US exceptions

Are there any exceptions in American law to this right?

Right	Breakout	Contents
Freedom of Association		Yes. As seen in Roberts v. US Jaycees, the right may be weighed against other state interests, especially when the association in question is neither expressive nor intimate. In that case, free association rights were curtailed to ensure adherence to non-discrimination laws. Additionally, a significant exception to free association rights in the United States is witnessed through legislation regarding political parties. For example, in New York State Board of Elections vs. Lopez Torres, the court claimed, A political party has a First Amendment right to limit its membership as it wishes, and to choose a candidate-selection process that will in its view produce the nominee who best represents its political platform. These rights are circumscribed, however, when the state gives a party a role in the election process...Then for example, the party’s racially discriminatory action may become state action that violates the Fifteenth Amendment Demonstrated by New York State Board of Elections vs. Lopez Torres, if a party associates with discriminatory or racist behavior, it cannot be involved in the state’s election process, demonstrating a limitation on free political association. Additionally, sections of the Federal Election Campaign Act are often interpreted to be exceptions to free association, as they require the public disclosure of individuals’ political donations. This position was echoed by the Buckley v. Valeo ruling, where the Supreme Court argued that new campaign finance laws, “impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedom of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions.” Thus, witnessed by Buckley v. Valeo, campaign finance laws may be interpreted as an exception to free association, as one cannot privately financially contribute to the political party they associate with. Within universities, freedom of association, specifically the right to associate as an exclusive religious group, may be regulated by anti-discrimination clauses. This was observed in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, where the court ruled in favor of Hastings’ College of Law’s anti-discrimintation policies, which prohibited Christian student group’s from excluding non-christians. Therefore, on university campuses, individuals must be able join any student group, regardless of their religious association. Ultimately, this decision restricted the parameters of free association, as one cannot actively discriminate on the basis of it. Consequently, decided by Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, certain groups can legally exclude individuals from associating with them. Furthermore, if an individual’s beliefs do not coincide with the group’s mission, the individual may be prohibited from membership. Specifically, the court claimed that by mandating the Boston Veterans’ Council to include Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual individuals in their parade, the Massachusetts State Court, “violates the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say.” Thus, while still restricting free association, the ruling counters Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, as individuals can be restricted from associating with certain groups if it is deemed that their identity does not conform to the group’s platform. Ultimately, these exceptions arise from the implicit nature of the freedom of association within the Constitution, as what qualifies as “association” is highly subject to interpretation by Supreme Court justices. For this reason, depending on who is sitting on the bench, freedom of association can be left unchecked or potentially be highly restricted. References: Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010), Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008) Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)
Freedom of Expression		Several Supreme Court cases have placed restrictions on the right to free expression, creating exceptions to the First Amendment. For example, in Schenk v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that free expression is not constitutionally protected when it will “to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent.” The qualifications for limiting dangerous speech were later established by Brandenburg v. Ohio: “Freedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Additionally, there is a legal exception for “fighting words”. This was decided by the Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire decision, where the court upheld that it was illegal for Walter Chaplinsky to call a police officer “a damned Fascist.” Another exception to the First Amendment is obscene language. In Miller v. California, the court clarified what qualifies as obscene language, which was described as speech that “To the average person, applying contemporary community standards, appeal to the prurient interest; Depict or describe, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct, as specifically defined by the applicable state law, and taken as a whole, lack any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Therefore, expression that falls under these standards may be regulated. Defamation, “a statement that injures a third party’s reputation” (Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School), is an additional exception to freedom of expression in the United States. The standards for defamation were established in New York Times Company v. Sullivan, which claimed that in order to sue a news outlet for defamation, one must have proof that the outlet was aware of their false claims prior to publishing. Lastly, commercial speech may be regulated in order to protect consumers. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York, the Court described a four-part test for determining whether or not the government could limit commercial speech: “At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” Ultimately, demonstrated by these numerous cases, although the United States Constitution upholds freedom of expression, there are various exceptions to the First Amendment. References: Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 48 (1919): https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/249/47/ Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969): https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/395/444/ Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 572; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942): https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/315/568/ Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 37 (1973): https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/413/15/ New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964): https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/376/254/ Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 US 566 (1980): https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/557/ Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/defamation#:~:text=Defamation%20is%20a%20statement%20that,for%20defamation%20and%20potential%20damages.
