Rousseau's Thought
Rousseau's Thought
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| Freedom of Association | Philosophical Origins | Rousseau’s political philosophy is generally based on his assessment of familial association and its effect on human society. Most of his works describe the family as the basic form of human interaction, the creation of which is one of the first steps that the “savage man” takes toward civilization. His work does not deal with the right to freedom of association as it exists in modern political discourse, but it does reveal a support for mankind’s tendency to gather into groups with which to live, work, and prosper.
Association itself is key to Rousseau’s political philosophy because in his mind it is a building block for political society. In The Social Contract he writes that humans come together to form communities by surrendering certain “natural” rights and liberties in favor of certain “civil” rights and liberties, such as the protection of private property or the adherence to general ideals of justice. “The problem,” he says, “is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.” (43). While the “association” of which Rousseau writes here does not resemble the right to association that most modern states protect in one way or another, the author’s thoughts on this kind of community-building clearly influence his views on the creation of social associations within the broader community. In his “Discourse on Political Economy” Rousseau writes that Every political society is composed of other smaller societies of different kinds, each of which has its interests and its rules of conduct: but those societies which everybody perceives, because they have an external and authorised form, are not the only ones that actually exist in the State: all individuals who are united by a common interest compose as many others, either transitory or permanent, whose influence is none the less real because it is less apparent, and the proper observation of whose various relations is the true knowledge of public morals and manners. The influence of all these tacit or formal associations causes, by the influence of their will, as many different modifications of the public will. (“Discourse on Political Economy,” 211) In this passage the modern conception of political association is more easily identified. He seems to view the formation of these “smaller societies” which exist within the State and influence the public will as more or less inevitable, though he does not express any disapproval of their existence. Rousseau expands upon these views in his discussion of the social “circles” within Genevan political society, which he describes in his “Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert on the Theater” as the Genevan equivalent of social clubs in England. Again, he points out that the formation of these circles is a natural consequence of communal association, and points out that they do not pose any great danger to the State. “Of all the kinds of relations which can bring individuals together in a city like our own,” he believes that “the circles form incontestably the most reasonable, the most decent, and the least·dangerous ones, because they neither wish nor are able to be hidden, because they are public and permitted, because order and rule prevail in them” (“Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert, 108). These “circles” serve more of a social purpose than a political one, and Rousseau notes that they could potentially have negative consequences by encouraging men to drink too much or women to gossip in excess. He believes that they can influence the general will that governs an ideal community, but these associations do not form with specific political goals in mind. Having weighed the costs and benefits that they bring, Rousseau recommends that the Genevan state should “preserve the circles, even with their faults. For these faults are not in the circles but in the men who compose them; and there is no imaginable form of social life in which the same faults do not produce more harmful effects.” (“Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert,” 110). While his advocacy for the circles’ preservation does not directly indicate Rousseau’s support for freedom of association, his work at least shows an unwillingness to restrict people’s access to associational interaction within political society. References: Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Collected Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by Allan Bloom, Publ. for Dartmouth College by Univ. Press of New England, 2004, ia800705.us.archive.org/34/items/RousseauLetterToDAlembertPoliticsTheArtsAllanBloo m_20 1811/ Rousseau%20-%20%27%27Letter%20to%20D%27Alembert%27%27%3B% 20Politics%20%26%20the%20Arts%20[Allan%20Bloom].pdf. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, and G. D. H. Cole. The Social Contract; and Discourses. Dent, 1963, Online Library of Liberty, oll-resources.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/638/Rousseau_0132_EBk_v6.0.pdf. |
| Freedom of Expression | Philosophical Origins | In his First Discourse, Rousseau elaborates on the problems of moral inequality that he believes have arisen out of unrestricted expression by elites in art, science, and philosophy, determining that “the pernicious inequality created among men by the distinction of talents and the debasement of virtues” gives rise to humanity’s moral decay. Elite control over what information is deemed important in society “corrupts our judgment” and teaches children “everything but their duty” to their families and communities (The Essential Rousseau 1974, p. 222). At the end of the Discourse, Rousseau encourages readers to deny elite priorities in favor of an emphasis on local, communal, and individual needs:
