult to achieve and maintain because people can share their information across multiple platforms and therefore share that information with the corporations around them. Postmodernists, like all theorists, tend to describe what is in society and by, doing so, challenge the view of the world that most people hold without questioning the norms and possible solutions to the problem described. When applying postmodernity to political theory, Michael Shapiro noted that âOne can, in short, render boundaries innocuous by speaking unproblematically about "public" and "private" spheres, the "work place," "recreational space," and so on. What is left of the political process in this model is primarily a policing function that consists in the prevention of intrusions from one institutional setting to another. Clearly, there is a significant operation of power and authority in the production of those domains whose inviolability Walzer seeks to preserve. His version of the liberal discourse depoliticizes modernity's contemporary ground plan and serves as a legitimation rhetoric. It distributes discursive assets to those who control the flow of goods, commitments, and, in general, all valued outcomesâ (Shapiro 1992, 94). Part of addressing the issue of privacy again realizes the state of society, which Shapiro argues is this state of maintaining whatever power an individual may have or be able to own. To add to this notion, Shapiro would say that society already blurs the private and public boundaries to pursue their social actions and agenda. He concludes that there cannot just be two distinct realms that people can adhere to, especially because he claims that there is no end to history in which this is possible. He continues this argument with the claim that even if there were space for this sort of dichotomy, it would not matter because of the ability society should have to extract the political tendencies from each realm rather than regulating them. Shapiro adds to the sentiments of Lyotard and Jameson in that all three recognize the power dynamic that any aspect of privacy adds to society. Shapiro adds that this privacy aspect solidifies the power dynamics that again allow the rich to get richer and others to remain in their place. This causes postmodernists to try and reimagine the private sphere in order to dismantle and restore the power relations between the people and the corporations that have monopolies on privatized information. In addition, Jameson wrote that âWe have touched briefly on property relations in the postmodern in a previous chapter; suffice it to say now that in itself, private property remains that dusty and drearily old-fashioned thing whose truth one used to glimpse when traveling in the older nation states and observing, with Mr. Bloom's "grey horror" that sears the flesh, the hoariest antique forms of British commerce or French family firms (Dickens remaining the most precious imperishable afterimage of the juridical exfoliation of these entities, unimaginable crystalline growths like some cancerous Antarctica)â (Jameson 1997, 320-321). Essentially, Jameson proposes that society does away with the notion of private property because it reinstates the aesthetics and the history that have created the present problems. However, Jamesonâs answer to privacy is quite complicated because in other works, he explains that the government needs to protect the individualâs privacy from monopolies. It must be noted that postmodernists do not usually favor a solution in general because they believe that society is more complicated than any solution can fix the problems at hand. Therefore, Jameson and the others reflect on the realities of privacy and the state of society without any solid remedy to the problems they propose. However, there seems to be some consensus that the notion of privacy should be abandoned or dismissed until society can remedy the problems already present in society. For Jameson, it seems to be the case that the private life is something he believes is worth preserving, but he understands that the condition of the private life is diminishing and might not be realistic to maintain. For example, Jameson holds that the media is the reason for an individualâs lack of privacy since the media advertises products using private personal information corporations know will appeal to the consumer. Jamesonâs assertion that there can be no sphere of privacy comes from the sentiment that society is based on the capitalistic marketplace in which corporations try to make as much money as possible and obtain as much information about the population as possible. The key to understanding the postmodernist perspective is the realization that this skeptical view prevents any theorist from developing a solution to the problems they describe. They have read and concluded that modernists believe they can solve all the worldâs problems with their theories without looking at the implications or analyzing the world on a different level that questions the popular culture norms that dictate all decisions individuals make. For that reason, they propose no definitive solutions because they do not see the point in making decisions when the aesthetics and the norms of society have already been so deeply rooted in society. Therefore, making definitive decisions about things such as privacy is only there to describe the current state in which they exist, if they even exist. In the matter of the private realm, postmodernists would conclude that the existence of a private sphere does not exist based on the premise that the capitalistic society will monopolize private information for its benefit.
REFERENCES:
Jameson, Frederic. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Duke University Press Durham. 1997.
Lyotard, Jean-Francios. The Inhuman Reflections of Time. Stanford University Press. 1991.
Shapiro, Michael J. Reading the Postmodern Polity: Political Theory as Textual Practice. NED-New edition. University of Minnesota Press, 1992. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttsg7v.
