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| |right=Freedom of Expression | | |right=Privacy Rights |
| |section=Philosophical Origins | | |section=Philosophical Origins |
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| |contents=Plato’s The Republic presents a vision of an ideal society marked by strict social order and rigorous control over various aspects of life, including censorship of poets and a eugenics program to maintain the purity of the ruling class (Grayling 2019, 71). In books II & III of this dialogue, Socrates —generally assumed to be Plato’s mouthpiece— discusses the origins of political life, constructing in speech a just city led by philosopher-kings, and defended by guardians who are meticulously educated and shaped to embody specific virtues. | | |contents=As with many of Plato's views, it is challenging to definitively pinpoint his stance on privacy given the variability of his perspectives across different dialogues. |
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| In this controlled educational framework, poetry must present gods as good and only as causes of good to ensure that the guardians do not see the gods as capricious or unjust (Plato 2016, 379b). The gods must be portrayed as unchanging and truthful, avoiding any depiction of deception to serve as role models and promote stability (380d, 381e). Additionally, all literature portraying the underworld (Hades) as a frightening place should be “expunged” to prevent guardians from fearing death, and thus encourage bravery (386b). Heroes and gods should not be shown lamenting to help guardians develop courage and emotional resilience (387e). Poetry that depicts gods engaging in “unquenchable” laughter is also inadmissible to maintain decorum and self-control among guardians (388e). | | In The Republic, Plato, through Socrates, outlines a vision of an ideal state that significantly diminishes the role of privacy. He advocates for communal living among the guardian class, proposing that women and children be shared among all men and that no parent or child know their biological family (Plato, 457d). Moreover, “there mustn’t be private houses for them, nor land, nor any possession. Instead they must get their livelihood from the others, as a wage for guarding, and use it up in common all together” (Plato, 464c). This communal arrangement is intended to prevent personal ties and conflicts of interest, ensuring that the guardians' loyalty and dedication are solely to the state and its welfare. |
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| In many more instances, such as Book X of The Republic, and in Ion, Socrates shows the dangers of poetry, and specifically imitative poetry: “these works are third from what is and are easy to make for the man who doesn’t know the truth — for such a man makes what look like beings but are not” (Plato 2016, 599a). He contends that poetry can evoke emotions and passions contrary to reason and the harmonious order of the state, justifying its censorship. Socrates critiques poets (especially Homer) and rhapsodes like Ion for creating works through “divine inspiration” rather than knowledge or skill, making their works unreliable and potentially harmful for moral education (Plato 2008). It is to therefore be replaced by “a new kind of poetry which leads beyond itself, which does not present man’s only alternatives as tragic or comic, which supports the philosophic life” (Bloom in Plato 2016, p. 428).
| | This is reinforced in Plato’s The Laws, where the Athenian Stranger asserts that the highest form of state, government, and law is one in which "Friends have all things in common” (Moore, 1). He paints an ideal society (Magnesia) where private ownership and individual distinctions are entirely eliminated. Here too communal living is emphasized to the extent that women, children, and property are shared, and things naturally private become common. The Athenian Stranger contends that no state can be truer or more exalted in virtue unless it adopts these principles (Plato, Book V, para 13). |
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| Socrates also insists that stories should encourage self-discipline and obedience, avoiding content that promotes avarice, hubris, or impiety (Plato 2016, 389c-d, 390d, 391a). They must promote truth-telling while allowing lies only “for the benefit of the city in cases involving enemies or citizens” (389b). An example is the ‘noble lie’ which aims to naturalize the social hierarchy by claiming that citizens are born with different types of metal in their souls corresponding to their social class (414b-415d). Such rigorous control over education and content is intended to start from a very young age, as "the beginning is the most important part of every work… at that stage, it is most plastic, and each thing assimilates itself to the model whose stamp anyone wishes to give it" (377b).
| | In The Apology and Crito, Plato presents a different view that, according to Konvitz, makes Socrates a pivotal figure in the development of the concept of privacy (Konvitz, 273). In The Apology, Socrates explains that he avoids public political activity because it is fraught with corruption and opposition to just actions. He argues that remaining a private citizen allows him to continue his philosophical mission of questioning, advising, and encouraging others to pursue virtue. Socrates asserts that those who fight for justice should do so privately to preserve their lives and integrity, suggesting that true philosophical work requires a degree of separation from the public sphere (Apology 31d-32a). |
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| These restrictive measures have led critics like Karl Popper to label Plato's philosophy as “totalitarian” and antithetical to the principles of free expression and individual rights (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xiii). Plato’s ideal society prioritizes the collective needs of the state over the freedoms of individuals, conflicting with the values of an “open society”— transparency, democratic governance, freedom of speech and thought — which Popper championed (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n.d.). The state wields significant control over education, art, individual behavior, occupational roles, and relationships. It regulates artistic and literary expression to ensure that all content aligns with the ethical and moral standards of the ideal city. Socrates himself explicitly acknowledges this need to control speech for the greater good of the society when, before transitioning to the subject of proper diction, he asks Glaucon and Adeimantus, “So what form of speeches still remains for which we are to define the sort of thing that must and must not be said?” (Plato 2016, 392a).