“Let us not pursue a reputation which would escape us and which, in the present state of things, would never repay us for what it had cost us, even if we were all qualified to obtain it. Why should we seek our happiness in the opinion of our fellow men if we can find it in ourselves? Let us leave to others the task of instructing peoples in their duties, and limit ourselves to fulfilling our own; if we have that, we have all the knowledge we need” (p. 227). Similarly, in The Social Contract, Rousseau offers a political system to address part of this problem, outlining that the institution of his ideal body politic depends upon the “complete surrender of each associate, with all his rights, to the political community” and the allocation of each person “and all his power...under the supreme control of the general will” (p. 17). While Rousseau posits that ensures equal political conditions for all and disincentivizes decisions that do not benefit the whole community, such a system also includes harsh restrictions on individual freedom of expression as it is conventionally understood today. While Rousseau endorses open debate and dissent during the lawmaking process, censorship plays a prominent role in the enforcement of newly-created laws to more easily keep subjects content and make legislation better reflect the general will: “although the law does not regulate morals, it is legislation that gives birth to them…censorship can be useful for preserving morals, but never for restoring them” (p. 105). To Rousseau, the majoritarian nature of the sovereign “always tends toward the public good” and leaves little opportunity for dissent in the political process after laws have been passed (p. 26). The role of the “government” in Rousseau’s thought also imposes coercive restrictions on individual expression. In carrying out its responsibilities as an executive force, Rousseau believes that the government ought to compel individuals to abide by the decisions of the general will and suppress those who speak out against it–a responsibility Rousseau recognizes as vital to the continual existence of the sovereign (p. 52). Censorship is also a prominent element of the responsibilities of Rousseau’s lawgiver, the societal first mover who ought to “concern himself” with the “morals, customs...and public opinion” of a people in secret to maintain social order (p. 47). While debate and dissent concerning religious speculation ought to be tolerated, the moral authority outlined by the lawgiver must go unquestioned, as “open dissent from these opinions can be understood as at best a declaration of independence from the community and at worst a declaration of war against it” (Kelly 1997, 1241). Suppression of the minority opinion in Rousseauian society severely encroaches upon individual autonomy and the incentivization of censorship immediately following the legislative process further suppresses the ability for individual thought to exist outside of what is deemed legitimate by the legislative assembly. References: Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, and Lowell. Bair. The Essential Rousseau. New York: New American Library, 1983. Kelly, Christopher. “Rousseau and the Case for (and Against) Censorship.” The Journal of politics 59, no. 4 (1997): 1232–1251. |
| Freedom of Religion | Philosophical Origins | Rousseau’s works of political philosophy are among the first modern sources to discuss at length the rights of the citizen within political society. A contemporary of such thinkers as Voltaire and Locke, his work contributed to the growing Enlightenment movement of the eighteenth century. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Rousseau’s work conveys an air of skepticism about the importance and centrality of religion as a cornerstone for a successful society. Indeed, while his “Discourses on the Origin of Inequality” and The Social Contract certainly affirm the existence of a Supreme Being and even seem to advocate for the Christian faith at times, his discussions of rights and religion ultimately conclude that it is both unnecessary and even destructive for states to impose any belief upon their citizens.
One of Rousseau’s most important contributions to political theory is his description of the “Social Contract,” an arrangement by which various citizens agree to live in a community governed by the collective “Sovereign,” thereby giving up certain natural rights and liberties in exchange for civil rights and liberties. He writes that “What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses” (The Social Contract, 47). The Sovereign governs according to the General Will of the people, which is collectively determined by all citizens living together under the social contract. In Rousseau’s words, “the social compact sets up among the citizens an equality of such a kind, that they all bind themselves to observe the same conditions and should therefore all enjoy the same rights” (The Social Contract, 55). The equality of rights that the social contract creates among citizens is the basis of Rousseau’s belief in religious toleration. It implies that the community does not have the legitimate right to limit any citizen’s religious belief because as a citizen, a member of a minority religion would not wish to restrict religious freedom. Thus, the general will could never legislate against an individual’s religious beliefs. Of course, there are a number of cases in which Rousseau more directly advocates for religious toleration within the ideal political society. Being native to Calvinist-dominated Geneva, it would have been easy for Rousseau to praise religious homogeneity as a republican virtue. He did not do so, however, because he did not view religion as a strong base for sustainable government. In The Social Contract he notes that while Christian states