Rousseau's Thought 🖉 edit
In Rousseau's works, there exist three states of society in which there are different and evolving stages of a right to privacy. First, there is the natural right to privacy in the state of nature. Next, there is society following the commencement of association and community. Finally, there is a society under the Social Contract. Rousseau believed that in the progression of different societies, privacy is slowly lost, first to other individuals, then to the government. In Rousseau's state of nature, humans act as individuals and do not intermingle with each other. Their projects never required "the joint labor of several hands," and they "lived free, healthy, honest, and happy lives" (Rousseau 1973, 92). These lives were completely independent of other humans. Humans roamed, hunted, and gathered alone; no one else had any power over him. Man was free to pursue "the only goods [he] recognized in the universe⌠food, a female, and sleep" (Rousseau 1973, 61). Life was simple, and humans had the right to do as they pleased, when they pleased, without anyone questioning why they were doing it. There was no overarching government or general will to encroach on the privacy of humans in nature. Humans "had no question⌠as to private likes or dislikes [as] all are alike" (Rousseau 2004). However, this simplicity of nature did not last forever. Eventually, humans came together to form societies due to the "two arts⌠which first civilized men and ruined society," metallurgy and agriculture (Rousseau 1973, 92). As society shifted from nature to civilization, humans signed a social contract to give away parts of their sovereignty to a new sovereign, the general will, a prince, a legislator, or a chief, for example. This society removed the natural freedom under which humans acted as they pleased without encroachment. However, they still held a right to privacy within a civilized society; however, it was much less than before. The second stage is where people can live in a state of the early community. This community lacks the oversight of a chief or government; however, unlike the state of nature, humans begin to associate with each other to sustain the new arts of metallurgy and agriculture. Since land is required to grow crops slowly, these early humans decided that "to secure each man his own, it had to be possible for each to have something" (Rousseau 1973, 94). This is the beginning of property, born from the manual labor of the farm, slowly allowing people to have their place where they can do whatever they want, also known as acting in their private interests. Metallurgy, on the other hand, "working metals and multiplying their uses," leads to the concept of value. People used these tools to better land plots and increase food production, among other things. Therefore, to acquire these irons and tools, people "required commodities in exchange" (Rousseau 1973, 94). These advancements gave value and worth to the ownership of items and land. As disparities began to develop between the people within these early communities, so too did the idea of jealousy and inequality (Rousseau 1973, 96). In a society with inequality and no authority to keep it in check, there then come individuals who will encroach on the privacy of other individuals. This threat to others is what slowly necessitates the tyranny of the government to establish peace and security in exchange for other losses of privacy. Once the social contract between humans and magistrates is established, people's liberties are immediately restricted compared to the state of nature and early societies. The average person signs away their liberties to their chief, establishing tyranny through the people's consent. The ordinary people sign "a contract binding on only one of the parties, where all the risk is on one side, and none on the other" (Rousseau 1973, 104). The magistrates take no risk in this exchange as they are not subject to their privacy being encroached upon, among other rights and liberties. However, just because the people sign away their freedoms to the legislature and chiefs does not mean they are entirely at the government's will. Rousseau does not believe that the government has complete control over the private actions and possessions of the common people. When discussing the right to ownership and sovereignty, Rousseau explains that the government limits how much power it has over people. Due to Rousseau's restricted discussion on privacy, we will have to look at the allusions made to it through the right to privacy. Taking the Lockean view that "'every man has a property in his person," we can assume that property "provides the foundation for the right to privacy" (DaCosta 2021, 2). If the government expects the people to respect their side of the social contract, it must uphold its end. In the case of property and privacy, Rousseau says that the government "has no right to touch the property of one or many; but he may lawfully take possession of the property of all" (Rousseau 2004). In other words, "the general and sovereign will is the master of all the others," showing that the will of the government must respect the people's privacy rights or else risk its demise (Rousseau 2004). This distinction between total and partial encroachment on rights shows Rousseau's exciting view on privacy and rights as a whole. Rousseau believed that the individual holds political rights; however, the government may take away the rights of every one in particular situations for the state's health. This general will also influence people's privacy; however, even this will is only "considered collectively and as a body, but each individual, as a subject, has his private and independent existence" (Rousseau 2004). Therefore, in a civilization, neither the general will nor the government can fully encroach on the citizens' privacy without the whole society falling apart. On the other hand, this freedom is nowhere near what it is in the state of nature, where people are entirely free to do as they please without the threat of government or general will even be considered a threat to that freedom of privacy.
