Semantic search

Clear and Present Danger: As the Supreme Court ruled in Schenck v. US (1919), speech can be curtailed when it poses a “clear and present danger.” This case arose when a defendant was accused of violating the Espionage Act by distributing leaflets encouraging people to dodge the draft. As the majority held, the defendant’s ability to undermine the war effort constituted such a danger, akin to yelling “fire” in a crowded theatre. Fighting Words: In a doctrine similar to the clear-and-present-danger test, the Supreme Court ruled in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) that the First Amendment does not protect “fighting words” - words that, as the court argued, “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Though this doctrine exists today, it has been undermined, especially by the court’s rulings protecting “hate speech” (see RAV v. St. Paul). O’Brien Test: In US v. O’brien (1968), the Supreme Court developed a four-pronged test for determining whether the government could justifiably limit expression. “We think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” In this case, the Supreme Court held that a ban on burning draft cards did constitute a substantial government interest. Speech in schools: In general, public schools have greater leeway to curtail free speech, although the court’s attitudes have changed repeatedly. In Tinker v. Des Moines (1965), the Supreme Court voided suspensions on students wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War, holding that limited speech must “materially and substantially interfere” with school activities. In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988), the court gave considerable leniency to schools restricting student speech in a school-sponsored platform (in this case, a school newspaper), allowing it to censor an article because it was “inconsistent with the shared values of a civilized social order.” In Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986), the court allowed a public school to suspend a student for using sexual innuendo at a speech at a school assembly because such speech undermined “fundamental values of public school education.” the Supreme Court ruled similarly in Morse v. Frederick (2007), holding that schools could limit speech advocating drug use. Imminent Lawless Action: In Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), the Supreme Court elaborated on the clear-and-present-danger test. To lack protection, certain speech must incite “imminent lawless action.” This means that the mere advocacy of violence is not enough; the speech must actually incite it. It was on these grounds that the court ruled that offensive, inflammatory speech from a klansman was protected because it did not imminently incite violence. This test has generally replaced clear and present danger, although clear and present danger is still the test used in military courts. Obscenity: The Supreme Court adopted a three-pronged test in Miller v. California (1973) to determine whether material is legally obscene (and therefore not protected). The prongs are as follows: “whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Pornography is often not legally obscene. Libel: Standards for what constitutes libel differ between private citizens and public figures (who can include political figures but also celebrities, business tycoons, etc). Libel against a public person requires a statement to have been false and made negligently. Libel against a public figure, does not include good-faith mistakes that may be considered negligent. Rather, it requires material to be false, and to have been published with “actual malice” (Hustler v. Falwell, 1988). Intellectual property: For example, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting (1977), the court ruled that the First Amendment does not protect the right of a television station to air an entire performance without the consent of the performers. Unlawful assembly: Authorities may restrict assemblies as long as the restrictions are reasonable, narrowly tailored to a specific public interest while limiting rights as little as possible, and are not content-based. For example, a city may require a permit for holding a large assembly. In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, the Supreme Court ruled that a permitting authority could not vary its demonstration permit fees based on the anticipated cost of maintaining public order. As the court held, making such a determination would require the government to differentiate its treatment toward demonstrations based on the content of their messages.

References:

US Free Speech Cases: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/landmark-cases/freedom-of-speech-general/

Fighting words: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/293/chaplinsky-v-new-hampshire

US v. Obrien: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/709/united-states-v-o-brien#:~:text=In%20United %20States%20v.,of%20an%20anti%2Dwar%20protester.

RAV v. St. Paul: https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/270/r-a-v-v-st-paul

Tinker v. Des Moines: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1968/21

Bethel v. Fraser: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1667

Morse v. Frederick: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-278

Imminent lawless action: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/970/incitement-to-imminent-lawless-action Libel info: https://www.freedomforum.org/libel/

Hustler v. Falwell: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1278

Free press cases in the US: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/landmark-cases/freedom-of-the-press/

Info on assembly: https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/criminal/the-right-to-gather-has-some-restrictions.html#:~:t ext=No%20First%20Amendment%20rights%20are,raises%20a%20%E2%80%9Cclear%20and %20present

Info on broadcast TV and radio, which includes descriptions of all relevant cases: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/broadcast-radio-and-television

Freedom of expression exists at the core of the United States of America and the freedoms it guarantees to its people. Beyond a core tenet in America, freedom of expression holds a defining place in democracies around the world, shaping their culture and development. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the United Nations in December 1966, explains how freedom of expression “shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice” (U.N. General Assembly 1966, art. 19). With such importance, infringement upon this freedom can be extremely contentious. In US history, this context has resulted in the development of the State Action Doctrine as delivered by the Supreme Court. According to the State Action Doctrine, “the US Constitution in general, and its individual rights in particular, apply only to state action, not to private action” ("State Action" 2017). In understanding the question of whether private actors curtail freedom of expression, the State Action Doctrine responds with a definite yes. This understanding has been developed through a series of court cases, creating a precedent that allows for private actors to breach free expression.

In United States v. Cruikshank, the Supreme Court ruled “the 14th Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses applied only to state action, and not to violations of civil rights by individual citizens.” (United States v. Cruikshank, 1875). This landmark decision took place following the Colfax Massacre wherein “300 white Democrats, many of them former Confederate soldiers,” were hoping “to dislodge an armed cadre of 150 freedmen and white Republicans who had barricaded themselves inside” in order to protect an election (Pusey 2021, 72). Due to the absence of civil rights protections in Louisiana, where the Colfax Massacre occurred, the state bore no responsibility and could not prosecute individuals for violating others' rights. This case is relevant to understanding how freedom of expression can be curtailed by private actors. It set a precedent that allowed private actors to infringe upon others' rights, such as voting, because of the state's lack of responsibility.

While legal precedents focus on the ability to discriminate, freedom of expression remains relevant because the freedoms “of speech, of the press, of association, of assembly and petition,” that comprise expression can be subject to that discrimination (ACLU, 2002). Further legal contributions exist along with social media usage statistics that present high percentages of US adults using various platforms. A Pew Research report found that 83% of US adults reported they ever used Youtube, 68% used Facebook, and 47% used Instagram (Pew Research Center, 2024). The private actors that run social media companies are able to curtail freedom of expression aided by Section 230 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. This provided “immunity to those that screened or removed offensive or indecent material that was posted on their sites by third parties” (First Amendment Encyclopedia, s.v. "Communications Decency Act and Section 230"). Originally created to “prevent minors from gaining access to sexually explicit materials on the internet,” the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has granted media platforms the ability to tailor violations of freedom of expression. Instagram, a social media platform used by just under 50% of Americans, explains their terms for content removal within their community guidelines (Pew Research Center, 2024) They “may remove entire posts if either the imagery or associated captions violate their guidelines,” some of those violations being nudity, promoting hate speech, and bullying amongst others (Instagram Help Center, n.d.). With laws and legal precedents to support infringement and equal opportunity and anti-discrimination policies protecting people’s freedoms, private actors are certainly able to curtail freedom of expression, but with limitations.

References

ACLU. 2002. “Freedom of Expression.” American Civil Liberties Union. March 1, 2002. https://www.aclu.org/documents/freedom-expression.

"Communications Decency Act and Section 230." First Amendment Encyclopedia. Accessed June 24, 2024. https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/communications-decency-act-and-section-230/#:~:text=To%20encourage%20internet%20service%20providers,their%20sites%20by%20third%20parties.

Instagram Help Center. s.v. "Privacy Settings." Accessed June 24, 2024. https://help.instagram.com/477434105621119#.

Pusey, Allen. "Colfax Massacre Convictions Tossed: March 27, 1876." ABA Journal 107, no. 1 (February-March 2021): 72. Gale Academic OneFile. Accessed June 20, 2024. https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A653471522/AONE?u=anon~c9675132&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=4c07453e.

Pew Research Center. "Social Media Use in 2024." Pew Research Center. January 31, 2024. Accessed June 24, 2024. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2024/01/PI_2024.01.31_Social-Media-use_report.pdf.

"State Action." Max Planck Encyclopedia of Comparative Constitutional Law. Last modified February 2017. https://oxcon.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law-mpeccol/law-mpeccol-e473#:~:text=The%20state%20action%20doctrine%20of,action%2C%20not%20to%20private%20action.

U.N. General Assembly. 1966. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.

United States v. Cruikshank. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).

The phrase “living constitutionalism” was first coined in Howard Lee McBain’s 1927 book The Living Constitution (Solum 1256, 2019). Although the theory was only beginning to form, the book provided the foundations of living constitutionalism that we know today: “The following passage illustrates McBain’s notion of a living constitution: ‘A word’, says Mr. Justice Holmes, ‘is the skin of a living thought.’ As applied to a living constitution the expression is particularly apt; for living skin is elastic, expansile, and is constantly being renewed. The constitution of the United States contains only about six thousand word; but millions of words have been written by the courts in elucidation of the ideas these few words encase” (Solum, 2019).

Ultimately, the fundamentals of living constitutionalism rely upon the laws of the Constitution being evolutionary, able to change over time, and adaptable to new circumstances and times without the difficult and time-consuming formal amendment process (Strauss, 2010). In a constantly changing world with advancements in technology, changes in international, diplomatic, and social relations, as well as economic evolution, the Constitution does need to be flexible to a certain degree (Strauss, 2010). However, the idea of a Constitution that constantly changes over time cannot entirely be; “The Constitution is supposed to be a rock-solid foundation, the embodiment of our most fundamental principles-that's the whole idea of having a constitution. Public opinion may blow this way and that, but our basic principles-our constitutional principles-must remain constant. Otherwise, why have a Constitution at all? Even worse, a living Constitution is, surely, a manipulable Constitution.” (Strauss, 2010). Scholar James E. Fleming goes on to explain that: “Strauss describes common-law constitutional interpretation as an evolving process of developing precedent and tradition, coupled with judgments of fairness and good policy. So far, so good. But some of his formulations make it sound like judges engaged in this process make judgments of fairness and good policy as if they were simply making pragmatic judgments rooted in concern to develop sensible doctrine, rather than judgments about how best to elaborate the abstract moral and political principles to which the Constitution commits us – or judgments about how best to realize our aspirational principles. He acknowledges this point elsewhere in the book, e.g., where he speaks of common-law courts as relying on “general principles derived from precedents and on its judgments about good policy.” Likewise, he refers to “a living constitution that exists apart from the text and the original understandings – that exists in, for example, the principles that protect freedom of expression and those of Brown v. Board of Education.” In short, we should conceive the Constitution as a framework or scheme of abstract aspirational principles that we elaborate through common-law constitutional interpretation” (Fleming 1178, 2011).

Regarding specifically freedom of expression in the First Amendment, the principles of freedom of expression that we know today did not become established in law until over a century after the Constitutions ratification (Strauss 52, 2010). The views of the drafters of the First Amendment drafters is unclear according to the wording of the rights, and even further “There is, in fact, good evidence that the people responsible for adding the First Amendment to the Constitution would have been comfortable with forms of suppression that would be anathema today… The central features of First Amendment law were hammered out in fits and starts, in a series of judicial decision and extrajudicial developments, over the course of the twentieth century” (Strauss 52-53, 2010).