often grow to be very strong, “the sacred cult has always remained or again become independent of the Sovereign, and there has been no necessary link between it and the body of the State” (The Social Contract, 1 29). Rousseau even goes as far as to imply that Christianity is incompatible with the creation of a perfect state because it opens the state up to abuses from figures like Cromwell and Cateline, bad Christians who brought turmoil to their Christian states (The Social Contract, 1 32). In the end, he concludes that religion should be practiced freely, because “the dogmas of that religion concern the State and its members only so far as they have reference to morality and to the duties which he who professes them is bound to do to others. Each man may have, over and above, what opinions he pleases, without it being the Sovereign’s business to take cognisance of them” (The Social Contract, 133). His position becomes even more clear in his “Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert on the Theater,” in which he writes that “in general, I am the friend of every peaceful religion in which the Eternal Being is served according to the reason he gave us. When a man cannot believe what he finds absurd, it is not his fault; it is that of his reason” (“Letter,” 11). Simply put: because a person cannot be forced to believe any one religion, it is unreasonable for a state to refuse religious liberty to its citizens. Rousseau’s toleration did have one limitation, however, which he shared with his pseudo-contemporary John Locke. Rousseau believed that the State ought not be able to dictate its citizens’ religions to them, but he did hold that all members of a political society should at least believe in a divine being of some kind. The Social Contract states that “it matters very much to the community that each citizen should have a religion,” because “that will make him love his duty” (133). Rousseau believed that good citizens must have some kind of religion to hold them accountable under the Social Contract. He advocates for the State to establish some basic moral code to which its citizens must abide, arguing that “while [the Sovereign] can compel no one to believe them, it can banish from the State whoever does not believe them—it can banish him, not for impiety, but as an anti-social being, incapable of truly loving the laws and justice, and of sacrificing, at need, his life to his duty.” (The Social Contract, 133). Even in this caveat, however, it is evident that Rousseau’s problem is not with atheism itself. His objection is to the inclusion of any citizen who cannot be trusted to look out for their fellows’ best interests within the context of the wider political society. As long as one is capable of this, he believes, the citizen should be free to practice whatever faith they desire. References: Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Collected Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by Allan Bloom, Publ. for Dartmouth College by Univ. Press of New England, 2004, ia800705.us.archive.org/34/items/RousseauLetterToDAlembertPoliticsTheArtsAllanBloo m_201811/Rousseau%20-%20%27%27Letter%20to%20D%27Alembert%27%27%3B% 20Politics%20%26%20the%20Arts%20%5BAllan%20Bloom%5D.pdf. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, and G. D. H. Cole. The Social Contract; and Discourses. Dent, 1963, Online Library of Liberty,oll-resources.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/638/Rousseau_0132_EBk_v6.0.pdf. |
| Privacy Rights | Philosophical Origins | In Rousseau's works, there exist three states of society in which there are different and evolving stages of a right to privacy. First, there is the natural right to privacy in the state of nature. Next, there is society following the commencement of association and community. Finally, there is a society under the Social Contract. Rousseau believed that in the progression of different societies, privacy is slowly lost, first to other individuals, then to the government.
In Rousseau's state of nature, humans act as individuals and do not intermingle with each other. Their projects never required "the joint labor of several hands," and they "lived free, healthy, honest, and happy lives" (Rousseau 1973, 92). These lives were completely independent of other humans. Humans roamed, hunted, and gathered alone; no one else had any power over him. Man was free to pursue "the only goods [he] recognized in the universe… food, a female, and sleep" (Rousseau 1973, 61). Life was simple, and humans had the right to do as they pleased, when they pleased, without anyone questioning why they were doing it. There was no overarching government or general will to encroach on the privacy of humans in nature. Humans "had no question… as to private likes or dislikes [as] all are alike" (Rousseau 2004). However, this simplicity of nature did not last forever. Eventually, humans came together to form societies due to the "two arts… which first civilized men and ruined society," metallurgy and agriculture (Rousseau 1973, 92). As society shifted from nature to civilization, humans signed a social contract to give away parts of their sovereignty to a new sovereign, the general will, a prince, a legislator, or a chief, for example. This society removed the natural freedom under which humans acted as they pleased without encroachment. However, they still held a right to privacy within a civilized society; however, it was much less than before. The second stage is where people can live in a state of the early community. This community lacks the oversight of a chief or government; however, unlike the state of nature, humans begin to associate with each other to sustain the new arts of metallurgy and agriculture. Since land is required to grow crops slowly, these early humans decided that "to secure each man his