Specific limitations

Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question?

Right	Breakout	Contents
Freedom of Association		The right to freedom of association is not an absolute right because it is subject to certain limitations. Political thinkers and legal experts generally agree that assembly and association can be justifiably restricted if it conflicts with other citizens’ security, liberty, or property. Another case in which the right is subject to certain limitations is in a case of emergency or long-run disaster. Recent history shows a number of instances in which the U.S. government has justified the restriction of the right to free association during times of war and natural disaster. Interestingly, it did not effectively curtail citizens’ right to free association during the recent COVID-19 pandemic. Freedom of association most often restricted in the event of war. In his work, “The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly,” Washington University scholar John D. Inazu briefly explores the effect that World War I had on citizens’ right to gather and discuss the country’s affairs. He writes that during the late World War I years, “the freedom of assembly was constrained by shortsighted legislation like the Espionage Act of 1917 (and its 1918 amendments) and the Immigration Act of 1918, and the Justice Department’s infamous Palmer Raids in 1920” (Inazu, “The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly”). William Riggs of the First Amendment Encyclopedia similarly notes that the Vietnam War era, in particular, saw drastic reductions in Americans’ rights to peaceable assembly and association. He writes that “the war in Vietnam quickly became the focus of major protests that resulted in increased government attempts to limit First Amendment protections. These efforts mostly dealt with the right to assemble and what constituted appropriate free speech criticism of the war” (“Vietnam War
Freedom of Expression		Freedom of expression can be limited in times of crisis, most notably in wartime. This was first enacted in the late 1790s, with the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Sedition Act most markedly affected freedom of expression and freedom of the press by making it illegal to speak against the government or president ("Alien and Sedition Acts"). These limitations were consistently applied in times of war until World War I, when its legality was cemented by the Supreme Court with Schenck vs. United States (Emerson 1968). In Schenck v. US, the Court ruled that the standards for regulation of freedom of speech were lower in wartime ("Schenck v. United States"). It also established, for the first time, the "clear and present danger" test, clarifying that "the First Amendment does not protect speech that approaches creating a clear and present danger of a significant evil that Congress has power to prevent ("Schenck v. United States"). During the Vietnam War, freedom of expression was upheld in New York Times v. United States by saying freedom of the press was "was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government" (Hudson). In states of emergency, such as the national one declared at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the president is granted special troubles that include infringements on freedom of the press/expression. One such power is the ability to shut down radio stations during a time of "public peril." This ability is cemented in section 706 of the Communications Act of 1934 (Rottman 2020). Since the law was passed in 1934, it did not include other forms of news publication, such as websites and TV news stations. There is a fear, however, that the government could broaden the law to include these types of news dissemination (Rottman 2020). In the COVID-19 pandemic, states and counties have declared media companies as essential services, thus exempting them from quarantine and shelter-in-place limitations (Rottman 2020). War may justify limitations on expression. This has long been true in the US; as Justice Holmes wrote in Schenck v. US (1919), a case over anti-draft publications, “when a nation is at war, many things that might be said in times of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.” During the Civil War, President Lincoln prohibited the publishing of information of troop movements, and government officials censored newspapers critical of the Union. During WWI, the US passed legislation such as the Sedition Act, which sought to eliminate speech “urging any curtailment of the war with intent to hinder its prosecution.” The Supreme Court has at times limited the wartime justification for restrictions. This occurred in New York Times v. US (1971), where the government was not allowed to censor publication of the Pentagon Papers, which contained information about the Vietnam War (Hudson). Contemporary jurisprudence would likely not justify some restrictions that have been allowed in the past. Schenck was decided using the clear and present danger test, which has been superseded by the more stringent imminent lawless action test (Parker). Had the newer test been used, Schenck may have been decided differently; the dissent argued that speech should be restricted only when it “imminently threaten[s] immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purpose of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country” (Parker). The COVID-19 pandemic has caused press crackdowns in various countries, often to downplay the outbreak’s severity. Egypt and Iran, for example have systematically curtailed reporting on the