The components within the First Amendment that protect the freedom of expression can be broken down into two main categories. First, the 1964 case of New York Times v. Sullivan helped to solidify the protection of the people’s right to criticize the government. The case was the first to place limitations upon the government’s ability to fine individuals who defame public officials (Strauss 53-54, 2010). Then five years later, in Bradenburg v. Ohio, it was decided by the Court that you, as an individual, can exercise your right to freedom of speech and expression by going as far as advocating for violence and/or use of force legally “except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action” (Strauss 54, 2010). Along the same vein, in the 1971 case of New York Times co. v. United States, the Court decided that the Pentagon papers (top secret government documents that revealed diplomatic secrets and detailed American involvement in the Vietnam war) were legally published by the New York Times seeing as the publication did not “surely result in direct, immediate, or irreparable damage to our Nation or its people” (Strauss 54, 2010). All these cases came together to underline the fact the people have the right to broad freedom of speech and expression. The government cannot infringe upon this right unless there is clear evidence that suggests other laws will be broken as a result of the exercising of the right; this is a very different image than what the drafters of the First Amendment presumably pictured. Second, within living constitutionalism, under the protection of the right to freedom of expression, there is a hierarchy in terms of which circumstances of exercising the right require the most protection from the Constitution and which the Constitution does not protect at all: “Certain values of low-value speech should receive less or no constitutional protection” (Strauss 55, 2010). Low-value speech, or relatively unimportant speech, includes instances of “obscenity, commercial speech, false and defamatory statements, perjury, blackmail, threats, criminal solicitation…” (Strauss 55, 2010). In lawmaking, laws must not infringe upon one’s rights to freedom of high-value speech, or relatively more important speech such as criticism of the government and public debate.

All this is in effect now because of the courts’ interpretations of the Constitution under living constitutionalism. The application of the Constitution now is very different from its first ratification. For example, eventually the Bill of Rights extended to states, but for a hundred years they did not extend to the states, and ultimately, the states were able to restrict freedom of expression freely and legally (Strauss 56, 2010). Also the focus of lawmaking has changed: “When the framers adopted the First Amendment, they were concerned with the balance of power between the federal government and the states and not just about protecting free expression in general. The entire focus of the debate over the First Amendment was on the federal government and on making clear that the Constitution’s grants of various powers to Congress did not include the power to restrict free speech or the press” (Strauss 59, 2010). The states, seeing as they were viewed as much more independent then, and federalism was much weaker, were seeking to protect their territories from an overly-powerful federal government and possible restrictions that could ensue. Ultimately, living constitutionalism has permitted for the practice of freedom of expression that we have today while still trying to maintain the central principles and themes of the American government granted to it by the Constitution.

Critical legal theory states that the law is inherently intertwined with social issues, essentially claiming that the law has social biases that maintain the status quo of systemic issues (Legal Information Institute). According to critical legal theorists, the law enables the protection of the privileged few and systemically disadvantages the underrepresented and underprivileged (Legal Information Institute). In “Speaking Respect, Respecting Speech,” lawyer Richard Abel attacks the legitimacy of First Amendment protections: first, by declaring that the line between accepted and prohibited speech is too subjective and, consequently, “rests on sociopolitical needs and judgements” (Gould 763). Secondly, Abel asserts that the marketplace of ideas—the concept that is used to defend free and unfiltered speech—skews in favor of the privileged few (Gould 764). Concurring with Abel’s assessment are Richard Delgado and Jean Stegancic, authors of “Must We Defend Nazis? Hate Speech, Pornography, and the New First Amendment” (Gould 765). They take issue with the view that First Amendment protections are neutral, instead declaring that this jurisprudence is “repeatedly reinforcing the status and views of the governing white, male elite” (Gould 765). While many scholars acknowledge that the judicial system is unintentionally political and, consequently, decides on legal matters, many believe that freedom of expression is an absolute, unwavering statue (Gould 767). Some, like Supreme Court Justice Black, believe that the First Amendment literally: that Congress shall make no law which restricts expression (Gould 767). Others argue that the values which motivated the First Amendment—“self-expression, truth seeking, and self-government—require that its doctrine be permanent and unwavering” (Gould 768). However, Gould points out “that we present cultural and political rationales for the norm of free speech mean[ing] that we determine its importance through social interactions (768).

Americans are often proud of their nation’s commitment to free speech; according to US jurisprudence, content-based restrictions on speech are generally unconstitutional unless they directly prevent criminality or public danger. Americans also tend to venerate the founding fathers, learning from a young age that the colonies courageously overthrew the British tyrants. Although free speech is enshrined in the Bill of Rights, the unique status that American courts have afforded free expression has little basis in originalism. Rather, such strong free-speech protection is a product of living-constitution theory and America’s modern notions of civil libertarianism. Originalist generally understand the First Amendment’s primary purpose as protecting political speech - not the broad speech protections we observe today. Justice Scalia, who was perhaps the country’s most prominent originalist, wrote the following sentence in his opinion of McConnell v. FEC: “Who could have imagined that the same Court which, within the past four years, has sternly disapproved of restrictions upon such inconsequential forms of expression as virtual child pornography, tobacco advertising, dissemination of illegally intercepted communications, and sexually explicit cable programming, would smile with favor upon a law that cuts to the heart of what the First Amendment is meant to protect: the right to criticize the government.” Many key free-expression cases, including arguably the two most important in establishing a standard for content-based restrictions, did not draw on originalist thought. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Schenck v. US (1919), which established the clear and present danger test, draws on no founding-era understanding of the Constitution to defend this standard. Ditto for Brandenberg v. Ohio (1969), where the court replaced clear and present danger with the more-stringent imminent lawless action test. Obviously, there have been many other important free-speech cases. Still, the lack of originalist insight on such important cases is telling. Modern free-expression jurisprudence demonstrates more fidelity to living constitution theory than to originalism. As the University of Chicago’s David A. Strauss articulated, “a living Constitution is one that evolves, changes over time, and adapts to new circumstances” (2010). As such, free-speech interpretation can shift to meet the needs of a changing nation According to SMU’s Christopher Wolfe, seditious speech was accepted early in the nation’s history as an exception to the First Amendment because the nation’s stability was not a given then as it is today (2019, 536-7). Today, however, courts can reevaluate anti-government speech in light of the fact that the US is a global superpower.

There is even some evidence that the Supreme Court takes public opinion into consideration (Epstein and Martin 1). This might help explain why the court has moved toward broad free-speech protections in a country where free speech is a huge aspect of political culture (although this begs the question of whether causation occurs in the opposite direction).

School-speech cases exemplify the different First-Amendment Jurisprudence produced by living-constitution and originalist theory. Justice Thomas issued a strikingly originalist opinion in Morse v. Frederick (2007). Thomas analyzed the history of US public schools, which proliferated in the early 1800s (Thomas 2007, 2). He argues that early public schools “were not places for freewheeling debates or exploration of competing ideas. Rather, teachers instilled ìa core of common valuesî in students and taught them self-control.” He concludes that because students in this area were not seen as having First-Amendment rights, neither are today’s. Meanwhile, in the court’s majority opinion in the landmark case Tinker v. Des Moines (1969), the court cited the following passage from Shelton v. Tucker (1960): “The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection." Here, it is argued that the First Amendment should protect schools’ current and future function as a breeding ground for ideas, regardless of whether such a function existed early in our nation’s history.

References:

Wolfe: https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4807&context=smulr

Fallone: https://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2018/12/on-originalism-and-the-first-amendment/ Dailey: https://open.bu.edu/bitstream/handle/2144/24083/Dailey_bu_0017N_12912.pdf?sequence=5

McConnell v. FEC: ttps://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-1674.ZX.html

Schenck v. US: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/249/47

Brandenburg v. Ohio: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/395/444

Strauss: https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/living-constitution

Epstein and Martin: http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/supctEMPubOp.pdf

Morse v. Frederick: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/690/morse-v-frederick

Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral Readings of the American Constitution, James E. Fleming, 1178, Boston University School of Law, 2011 Boston.

Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, Lawrence B. Solum, 1256, Northwestern University Law Review, 2019 Evanston.

The Living Constitution, David Strauss, 52-59, Oxford University Press, 2010 Oxford.

The Living Constitution, David Strauss, The University of Chicago Law School, 2010 Chicago.

Freedom of expression is recognized in many philosophical and moral traditions as a fundamental right. Communitarianism is described as “…the idea that human identities are largely shaped by different kinds of constitutive communities (or social relations) and that this conception of human nature should inform our moral and political judgments as well as policies and institutions.” (Bell 2024). The core idea argues that communities shape our judgements and that humans have an obligation to support the communities that shaped their judgements. Since the core idea of communitarianism is that the community comes before all else, this means that basic freedoms, including freedom of expression, must be balanced against the needs and values of the community. Community cohesion is paramount to communitarianism, and in certain communities, freedom of expression could undermine social order. Some forms of expression could prove harmful to the community, so this philosophy argues that those expressions should be censored (Bell 2024).

Freedom of expression was not recognized for much of history. Freedom of expression was seen in ancient Athens, but there were philosophers that disputed it. Plato wrote in Republic against freedom of expression. Republic is a theory for a perfect city, and Plato believed that some form of censorship would be needed. Plato doesn’t disagree with freedom of expression; he believes it is a valuable tool to be used by philosophers and just men.

References:

Bell, Daniel. “Communitarianism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman, Summer 2024. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2024. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/communitarianism/.

Glaun, Dan. “Germany’s Laws on Antisemitic Hate Speech and Holocaust Denial.”. FRONTLINE (2021). https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/germanys-laws-antisemitic-hate-speech-nazi-propaganda-holocaust-denial/.

In regards to gay marriage and religious freedom, two often interconnected topics, federalism is particularly apparent. Furthermore, many conservatives argue that states should be able to use religious rights in deciding whether or not gay marriage is legal. Robert A. Levy of the Cato Institute explains how technically, this position is legally valid, as “Clearly, federalism allows states to decide whether to recognize both same-sex and conventional marriages, or assign a different label, or privatize marriage altogether.” In this way, Levy emphasizes that due to federalism, depending on the region of the country, religious rights may be used to justify denying gay couples the ability to marry. Though, ultimately Levy questions the realistic strengths of federalism, asserting that the Constitution’s limits on discrimination outweigh the powers allocated to the states by federalism. Thus, according to Levy, federalism does not allow for states to exercise religious rights in a way that permits them to discriminate against LGBTQ+ individuals. Following this logic, federalism can be viewed to weaken the exercise of religious freedom. Additionally, states’ varying approaches to school prayer demonstrate how religious rights are subject to federalism. Although federal law prohibits prayer in public schools, upholding it to be a violation of the establishment clause, certain school districts have acted to protect school prayer. For example, nearly forty years after Engel v. Vitale and Abington School District v. Schempp, which struck down on school prayer, Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe proved school prayer was still alive in certain states, as the case presented a situation of student-led prayer prior to high school football games. Demonstrated by Santa Fe, while federal law may prohibit school-mandated prayer, certain states may permit public school districts to contradict these laws with student lead prayer. Furthermore, depending on the state, the degree of secularism within public schools may differ. This emphasizes how federalism can bolster religious rights, as state’s rights may permit them to evoke certain religious practices misaligned with federal law. Lastly, state constitutions additionally demonstrate how federalism affects religious freedom. Noted by Christopher Hammons, numerous states invoke religion in their constitutions, asserting God to be “the foundation of order, liberty, and good government.” (226) The emphasis on god and direct religious references within certain state’s constitutions demonstrate how federalism, which provides states with specific liberties, allows for a varying image of religious freedom throughout the United States.

