Traditions
Are there any philosophical or moral traditions that dispute the classification of this right as a fundamental right?
| Right | Breakout | Contents |
|---|---|---|
| Freedom of Association | While freedom of association is a fundamental human right today, it has not always been recognized as such. Furthermore, several philosophers stretching from the Enlightenment period to the 20th century have argued for restrictions to be placed on freedom of association, rendering it a conditional right. Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, and Carl Schmitt are four such philosophers who, despite being products of varying centuries, disputed the classification of freedom of association as a fundamental and unconditional right in their respective social, political, and economic contexts.
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) Hobbes viewed freedom of association as an important social right, but not as a fundamental or unconditional one. Freedom of association was subject to political authority under the agreement that both the citizens and authority entered into to maintain societal and political order. This agreement exists to counter the natural state of human life which is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes). By giving up some freedom and liberty in exchange for order, protection, and security from the sovereign or authority, the natural state of humanity can be counteracted (Lloyd). Hobbes emphasized that while individuals are allowed to form relationships and create associations with others, these groups are ultimately subordinated to the sovereign, who can dissolve associations for the good of society to maintain peace and order. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) Rousseau’s views on freedom of association are heavily centered on his ideal of a social contract. This is a relationship that exists between the individual and the state in which the individual experiences no net loss of freedom, but rather exchanges some of his natural freedom for civil freedom (Bertram). In his seminal work The Social Contract, Rousseau explains this exchange by emphasizing that man should promote the common good of society over his own interests: “Each citizen would then be perfectly independent of all the rest, and at the same time very dependent on the city; which is brought about always by the same means, as the strength of the State can alone secure the liberty of its members.” (Rousseau, 24). The main issue with unconditional freedom of association came from his claim that “the required degree of social cohesion could not, in practice, be achieved merely through appeal to rational self-interest” (Chappell). This is not to say that Rousseau believed in stamping out individuality in its entirety, just that devotion to a stable political and societal status quo should be the main priority of civilized societies. Karl Marx (1818-1883) Marx held a more complex view of freedom of association than other political philosophers. His philosophy was rooted in a socially mediated economic structure that would then, in turn, impact a society's political and social practices—he believed in abolishing private ownership of production (capitalism) and instead establishing collective ownership (socialism or communism). He believed that capitalist systems limit and distort freedom of association because of their economically exploitative and class-based structures; relationships in capitalist societies are never between “individuals,” but rather between “workers and capitalist, between farmer and landlord” (Marx, 44). Socialist or communist political and societal structures would allow freedom of association because individuals could unite freely based on their interests and needs (Jian-xing, 351). Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) Schmitt was a prominent member of the Nazi party, and his views on freedom of association are very much influenced by his “anti-democratic and anti-liberal” political beliefs (Frye, 818). In a similar approach to Hobbes, Schmitt believed that freedom of association is an important but highly conditional right that is subject to a central authority. If associations prove to be a threat to the central authority or order of society, the authority must dissolve them (Vinx). He stipulates that the decisions of the authority should not be influenced by external morals, but rather solely based on political reasoning (Vinx). His parameters on freedom of association raise concerns over the potential to justify authoritarianism and the abuse of democratic principles.
Bertram, Christopher, "Jean Jacques Rousseau", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/rousseau/>. Chappell, Richard. “Rousseau and Freedom.” Philosophy, et cetera, April 27, 2005. https://www.philosophyetc.net/2005/04/rousseau-and-freedom.html. Frye, Charles E. “Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political.” The Journal of Politics 28, no. 4 (1966): 818–30. https://doi.org/10.2307/2127676. Hobbes, Thomas. “The Project Gutenberg eBook of Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes.” Edited by Edward White and David Widger. The Project Gutenberg eBook of Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes, March 27, 2021. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm. Jian-xing, Y., Jun-guo, C. A reconsideration of Marx’s idea of “association of free individuals”. J. Zhejiang Univ.-Sci. 2, 348–355 (2001). https://doi-org.uc.idm.oclc.org/10.1007/BF02839474 Lloyd, Sharon A. and Susanne Sreedhar, "Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/hobbes-moral/>. Marx, Karl. Edited by Matthew Carmody. The Poverty of Philosophy, 2009. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/. Rousseau, Jean-Jaques. Translated by G.D.H/ Cole. The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right. Accessed July 13, 2023. https://discoversocialsciences.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Rousseau-Social-Contract.pdf. Sowell, Thomas. “Karl Marx and the Freedom of the Individual.” Ethics 73, no. 2 (1963): 119–25. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2379553. Vinx, Lars, "Carl Schmitt", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/schmitt/>. Williams, Garrath. “Thomas Hobbes: Moral and Political Philosophy.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed July 11, 2023. https://iep.utm.edu/hobmoral/. | |
| Freedom of Expression | Freedom of expression is recognized in many philosophical and moral traditions as a fundamental right. Communitarianism is described as “…the idea that human identities are largely shaped by different kinds of constitutive communities (or social relations) and that this conception of human nature should inform our moral and political judgments as well as policies and institutions.” (Bell 2024). The core idea argues that communities shape our judgements and that humans have an obligation to support the communities that shaped their judgements. Since the core idea of communitarianism is that the community comes before all else, this means that basic freedoms, including freedom of expression, must be balanced against the needs and values of the community. Community cohesion is paramount to communitarianism, and in certain communities, freedom of expression could undermine social order. Some forms of expression could prove harmful to the community, so this philosophy argues that those expressions should be censored (Bell 2024).