epidemic (Egypt guarantees freedom of expression in its Constitution, though this has long not been the case in practice (“Egypt). Iran guarantees free press subject to derogation in the national interest or under “Islamic criteria”). Honduras went so far as to suspend the clause in its constitution guaranteeing free speech. South Africa has curtailed free speech, albeit not to promote a rosy view of the pandemic. Rather, it has criminalized misinformation (Simon 2020). Responses to the pandemic provide insight into potential restrictions during other disasters. If a large part of Egypt or Iran were leveled by an earthquake, their governments might restrict free speech to ensure that only positive information about the recovery effort surfaces. Similarly, the South Africans who support criminalizing pandemic misinformation may also support criminalizing hurricane-safety misinformation if such a storm barrelled toward South Africa (putting aside whether this is meteorologically possible). As is argued in a report by the organization Article 19, free expression may be of even greater importance than normal during an emergency. Citizens need complete access to the truth so that they can make decisions about their safety (6). Free expression is an excellent way to ensure this truth comes out. References: Hudson: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1597/free-speech-during-wartime#:~:text=Freedo Parker: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/898/clear-and-present-danger-test m%20of%20speech%20often%20suffers,backseat%20to%20security%20and%20order.&text=In %20other%20words%2C%20the%20Supreme,than%20in%20times%20of%20peace. Simon: https://www.cjr.org/analysis/coronavirus-press-freedom-crackdown.php Egyptian Constitution: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2014.pdf “Egypt”: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/egypt-unprecedented-crackdown-on-freedom-o f-expression-under-alsisi-turns-egypt-into-openair-prison/ Iranian Constitution: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ir/ir001en.pdf Article 19 Report: https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/freedom-of-information-humanitarian-disa sters.pdf
Freedom of Religion		In the United States, certain religious practices have been limited during times of disease. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, limitations on free religious exercise have been visibly witnessed, demonstrating how the right is subject to restrictions during a health crisis. This was observed in the beginning of the pandemic, when many houses of worship challenged their closures by state governments, arguing that such actions violated their rights to free religious exercise. Thus, witnessed through the closing of churches as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, a disaster can alter the Supreme court’s constitutional interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. The COVID-19 pandemic has caused many governments to limit religious gatherings. For example, at the outset of the pandemic, Maryland banned gatherings of more than ten people, including religious services (Pitts 2020). Terrorism has justified bans on Muslim veils in public places, a restriction on the free exercise of religion. From a 2019 piece by the London Schools of Economics’ Stuti Manchanda and Nilay Saiya: “Proponents of restrictions on Muslim veils make three main arguments. First, they claim that enveloping Islamic veils present a physical security threat, insofar as Muslim women might use these traditional Islamic garments to conceal weapons or explosives. ‘You could carry a rocket launcher under your veil,’ as the former President of Latvia, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, put it. Similarly, Paul Nuttall, former leader of the UK Independence Party, justified banning the burqa on similar physical security grounds: ‘Obviously we have a heightened security risk at the moment and for CCTV to be effective, in an age of heightened terror, you need to be able to see people’s faces.’ Finally, British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, compared Muslim women in veils to letter boxes and bank robbers.” Israel has restricted Muslim practices to respond to terrorism. In 2017, due to a recent incident, Israel banned Muslim men under 50 from visiting the Western Wall (there is some conflicting reporting as to whether the ban extended to non-Muslim men as well). Israel has similarly restricted other sites during times of tension, such as Jerusalem’s Aqsa mosque (Baker 2017). Given that the Western Wall is a sacred site to Muslims, restricting access should be considered a restriction on Muslim practice. The ban still restricted the ability of people to freely worship even if it extended to non-Muslims. Certain US anti-terror policies, though stopping short of restricting Muslim religious practices, have significantly impacted Muslims. In Response to 9-11, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act. The act’s provisions included those designed to facilitate search warrants on suspected terrorists, enable increased surveillance, and prevent terrorists from exploiting the immigration system. These provisions and post-attack suspicion of Muslims have led law-enforcement agencies to disproportionately target them. A 2006 piece by Xavier University’s Kam C. Wong referred to Muslim-Americans’ situation as a “virtual internment camp” (194). Wong cites staggering data on Muslim-Americans between 2001 and 2005; using conservative estimates, 90,000 had been detained, raided, or questioned