REFERENCES:

Christopher Hammons, State Constitutions, Religious Protection, and Federalism, 7 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 226 (2013)

Robert A. Levy, Marriage equality: religious freedom, federalism, and judicial activism, SCOTUSblog (Aug. 15, 2011, 4:32 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/marriage-equality-religious-freedom-federalism-and-judicial-activism/

Freedom of religion often conflicts with other human rights. Specifically in contemporary times, other fundamental rights are often prioritized over religious rights. In particular, this is observed with LGBTQ+ rights. Explained by Dr Alice Donald and Erica Howard of Middlesex University, the rights to religious freedom and anti-discrimination are both globally upheld as fundamental rights. Though, Donald and Howard argue, ultimately LGBTQ+ individuals’ rights to non-discrimination hold precedence over religious rights. Explaining how religious freedom is enshrined in numerous human rights treaties, Donald and Howard do not shy from acknowledging the importance of freedom of religion. Though, later explaining its intersectionality with anti-discrimination rights, which they further assert to be a fundamental human right, Donald and Howard ultimately uphold the importance and prioritization of LGBTQ+ rights. In this way, Donald and Howard diminish the dominance of freedom of religion within the hierarchy of fundamental rights. Donald and Howard assert, “As mentioned, the right to manifest one’s religion or belief can be restricted if this is necessary for the protection of public safety, public order, health or morals or the rights of others. The latter includes the right of others not to be discriminated against.” Thus, as explained by Donald and Howard, the right to anti-discrimination places the right to free religious exercise at a lower position within the hierarchy of rights. Though, recent United States court cases have countered Donald and Howard’s positions, denoting a higher status to freedom of religion. Furthermore, within American jurisprudence, freedom of religion holds a particularly higher position in the hierarchy of rights. This was most notably observed in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, where the court defended a baker’s denial of services to a gay couple on the grounds of religion. Upholding the ability of the baker to discriminate against the gay couple, the court asserted the dominance of religious rights over anti-discrimination laws. Noted by Justice Gorsuch, “The Constitution protects not just popular religious exercises from the condemnation of civil authorities. It protects them all.” Through this, the court demonstrated that religious rights hold a principal position above other fundamental rights within the United States.

REFERENCES:

Dr Alice Donald and Dr Erica Howard, “The right to freedom of religion or belief and its intersection with other rights,” ILGA-Europe, 2015 London.

The right to freedom of religion is interpreted and expressed in a number of different ways all over the world. Most modern states’ constitutions recognize freedoms of belief, faith, and practice of religion within their borders, so long as that practice does not pose a danger to the state or society. Many of these countries respect their citizens’ right to freedom of religion, though some do place certain restrictions on the right by requiring religious organizations to register, outlawing certain religious practices, or restricting religious toleration to a few choice faiths. The United States was one of the earliest countries to embrace the principle of freedom of religion, but its implementation of that right within its legal framework is rather unusual. While the country was founded upon the principles of liberty and freedom, it does not specify the right to religious freedom within its Constitution. Rather, the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (United States Bill of Rights, Article I). This means that the government must respect the people’s religious freedom, but it does not specifically establish the right to the free practice of faith or belief. Of course, the right has been exercised freely throughout the country’s history, and over the years the courts have determined that the right is implied within the Constitution. Canada also guarantees the right to religious freedom, but it does so more directly than the United States. Its constitution guarantees that “freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression, and the right to equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination based on religion” (U.S. State Department, “Canada,” 2018, 1). By directly invoking freedom of religion in its legal system, Canada leaves less to interpretation than the United States Bill of Rights. It also allows citizens to protect their own right to religious freedom by appealing directly to the right in legal cases. A 2018 U.S. State Department report on Canadian religious freedom notes that while Canadian law “imposes ‘reasonable limits’ on the exercise of these religious rights only where such restrictions can be ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society,’” the law also “permits individuals to sue the government for ‘violations’ of religious freedom.” (U.S. State Department, “Canada,” 2018, 3).

Of course, not every country that guarantees the right to freedom of religion allows its citizens to exercise that right. The People’s Republic of China, for instance, guarantees its citizens the right to freedom of religion, but places heavy restrictions on the practice of that freedom. The U.S. State Department reports that the PRC government “limits protections for religious practice to ‘normal religious activities’ and does not define ‘normal,’” and that it “continues to exercise control over religion and restrict the activities and personal freedom of religious adherents when the government perceived these as threatening state or Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interests” (U.S. State Department, “China,” 2018, 1). The report also states that in 2018 “there continued to be reports of deaths in custody and that the government tortured, physically abused, arrested, detained, sentenced to prison, or harassed adherents of both registered and unregistered religious groups for activities related to their religious beliefs and practices” (U.S. State Department, “China,” 2018, 1). Reports show that Muslims have recently been the most heavily targeted religious group as the Chinese government continues to crack down on religious expression.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is guilty of similar rights violations. While the North Korean constitution also guarantees freedom of religion for its citizens, the State Department reports that within the country“there was an almost complete denial by the government of the rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and in many instances, violations of human rights committed by the government constituted crimes against humanity” (U.S. State Department, “North Korea,” 2018, 1). While information on the North Korean government is notoriously difficult to acquire, accounts from witnesses and refugees indicate that the country is reluctant to allow the free practice of religion, and that it actively represses the people’s exercise of this right through the use of force. The State Department reports that “one [North Korean] refugee said there was no religious freedom in the country, and another said that if someone were found to be a Christian, he or she would immediately be shot.” (U.S. State Department, “North Korea,” 2018, 3). Such horrific conditions prove that while many states may claim to respect their citizens’ freedom of religion, this right is often subject to heavy regulation and restriction.

Iran is almost unique in its treatment of religious freedom, because its government does not guarantee the right at all. “The constitution defines the country as an Islamic republic, and specifies Twelver Ja’afari Shia Islam as the official state religion. It states all laws and regulations must be based on “Islamic criteria” and an official interpretation of sharia” (U.S. State Department, “Iran,” 2018, 3). The discussion of other religions is restricted within the country, and the constitution states that “no one may be ‘subjected to questioning and aggression for merely holding an opinion.’” According to the State Department, the law also “prohibits Muslim citizens from changing or renouncing their religious beliefs” (U.S. State Department, “Iran,” 2018, 3). This does not mean that minority religions are outlawed; recognized minority groups are allowed to operate private schools, though they are subject to a number of restrictions (U.S. State Department, “Iran,” 2018, 7). In such a theocracy, the exercise of religious freedom is very difficult and exceedingly dangerous.

Different countries interpret the right to freedom of religion in a number of varying ways, and this often leads governments to restrict their citizens’ exercise of that right. Most modern states guarantee the right within their constitutions, but the actual protection of citizens’ freedom of religion is not always observed in states controlled by authoritarian or oppressive regimes.

References:

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. IRAN 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IRAN-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FRE EDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, XINJIANG, HONG KONG, AND MACAU) 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT.

International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CHINA-INCLUSIVE-2018-INTERNATIONAL-R ELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

Ochab, Ewelina U. “Is China Conducting A Crackdown On Religion?” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 20 Apr. 2019, www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2019/04/20/is-china-conducting-a-crackdown-on-religion/.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. ITALY 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ITALY-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FR EEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. IRAN 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IRAN-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FRE EDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK) 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/KOREA-DEM-REP-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RE LIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. RUSSIA 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/RUSSIA-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-F REEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

U.S. Mission Egypt, 23 June, 2019, Topics: News. “2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Egypt.” U.S. Embassy in Egypt, 27 June 2019, eg.usembassy.gov/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom-egypt/.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. BELARUS 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/BELARUS-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS -FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. CANADA 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CANADA-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS- FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. NEW ZEALAND 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/NEW-ZEALAND-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELI GIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a landmark document within the field of international human rights law, recognizes freedom of religion as a fundamental and intrinsic human right. It establishes the right to freedom of religion as encompassing an individual’s “freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance” (UN General Assembly 1948, 1). Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration by the United Nations General Assembly in December of 1948, freedom of religion is guaranteed in the charters and constitutions of several regional organizations, including the Organization of American States (OAS), the Council of Europe (CoE), and the African Union (AU), as well as their member states, reinforcing the belief that the right is fundamental and should generally be protected, with rare exceptions, on an international level. Individual states vary on their interpretation and length to which they guarantee the freedom, though a majority include it within their legal code and consider it a human right, with few nations serving as notable exceptions.

The right to freedom of religion is protected under international human rights law, appearing in various international documents and treaties, most markedly in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. The United Nations considers “that religion or belief, for anyone who professes either, is one of the fundamental elements in his conception of life and that freedom of religion or belief should be fully respected and guaranteed” (UN General Assembly 1981, 1). The organization expects its member states to promote and encourage universal respect and observance of the right, stating that the points set forth relating to freedom of religion in the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance “shall be accorded in national legislation in such a manner that everyone shall be able to avail himself of such rights and freedoms in practice”, with few exceptions: “Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” (UN General Assembly 1981, 3). With 193 Member States, the UN is the world’s largest intergovernmental organization, pushing for the protection of the right to freedom of religion internationally and its recognition as a fundamental human right by all nations under international human rights law.

The Organization of American States (OAS) is an international organization that brings together “all 35 independent states of the Americas and constitutes the main political, juridical, and social governmental forum in the [Western] Hemisphere” (“OAS: Who We Are” 2023). It is committed to upholding freedom of religion, with the Declaration of the OAS General Secretariat on the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Religion or Belief reaffirming the organization’s belief that “guaranteeing freedom of religion or belief continues to be a fundamental responsibility of States” as it is “essential to understand that religious freedom or belief as a human right is, in turn, linked to the defense of the rights of all individuals and groups, in all areas” (“Declaration of the OAS General Secretariat.” 2023, 1). Currently, every country in the Americas includes a provision protecting freedom of religion in their constitution, though the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom raised concern for indigenous peoples in Latin America in their 2023 annual report: “Indigenous peoples in Latin America have long faced a series of collective and individual threats to the full enjoyment of their religious freedom and related rights” (75). It also focused on Cuba and Nicaragua as countries of particular concern, citing the Nicaraguan regime’s “campaign of harassment and severe persecution against the Catholic Church by targeting clergy, eliminating Church-affiliated organizations, and placing restrictions on religious observances” and the Cuban government’s tight control over religious “activity through surveillance, harassment of religious leaders and laypeople, forced exile, fines, and ill treatment of religious prisoners of conscience”. (20-30). The report did not note other concern or violation of freedom of religion in the Americas region in other states. The right is generally protected across America and is considered a fundamental human right.