Freedom of Religion		Based upon the Constitution and the First Amendment, the federal government is, by law, not permitted to limit the exercising of one’s right to freedom of religion, but this specific clause did not apply at the state level (Lutz 2013). Eventually the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, extending more religious freedoms as a guaranteed right to the states. However, in the actual application of the freedom of religion, the US relies upon Supreme Court decisions as a guide to the manner in which the right is exercised. In 1878, in the case of Reynolds v. United States, the Mormon Church legally challenged the 1862 Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act in efforts to continue their polygamist practices according to their beliefs and interpretations of their religion. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the US, citing that the law did not interfere with religious belief nor did it selectively target religious practice. In essence, “while the freedom to believe is absolute, the freedom to act on those beliefs is not” (Freedom Forum Institute 2020). Chief Justice Morrison Waite wrote, “To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and, in effect, permit every citizen to become a law unto himself” (Lutz 2013). This decision was later reinforced in 1990, with the case of Employment Division v. Smith. After Alred Smith was fired from his job for using peyote, a controversial and, at that time, illegal hallucinogenic plant used in some religious rituals within the Native American Church, he sued the employment division under the law’s protection of “free exercise” (Cornell Legal Information Institute 2020). The Court ruled in favor of the Employment Division citing that the reason for the termination was work-related misconduct. Scalia stated that, allowing this kind of exemption from the law “would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.” Eventually in 1994, however, this decision was reversed with the passing of the H.R. 4230 amendment to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act which protected the use of peyote in religious ceremonies. Also notably, the Sherbert v. Verner case of 1963 established the four-part “Sherbert test.” This test is also referred to as the “compelling interest” test. The test’s four parts are that: “For the individual, the court must 1. determine whether the person has a claim involving a sincere religious belief, and 2. whether the government action places a substantial burden on the person’s ability to act on that belief. Next, if these two elements are established, then the government must prove that 1. it is acting in furtherance of a “compelling state interest,” and that 2. it has pursued that interest in the manner least restrictive, or least burdensome, to religion” (Freedom Forum Institute 2020). However, the test was undermined in the ruling of the Employment Division v. Smith case because of the court’s implication that one could not legally and successfully challenge an infringement upon free exercise if the unintended result was to break laws that were generally applicable to all (and it permitted that the government did not have to justify this infringement by proving a compelling state interest). Also, these rulings were all made at the federal level; many states still control the ultimate application of “free exercise,” and as a result, the interpretation varies in differing states. Another notable case is the 1968 case of Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises (Justia 2020). This case backed anti-discriminatory statutes after a barbecue chain refused to serve black people with the justification of the owner being that his beliefs compelled him to segregate races within his restaurants. This case was monumental because it well-established the limit to freedom of religion that allows for the weaponizing of one’s rights against another man. The courts also uses other tests in determining decisions regarding freedom of religion. The three-part Lemon test from the 1971 decision Lemon v. Kurtzman (which prohibited state funding of religious schools) states that 1. a court must first determine whether the law or government action in question has a compelling state and secular interest, underlining the idea that government should only concern itself in civil matters and should interfere with matters of individual religion as little as possible. 