by the FBI. Similarly, the NYPD ran a controversial program after 9-11 surveilling Muslims. According to the ACLU, its methods included undercover officers in Muslim communities, tracking individuals who had changed their name, and recording information on people who attended Muslim services. The ACLU even claims that the program interfered with Muslim practice by instilling fear that religious doctrine may be misinterpreted by law enforcement (“Factsheet”). From the report: “The NYPD’s suspicionless surveillance has forced religious leaders to censor what they say to their congregants, for fear anything they say could be taken out of context by police officers or informants. Some religious leaders feel they must regularly record their sermons to defend themselves against potential NYPD mischaracterizations. Disruptions resulting from unlawful NYPD surveillance have also diverted time and resources away from religious education and counseling. Muslims have reported feeling pressure to avoid appearing overtly religious, for example, by changing their dress or the length of their beards. REFERENCES: Luke Baker, “Muslim men over 50 pray at Jerusalem's Aqsa mosque amid tight security”, October 31, 2014: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-palestinians-israel/muslim-men-over-50-pray-at-jerusalems-aqsa-mosque-amid-tight-security-idUSKBN0IK0PR20141031 “Factsheet: The NYPD Muslim Surveillance Program” https://www.aclu.org/other/factsheet-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program Stuti Manchada and Nilay Saiya, “Why veil restrictions increase the risk of terrorism in Europe,” 12/17/2019: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2019/12/17/why-veil-restrictions-increase-the-risk-of-terrorism-in-europe/ Jonathan M. Pitts, “Houses of worship ‘in no rush’ to reopen as Maryland eases restrictions on indoor gatherings,” Baltimore Sun, Jun 06, 2020: https://www.baltimoresun.com/coronavirus/bs-md-ci-churches-reopening-20200606-mgrlkn2kdjd77ealcnnu5lmsoe-story.html Kam C. Wong, The USA Patriot Act: A Policy of Alienation, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 161 (2006). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1111&context=mjrl
Freedom of the Press		Freedom of the press long been shaped by state actors that often in times of emergency see individual rights as second to state interests. Emergency situations such as war, natural disaster and disease typically has allowed governments to restrict this right on the basis of emergency, national security, or fear. Though this restriction can vary on duration, emergency event, country and government type, restrictions of the freedom of the press in emergency situations has a precedent. In the United States context, in times of war there has been legislation passed to restrict public discourse with government on the basis of national security. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, passed as the United States prepared for war against France, restricted speech and press critical to government which allowed for the Federalist held government under John Adams to weaken the Republican party’s effect in politics. Under this act, politicians, editors, and writers were arrested and given jail time because of their publishing against the United States government (Stone, pg. 1663). During the Civil War, President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeus corpus and allowed military officials to enact martial law. This allowed for over 300 newspapers to be shut down for publications that were sympathetic to the confederacy. President Wilson, during World War I, enacted the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 which stifled those who opposed his policies during wartime. “In effect, these two laws made it unlawful for any person to write or publish any statement that criticized the President, the Congress, the government, the Constitution, the war, the draft, the military, or the uniform of the military of the United States.” (Stone, pg. 1666). These two acts essentially brought back the Alien and Seditions Acts of 1798 which restricted publications opposing government during times of war. During World War I the United States government prosecuted nearly 2000 people under these acts and essentially suspended the freedom of the press concerning government accountability, opposing government, and questioning policy (Stone, pg. 1666). By the time the Vietnam War came, a significant switch in opinion came concerning the freedom of the press during times of war. Mass protests, newspaper publications, news outlets, and other forms of press opposing the Vietnam War were condoned and even backed by judicial case. The publishing of the Pentagon Papers was backed by Supreme Court decision where the court ruled that the national security threat was not clear, or grave enough to restrict the first amendment right of free press. (Stone, pg. 1668). This stance has remained as opposition publications concerning the Korean War and occupation of Iraq have not been restricted and the freedom of the press has not seen any significant restrictions during wartime on the basis of national security in the more modern (post-World War II) context. With respect to the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been numerous international examples of the restriction of the freedom of the press. Jordan has strengthened the censorship program present, allowing all publications to be subject to censorship concerning the pandemic. Israel has enhanced surveillance on journalists because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the