Article 8 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted by the African Union in 1981, states that “freedom of conscience, the profession and free practice of religion shall be guaranteed” and that “no one may, subject to law and order, be submitted to measures restricting the exercise of these freedoms” (Organization of African Unity 1981, 4). The African Union is a continental union consisting of 55 member states, with a majority including provisions protecting freedom of religion in their constitutions, though there are a few countries where it is very limited or violated. The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom highlighted Eritrea, Mauritania, Nigeria, Central African Republic, and Egypt for a lack of religious freedom, citing instances of religious persecution and punishment for certain religious minorities (“2023 Annual Report” 2023, 11). The report did not find any serious violations in other African nations, with most prohibiting religious discrimination and allowing individuals to practice their religion. The Council of Europe (CoE) also holds freedom of religion to be a fundamental right, explicitly stating so in Article 9 in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The document states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance” noting few exceptions as “are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (European Court of Human Rights 1950, 11). With the end of the Cold War, virtually all of Europe has an unprecedented general freedom of religion guaranteed by their constitution (Juviler 2003, 859). However, there have been concerns with rising Islamophobic legislation, including the banning of particular religious clothing like burqas (U.S. Department of State 2022, 6). Though practices vary, the freedom is held in high standard and seen as a core human right.

The Asia Pacific Forum (APF) is a regional grouping of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) that focuses on monitoring, promoting, and protecting human rights in Asia and the Pacific. It is a coalition of 25 independent national human rights institutions that aim to uphold human rights, including freedom of religion, educating and reaffirming the “purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations with regard to the promotion and encouragement of respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion” (Asia Pacific Forum 2013, 205). The Asia Pacific Forum notes that unlike other regions in the world, “there is no regional court or protection system in the Asia Pacific that people can turn to when their human rights are abused,” though they can help “shape laws, policies, practices and attitudes that create strong, fair and inclusive communities” to combat this (“About the Asia Pacific Forum 2023). Several countries in Asia were listed in the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s annual report on freedom of religion as countries of particular concern. It noted Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam, among others (“2023 Annual Report” 2023, 11). Though most states in the continent protect freedom of religion in their legal code, there is quite a discrepancy in their practices and extent to which they safeguard it. The report noted that Vietnamese authorities “intensified their control and persecution of religious groups—especially unregistered, independent communities” while the Saudi government “continued to systematically deny non-Muslims the ability to build houses of worship or worship in public” and create anti-blasphemy and apostasy laws (“2023 Annual Report” 2023, 38-46). It further states that China “has become increasingly hostile toward religion, implementing campaigns to ‘sinicize’ Islam, Tibetan Buddhism, and Christianity to remove alleged ‘foreign influences’” and in Afghanistan the government of the “Taliban also either actively targets, discriminates against, or outright denies the existence of many vulnerable religious minorities” (“2023 Annual Report” 2023, 12-16).

On an international level, there is a belief that freedom of religion is a fundamental human right that should be protected, with few exceptions. Intergovernmental organizations, which a majority of the countries in the world belong to, such as the UN, the AU, and the CoE, reaffirm the importance of the right and push its members to uphold it. On an individual state by state basis, however, the amount of protection and importance the right receives varies. The majority of countries include provisions safeguarding freedom of religion in the constitution, but their rules and regulations differ, as well as their practices. Overall, the right to freedom of religion is generally regarded as an intrinsic and fundamental by a large number of states and other actors.

References:

“About the Asia Pacific Forum.” 2023. Asia Pacific Forum. Accessed July 4. https://www.asiapacificforum.net/about/.

“Annual Report” 2023. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2023-05/2023%20Annual%20Report.pdf

Asia Pacific Forum. 2013. Human Rights Education: A Manual for National Human Rights Institutions. Asia Pacific Forum National Human Rights Institutions. https://apf- prod.s3.amazonaws.com/media/resource_file/2019_HRE_Manual_for_NHRIs.pdf?AWS AccessKeyId=AKIA57J6V557ISASX34R&Signature=NXImyA3dX%2FFHi6h08a uFkAwzEnE%3D&Expires=1688487584.

“Declaration of the OAS General Secretariat.” 2023. Organization of American States. General Secretariat https://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-008/23.

European Court of Human Rights. 1950. European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.

Juviler, Peter. 2003. Freedom and Religious Tolerance in Europe . University of Michigan. https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1316&context=mjil.

“OAS: Who We Are.” 2023. Organization of American States. https://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp.

Organization of African Unity. 1981. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36390-treaty-0011.pdf.

UN General Assembly. 1981. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, OHCHR. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/declaration-elimination

UN General Assembly. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 217 A (III), https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2021/03/udhr.pdf

U.S. Department of State. 2022. France 2022 International Religious Freedom Report. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/441219-FRANCE-2022- INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

After witnessing the horror of religious warfare during the Reformation era, European philosophy began to explore the idea of religious toleration within political society. As the Enlightenment movement gained momentum during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, western civilization turned to science, empiricism, and reason as sources of wisdom and knowledge. This movement was accompanied by a shift away from purely religious discourse as innovative thinkers began to take up more secular pursuits than they could have in centuries past. With this shift thinkers like Locke, Voltaire, Spinoza, and Williams began to question whether states had the right to dictate their subjects’ religious beliefs. These questions led these Enlightenment thinkers to begin believing that political society would better respect its citizens’ rights if it were to adopt policies of religious toleration.

Religious pluralism became a reality in Enlightenment-era Europe. The Protestant Reformation of the previous centuries had given rise to a number of Protestant-dominated secular states which had carved out a right to remain independent of the Catholic Church after decades of bloodshed and warfare. In the following centuries, thinkers like Spinoza and Voltaire reflected upon the dangers that intolerance can pose to a peaceful society. In 1670 Spinoza’s anonymously published “Treatise on Theology and Politics” radically asserted that “men are very prone to error on religious subjects, and, according to the diversity of their dispositions, are wont with considerable stir to put forward their own inventions, as experience more than sufficiently attests.” (Spinoza, “The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza,” 163). However, rather than calling for the abolition of religious toleration, Spinoza uses this idea that religious difference breeds conflict to suggest that states should abandon any effort to control their citizens’ beliefs, and should instead simply protect the people’s right to their own thoughts. In a state built on principles of toleration instead of religious unity, religious conflict would be less likely. A century later, Voltaire came to a similar conclusion in his 1775 “Treatise on Tolerance.” In this work, the Frenchman writes that “toleration, in fine, never led to civil war; intolerance has covered the earth with carnage,” and asserts that “the whole of our continent shows us that we must neither preach nor practise intolerance” (Voltaire, “Toleration and Other Essays-Online Library of Liberty”). By linking the idea of religious toleration to the need for states to maintain law and order within society, both Spinoza and Voltaire began to identify religious freedom as an essential facet of a well-ordered state.

Another important Enlightenment idea that contributed to the identification of the right to religious freedom was the argument that God may will that religious toleration be extended throughout the Christian world. After centuries of warfare, much of it based on the principle that members of the one true religion must fight infidels in the name of God, this was a relatively novel idea. In his 1644 work, The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, Roger Williams rejects this idea and states that “it is the will and command of God, that (since the coming of his Son the Lord Jesus) a permission of the most pagan, Jewish, Turkish, or Antichristian consciences and worships, be granted to all men in all nations and countries...” (Williams, “The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution”). The Tenant even goes as far as to claim that “God requireth not an uniformity of religion to be enacted and enforced in any civil state…”(Williams, “The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution”). Williams’ work was not well-received by his audience in England, especially considering that the country was still in the midst of a religiously-motivated civil war. However, the idea that the civil state should not enforce any religion was hugely influential in the colony of Rhode Island, of which Williams is considered the sole founder. Decades later, in 1689 following the French King Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Locke wrote something very similar in his “Letter Concerning Toleration.” In this letter, he asserts that “the toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ...that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light” (Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration”). The desire to follow God’s will had long guided European thoughts about the connection between church and state, but thinkers like Williams and Locke presented important challenges to this notion. This allowed for discussion over the right to religious freedom to flourish as the Enlightenment wore on.

Though discourse on religious toleration was still considered fairly radical during the seventeenth century, Enlightenment philosophers also questioned whether it was indeed even possible for a state to dictate its citizens’ religious beliefs. Spinoza’s “Treatise” is heavily concerned with the idea that a person’s right to think freely is a natural right which cannot be deprived by any political society. He writes that “however unlimited, therefore, the power of a sovereign may be, however implicitly it is trusted as the exponent of law and religion, it can never prevent men from forming judgments according to their intellect, or being influenced by any given emotion” (Spinoza, “The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza,” 194). This, Spinoza believes, necessarily implies that a state could never enforce a person’s belief or religious faith because it is not possible for a state to take a person’s mastery of their own thoughts. Voltaire expresses a similar sentiment in his essays when he states that “it does not depend on man to believe or not to believe: but it depends on him to respect the usages of his country” (Voltaire, “Toleration and Other Essays-Online Library of Liberty”). Writing about a century after Spinoza, Voltaire also explored the idea that the state is unable to change how a citizen believes, as long as the belief is not inherently detrimental to the state itself. With this in mind, Voltaire advances the idea that because states cannot change its citizens’ beliefs, it should embrace a diversity of beliefs by incorporating the principle of religious freedom into its governance.

Among the most radical Enlightenment-era ideas concerning religious toleration was the thought that civil states did not have the inherent right to dictate citizens’ religion at all. Locke’s “Letter” asserts that “nobody, therefore, in fine, neither single persons nor churches, nay, nor even commonwealths, have any just title to invade the civil rights and worldly goods of each other upon pretence of religion” (Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration”). Spinoza similarly states that “government which attempts to control minds is accounted tyrannical, and it is considered an abuse of sovereignty and a usurpation of the rights of subjects” (Spinoza, “The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza,” 194). This idea that citizens of a political society could have the innate right to decide their own thoughts and religion built upon the initial identification of religion as a multifaceted issue, which originated centuries earlier during the Reformation. As early as 1644, former Massachusetts Puritain Roger Williams rather controversially wrote that “all civil states and their officers of justice in their respective constitutions and administrations are proved essentially civil, and therefore not judges, governors, or defenders of the Spiritual or Christian state and worship” (Williams, “The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution”). The principle that civil states could not serve as spiritual authorities directly influenced the development of political states such as the Rhode Island Colony and the United States of America, in which freedom of religion was identified as an essential right with which the government could not interfere.

Though the idea of a right to religious freedom was first conceived during the religious wars of the Reformation era, Enlightenment thinkers deserve credit for identifying religious freedom as an essential right. Questions of whether God’s will dictated religious uniformity, the dangers of combating religious pluralism, as well as issues of citizen and states’ rights all contributed, decades and centuries after they were originally pondered, to the inclusion of religious freedom in mainstream political discourse. Williams and Locke both made important contributions to the growing American discussion of essential rights and liberties, while writings from thinkers like Spinoza and Voltaire gradually invited Europeans to consider the benefits of granting religious freedom to their subjects.