Freedom of expression was not recognized for much of history. Freedom of expression was seen in ancient Athens, but there were philosophers that disputed it. Plato wrote in Republic against freedom of expression. Republic is a theory for a perfect city, and Plato believed that some form of censorship would be needed. Plato doesn’t disagree with freedom of expression; he believes it is a valuable tool to be used by philosophers and just men.
Bell, Daniel. “Communitarianism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, Summer 2024. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2024. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/communitarianism/. Glaun, Dan. “Germany’s Laws on Antisemitic Hate Speech and Holocaust Denial.”. FRONTLINE (2021). https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/germanys-laws-antisemitic-hate-speech-nazi-propaganda-holocaust-denial/. | |
| Freedom of Religion | Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) protects an individual’s right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. The classification of freedom of religion as a fundamental right is to allow public choice of worship and to ensure protection from persecution on religious grounds and from conformity to a cultural majority through government influence. A state authority cannot interfere with how one chooses to worship or practice their religion, or whether one chooses if they worship at all. However, there is a philosophical and moral tradition of state secularism that challenges the classification of this freedom.
From a secular state perspective, a state with separation between religious institutions and law making bodies or governance powers, is intended to offer a neutral standpoint on the matter of religion. The institutional order separates church and state, in order to prevent religious powers from advancing their interests with the use of political influence, and to keep political duties prioritized over religious obligations. “In a secular state, the protection of freedom of conscience and the equal treatment of people in religious matters does require restrictions on religious freedom in official spaces (Castro, 2021)” This perspective puts into question how fundamental religious freedom really is in practice compared to the freedom of conscience, whether in a public or private manner. Hobbes suggests that rather than separation of church and state, the subordination of church to the state for the sake of survival through unity is well within the authority of the state (Curley, 2015, 2). Unity through a common religion would then in theory benefit the survival of the state. In Leviathan, Hobbes discusses the Rights of Sovereigns by Institutions, articulating how the sovereign is judge of what is necessary for the peace and defense of its subjects, including the judgment of what doctrines are fit to be taught by them (Hobbes, 1651, XVIII). In his analysis, Edwin Curley discusses the extent to Hobbsian theory where he believes this repression is just so far it does not exceed its limits. “Repression of thought and expression beyond what is necessary for political purposes is not only an abrogation of the sovereign's duty, it is counter-productive, provoking bitterness and resentment, and undermining the loyalty of his subjects (Curley, 2015, 3). While there is still the right to private conscience, as long as one adheres to the doctrines of the state publicly, based on the previous argument, Hobbes advocates for the private beliefs of whatever one chooses, as long as it does not affect the actions of an individual as a subject to the sovereign state. “Hobbesian theory states that laws bind actions; people are thus free to do whatever they like as long as this doing stays in their thoughts (Tralau, 2011, 67).” This restriction on free practice, public or private, and the individual classifications of religious liberty and liberty of conscience, declassify freedom of religion as a fundamental right completely, but still includes freedom of conscience as acceptable under the limit that it still does not threaten the state. According to this theory by Hobbes, Freedom of conscience is the only guaranteed element of this freedom, truly classified as a fundamental right, in order to avoid disparity and conflict within the body of state subjects. While Hobbes advocated for absolute state authority, removing religious freedom from the state completely, the secular state allows religious liberty but only to an extent. In both a Hobbesian state and a secular state, freedom of conscience can only truly be protected as a fundamental right, to ensure true neutrality or stability. Freedom of conscience and religion combat one another in each of these perspectives, thus disputing the classification of freedom of religion in the philosophical tradition of a Hobbesian state, or a moral tradition of state secularism and neutrality.
Curley, Edwin. 2015. “Hobbes and the Cause of Religious Toleration.” https://sites01.lsu.edu/faculty/voegelin/wp-content/uploads/sites/80/2015/09/Edwin-Curley.pdf. Hobbes, Thomas. April 1651. Leviathan. “The Project Gutenberg EBook of Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes.” n.d. Www.gutenberg.org. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm#link2H_4_0215. Tralau, Johan. 2011. “Hobbes Contra Liberty of Conscience.” Political Theory 39, no. 1: 58–84. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23036034?seq=14. |