effects publications can have in causing fear. In Hungary, new punishments allowing for the imprisonment of members of the press for publishing anything the government deems to be false information on the basis of starting public panic. Many countries like Greece, Japan, and Ukraine have imposed new laws allowing government to restrict what the media can do and have access to concerning public health. In Cambodia and Vanuatu, legislation has been passed that puts in place a censorship program on the basis of emergency to prevent unrest and fear. These laws prohibit publishing without government approval essentially allowing for government censorship of publications concerning the COVID-19 pandemic. Countries such as Russia, Kyrgyzstan, South Africa, Indonesia, Botswana, Algeria, and Zimbabwe have placed prison sentences as deterrents for journalists and news outlets for publishing anything the government deems untrue or could spark fear. In Liberia, Romania and Myanmar, the government has closed down news sites for publishing information that the government has deemed untrue. These were mainly ethnic minority sites (Selva 2020). A study published in 2018 by Kodai Kusano and Markus Kemmelmeier looked into the effect natural disasters have on socio-political rights and the freedom of the press, among other things. They concluded that natural disasters cannot predict the level of freedom of the press as other economic factors have a stronger causal relationship. There was no support for their hypothesis that natural disasters will lead to lower levels of socio-political freedoms and freedom of the press (Kusano and Kemmelmeier, 2018). It is nearly impossible to define limitations of free speech because of a given emergency as each example varies on a number of different aspects concerning, regime type, government stability, economic factors, and emergency type. Though typically when it comes down to granting the freedom of the press or regime stability, regime stability will prevail, and freedom of the press will be restricted. References: Geoffrey R. Stone, "Freedom of the Press in Time of War," 59 SMU Law Review 1663 (2006). Kusano K and Kemmelmeier M (2018) Ecology of Freedom: Competitive Tests of the Role of Pathogens, Climate, and Natural Disasters in the Development of Socio-Political Freedom. Front. Psychol. 9:954. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00954 Selva, Meera. “Healing Words: How Press Freedom Is Being Threatened by the Coronavirus Pandemic.” Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford, 7 Apr. 2020, reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/risj-review/healing-words-how-press-freedom-being-threatened-coronavirus-pandemic.
Privacy Rights		Privacy protections are typically limited in times of emergency, but the type of emergency seems to dictate its limitations. Natural Disasters A Wilson Center report from 2013 outlines various times in which natural disasters have elicited temporary easing of privacy rules to aid in searching for missing persons. The first examples were from Australia after the 2002 Bali earthquake and the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami. During the Bali earthquake, many governmental agencies had to spend time creating their own missing persons reports (Reidenberg, Gellman, Debelak, Elewa, & Liu, 2013, 12). This was recognized as a waste of resources in light of the disaster and the importance of timeliness (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 12). The 2004 tsunamis renewed this sentiment (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 12). In response to these impeded disaster responses, Australia passed Part VIA to the Australian Privacy Act in 2006 (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13). Part VIA allows for sharing of otherwise protected information through a government emergency declaration if “(1) the entity reasonably believes that the individual may be involved in the disaster; and (2) the collection, use or disclosure of personal information is for a permitted purpose related to the disaster” (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13, 14). It also has stipulations on how long these special provisions can be in place and works for events both in and out of Australian borders while specifically preventing disclosure to media outlets (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13-14) . Despite New Zealand’s comprehensive privacy laws, similar actions were taken in New Zealand after the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. There were stipulations in the Privacy Act to permit the sharing of information in some circumstances, it was unclear if they directly applied to natural disaster emergencies (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 15). This lack of clarity was impeding rescue efforts and the Privacy Commissioner, who is granted some discretion through the Privacy Act, took steps to allow temporary authorization of information sharing concerning the emergency at hand (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 16). Incidentally, many realized that this liberation of privacy issues reassured a variety of sectors’ information sharing in their emergency response (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 17). These reassurances caused the Privacy Commissioner to propose and pass the Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code in 2013, allowing for these different privacy stipulations to be counted on during emergency planning (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 