References:

Locke, “Letter Concerning Toleration”

Spinoza, The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza

Voltaire, Voltaire. Toleration and Other Essays. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1755. https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/mccabe-toleration-and-other-essays.

Roger Williams, “The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution”

Religious freedom, while commonplace in modern liberal democracies, was not always identified as a natural right with which people were born. Historical narratives describe the “Dark Ages” between the fall of the Roman Empire and the advent of early modernity as a period in which the world was divided between various civilizations according to the religions which they professed. The Reformation was one of the most influential movements in the course of western history. As leaders like Martin Luther, and John Calvin led Christian communities to break from traditional Catholicism, the rate of religious pluralism rose within Europe and led to a series of religious wars that defined the sixteenth century. In an early attempt to mediate these conflicts, German rulers negotiated the 1555 Peace of Augsburg. Alexandra Walsham writes that this document “established the principle of cuius regio, eius religio, by which individual rulers were permitted to choose whether Catholicism or Protestantism should be professed in their states” (Walsham, “Reformation Legacies,” 297.) Thus, in addition to legalizing the practice of multiple religions within the German states, the adoption of cuius regio, eius religio also meant that religion would no longer be forced upon a principality by outside forces. The idea that Christian rulers could have the right to choose their own religion, and that this choice would be respected, represents an early step toward the principles of religious pluralism and toleration. The Peace of Augsburg did not lend religious agency to the subjects living within these principalities, but it did show European leaders that cooperation was possible between rulers who belonged to differing faiths. The seventeenth century was an especially bloody one which included such conflicts as the English Civil War, the French Wars of Religion, and the vicious Thirty Years’ War. Religious plurality invariably led to violence in the seventeenth century, but these conflicts were often followed by important agreements that fostered some level of religious toleration. In 1598, following the religious battles between Catholics and Protestants in France, the French King Henry (IV) of Navarre signed the Edict of Nantes, which “gave Protestants permission to practice their faith openly, albeit within strict limits and as second-class citizens” (Walsham, “Reformation Legacies,” 299). The Thirty Years’ War famously concluded with the Peace of Westphalia, which decreed (among other things) that while each state should have the right to establish an official religion, they were also obligated to allow their subjects the opportunity to practice different Christian denominations without fear of persecution (Christenson, “Liberty of the Exercise of Religion in the Peace of Westphalia,” 740). By favoring religious toleration, Westphalia’s signatories recognized that only religious toleration would reduce the potential for future conflict between the various sects of Christianity. Documents like the Edict of Nantes and the Peace of Westphalia ultimately failed to end religious persecution and conflict within Europe, but they still reveal a heightened awareness of the need for leaders to tolerate religious plurality within their borders. As the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries wore on, European intelligentsia began exploring the concept of religious freedom more directly. Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire and Baruch Spinoza led the intellectual charge in support of freedom of conscience and thought, while political leaders such as Roger Williams and Thomas Jefferson incorporated principles of religious freedom and the separation of church and state into their state building efforts in North America. While legal guarantees of the right to religious freedom would not be made until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the modern right to freedom of religion is rooted in Reformation-era efforts to mediate religious conflict and incorporate religious toleration into budding European nation-states.

REFERENCES

Gordon A. Christenson, “Liberty of the Exercise of Religion in the Peace of Westphalia,” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol. 21, 2012).

Alexandra Walsham, “Reformation Legacies,” from The Oxford History of the Reformation, ed. Peter Marshall, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2022

The Edict of Milan came two years after the Edict of Toleration by Galerius and granted religious toleration within the Roman Empire.

References:

Reference needed here

Yes, the freedom of religion is protected under several international human rights conventions, treaties, and decrees. This right is protected in article 18 of the UN’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 18 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and also in the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner). The right is also protected by relevant articles within the following conventions and treaties: 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 1969 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the 1990 UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the 1951 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. However, despite the writings and workings of all these conventions, treaties, and declarations, freedom of religion is still commonly suppressed in many areas of the world (Janis 2002). There is no effective international supervision of rights to religious freedom and diversity. However, regional European human rights law does in fact have tangible supervision of and consequences regarding the suppression of the freedom of religion. Article 9 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms protects right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

REFERENCES

“Global Restrictions on Religion.” Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project, 30 May 2020, www.pewforum.org/2009/12/17/global-restrictions-on-religion/.

Human Rights Library- University of Minnesota, hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/studyguides/religion.html.

“International Religious Freedom Report for 2017.” Wilson Center, www.wilsoncenter.org/article/international-religious-freedom-report-for-2017.

“International Standards - Framework for Communications.” OHCHR, www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomReligion/Pages/Standards.aspx.

Mark Weston Janis, “Religion and International Law.” ASIL, 17 Nov. 2002, www.asil.org/insights/volume/7/issue/13/religion-and-international-law.

U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom//index.htm.

“You Can Be Put to Death for Atheism in 13 Countries around the World.” Humanists International, 1 Feb. 2019, humanists.international/2013/12/you-can-be-put-death-atheism-13-countries-around-world/.

Freedom of religion is included in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

The right to free religious exercise was enshrined in the presence of several other noteworthy rights, and was complemented by what we refer to today as the Establishment Clause—a provision mandating the separation of stately matters and religion. Furthermore, the Free Exercise Clause was later expanded by proxy through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

The Fourteenth Amendment established the process of Selective Incorporation, which extended the Bill of Rights to state governments. The extent of religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution remains an open question, however, as the evolution of case law pertaining to the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause has gradually created a formula of exceptions and standards for governments and religious organizations alike.

Given that Constitutionally-protected rights must be manually incorporated to the states, the incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause by the Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) represented a milestone for religious freedom. The arrest of several Jehovah’s Witnesses in New Haven, Connecticut due to their failure to obtain a religious solicitation license provoked a free exercise lawsuit against the city. Ruling for the Witnesses, the Court decried the “censorship of religion” based on its “right to survive” in a hostile environment (Justice Roberts, 1940). Despite their statements in support of religious freedom, the justices also used the Cantwell decision to imply different ways that religious expression can be regulated while acknowledging the government’s interest in maintaining public order.

In light of the Cantwell precedent, a strenuous situation unfolded between religious organizations and the government, given that the latter’s power to prosecute certain religious activities was both restricted and affirmed by the Court. This situation escalated following the adoption of the Sherbert-Yoder test. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court ruled in favor of Adeil Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist in South Carolina who was fired—and denied unemployment benefits—for refusing to work on Saturday, which is viewed as a religious holiday by the Seventh-day Adventist Church. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the justices struck down a Wisconsin statute mandating a public education for children under the age of 16 following a lawsuit from several Amish residents, who accused the law of infringing on their religious exercise.

The Sherbert-Yoder test mandated that strict scrutiny be applied to laws that potentially infringe on religious freedom. Specifically, the state must prove that the law in question is vital to achieving a compelling interest, and that no less restrictive alternatives exist. South Carolina’s refusal to accommodate Adeil Sherbert in spite of her “declared ineligibility” to work on Saturdays, for example, forced her to choose between her financial well-being and religious adherence—a reality that could have reasonably been accommodated by exceptions for practicing Seventh-Day Adventists (Justice Brennan, 1963). Comparatively, the Wisconsin Statute struck down by Yoder did not offer any religious exemptions to compulsory public school attendance. Due to the well-established nature of Amish primary education, such an exception could reasonably have been made in this case without compromising the state’s interest in ensuring an educated populace.

Despite the high standard created by strict scrutiny for the incidental suppression of religious exercise, the Court established clear exceptions for the Free Exercise Clause in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) and Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), two cases that preceded and followed the Court’s adoption of the Sherbert-Yoder test, respectively (both cases predated the Smith test, which will be further discussed below). In Braunfeld, the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania Blue Law (ordinances that ban nonessential commercial activity on a certain day, most commonly Sunday) was challenged by Abraham Braunfeld, an Orthodox Jew who could not work on Saturdays due to his religion. Ruling for the state, the justices asserted that Pennsylvania’s attempt to create a “day of rest” represented one of many “important social duties” afforded to the state (Justice Warren, 1961). Given that religious exceptions would likely compromise the legitimacy of this effort by promoting typical commercial activities, no realistic alternative existed for Pennsylvania—a key difference from the situation in Sherbert. Finally, the Court gave its typical deference to “the professional judgment of military authorities” in Goldman (Justice Rehnquist, 1986). The justices ruled that Simcha Goldman, a United States Air Force captain who challenged the Air Force Dress Code due to its prohibition of religious garments, was not entitled to wear a yarmulke while serving in the military.

Despite the various examples of court-imposed limitations to religious activity evidenced by Braunfeld and Goldman, the Sherbert-Yoder test continued to provide a high bar for governmental intrusions on free exercise. The purview of this test was greatly limited, however, by the Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in which the justices rejected a free exercise claim from the Native American Church in Oregon. Two adherents to the Church were fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote, a practice encouraged by their religion but outlawed in the state of Oregon. Like Sherbert, they were fired and denied unemployment benefits. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia asserted that the Oregon statute was “generally applicable criminal law” that was not designed to infringe on the Native American Church—a stark departure from the Court’s rulings on supposedly secular laws in Sherbert and Yoder. Unlike both cases, however, an exception for Smith would have likely imperiled the legitimacy of Oregon’s drug control laws, thereby creating a problematic issue for public safety. Following this ruling, broad public outcry prompted congress to pass the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which effectively mandated the reapplication of the strict scrutiny standard for all levels of government. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Court curtailed the RFRA by limiting its purview to federal issues.

In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014), the court pivoted back to the least restrictive means test outlined in Sherbert and Yoder without explicitly overruling Smith. In response to a provision by the Affordable Care Act requiring for-profit corporations to provide funding for contraceptives as part of their insurance plans, the owners of Hobby Lobby filed suit, alleging the law violated the RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause. Ruling for Hobby Lobby, the Court asserted that any contraceptive mandate would compel the Burwell family to “facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices” that would violate their “sincere Christian beliefs” (Justice Alito, 2014). Furthermore, the justices contended that exemptions for closely-held for-profit companies such as Hobby Lobby would have represented a less restrictive measure—an argument that encapsulated the broader shift towards the Sherbert-Yoder test for certain cases.

Contrary to the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause plays a more subtle role in matters pertaining to religious exercise. The question of whether freedom of religion includes the right to be free from religion has been debated since the inception of the Constitution, and several cases pertaining to the Establishment Clause have also created implications for free exercise. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the Court established a standard for determining any governmental violations of the Establishment Clause, highlighted by its prohibition of activities that constitute “an excessive government entanglement with religion” (Justice Burger, 1971).