own, it had to be possible for each to have something" (Rousseau 1973, 94). This is the beginning of property, born from the manual labor of the farm, slowly allowing people to have their place where they can do whatever they want, also known as acting in their private interests. Metallurgy, on the other hand, "working metals and multiplying their uses," leads to the concept of value. People used these tools to better land plots and increase food production, among other things. Therefore, to acquire these irons and tools, people "required commodities in exchange" (Rousseau 1973, 94). These advancements gave value and worth to the ownership of items and land. As disparities began to develop between the people within these early communities, so too did the idea of jealousy and inequality (Rousseau 1973, 96). In a society with inequality and no authority to keep it in check, there then come individuals who will encroach on the privacy of other individuals. This threat to others is what slowly necessitates the tyranny of the government to establish peace and security in exchange for other losses of privacy. Once the social contract between humans and magistrates is established, people's liberties are immediately restricted compared to the state of nature and early societies. The average person signs away their liberties to their chief, establishing tyranny through the people's consent. The ordinary people sign "a contract binding on only one of the parties, where all the risk is on one side, and none on the other" (Rousseau 1973, 104). The magistrates take no risk in this exchange as they are not subject to their privacy being encroached upon, among other rights and liberties. However, just because the people sign away their freedoms to the legislature and chiefs does not mean they are entirely at the government's will. Rousseau does not believe that the government has complete control over the private actions and possessions of the common people. When discussing the right to ownership and sovereignty, Rousseau explains that the government limits how much power it has over people. Due to Rousseau's restricted discussion on privacy, we will have to look at the allusions made to it through the right to privacy. Taking the Lockean view that "'every man has a property in his person," we can assume that property "provides the foundation for the right to privacy" (DaCosta 2021, 2). If the government expects the people to respect their side of the social contract, it must uphold its end. In the case of property and privacy, Rousseau says that the government "has no right to touch the property of one or many; but he may lawfully take possession of the property of all" (Rousseau 2004). In other words, "the general and sovereign will is the master of all the others," showing that the will of the government must respect the people's privacy rights or else risk its demise (Rousseau 2004). This distinction between total and partial encroachment on rights shows Rousseau's exciting view on privacy and rights as a whole. Rousseau believed that the individual holds political rights; however, the government may take away the rights of every one in particular situations for the state's health. This general will also influence people's privacy; however, even this will is only "considered collectively and as a body, but each individual, as a subject, has his private and independent existence" (Rousseau 2004). Therefore, in a civilization, neither the general will nor the government can fully encroach on the citizens' privacy without the whole society falling apart. On the other hand, this freedom is nowhere near what it is in the state of nature, where people are entirely free to do as they please without the threat of government or general will even be considered a threat to that freedom of privacy. REFERENCES: Rousseau, Jean-Jaques. 1973. The Social Contract and Discourses. Translated by G. D. H. Cole. David Campbell Publishers Rousseau, Jean-Jaques. 2004. Emile. The Project Gutenberg EBook of Emile. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5427/5427-h/5427-h.htm#link2H_4_0002 |
| Voting Rights and Suffrage | Philosophical Origins | In Rousseau's Social Contract, he discusses how society is designed to be a give and take between governors and the governed. This relationship is probably most evident in his discussion on elections and democracy. Rousseau believes that democracy is a perfect form of government, as it holds the sovereign to the general will and separates the "maker of laws [from the one] to execute them" (Rousseau 1953, 71). However, there are many flaws with democracy in Rousseau's mind, primarily being born from the inherent flaws of the people within it. People need the government to be governed as they are not perfect; therefore, there will always be problems with the "influence of private interests in public affairs" (Rousseau 1953, 71). This influence of personal interest coupled with the struggle of forming a society "where the people can readily be assembled" for matters of state like a true democracy requires (Rousseau 1953, 72). For both of these requirements to be met, the government must only control a small amount of land with a small population "where each citizen… [is] well acquainted with all the rest" (Rousseau 1953, 72). These criteria allow for a society that can always gather to discuss policy and legislation for each person to cast their vote on each issue presented. However, these criteria, the elimination of personal interest and a small state, are nearly impossible to establish in society sustainably. Inevitably, personal interest, corruption, or any other inhibitor will get in the way, or a city’s population will increase too much and that is why Rousseau believes that "so perfect a form of government is not for men"' (Rousseau 1953, 73).