19). The United States notoriously lacks privacy law. However, there is regulation in the medical field – Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1966 (HIPAA). HIPAA was somewhat suspended after Hurricane Katrina in light of nine of the eleven New Orleans hospitals incapacitated and people fleeing to surrounding states to receive medical attention (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 19-21). It prioritized providing treatment over payment and aided in locating missing persons by publishing facility directories (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 21). This privacy law alteration was less comprehensive than those in New Zealand and Australia after natural disasters, but it shows that the response regarding privacy exceptions is dependent on need. All of these disasters culminated in the creation of the Missing Persons Community of Interest (MPCI), in which non-government actors collaborated to create standardized missing persons databases after disasters (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 25). At the time the report was written, there were five interlocking systems to record who was missing and try to connect these people with worried family (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 27). These systems were used multiple times from 2006 to 2012 when this report was written (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 27). The systems all have varying balances of access and privacy and, interestingly, one of these services is run by the International Committee of the Red Cross out of Geneva, Switzerland and is explicitly exempt from the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 29, 35). Additionally, in 2011, the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners on Data Protection and Major Natural Disasters asked countries to review their privacy laws to make sure they were flexible in the event of a major natural disaster (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 73). Disease Rothstein ( 2020) suggests the following be considered when creating policy exceptions and interventions to health information during disease outbreaks: (1) necessity and effectiveness, (2) proportionality and minimal infringement, (3) purpose limitations, and (4) justice ( 1374) . Policies that become altered during the outbreak should remain monitored for continued justification of the alteration and should discontinue at the end of the outbreak (Rothstein, 2020, 1375) . During the COVID-19 pandemic, Canada realized the conflict between the creation of a public health database and data privacy law. Data privacy laws vary by province (some have legislation, others default to federal law), sector (public and private), and profession (i.e., healthcare data is strictly regulated) (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 454-455). Generally, data cannot be shared between provinces, though this is debated based on local and federal laws, nor used for purposes other than for which it was collected (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 455). However, all these limits can be loosened during public health emergencies. There are legislative carve-outs for combating health risks, and during COVID-19 the Privacy Commissioner allowed officials to forgo consent from each individual, a privilege that is repealed after the emergency (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 455). War McDonald ( 2020) describes privacy as a social good and notes there is a trade-off between privacy and national security, claiming these rights are dependent on context (380). As such, these privacy limitations can be toward individuals or society, but they usually come to light ex parte (McDonald, 2020, 385, 380). However, it is unclear who dictates when this trade-off between privacy and security begins, ends, or how invasive it is as war surveillance is largely unregulated; there is no law of war regarding privacy (McDonald, 2020, 385, 386). It seems feasible violations can be committed by both one’s own country and the opposition. By one’s own country in the sense that they don’t want traitors, resulting in actions similar to how the United States placed Japanese Americans into internment camps during WWI or passed the Sedition Act of 1798 (Share America, 2015) . Alternatively, the opposition can somewhat feasibly be expected to also survey those they are at war against, especially when attacking and trying to avoid civilian injury (McDonald, 2020, 381). Enemies may also invade privacy through espionage and intelligence which isn’t necessarily legal under international law though it is not limited to wartime (Pun, 2017, 360-361, 364; McDonald, 2020, 384). References: Bernier, A. & Knoppers, B.M. (2020, June 26). Pandemics, privacy, and public health research. Canadian Journal of Public Health 111(4), 454-457. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7318908/pdf/41997_2020_Article_368.pdf McDonald, J. (2020). Information, privacy, and just war theory. Ethics & International Affairs 34(3), 379-400. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679420000477 Pun, D. (2017, Summer). Rethinking espionage in the Modern Era. Chicago Journal of International Law 18(1), 353-391. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol18/iss1/10/ Quinton, A. (1988, Autumn). Plagues and morality. Social Research: An International Quarterly 55(3), 451-462. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40970516 Reidenberg, J.R., Gellman, R., Debelak, J., Elewa, A., & Liu, N. (2013). Privacy and missing persons after natural disasters. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Commons Lab. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/privacy-and-missing-persons-after-natural-disasters Rothstein, M.A. (2020, Aug. 12). Public health and privacy in the pandemic. American Journal of Public Health 110(9), 1374-1375. https://www.doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2020.305849 Share America. (2015, Apr. 6). Civil liberties in wartime. United States Department of State. Retrieved October 18, 2021, https://share.america.gov/civil-liberties-wartime/