The ambiguity of this test was made clear by Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. 507 (2022), in which the Court ruled in favor of a public high school football coach in Washington State who had been suspended for holding prayers with his students during school events. This decision replaced the Lemon test with the “historical practices and understandings” test, which asserted that Christianity can be treated as an American cultural phenomenon. This line of reasoning was previously implied in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) and American Legion v. American Humanist Association, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), in which the presence of Christian religious symbols on public property (outside a courthouse and in a veterans' cemetery, respectively) were upheld for their cultural—rather than religious—significance. While the cultural importance of Christianity to American culture cannot be denied, this test does not deny that Christian exercises or objects within public property are inherently religious—a dilemma that has sparked fierce debate since the Kennedy ruling.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/310/296/

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/374/398/

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/406/205/

Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/366/599/

Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/475/503/

Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/494/872/

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/521/507/

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/573/682/

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/602/

Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. 507 (2022) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-418/

Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/545/677/

American Legion v. American Humanist Association, 588 U.S. ___ (2019) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/588/17-1717/

The right is explicitly protected both in the Bill of Rights, but also in Article VI of the Constitution. This article prohibits religious discrimination in the formation of the government under the No Religious Test Clause. The clause, stating that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States,” promotes the freedom of religion and religious equality in all manners of life, starting from within the government itself (Brownstein and Campbell)

REFERENCES

Alan E. Brownstein and Jud Campbell, “The No Religious Test Clause,” https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/articles/article-vi/clauses/32

Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The UDHR provides for exceptions to human rights “determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” American Convention on Human Rights: Article 12-3 of the convention states that religious practice may “be subject only to the limitations prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others.” The relevant court has “recognized that a state can limit the exercise of free religious expression when there is a conflict with other rights or when such expression constitutes a threat to society or political stability” (Gomes 2009, 98). European Convention on Human Rights: Article 9-2 states that “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted a right not to have one’s religious views insulted by the public and has condoned state action against blasphemy (Koev 2019). In Valsamis v. Greece (1996), the court ruled against a defendant seeking a religious a religious exemption from a school-sponsored activity (Koev 2019). In Eweida and others v. UK (2013), the court ruled against civil servants who refused to register same-sex marriages (Koev 2019). In Sahin v. Turkey ( 2004), the court upheld restricts on beards and headscarves for Muslim university students to “reconcile the interests of various groups” (Koev 2019, 188). In SAS v. France, the court upheld a ban on public face coverings because the face coverings would intrude on concepts of secularism and liberty (because, the court argued, face coverings symbolize subservience).

REFERENCES:

Evaldo Xavier Gomes, “The Implementation of Inter-American Norms on Freedom of Religion in the National Legislation of OAS Member States,” BYU Law Review, 2009, Issue 3 Article 5, 9-1-2009

Dan Koev (2019) Not Taking it on Faith: State and Religious Influences on European Court of

Human Rights Judges in Freedom of Religion Cases, Journal of Human Rights, 18:2, 184-200, DOI: 10.1080/14754835.2019.1588715

Universal Declaration of Human Rights: https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/

The conflict of civil and religious rights has presented several exceptions to the right to free religious exercise. Specifically, stemming from the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of marriage equality in 2015, many anti-discrimination laws have passed, restricting the right to unfettered religious exercise. Several scholars have argued in favor of these exceptions. In discussing the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Suzanne Goldberg states, “After many years of battles in which the religious right had hammered the message that gay people were somehow seeking “special rights” when advocating for laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, the court added its authoritative view that the “special rights” rhetoric was meaningless” (Keen and Goldberg, 236-237). Emulated by Goldberg, as civil rights, such as marriage equality, are not “special rights", they must be protected equally to the First Amendment right to free religious exercise. Ultimately, Goldberg conveys the sentiment that within American jurisprudence, the right to free religious exercise is prima facie, and thus can be subject to numerous exceptions. Additionally, in regards to criminal law violations, William P Marshall of the University of Chicago Law Review supports the need for exceptions to the Free Exercise Clause. Furthermore, Marshall condemns the belief that religious activity, as protected by the Free Exercise Clause, should be exempt from criminal laws. In defending the Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith decision, which confirmed the state’s ability to withhold unemployment benefits from workers fired for using illegal drugs for religious purposes, Marshall argues that if the Supreme Court were to permit religious exemptions to criminal laws, strengthening First Amendment Rights, they would have to engage in dangerous “constitutional balancing” (Marshall, 311). As explained by Marshall, this balancing would force the court to weigh the interests of religious groups against the interests of states, resulting in inconsistent rulings. Thus, presenting a clear exception to freedom of religion, Marshall argues that First Amendment rights, specifically the right to free religious exercise, do not exempt one from criminal prosecution. Between the positions of Marshall and Goldberg, lies Ira C. Lupu of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. While Lupu dismisses the Smith decision, claiming religious rights should have been accommodated in that particular case, he still argues for limitations on religious expression, claiming, “every person may pursue religious freedom to the extent that it is fully compatible with the equal pursuit of religious freedom by others” (Lupu, 558). Similar to Goldberg, Lupu asserts that religious expression can be curtailed when it restricts the liberties of others. Thus, Lupu emphasizes that although certain religious practices should be exempt from the law, such as the peyote drinking incident in Smith, religious expression should not be left legally unrestricted.

REFERENCES:

Keen, Lisa., and Suzanne B. Goldberg. Strangers to the Law : Gay People on Trial. University of Michigan Press, 1998.

Lupu, Ira C. “Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion.” University of Pennsylvania law review 140, no. 2 (1991): 555–612.

Marshall, William P. “In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism.” The University of Chicago Law Review 58, no. 1 (1991): 308–28. https://doi.org/10.2307/1599906.

In the United States, certain religious practices have been limited during times of disease. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, limitations on free religious exercise have been visibly witnessed, demonstrating how the right is subject to restrictions during a health crisis. This was observed in the beginning of the pandemic, when many houses of worship challenged their closures by state governments, arguing that such actions violated their rights to free religious exercise. Thus, witnessed through the closing of churches as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, a disaster can alter the Supreme court’s constitutional interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. The COVID-19 pandemic has caused many governments to limit religious gatherings. For example, at the outset of the pandemic, Maryland banned gatherings of more than ten people, including religious services (Pitts 2020). Terrorism has justified bans on Muslim veils in public places, a restriction on the free exercise of religion. From a 2019 piece by the London Schools of Economics’ Stuti Manchanda and Nilay Saiya: “Proponents of restrictions on Muslim veils make three main arguments. First, they claim that enveloping Islamic veils present a physical security threat, insofar as Muslim women might use these traditional Islamic garments to conceal weapons or explosives. ‘You could carry a rocket launcher under your veil,’ as the former President of Latvia, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, put it. Similarly, Paul Nuttall, former leader of the UK Independence Party, justified banning the burqa on similar physical security grounds: ‘Obviously we have a heightened security risk at the moment and for CCTV to be effective, in an age of heightened terror, you need to be able to see people’s faces.’ Finally, British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, compared Muslim women in veils to letter boxes and bank robbers.” Israel has restricted Muslim practices to respond to terrorism. In 2017, due to a recent incident, Israel banned Muslim men under 50 from visiting the Western Wall (there is some conflicting reporting as to whether the ban extended to non-Muslim men as well). Israel has similarly restricted other sites during times of tension, such as Jerusalem’s Aqsa mosque (Baker 2017). Given that the Western Wall is a sacred site to Muslims, restricting access should be considered a restriction on Muslim practice. The ban still restricted the ability of people to freely worship even if it extended to non-Muslims. Certain US anti-terror policies, though stopping short of restricting Muslim religious practices, have significantly impacted Muslims. In Response to 9-11, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act. The act’s provisions included those designed to facilitate search warrants on suspected terrorists, enable increased surveillance, and prevent terrorists from exploiting the immigration system. These provisions and post-attack suspicion of Muslims have led law-enforcement agencies to disproportionately target them. A 2006 piece by Xavier University’s Kam C. Wong referred to Muslim-Americans’ situation as a “virtual internment camp” (194). Wong cites staggering data on Muslim-Americans between 2001 and 2005; using conservative estimates, 90,000 had been detained, raided, or questioned by the FBI. Similarly, the NYPD ran a controversial program after 9-11 surveilling Muslims. According to the ACLU, its methods included undercover officers in Muslim communities, tracking individuals who had changed their name, and recording information on people who attended Muslim services. The ACLU even claims that the program interfered with Muslim practice by instilling fear that religious doctrine may be misinterpreted by law enforcement (“Factsheet”). From the report: “The NYPD’s suspicionless surveillance has forced religious leaders to censor what they say to their congregants, for fear anything they say could be taken out of context by police officers or informants. Some religious leaders feel they must regularly record their sermons to defend themselves against potential NYPD mischaracterizations. Disruptions resulting from unlawful NYPD surveillance have also diverted time and resources away from religious education and counseling. Muslims have reported feeling pressure to avoid appearing overtly religious, for example, by changing their dress or the length of their beards.

REFERENCES:

Luke Baker, “Muslim men over 50 pray at Jerusalem's Aqsa mosque amid tight security”, October 31, 2014: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-palestinians-israel/muslim-men-over-50-pray-at-jerusalems-aqsa-mosque-amid-tight-security-idUSKBN0IK0PR20141031 “Factsheet: The NYPD Muslim Surveillance Program” https://www.aclu.org/other/factsheet-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program

Stuti Manchada and Nilay Saiya, “Why veil restrictions increase the risk of terrorism in Europe,” 12/17/2019: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2019/12/17/why-veil-restrictions-increase-the-risk-of-terrorism-in-europe/

Jonathan M. Pitts, “Houses of worship ‘in no rush’ to reopen as Maryland eases restrictions on indoor gatherings,” Baltimore Sun, Jun 06, 2020: https://www.baltimoresun.com/coronavirus/bs-md-ci-churches-reopening-20200606-mgrlkn2kdjd77ealcnnu5lmsoe-story.html

Kam C. Wong, The USA Patriot Act: A Policy of Alienation, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 161 (2006). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1111&context=mjrl

While the degree to which people are allowed to express themselves religiously varies in different countries, the importance that religion has in people’s lives also varies grately. Over half the people in countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, and Romania say that religion is very important in their lives. However, in countries like the Baltics, Scandinavia, and Western Europe, fewer than 1 in 5 people say that religion is important to them (How Religious Commitment Varies by Country Among People of all Ages). Many people have different ways in which they express themselves religiously. A survey done by the Pew Research Center found that in Europe, “about four-in-ten adults in the average country surveyed say that they attend religious services at least weekly.” They go on to say that “Buddhists and Hindus do not observe weekly holy days, and weekly communal worship services are not necessarily a part of their religious traditions” and that “countries in sub-Saharan Africa with predominantly Christian or Muslim populations tend to have the world’s highest levels of regular worship attendance; in the average country in that region, 79% of adults say they attend services weekly.” Daily prayer is one way that people express themselves religiously: “fully 96% of Afghans and 87% of Iranians report praying daily, reflecting a global pattern of high levels of prayer in Muslim-majority countries” (How Religious Commitment Varies by Country Among People of all Ages). This relates to freedom of religion because people are able to choose the way they want to express themselcces in this manner. For example, some people may choose to attend religious services, while others don’t practice religion in that manner. In a 2009 Gallup Survey, 65% of Americans said that religion was an important part of their daily lives. This is a significant contrast from other countries, with Spain being 49%, Canada at 42%, France at 30%, the United Kingdom at 27%, and Sweden at 17% (Religion in the United States). Among Americans, their choice to identify with religion varies greatly. 29% of Americans think that they’re a part of a minority group because of their religious beliefs and 70.6% of Americans affiliate with Christianity (Religion’s Role in Public Life). While some people may feel they’re a part of a minority group, the United States is less restrictive in regards to people’s ability to practice their religion than other countries. According to the Pew Research Center, “government restrictions on religion in the U.S. are nowhere near as extensive as those of countries such as China, Iran and Burma. Likewise, the U.S. has much lower levels of social hostilities to religion than countries like India, Pakistan and Nigeria” (Henne, 2015). One example of the religious restrictions in China is that “Christians are allowed to worship in ‘official churches’ registered with supervisory government agencies responsible for Protestantism and Catholicism” (10 Things to Know about China’s Policies on Religion).