| | Similarly, in Crito, Socrates emphasizes the distinction between the physical body and the true self, which he identifies with the soul (Konvitz, 273). As he faces death, he tells Crito that the true Socrates is not the body that will be buried but the soul that transcends physical death. This conversation highlights Socrates' belief that the essence of a person lies in their inner self, not in their physical presence or public identity. His emphasis on the inner self versus the outer, physical existence underscores a key aspect of the concept of privacy: the idea that there is an inner realm of personal identity and thought that remains separate and protected from public intrusion (Konvitz, 273). By focusing on the soul as the true self, Socrates' philosophy supports the notion of a private, inviolable space where individuals can be truly themselves, free from external influence and societal roles. According to Adam Moore, this concept provided some backdrop for later debates regarding the importance of privacy and personal autonomy (Moore, 1). |
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| And yet, when defending himself at his trial for impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens, Socrates famously rejects a hypothetical offer that he himself introduces, where the jury might agree to spare his life if he ceases his philosophizing (Plato 2003, 29c-30c). This commitment to philosophical inquiry is vividly depicted in the Apology, where Socrates makes his oft-quoted assertion that “life without…examination is not worth living” (Plato 2003, 38a). Later thinkers like Alexander Meiklejohn and John Stuart Mill would use this to argue for an expansive interpretation of freedom of expression.
| | These contrasting positions raise the question of how to reconcile Plato's stance on privacy. Some scholars like Adam Moore distinguish between the Socrates in The Republic and The Laws, and the Socrates in The Apology (Moore, 1). He regards the communal living ideas presented in The Republic and The Laws as representative of Plato's stance, which is “openly hostile towards privacy”, and the views in The Apology to be representative of Socrates' (Moore,1). Aristotle also critiques “Plato in the Republic,” arguing that both the end and the means of his proposed communal living are flawed: “The abolition of property will produce, not remove, dissension. Communism of wives and children will destroy natural affection” (Aristotle, Book II, Chapter 3). He further contends that the differentiation of functions is a natural law and trying to enforce absolute uniformity is impractical and unnatural. |
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| For Mill, Socrates was a “moral exemplar”, demonstrating that even unpopular opinions must be heard to prevent intellectual stagnation (Dry 1994, 87). He viewed Socrates’ death as evidence of “the ill effects of suppression per se” (Dry 1994, 87). Similarly, Meiklejohn interpreted Socrates' defense as an assertion of the fundamental right to freedom of speech, akin to the protections later enshrined in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Dry 1994, 92). “Accepting Socrates’ argument [in Crito] at face value”, Meiklejohn saw his willingness to face legal punishment as a recognition of the government’s “power and the legal right to put him to death. But so far as the content of his teaching is concerned, he claims unqualified independence. ‘Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech’, he seems to be saying” (Meiklejohn as quoted by Dry, 1994, 92).
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| Political Scientist Murray Dry finds Meiklejohn’s understanding of the dialogue (Crito) simplistic, arguing instead that Socrates’ refusal to escape his sentence is rooted in the inherent tension between philosophy and the demands of political life (Dry 1994, 97). While both Mill and Meiklejohn view Socrates’ defense through the lens of an individual asserting his rights (to free speech and inquiry), Dry sees it as an inevitable clash between a philosopher deeply committed to his craft and the state’s authority, ultimately culminating in his execution. The arguments that Socrates uses in Crito to persuade his friend that fleeing is not an option are not intended to show that free speech is a fundamental right that should not be governed or compromised, even at the expense of one’s own life. Instead, they are designed to resonate with his “non-philosophical friend”, who is more concerned with immediate consequences and Socrates' welfare than with abstract philosophical principles (Dry, 1994, 97). By focusing on the duty to obey laws, Socrates speaks to Crito in terms he can understand and accept.