Voting Rights and Suffrage		The fundamental right to vote has remained resilient during both state and national emergencies. Voting access in the United States is primarily governed by state law. Federal laws prohibit a range of restrictions of this right, as has been a historical commitment. As noted in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona (2013), the Supreme Court described Congress’s federal election regulation power as “paramount,” emphasizing that it “may be exercised at any time, and to any extent which [Congress] deems expedient” (National Constitution Center, 2024). Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution does not grant the President the power to postpone or alter elections, clearly delineating their authority (Congress.gov, 2024). In 1845, Congress established the federal election day as “the Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered year” (Legal Information Institute, 2024). This framework has provided a longstanding structure for U.S. elections. Chapter 68 of Title 42 U.S.C. § 5122 defines an emergency as “any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States” (“42 USC 5122: Definitions,” 2018). Similarly, Chapter 34 of Title 50 in the U.S. Code states, “With respect to Acts of Congress authorizing the exercise, during the period of a national emergency, of any special or extraordinary power, the President is authorized to declare such national emergency” (“50 U.S. Code Chapter 34 – National Emergencies,” 2024). Elections have continued to be held during times of war. For example, President Lincoln was elected during the Civil War, and President Franklin Roosevelt was re-elected during World War II (Best Best & Krieger LLP, 2024). The specific measures to mitigate the impact of emergencies on elections are determined at the state level. During times of war, if a national or state emergency is declared, states may adjust their election processes accordingly, upholding accessibility to voting to the best of their ability. In Kansas, for example, K.S.A. § 25-622 states that “The secretary of state can adopt alternative methods for distributing ballots in a time of war, equipment failure, or disaster that makes it impossible for voters in an area to obtain ballots” (“25-622,” 2024). States such as Idaho, Kentucky, New York, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah have policies in place to delay or reschedule elections in the event of an emergency (“Election Emergencies,” 2024). This holds during emergencies relating to severe weather. Severe weather emergencies are understood under Title 42 as “any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby” (“42 USC 5122: Definitions” 2018). For example, in South Dakota, “Local election boards can delay an election (except for primary or general elections) for 1 week due to weather” (“Election Emergencies” 2024). A governor can request the President to issue a declaration of a major disaster or emergency under this chapter upon "finding that [a] disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected local governments and that Federal assistance is necessary” (“42 USC 5122: Definitions” 2018). References “A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use.” 2018. Brennan Center for Justice. December 5, 2018. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/guide-emergency-powers-and-their-use. Best Best & Krieger LLP. "Postponing a Presidential Election and the Law." Accessed August 1, 2024. https://bbklaw.com/resources/postponing-a-presidential-election-and-the-law. Congress.gov. "Browse: Article II, Section 2." Accessed July 28, 2024. https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/article-2/section-2/#:~:text=The%20President%20shall%20have%20Power,End%20of%20their%20next%20Session. “Election Emergencies.” 2024. Ncsl.org. 2024. https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/election-emergencies#election. Legal Information Institute. "2 U.S. Code § 7 - Time of Election." Accessed July 27, 2024. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/2/7. National Constitution Center. "Elections Clause." Last modified 2024. Accessed July 28, 2024. https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/articles/article-i/clauses/750. Oyez. "Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona." Accessed August 1, 2024. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-71. “25-622.” 2024. Ksrevisor.org. 2024. https://www.ksrevisor.org/statutes/chapters/ch25/025_006_0022.html. “42 U.S. Code § 5122 - Definitions.” 2015. LII / Legal Information Institute. 2015. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/5122. “42 USC 5122: Definitions.” 2018. House.gov. 2018. https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-1999-title42-section5122&num=0&edition=1999#:~:text=%2D%22Major%20disaster%22%20means%20any. “50 U.S. Code Chapter 34 - NATIONAL EMERGENCIES.” 2024. LII / Legal Information Institute. 2024. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/chapter-34.