REFERENCES:
Rousseau, Jean-Jaques. 1973. The Social Contract and Discourses. Translated by G. D. H. Cole. David Campbell Publishers
Rousseau, Jean-Jaques. 2004. Emile. The Project Gutenberg EBook of Emile. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5427/5427-h/5427-h.htm#link2H_4_0002
What do the major legal theories (positive law, natural law, critical legal studies, etc.) say about this right? 🖉 edit
Positive Law Positive law theory asks if the actions the government actor took would have been unlawful for a nongovernment actor to do in that jurisdiction (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1830, 1831). In other words, what does the written law allow? For instance, the model holds something to be a search if the government uses special legal powers to gain access to information (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1832). This model constrains the ability possessed by police to gain information from private parties while creating a predictable conception of privacy (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1856). Its use in the United States aims to add clarity to privacy expectations that is not had in the Katz test (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1869). Positive law theory was used in California v. Ciraolo and Florida v. Riley (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1867). Natural Law Locke is one of the primary natural law theorists. In his Two Treatises on Government: Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government (Essay Two) he discusses some of these rights which implicitly concern privacy in the State of Nature. In Chapter II: Of the State of Nature, he recognizes in section 6 that the laws of nature prevent âharm[ing] another in his life, health, liberty or possessionsâ (Locke, 1832, 107). All of these categories can be linked to laws today which protect privacy: mainly constitutional law in various countries, but also, for instance, the United States Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (1996). Critical Legal Studies Critical Legal Theorists believe law becomes intertwined with social issues causing each judge to have a somewhat different judgement in each case (Dworkin, 1977, 117). These differing torts and constitutional interpretations create varying implications in jurisdictions based on the weight precedents are given (Dworkin, 1977, 118). Dworkin recognizes that with this connection to social facts, the judiciary plays a bigger role in society (Waldron. 1999, 211). For instance, some judges may find a connection between the directly provided for protection of the right to liberty and implied right to privacy, while others may not (Dworkin, 1977, 117). Roberto Unger supports this example, writing in his essay ââCritical Legal Studies Movementââ that some rights give individuals âa zone of unchecked discretionary action that others ⌠may not invade,â reminiscent of Warren & Brandeisâs original claim to the right to privacy (Unger, 1983, 599). Legal Positivism Legal Positivism claims law depends on social facts, but the existence of law is not dependent on its merits or morals (Sevel & Leiter, 2010). H. L. A. Hart, a famed positivist, claimed that âlaw should be bound by limits and respect citizenâs privacyâ (van der Sloot, 1). Moreover, the state could not and should not regulate private conduct unless there was harm (van der Sloot, 1). Robert Burt claims Hart essentially follows Louis Brandeisâs âright to be let aloneâ (Burt, 2004, 14). Legal Realism Legal Realism is reading laws âin the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in questionâ (Macauley, 2005, 371). As such, legal realism expects the law to be constantly changing based on social conditions (Hall, 2005, 452). Calo claims privacy law exemplifies legal realism because of all of the exceptions, shifts with technology, and meanings dependent on other values and rights (Calo, 2019, 34). Despite privacy lawâs beginnings being rooted in legal realism, he recognizes that privacy scholars have not expressly used this legal theory (Calo, 2019, 34, 40, 48). United States Constitutional Theorists One would think defining the appearance of privacy rights in the United States Constitution to be easy, especially given the language of âpenumbrasâ used in Griswold v. Connecticut rather than citing one specific clause constitutional (Griswold v. CT, 1965, pars. 14-15). However, Scott Gerber demonstrated in his work Privacy and Constitutional Theory that all six of the constitutional theories of interpretation he presented can be used to find privacy rights in the Constitution (Gerber, 2000; Baker, 2004). Originalists: In his writing, Gerber (2000) posits that if an originalist interpreter wants to find privacy rights in the constitution, they can (167). Generally, those who do find privacy rights in the Constitution cite the Ninth Amendment (Gerber, 2000, 171). This is what Justice Arthur Goldberg cited in his Griswold concurrence and has been cited as such since James Madison wrote the amendment (Gerber, 2000, 171, 172). Living Constitutionalists (US): Living constitutionalists allow for precedents to be called upon. It can be argued this is what was done in Griswold v. CT and other substantive due process decisions on privacy, such as Boyd v. US in 1886 (Gerber, 2000, 178). In the Griswold majority opinion, Justice William Douglas argued that the Supreme Court had previously ruled on cases in which rights were not explicit in the Bill of Rights, but the rights were justifiable to the Court through the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965, par. 11).
REFERENCES:
Baker, T.E. (2004). Constitutional theory in a nutshell. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 13(1), 57-123. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1245&context=wmborj
Baude, W. & Stern, J.Y. (2016, May). The positive law model of the Fourth Amendment. Harvard Law Review 129(7), 1821-1889. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44072348
Burt, R. (2004). Moral offenses and same sex relations: Revisiting the Hart-Devlin Debate. Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series. https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/711/
Calo, R. (2019). Privacy Lawâs Indeterminacy. Theoretical Inquiries in Law 20(1), 33-52. https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2019-0001
Dworkin, R. (1977). Taking rights seriously. Harvard University Press. Gerber, S. (2000). Privacy and constitutional theory. Social Philosophy and Policy 17(2), 165-185. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002156
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479
Hall, E.L. (Ed.). (2005). The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
Locke, J. (2008). Concerning the true original extent and end of civil government. In R. Hay (Ed.), The Works of John Locke: In 10 volumes (Vol. V). Cosimo Classics.
Macaulay, S. (2005). The new versus od legal realism: âThings ainât what they used to be.â Wisconsin Law Review 2005(2), 365-403. From https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_8/tg2md/new_versus.pdf
Sevel, M. & Leiter, B. (2010). Legal Positivism. Oxford Bibliographies. https://doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0065
van der Sloot, B. (2017). Privacy as secondary rule, or the intrinsic limits of legal orders in the age of Big Data. In M. Dehmer and F. Emmert-Streib (Eds.), Frontiers in Data Science. CRC Press. https://bartvandersloot.com/onewebmedia/Privacy%20as%20secondary%20rule.pdf
Unger, R.M. (1983, Jan.). The Critical Legal Studies Movement. Harvard Law Review 96(3), 561-675. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1341032
Waldron, J. (1999) Law and Disagreement. Oxford University Press.