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| Like Meiklejohn, Dry notes a shift in Socrates’ attitude in “Apology”, from the “categorical law abidingness” described in Crito to one of defiance (Dry, 1994 97). However, while Meiklejohn tries to reconcile this difference by taking philosophy and politics to be potentially harmonious and emphasizing the compatibility of free speech and lawful obedience, Dry attributes the change to a shift in goals and context. In "Apology," Socrates aims to justify his distinctive way of life and address the philosophical and ethical imperatives that transcend human laws (Dry 1994, 98). This philosophic way of life demands a degree of detachment from public affairs, for “the true champion of justice, if he intends to survive even for a short time, must necessarily confine himself to private life and leave politics alone." (Plato 2003, 32a). This inherent tension, according to Dry, is the main theme in both Apology, and The Republic. It is also the basis on which he argues that Plato would stand for a more restrictive view of freedom of speech than the demands of liberal democracy (Dry 1994, 99).
| | Adam D. Moore, "Privacy," in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 11 Volume Set, 2nd ed., edited by Hugh LaFollette (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2022), accessed July 27, 2024, http://faculty.washington.edu/moore2/IEEP.pdf. |
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| Dry’s reasoning regarding Socrates’ argument in Crito resonates with Alan Bloom’s view that “Plato’s focus is not so much on the content of Socrates’ ideas as on the way those ideas affect and transform his listeners” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xiii). One way Socrates does this is by tailoring his hypotheticals to his interlocutors’ critiques, which often reflect their character. Bloom cites as an example how Socrates modifies the initial description of a just city given to Adeimantus — from one that fulfills basic needs to one that is more “luxurious” — in response to Glaucon’s objections (Plato 2016, 372d-375c). Otherwise, Socrates’ proposed ideal society would be so extreme and unrealistic that it undermines “the very utopian impulses it expresses” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xvii). As Adam Kirsch notes, Socrates himself acknowledges its impracticality when he asks Glaucon, “Do you suppose that what we say is any less good on account of our not being able to prove that it is possible to find a city the same as one in speech?”, suggesting that the theoretical model serves more to provoke thought and explore philosophical principles than to present a literal blueprint for a city (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xii). Bloom suggests that it was in fact intentionally designed to highlight the “dangers of what we could call utopianism”, making it “the greatest critique of political idealism ever written” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xvii). This exercise — taking philosophical ideals to their logical extremes — has in turn revealed the tension between “what philosophy demands and what politics is prepared to tolerate, [bringing] into focus the precarious and subversive position of the philosopher” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xii & xiv).
| | Aristotle. Politics. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Bard College. Accessed July 28, 2024. https://www.bard.edu/library/arendt/pdfs/Aristotle-Politics.pdf. |
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| This begs the question: to what extent can Plato’s idealized constructs be taken as practical recommendations? While there is no definitive answer, the consistency of themes across multiple works, such as The Republic, Laws, and Gorgias, suggests that Plato's advocacy for control over speech was a genuine political stance rather than just a philosophical exercise. They indicate a nuanced understanding of free speech, where its value is context dependent. In "The Republic," Socrates encourages free expression among his interlocutors, as he does in many other dialogues, such as with Callicles in Gorgias (Plato 1999, para. 32). This may be because these discussions allow for one-on-one interactions moderated by Socrates, which minimizes the risk of misunderstanding and causing harm, or because open dialogue is inherent to the process of philosophical inquiry. Nonetheless, it contrasts with his position for stricter control over speech in the ideal state, which is mirrored in the statements of the Athenian Stranger in “Laws”: “Poet shall compose nothing contrary to the ideas of the lawful, or just, or beautiful, or good, which are allowed in the state…nor shall he be permitted to communicate his compositions to any private individuals until he shall have shown them to the appointed judges and the guardians of the law, and they are satisfied with them” (Plato 2008, Book VII). Such selective endorsement indicates that Plato discriminates based on the purpose and content of speech, holding a special regard for philosophical speech (or inquiry). While free speech is highly valued in the context of philosophical dialogue, it is not seen as an unqualified good in all situations. This stance likely stems from the belief that philosophy, when properly conducted, can do no harm, and is inherently aligned with the pursuit of truth and virtue; a means to the "perfection of [the] soul" (Plato 2003, "Apology," 29e).
| | Milton R. Konvitz, "Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude," Law and Contemporary Problems 31, no. 2 (1966): 272-291, accessed July 26, 2024, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3108&context=lcp. |
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| Grayling, A.C. The History of Philosophy. Penguin Random House UK, 2019, 108-115.
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| Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. "Karl Popper: Political Philosophy." Accessed July 8, 2024. https://iep.utm.edu/popp-pol/.
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| Plato. Ion, trans. Benjamin Jowett, Project Gutenberg, 2008, last updated January 15, 2013, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1635/1635-h/1635-h.htm.
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| Plato. The Last Days of Socrates: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito and Phaedo. Translated by Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant. London: Penguin Books, 2003.
