Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Platonism

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What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?

Platonism

As with many of Plato's views, it is challenging to definitively pinpoint his stance on privacy given the variability of his perspectives across different dialogues.

In The Republic, Plato, through Socrates, outlines a vision of an ideal state that significantly diminishes the role of privacy. He advocates for communal living among the guardian class, proposing that women and children be shared among all men and that no parent or child know their biological family (Plato, 457d). Moreover, “there mustn’t be private houses for them, nor land, nor any possession. Instead they must get their livelihood from the others, as a wage for guarding, and use it up in common all together” (Plato, 464c). This communal arrangement is intended to prevent personal ties and conflicts of interest, ensuring that the guardians' loyalty and dedication are solely to the state and its welfare.

This is reinforced in Plato’s The Laws, where the Athenian Stranger asserts that the highest form of state, government, and law is one in which "Friends have all things in common” (Moore, 1). He paints an ideal society (Magnesia) where private ownership and individual distinctions are entirely eliminated. Here too communal living is emphasized to the extent that women, children, and property are shared, and things naturally private become common. The Athenian Stranger contends that no state can be truer or more exalted in virtue unless it adopts these principles (Plato, Book V, para 13).

In The Apology and Crito, Plato presents a different view that, according to Konvitz, makes Socrates a pivotal figure in the development of the concept of privacy (Konvitz, 273). In The Apology, Socrates explains that he avoids public political activity because it is fraught with corruption and opposition to just actions. He argues that remaining a private citizen allows him to continue his philosophical mission of questioning, advising, and encouraging others to pursue virtue. Socrates asserts that those who fight for justice should do so privately to preserve their lives and integrity, suggesting that true philosophical work requires a degree of separation from the public sphere (Apology 31d-32a).

Similarly, in Crito, Socrates emphasizes the distinction between the physical body and the true self, which he identifies with the soul (Konvitz, 273). As he faces death, he tells Crito that the true Socrates is not the body that will be buried but the soul that transcends physical death. This conversation highlights Socrates' belief that the essence of a person lies in their inner self, not in their physical presence or public identity. His emphasis on the inner self versus the outer, physical existence underscores a key aspect of the concept of privacy: the idea that there is an inner realm of personal identity and thought that remains separate and protected from public intrusion (Konvitz, 273). By focusing on the soul as the true self, Socrates' philosophy supports the notion of a private, inviolable space where individuals can be truly themselves, free from external influence and societal roles. According to Adam Moore, this concept provided some backdrop for later debates regarding the importance of privacy and personal autonomy (Moore, 1).

These contrasting positions raise the question of how to reconcile Plato's stance on privacy. Some scholars like Adam Moore distinguish between the Socrates in The Republic and The Laws, and the Socrates in The Apology (Moore, 1). He regards the communal living ideas presented in The Republic and The Laws as representative of Plato's stance, which is “openly hostile towards privacy”, and the views in The Apology to be representative of Socrates' (Moore,1). Aristotle also critiques “Plato in the Republic,” arguing that both the end and the means of his proposed communal living are flawed: “The abolition of property will produce, not remove, dissension. Communism of wives and children will destroy natural affection” (Aristotle, Book II, Chapter 3). He further contends that the differentiation of functions is a natural law and trying to enforce absolute uniformity is impractical and unnatural.


References

Adam D. Moore, "Privacy," in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 11 Volume Set, 2nd ed., edited by Hugh LaFollette (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2022), accessed July 27, 2024, http://faculty.washington.edu/moore2/IEEP.pdf.

Aristotle. Politics. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Bard College. Accessed July 28, 2024. https://www.bard.edu/library/arendt/pdfs/Aristotle-Politics.pdf.

Milton R. Konvitz, "Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude," Law and Contemporary Problems 31, no. 2 (1966): 272-291, accessed July 26, 2024, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3108&context=lcp.

Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated with an interpretive essay by Allan Bloom. Introduction by Adam Kirsch. New York: Basic Books, 2016.

Plato. Laws. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg, 2008 https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1750/1750-h/1750-h.htm.