“3. How Religious Commitment Varies by Country among People of All Ages.” 2018. Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project. June 13, 2018. https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2018/06/13/how-religious-commitment-varies-by-country-among-people-of-all-ages/.

“Religion in the United States.” Pressbooks.howardcc.edu, April https://pressbooks.howardcc.edu/soci101/chapter/17-5-religion-in-the-united-states/.

Center, Pew Research. 2024. “1. Religion’s Role in Public Life.” Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project. March 15, 2024. https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2024/03/15/religions-role-in-public-life/.

Henne, Peter. n.d. “How the U.S. Compares with the Rest of the World on Religious Restrictions.” Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2015/03/25/how-the-u-s-compares-with-the-rest-of-the-world-on-religious-restrictions/.

Pew Research Center. 2023. “10 Things to Know about China’s Policies on Religion.” Pew Research Center. October 23, 2023. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/10/23/10-things-to-know-about-chinas-policies-on-religion/.

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) protects an individual’s right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. The classification of freedom of religion as a fundamental right is to allow public choice of worship and to ensure protection from persecution on religious grounds and from conformity to a cultural majority through government influence. A state authority cannot interfere with how one chooses to worship or practice their religion, or whether one chooses if they worship at all. However, there is a philosophical and moral tradition of state secularism that challenges the classification of this freedom. From a secular state perspective, a state with separation between religious institutions and law making bodies or governance powers, is intended to offer a neutral standpoint on the matter of religion. The institutional order separates church and state, in order to prevent religious powers from advancing their interests with the use of political influence, and to keep political duties prioritized over religious obligations. “In a secular state, the protection of freedom of conscience and the equal treatment of people in religious matters does require restrictions on religious freedom in official spaces (Castro, 2021)” This perspective puts into question how fundamental religious freedom really is in practice compared to the freedom of conscience, whether in a public or private manner. Hobbes suggests that rather than separation of church and state, the subordination of church to the state for the sake of survival through unity is well within the authority of the state (Curley, 2015, 2). Unity through a common religion would then in theory benefit the survival of the state. In Leviathan, Hobbes discusses the Rights of Sovereigns by Institutions, articulating how the sovereign is judge of what is necessary for the peace and defense of its subjects, including the judgment of what doctrines are fit to be taught by them (Hobbes, 1651, XVIII). In his analysis, Edwin Curley discusses the extent to Hobbsian theory where he believes this repression is just so far it does not exceed its limits. “Repression of thought and expression beyond what is necessary for political purposes is not only an abrogation of the sovereign's duty, it is counter-productive, provoking bitterness and resentment, and undermining the loyalty of his subjects (Curley, 2015, 3). While there is still the right to private conscience, as long as one adheres to the doctrines of the state publicly, based on the previous argument, Hobbes advocates for the private beliefs of whatever one chooses, as long as it does not affect the actions of an individual as a subject to the sovereign state. “Hobbesian theory states that laws bind actions; people are thus free to do whatever they like as long as this doing stays in their thoughts (Tralau, 2011, 67).” This restriction on free practice, public or private, and the individual classifications of religious liberty and liberty of conscience, declassify freedom of religion as a fundamental right completely, but still includes freedom of conscience as acceptable under the limit that it still does not threaten the state. According to this theory by Hobbes, Freedom of conscience is the only guaranteed element of this freedom, truly classified as a fundamental right, in order to avoid disparity and conflict within the body of state subjects. While Hobbes advocated for absolute state authority, removing religious freedom from the state completely, the secular state allows religious liberty but only to an extent. In both a Hobbesian state and a secular state, freedom of conscience can only truly be protected as a fundamental right, to ensure true neutrality or stability. Freedom of conscience and religion combat one another in each of these perspectives, thus disputing the classification of freedom of religion in the philosophical tradition of a Hobbesian state, or a moral tradition of state secularism and neutrality.

Castro, Faviola Rivera. 2021. “Rawls’ Critique of the Secular State.” IDEES. December 17, 2021. https://revistaidees.cat/en/rawls-critique-of-the-secular-state/.

Curley, Edwin. 2015. “Hobbes and the Cause of Religious Toleration.” https://sites01.lsu.edu/faculty/voegelin/wp-content/uploads/sites/80/2015/09/Edwin-Curley.pdf.

Hobbes, Thomas. April 1651. Leviathan. “The Project Gutenberg EBook of Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes.” n.d. Www.gutenberg.org. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm#link2H_4_0215.

Tralau, Johan. 2011. “Hobbes Contra Liberty of Conscience.” Political Theory 39, no. 1: 58–84. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23036034?seq=14.

A fundamental right that tends to conflict with freedom of the press is the right to privacy, which includes the protection of reputation. Two common conflicts between freedom of the press and the right to privacy are that between the right to publish and privacy and that between the right of the press to obtain information and the right to privacy. Beginning with the conflict between the right to publish and privacy, the issues concern the disclosure of embarrassing factual information about a person and the publishing of information that falsely displays a person to the public (Emerson 1979, 332). Historically, in cases where privacy law is applicable, the courts have tended to balance the importance of the publication for news purposes with the extent of the invasion of privacy. For instance, if the publication is not thought to be newsworthy or necessary, but most people would view it as offensive, the court would allow a claim to privacy. Although, the same claim to privacy may not stand in a case in which the publication is considered newsworthy. Similarly, in defamation cases, courts consider the extent to which reputation is harmed, and therefore courts may be more likely to protect the reputation of a public figure over that of someone more private (Emerson 1979, 333).

A specific case involving the conflict between the right to publish and privacy is Time Inc. v. Hill which took place in 1967 (Time, Inc. v. Hill 1967) . Hill and his family were held hostage in their home in 1952, and upon being released unharmed, they moved homes and requested limited publicity about what took place. Later, a novel came out about a similar situation which was also made into a play. Life magazine published an article about the play suggesting that it was a depiction of what happened to Hill’s family, even though the play reflected various incidents. The family sued for damages on the grounds that Life had knowingly presented false information about the Hill incident. Life suggested that the article was of public interest and was not published with malicious intent. The court determined that the Life article was not intended to be a source of news, but was rather distributed for advertising purposes. Subsequently, the family received compensatory damages (Time, Inc. v. Hill 1967) .

Another specific example is Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn which took place in 1975 (Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn 1975) . Cohn was the father of a seventeen year old girl who had been raped and killed in Georgia. Cox Broadcasting had obtained the girl’s name from public records and broadcasted the name during a news report. According to a Georgia privacy statute, names and identities of rape victims cannot be publicized. The court ultimately decided that the girl’s name was not a matter of public interest, and hence sided with Cohn, that the incident was an invasion of privacy (Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn 1975) . From these two cases, it is clear that at times, the right to privacy can limit the First Amendment right to freedom of the press, especially in cases presenting information in a false light.

The second main conflict is that between the right to privacy and the right to obtain information. The press has a right to obtain information voluntarily from private sources, however, it does not have the right to compel such information. The press is generally restricted by laws against wiretapping, trespass, theft, etc. In terms of receiving information from government sources, the press can claim the constitutional right to know. The right to know is used for the purpose of informing and transmitting information to the public, especially when the government is barring such communication (Emerson 1979, 333). There have however been cases in which the right of the press to obtain information has been limited for privacy concerns. For instance, in Pell v. Procunier journalists were prevented from interviewing prison inmates (Pell v. Procunier 1974) . Similar to the conflict between the right to publish and privacy, in many cases involving the right of the press to obtain information, the court attempts to balance the public’s right to know with privacy concerns. In the case of Pell v. Procunier, interviewing the inmates would not have provided the public with important information regarding the conditions of the prisons, and therefore the privacy of the inmates was upheld (Pell v. Procunier 1974) .

As of 1996, the Federal Freedom of Information Act was passed which gives public access to many federal records. However, there are nine exemptions to the Act that restrict public access to certain health and medical records, documents for the purpose of law enforcement, trade secrets or classified documents, among others. These exemptions are commonly referred to in right to know cases. Additionally, the Government in Sunshine Act of 1976 ensures that federal agency meetings are open to the public. An exception to this act is made in cases where the meetings contain, “information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The phrase, “clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” has been broadly interpreted. Overall, the conflicts surrounding freedom of the press and privacy lack consistent legal procedure (Emerson 1979, 351).

References:

Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975): https://www.oyez.org/search/Cox%20Broadcasting%20Corporation%20v.%20Cohn

Thomas I. Emerson, "The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 14, no. 2 (Summer 1979): 329-360

Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974): https://www.oyez.org/cases/1973/73-918

Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967): https://www.oyez.org/cases/1965/22

Freedom of the press is extremely entrenched in international law, demonstrating its high status. In 1644, John Milton began the discussion about freedom of the press in response to the British government having to approve each publication before it went to print. Before this time, media wasn’t common, so refuting such regulation didn’t make sense (Cunningham). In 1766, Sweden passed the first known act requiring freedom of the press (Cunningham). It was intended to prevent the Swedish government from having to approve each publication, much like Milton was advocating for in Britain a century earlier (Cunningham). Ten years later, this right appeared in the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776 and was later brought by Virginian James Madison to the United States Bill of Rights (Freedom of the press, 2018) .

Today, the protection of expression, media, and opinion is seen in conventions and declarations worldwide. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) has a wide reach and a broad expression of freedom as it is intended to apply to all people. Article 19 states “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (UDHR, 1948) . Although the UDHR is neither a treaty nor legally binding, it has heavily influenced the development of international human rights law (Australian Human Rights Commission). The UN has also signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a treaty that outlines rights that “derive from the inherent dignity of a person” ( 1966, Art. 19). Article 19 of the ICCPR ( 1966) outlines the freedom of expression, explicitly calling out the right to freely “seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” Article 5 of the UN’s 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination explicitly expands this right to all people.

Regional supranational organizations have also called out this right explicitly. In 1953, the Council of Europe (which contains more member states than the European Union) adopted the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Article 10 of the ECHR ( 1950) says the right of free expression “shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” The European Union has also adopted the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights ( 2009) , which states in Article 11 “the freedom and pluralism of media shall be respected.” The African Union and Organization of American States (OAS) took similar steps in 1981 and 1969, respectively, with Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights, also called the Pact of San Jose. These freedoms were reaffirmed in 2001 with a joint statement between the UN, OAS, and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and again by the OSCE in the 2003 Amsterdam Recommendations.