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| Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated with an interpretive essay by Allan Bloom. Introduction by Adam Kirsch. New York: Basic Books, 2016. | | Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated with an interpretive essay by Allan Bloom. Introduction by Adam Kirsch. New York: Basic Books, 2016. |
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| Plato. Laws. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg, 2008 https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1750/1750-h/1750-h.htm. | | Plato. Laws. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg, 2008 |
| Plato. Gorgias. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg,1999, last updated April 27, 2022, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1672/1672-h/1672-h.htm.
| | https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1750/1750-h/1750-h.htm. |
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What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
Platonism
As with many of Plato's views, it is challenging to definitively pinpoint his stance on privacy given the variability of his perspectives across different dialogues.
In The Republic, Plato, through Socrates, outlines a vision of an ideal state that significantly diminishes the role of privacy. He advocates for communal living among the guardian class, proposing that women and children be shared among all men and that no parent or child know their biological family (Plato, 457d). Moreover, “there mustn’t be private houses for them, nor land, nor any possession. Instead they must get their livelihood from the others, as a wage for guarding, and use it up in common all together” (Plato, 464c). This communal arrangement is intended to prevent personal ties and conflicts of interest, ensuring that the guardians' loyalty and dedication are solely to the state and its welfare.
This is reinforced in Plato’s The Laws, where the Athenian Stranger asserts that the highest form of state, government, and law is one in which "Friends have all things in common” (Moore, 1). He paints an ideal society (Magnesia) where private ownership and individual distinctions are entirely eliminated. Here too communal living is emphasized to the extent that women, children, and property are shared, and things naturally private become common. The Athenian Stranger contends that no state can be truer or more exalted in virtue unless it adopts these principles (Plato, Book V, para 13).
In The Apology and Crito, Plato presents a different view that, according to Konvitz, makes Socrates a pivotal figure in the development of the concept of privacy (Konvitz, 273). In The Apology, Socrates explains that he avoids public political activity because it is fraught with corruption and opposition to just actions. He argues that remaining a private citizen allows him to continue his philosophical mission of questioning, advising, and encouraging others to pursue virtue. Socrates asserts that those who fight for justice should do so privately to preserve their lives and integrity, suggesting that true philosophical work requires a degree of separation from the public sphere (Apology 31d-32a).
Similarly, in Crito, Socrates emphasizes the distinction between the physical body and the true self, which he identifies with the soul (Konvitz, 273). As he faces death, he tells Crito that the true Socrates is not the body that will be buried but the soul that transcends physical death. This conversation highlights Socrates' belief that the essence of a person lies in their inner self, not in their physical presence or public identity. His emphasis on the inner self versus the outer, physical existence underscores a key aspect of the concept of privacy: the idea that there is an inner realm of personal identity and thought that remains separate and protected from public intrusion (Konvitz, 273). By focusing on the soul as the true self, Socrates' philosophy supports the notion of a private, inviolable space where individuals can be truly themselves, free from external influence and societal roles. According to Adam Moore, this concept provided some backdrop for later debates regarding the importance of privacy and personal autonomy (Moore, 1).
These contrasting positions raise the question of how to reconcile Plato's stance on privacy. Some scholars like Adam Moore distinguish between the Socrates in The Republic and The Laws, and the Socrates in The Apology (Moore, 1). He regards the communal living ideas presented in The Republic and The Laws as representative of Plato's stance, which is “openly hostile towards privacy”, and the views in The Apology to be representative of Socrates' (Moore,1). Aristotle also critiques “Plato in the Republic,” arguing that both the end and the means of his proposed communal living are flawed: “The abolition of property will produce, not remove, dissension. Communism of wives and children will destroy natural affection” (Aristotle, Book II, Chapter 3). He further contends that the differentiation of functions is a natural law and trying to enforce absolute uniformity is impractical and unnatural.
References
Adam D. Moore, "Privacy," in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 11 Volume Set, 2nd ed., edited by Hugh LaFollette (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2022), accessed July 27, 2024, http://faculty.washington.edu/moore2/IEEP.pdf.
Aristotle. Politics. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Bard College. Accessed July 28, 2024. https://www.bard.edu/library/arendt/pdfs/Aristotle-Politics.pdf.
Milton R. Konvitz, "Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude," Law and Contemporary Problems 31, no. 2 (1966): 272-291, accessed July 26, 2024, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3108&context=lcp.
Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated with an interpretive essay by Allan Bloom. Introduction by Adam Kirsch. New York: Basic Books, 2016.
Plato. Laws. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg, 2008
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1750/1750-h/1750-h.htm.