2. The state action must be proved to have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. And 3. the court must consider whether the action in question excessively entangles religion and government (Pacelle Jr.). Although criticized by several Supreme Court justices, some courts still use this test in establishment-clause cases. However, in the 1997 decision Agostini v. Felton, the Supreme Court finally modified the Lemon test in that it combined the entanglement and primary effects prongs of the test. The endorsement test, proposed by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her concurring opinion in the 1984 case of Lynch v. Donnelly, asks whether a particular government action amounts to an endorsement of religion (Hudson Jr.). This test has sometimes been assumed to fall into the Lemon test. It is similar to the first two prongs of the Lemon test by subjecting the challenged government act to the criteria of having the purpose or effect of endorsing religion. This test typically is invoked where the government is involved in expressive activities such as graduation prayers, religious signs on government property, religion in the curriculum, etc. Under the coercion test, the government does not violate the establishment clause unless it provides direct aid to religion in a way that would establish a state church or unless it coerces people to practice a religion against their will (Vile). However, this test is subject to varying interpretations, as is demonstrated in the conflicting cases of Allegheny County v. ACLU in 1989 and the 1992 case of Lee v. Weisman, in which Justices Kennedy and Antonin Scalia, applying the same test, reached different results (FindLaw 2020). Although freedom of religion is well-protected by the Constitution, debates over its application, protections from/of, and limitations to the right are an ongoing debate in the legal and free world. REFERENCES A Brief History of Peyote, www.peyote.org/. “Establishment Clause Overview.” Freedom Forum Institute, www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-religion/establishment-clause-overview/. “FindLaw's United States Supreme Court Case and Opinions.” Findlaw, caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/492/573.html. David L. Hudson, Jr.. Endorsement Test, mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/833/endorsement-test. Lutz, Zak. “Limits of Religious Freedom.” Harvard Political Review, 6 Nov. 2015, harvardpolitics.com/covers/limits-of-religious-freedom/. McGovern, Geoff. Lynch v. Donnelly, mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/737/lynch-v-donnelly. “Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).” Justia Law, supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/390/400/. Richard L. Pacelle, Jr.. Lemon Test, www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/834/lemon-test. “The No Religious Test Clause.” Article VI, The National Constitution Center, constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/article-vi/clauses/32. Vile, John R. Coercion Test, www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/899/coercion-test. “What Does ‘Free Exercise’ of Religion Mean under the First Amendment?” Freedom Forum Institute, www.freedomforuminstitute.org/about/faq/what-does-free-exercise-of-religion-mean-under-the-first-amendment/.
Freedom of the Press		Given the fuzzy line between freedom of speech and freedom of the press (Freedom of Expression, n.d.), restrictions or exceptions towards speech will impact the press and vice versa. With this is mind, there are two main exceptions in the history of United States law to the right of freedom of the press: the Espionage Act of 1917, and the Sedition Act of 1918. The Espionage Act of 1917 stated that an individual who shares a document or information that “…could be used to the injury of the United States…shall be fined…or imprisoned…” (18 U.S. Code § 793 - Gathering, Transmitting or Losing Defense Information, n.d.). Similar to the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Espionage Act was proposed in the context of war where President Woodrow Wilson himself pleaded for greater restriction to expression and punishment towards individuals that opposed the United States government in his State of the Union address: “Such creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out” (Handout B, n.d.). The Espionage Act was put to the test in the case Schenck v. United States ( 1919) . Charles Schenck and Elizabeth Baer were convicted for violating the act by distributing leaflets that claimed the draft unconstitutional and was akin to “involuntary servitude” (Schenck v. United States, n.d.). The conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court due to Schenck and Baer’s actions providing a “clear and present danger” which the government has the constitutional ability to block (Asp, n.d.). A similar decision occurred with Debs v. United States ( 1919) . Eugene V. Debs, a popular socialist politician, was sentenced to ten years in prison for condemning the involvement of the United States in the first World War. Debs claimed protection under the First Amendment, but it was not accepted as Debs’ statements were considered, again, a clear and present danger due to them potentially causing resentment towards the draft (Dow, n.d.). Many were indicted through the Espionage Act, though as time passed, there was controversy over its small scope and high leniency as the first World War continued its drastic impact on the United States. The case that tipped the balance towards a stronger Espionage Act was an indictment to Ves Hall. Hall was a rancher in rural Montana who expressed plans to desert if he were drafted, that Germany would win the war, and that Woodrow Wilson was a corrupt president (Galison, 2010) . Hall’s prosecution had