Having a small and compact state is also a utilitarian view. Rousseau knows that for voters to want to participate, they will need to think that their vote matters, for example: "suppose that this state consists of ten thousand citizens… thus the sovereign is as ten thousand to one; that is to say, every member of the state has, as his own share, only one ten-thousandth part of the sovereign power, although he is subject to the whole" (Rousseau 2004) . Therefore, if you make the republic bigger, let us say this time the republic is "composed of one hundred thousand men, the position of the subjects is unchanged, and each continues to bear the whole weight of the laws, while his vote, reduced to the one hundred-thousandth part, has ten times less influence in the making of the laws" (Rousseau 2004) . This means that as the republic thrives and grows, it will become more prominent, and therefore less liberty is guaranteed through the republic's own institutions (Rousseau 2004) . However, Rousseau's apprehension toward a true democracy does not mean that he does not believe in citizens' right to vote. Since Rousseau identifies direct or perfect democracies as implausible, he discusses the two main ways magistrates, legislators, and the prince should be appointed. Rousseau agrees with Montesquieu in that "'selection by lot… is natural to democracy'" (Rousseau 1953, 119). This is because a democracy facilitates a community "in which each member can participate unreservedly" (Watt 1981, 719), acting on their right to vote and even having "'a reasonable hope of serving his country'" (Rousseau 1953, 119). However, the act of desiring a political position, as prospective representatives would need to campaign for election, is a personal interest that Rousseau sees as a hindrance to government. Rousseau criticizes Montesquieu by pointing out that in a "democracy, public office is not an advantage but a heavy responsibility" (Rousseau 1953, 119-120). Because of this, Rousseau believes that the Venetian and Athenian system for appointing legislators is better for democracy than vote by lot. Since the "selection of rulers is a function of government, and not of sovereignty," and that "common sense, judgment, and integrity [should be] sufficient" in all candidates, then sortition, which appoints the legislators by random chance, allows for a government without infighting and personal interest influencing the functions of government (Rousseau 1953, 119-120). However, even in this system, Rousseau believes that the public should still have a say when voting to "fill those positions which demand particular talents, such as military officers" (Rousseau 1953, 121). The military is exempt from the duty which is associated with public office as it is a position which does not need to follow the general will. The government must be run by the people and not be diluted by their opinions. Therefore, the military can be elected, while the legislator must be appointed by random chance. This is where Rousseau's concept of the general will come in and starts playing a role in his view on voting. Whether it is the public voting on a member of the government or legislators voting on policy, there will always be a majority and minority, which will form based on differing opinions about what is best for the republic. Rousseau stresses that within the assemblies of government, "the more agreement there is…, the more also does the general will prevail" (Rousseau 1953, 116). Therefore, the more "long debates, dissensions, and tumult" allowed within the assemblies leads to the "ascendancy of private and particular interests and the decline of the state" (Rousseau 1953, 116). Rousseau's solution to this dissent to the general will is "unanimous consent" (Rousseau 1953, 117). If the general will is being challenged, then the only way to refine it is only to pass legislation on which everyone agrees. While technically still allowing each magistrate to vote on policy, this leaves their votes meaning nothing unless everyone can agree. This dilutes the power of each person's vote even further, making the dissent and long discussion that Rousseau pointed to as the things that made the state's decline necessary. Therefore, while Rousseau believes that there is a right to vote, there are restrictions on the power that each person's vote holds due to the chance of the general will being deteriorated by personal interests and intrigues. While the people's right to vote is guaranteed in democracies, Rousseau does not believe it is an inherent right in all governments. He is relatively straightforward about monarchies stating that "neither sortition nor election has any place in a monarchical government," going further to say that "the monarch is by right the sole prince and magistrate, the choice of his lieutenants belongs to him only" (Rousseau 1953, 121). Therefore, monarchs have the right to hold the sole authority in the government and do not have to give the people the power to vote due to their monarchical rights. However, even in republics, there are situations in which Rousseau believes the right to vote can be curbed. Taking from the Roman institution of the dictator, Rousseau believes that if "the greatest dangers are great enough to equal the danger of changing the public order," then the rule of law may have to be set aside to remedy the dangers (Rousseau 1953, 136). Therefore, the government must "increase the activity of the government" to counteract the issue, and Rousseau believes that "if the peril is such that the apparatus of law itself is an obstacle to security, then [the state] must appoint a supreme ruler who will silence the law" (Rousseau 1953, 137). This ruler's sole goal would be to see that "the state does not perish," and to do this the dictator will use their authority to ensure that "there is no doubt as to the general will" (Rousseau 1953, 137). The dictator will unify the government citizenry of the republic and enforce his will to save the state. However, the dictator must remove the people's voice in the assemblies and their say as to who will be legislators. They will curb the "long debates, dissensions, and tumult" which lead to the "decline of the state," effectively silencing dissenters and saving the state at the expense of the citizens' rights. Therefore, while Rousseau believes in the right to vote, he only believes that a citizen's vote should hold so much power. Furthermore, in some instances, these votes should hold no power, depending on the threats to the state and the form of government. References: Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1953. Political Writings. Translated and edited by Frederick Watkins. The University of Wisconsin Press. Watt, E. D. 1981. “Rousseau Réchaufée-Being Obliged, Consenting, Participating, and Obeying Only Oneself.” The Journal of Politics Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 707-719. https://www-jstor-org.libproxy.furman.edu/stable/2130633?seq=13#metadata_info_tab_contents Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 2004. Emile. The Project Gutenberg EBook of Emile. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5427/5427-h/5427-h.htm#link2H_4_0002 |