broad support from the press and the public. However, Hall was acquitted in the district court as the judge at the time decided that as Hall was in a remote village of 60 people and was miles and miles away from any military presence, and therefore his words did not present any threat to the United States: “…[Hall’s] verbal assault was so distant from its target that there simply was no plausible case to be made for interference with military operations or recruitment” (Ibid.). After Hall’s acquittal, in addition to other acquittals or lenient sentences, desire from American nationalists and supporters from the war increased for an expansion of the Espionage Act to be able to effectively punish and deter disloyalty (Ibid.; Gutfeld, 1968, pg. 169). An amendment was added to the Espionage Act, the Sedition Act of 1918, which rather than merely prohibiting the sharing of a document that could jeopardize American security, instead makes any “disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language” expressions towards the government, the Constitution, the military, or the flag a federal offense (The Espionage and Sedition Acts, 2021) . Eventually, the early 20th century war-era acts were reversed by the 1964 case Brandenburg v. Ohio. In the case, Clarence Brandenburg, a member of the Ku Klux Klan, was having a meeting where he planned a demonstration on Washington, D.C. Brandenburg was convicted to ten years in prison for advocating crime and terrorism (Walker, n.d.). When the case went to the Supreme Court, the Court unanimously decided to overturn Brandenburg’s conviction (Ibid.). The Court stated: “Freedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action” (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 1969) . As a result, this gave political dissenters a greater ability to express their beliefs despite whatever position towards the United States Government they may have. Even with Brandenburg’s “imminent lawless action” rule did not completely dissolve the Espionage Act, however. As the Cold War became a more prominent conflict in the 20th century, the Espionage Act was used to justify convictions of American citizens who shared sensitive information about the United States’ research into atomic bombs (DeWitt, 2016, pg. 124). Henceforth, citizens who had access to sensitive information would have their speech limited, in order to protect national security, and it is this interpretation of the Espionage Act which the United States government uses to justify convictions towards “whistleblowers”—Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning for example—in the present day (DeWitt, 2016, pg. 127; Greenwald, 2013; Volokh, 2018) . Other exceptions to freedom of the press exist. One example is that of obscenity. In 1973, the case Miller v. California, publisher Marvin Miller was prosecuted for mailing advertisements considered obscene (Hudson, n.d.). The Supreme Court acquitted Miller of the charge and established a three-part test—the Miller test— to decide whether an expression is obscene or not: “Whether the average person…would find the work…appeals to the prurient interest,…whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law,…and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” (Marvin MILLER, Appellant, v. State of CALIFORNIA., 1973) . Defamation is another exception, of which the 1964 case New York Times v. Sullivan is an example. The New York Times published an advertisement containing false information about actions taken by opposers of civil rights which included Alabama police, which the Montgomery, Alabama city commissioner, L.B. Sullivan, then responded by filing suit, claiming that the advertisement harmed his reputation and was libelous (Wermiel, n.d.). The Supreme Court reversed the motions of the previous courts that defended Sullivan and Justice William J. Brennan Jr. Opined for the majority: “[We] consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open…” allowing even for “…vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials” (Hudson Jr, n.d.). With this defense, however, limits could be enforced if the expression is made with “ ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not” (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 1964) . Lastly, there is a limit as to what extent the press can protect their reporters’ confidentiality, and this was established in the 1972 case Branzburg v. Hayes (Tom McInnis, n.d.). Reporter Paul Branzburg published a story about drug use and the Black Panthers. Branzburg was asked to testify on the illegal activity and Branzburg refused due to the confidentiality he promised his sources. The Supreme Court decided that, as the information was relevant to a criminal investigation, reporters are obligated to testify on that information (Ibid.). The Court states: “The First Amendment does not relieve a newspaper reporter of the obligation that all citizens have to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant to a criminal investigation, and therefore the Amendment does not afford him a constitutional testimonial privilege…” (Branzburg v. Hayes, 1972) .
Privacy Rights		Most recent US legislation regarding the right to privacy concerns the collection, retention, and transfer of personal data. Under the Department of Justice, the Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties (OPCL) enforces privacy laws, recommends privacy policies (including exceptions), and responds to data breaches (Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, n.d.). Freedom of Information Act 1966 (as amended 2016) In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This act granted anyone the ability to request access to federal agency records but not the records of private companies. However, nine exemptions and three exclusions may prevent access to these records (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The exclusions are narrow and related to law enforcement and ongoing intelligence investigations and are unaffected by FOIA (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The exemptions authorize government agencies to withhold information from those requesting it (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The nine exemptions prevent the sharing of information if it is classified for national security, part of internal rules or practices, prohibited through other laws (such as the Privacy Act, see below), a trade secret, legally protected, a medical file, law enforcement records, regarding bank supervision, or locational information (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). FOIA was most recently updated with the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, which increased transparency and altered procedures (OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, 2016). Privacy Act 1974 The Privacy Act of 1974 was an effort to balance the “governments’ need to maintain information” and the “rights of individuals to be protected against unwarranted invasions of their privacy” (Walls, n.d.; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.). It prevents agencies from disclosing records to any person or agency unless it falls into one of the twelve approved guidelines (Walls, n.d.; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.). The most used reasons which allow for disclosure are subsections 1, 2, and 3 of 5 US Code § 552a(b) (Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition, 2021). Subsection One allows for the disclosure of information between agencies on a need-to-know basis. Subsection Two allows the FOIA to overrule the Privacy Act with regards to when to disclose information. Subsection Three allows for disclosure to another party if their use is similar to the use for which the data was originally collected. This third exception is quite broad, which causes controversy (Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition, 2021). Other exceptions include use for public record (used for the Census or National Archive data), or requests by law enforcement or the court system. In addition to putting forth information disclosure guidelines, this act requires agencies to keep accurate records of how, where, and why they sent information if they had sent information (Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.). Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) was passed to regulate the transfer of consumers’ “nonpublic personal information” by financial institutions (FDIC, 2021). At its core, the law says financial institutions cannot pass along personal data to third parties unless the customer is put on notice, given the opportunity to opt out, and they do not opt out (FDIC, 2021). Exceptions to this rule appear in Sections 13-15 (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Section 13 permits the transfer of some personal data to a third party if they are performing services on behalf of the financial institution, but they must be contractually bound to not do anything else with the data (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Section 14 allows the bank to disclose information as needed to perform banking functions initiated by the customer, while Section 15 extends that disclosure to normal financial institution acts, such as fraud detection (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Of these exceptions, only Section 13 requires the customer to be notified that their information is being shared (FDIC, 2021). USA PATRIOT Act 2001 & USA Freedom Act 2015 Enacted less than two months after the 9/11 attacks, the PATRIOT Act was passed with the intention of increasing homeland security by allowing surveillance techniques used in local crime to be used to fight terrorism (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.; USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). Most importantly, this law allowed for the sharing of information between law enforcement agencies at various levels without notice (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). This law wasn’t the most protective of civil rights and liberties and to rectify that President Obama signed the USA Freedom Act in 2015, ending government collection of metadata (Patriot Act, n.d.; Fact sheet, 2015). REFERENCES: Fact sheet: Implementation of the USA Freedom Act of 2015. (2015, Nov. 27). Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.intelligence.gov/index.php/ic-on-the-record-database/results/787-fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-usa-freedom-act-of-2015 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). (2021, April). FDIC Consumer Compliance Examination Manual: VIII-1.1 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Author. https://www.fdic.gov/resources/supervision-and-examinations/consumer-compliance-examination-manual/index.html Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. (1966). Freedom of Information Act, The. (n.d.). Department of State. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://foia.state.gov/learn/foia.aspx Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.) Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/opcl OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016. (2016, Aug. 17). Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/oip/oip-summary-foia-improvement-act-2016 Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition. (2021, Feb. 16). Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/opcl/overview-privacy-act-1974-2020-edition/disclosures-third-parties Patriot Act. (n.d.) History.com. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/patriot-act Privacy Act of 1974. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1279#vf4tzl Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). (1974). USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1281 Walls, T. (n.d.). FOIA v. Privacy Act: A comparison chart. IAPP. https://iapp.org/resources/article/foia-v-privacy-act-a-comparison-chart/