At a state level, there are two extremes along a spectrum of free expression and press: Egypt and Norway. In Egypt, the 2014 constitution protects freedom of the press, though it is not protected in practice – government implemented censorship, imprisonment of journalists, and closures of media outlets are all prominent (Press freedom in Egypt, 2019) . Moreover, since 2015, journalists have been restricted to telling the “official” story rather than the real one (Egypt, 2021) . In Norway, there is a yearly report on the freedom of the press and expression, with the main complaints resulting from online government meetings, limiting press access (Norway, 2021) . The United States is between these two states, where freedom of the press is a highly respected right from the First Amendment of the Constitution and is fervently protected with limited exceptions usually resulting from Supreme Court decisions. Even so, today media freedom is limited due to distrust of “mainstream” sources and the loss of local news (United States, 2021) . Even local government recognizes the importance of this right, demonstrated by the 2019 passage of Queensland, Australia’s Human Rights Act.

References:

African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. African Union. June 1, 1981. https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights

American Convention on Human Rights. Organization of American States. Nov. 22, 1969. http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_american_treaties_A-41_charter_OAS.asp

Amsterdam Recommendations. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. June 14, 2003. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/a/4 1903. pdf

Australian Human Rights Commission. (n.d.) What is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/what-universal-declaration-human-rights

Cunningham. (n.d.) Brief history of press freedom, A. Britannica. Retrieved Sept. 3, 2021, from https://www.britannica.com/story/250-years-of-press-freedom

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Dec. 1, 2009. https://fra.europa.eu/en/eu-charter

Egypt. ( 2021) . Reporters without Borders. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://rsf.org/en/taxonomy/term/156

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf

Freedom of the press. ( 2018, Aug. 21). History.com. Retrieved Sept. 3, 2021, from https://www.history.com/topics/united-states-constitution/freedom-of-the-press

Human Rights Act. Queensland Legislative Assembly. Mar. 7, 2019. Retrieved Sept. 3, 2021, from https://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/view/html/inforce/current/act- 2019- 005

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Dec. 21, 1965. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. UNGA. Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx

Norway. ( 2021) . Reporters without Borders. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://rsf.org/en/norway

Tahir Institute for Middle East Policy. ( 2019, May 24). Press freedom in Egypt. https://timep.org/reports-briefings/timep-briefs/timep-brief-press-freedom-in-egypt/

United States. ( 2021) . Reporters without Borders. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://rsf.org/en/united-states

Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

U.S. Constitution. Amendment I. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript

In 2017, Freedom House estimated that only 13% of the world’s population lived in states with free press (Abramowitz, 2017, 8). Thirteen percent is low and creates little incentive for less-free media states to improve media freedoms (Abramowitz, 2017, 16). 45% of the population lived in states with ‘not free’ press, while 42% of the population lived in states with ‘partly free’ press (Abramowitz, 2017, 8). Freedom House defines free press on a spectrum, with free press being an environment that allows the right to seek and distribute information without interruption or censorship. These can take many forms, such as arresting or threatening journalists, being influenced by the government (monetarily or otherwise), or restricting access to news sources (i.e., disabling the internet) (Repucci, 2019) . The presence of these elements decreased media in the state and hinders citizens’ ability to get impartial information. In 2017, free states were, generally, the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and Western Europe (Abramowitz, 2017, 14-15). Partially free states were prominent in South America, Southern Africa, Western Africa, Oceania, Central America, and Central and Eastern Europe, with the additions of India and Mongolia (Abramowitz, 2017, 14-15). Not free states were common in Eastern Africa and Asia (Abramowitz, 2017, 14-15). Freedom of expression is called for and agreed upon in many international conventions: the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Article 10, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 19, American Convention on Human Rights Article 13, and the African Charter of Human Rights Article 9 (ARTICLE 19, 2004, 2). The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights explicitly calls out freedom of the press (ARTICLE 19, 2004, 2; Stier, 2015, 1274) . These conventions and declarations pave the way for freedom of the press in many states, though it is recognized that freedom of expression may be limited, mostly for the protection of something or someone. Exceptions, according to the Human Rights Committee, must be provided by law to safeguard a legitimate interest and must also be necessary to secure this interest (ARTICLE 19, 2004, 2).

Free: Though credited with some of the freest press in the world in 2017, freedom of the press in the United States looked to be declining (Abramowitz, 2017, 1). Factors such as media polarization, mistrust, undermining, and profit-motivated media coupled with changing business models were contributing factors in this decline, though constitutional checks prevented even more decline (Abramowitz, 2017, 1). Additionally, recent presidents’ actions have trended toward more restrictive of the media (Abramowitz, 2017, 1-2). Despite the Freedom Act of 2015, media monitoring is prominent in the United States, as well as other free media states such as Canada, Britain, Germany, and France, and becomes more prominent with less free media (Abramowitz, 2017, 16).

Partly Free: In partly free media states, generally, media is not explicitly restricted or censored, but actions taken by the government have demonstrated restrictions. In Hungary, pro-government media was monetarily rewarded by Hungary’s government was only selling stories to specific media outlets (Abramowitz, 2017, 6; Banks, 2020) . These actions “unfairly starved independent media channels” while publicly funding channels that were politically advantageous to the government (Banks, 2020) . This practice began after Hungary adopted a new constitution in 2011 and the incident was taken up for investigation in accordance with the ECHR in 2020 after multiple complaints (Banks, 2020) . Brazil used five journalists’ trials as a warning toward journalists and potential stories rather than explicitly restricting the media (Abramowitz, 2017, 21). The five journalists were taken to court for 50 counts exposing the high earnings of judiciary members but placed the trials all over the country (Abramowitz, 2017, 21). This action imposed a large monetary and temporal cost on the journalists, causing journalists to think twice about a story before publishing.

Not Free: The ten states with the least amount of press freedom are North Korea, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Crimea, Eritrea, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Syria (Abramowitz, 2017, 9). States such as these have restrictive media guidelines, such as media monitoring or elimination. In many states, from Ethiopia to Zimbabwe to Turkey, media has been shut down at crucial political moments such as elections or protests (Abramowitz, 2017, 5, 9, 20). Turkey is a state with constitutional protection of media, though it has laws that contradict this protection and criminalize reporting on some topics (Whitten-Woodring, 2009, 599). In Egypt, the military influences the media, preventing private, independent media (Abramowitz, 2017, 17). In Syria, many journalists are exiled, and many surrounding states make it difficult for them to continue their work (Abramowitz, 2017, 4). In Venezuela, some actions against the media have consisted of preventing international journalists from covering a planned protest and reacting with violence when some chose to cover it anyway (Abramowitz, 2017, 13). Russia and China are restrictive of their press with both censorship and market influence, but they take advantage of the freedoms in the United States and France to try to influence perceptions in these areas for their state’s political gain (Repucci & Slipowitz, 2021; Stier, 2015, 1275) . Russia takes similar actions with its Russian-speaking neighbors, especially Ukraine, for similar reasons, and has begun to try to influence the EU as well (Abramowitz, 2017, 9). China is also restrictive due to its very strict penalties and monitoring for criticism, while also preventing its people from giving information to outside sources (Abramowitz, 2017, 16).

Exceptions

Exceptions to freedom of the press vary between states. Pew Research Center found that Americans are most likely to accept all types of free speech and people in most states are content with protecting speech against the government under freedom of expression, even if it may cause instability (Poushter & Givens, 2015) . However, this acceptance varies by region; there is over 90% support for this idea in North American and Europe, while there is less support, around 70% in the Middle East, Asia, the Pacific, and Africa (Wike & Simmons, 2015) . Exceptions begin to appear beyond these boundaries (Wike & Simmons, 2015) . For instance, support for being able to say offensive words to minorities or about religious beliefs is below 50% in all regions of the world surveyed except for the United States and Canada (Wike & Simmons). Exceptions against freedom of the press with the most support are comments that are sexually explicit or call for violent protests. Each of these types has less than 40% support to be a protected form of speech (Wike & Simmons, 2015) . Defamation: Most common in media is defamation law, in which strictness varies between states based on the written laws, strictness of implementation, burden of proof, and punishment (Botsford). Internationally, defamation’s burden of proof is typically just the intent to make the statement, not that it was made in bad faith (Botsford). In most places, defamation is a criminal offense, though there are some advocates for a change toward a civil offense (Botsford). Defamation charges are somewhat common with just over half of EU states convicting a journalist of defamation between 2010 and 2015, though imprisonment was rare, and some states have such laws but do not enforce them (Botsford).

Investigation for defamation can be very disruptive due to the seizure of personal and professional assets, preventing further journalism at the time (Botsford). Libel and insult charges against Russian Mikhail Afanasyev resulting from a piece he authored were quite disruptive to the media in the region (Botsford; Committee to Protect Journalists, 2013) . In the piece, Afanasyev claimed that Alexander Zlotnikov, who had testified to a court that Afanasyev had attempted to record a police arrest and was obstructive while doing so, was lying and immoral, among other things (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2013) . A defamation claim was immediately filed against Afanasyev, and a four-month investigation commenced (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2013) . Despite his eventual acquittal, the Russian investigation into Mikhail Afanasyev ruined media in his region of Siberia, as he was the only independent source (Botsford). This instance was not the first time he was targeted for his work at the Novy Fokus (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2013) . Turkey also strictly implements defamation law, so that it not only is affecting journalists but those in other professions as well (Botsford). Italy, a partly free media state, routinely uses these laws and imprisons journalists for libel – the only EU state to do so (Botsford). On the other hand, Ireland and the United Kingdom, free media states, have repealed their libel laws, and South Africa, a partly free media state, has taken steps to eliminate the law as well (Botsford).

References:

Abramowitz, M. (2017, Apr.). Freedom of the press 2017. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/FOTP_2017_booklet_FINAL_April28_1.pdf

ARTICLE 19. (2004, Feb.). Briefing note on international and comparative defamation standards. https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/analysis/defamation-standards.pdf

Banks, M. (2020, Oct. 26). EU investigating whether Hungarian state aid spending is undermining media freedom. https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/eu-investigating-whether-hungarian-state-aid-spending-is-undermining-media-freedom

Botsford, P. (n.d.). Word crimes – defamation and freedom of expression. International Bar Association. https://www.ibanet.org/article/9E40E124-20BB-4533-A919-C7B5345F34C4 Committee to Protect Journalists. (2013, Apr. 15). Online journalist in Siberia faces defamation charges. https://cpj.org/2013/04/online-journalist-in-siberia-faces-defamation-char/

Poushter, J. & Givens, G. (2015, Nov. 18). Where the world sees limits to free speech. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/18/where-the-world-sees-limits-to-free-speech/

Repucci, S. (2019). Freedom and the media 2019. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-and-media/2019/media-freedom-downward-spiral.

Repucci, S. & Slipowitz, A. (2021). Freedom in the world 2021. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2021/democracy-under-siege Stier, S. (2015). Democracy, autocracy and the news: the impact of regime type on media freedom. Democratization, 22(7), 1273-1295. https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2014.964643

Whitten-Woodring, J. (2009). Watchdog or lapdog? Media freedom, regime type, and government respect for human rights. International Studies Quarterly 53, 595-625. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00548.x

Wike, R. & Simmons, K. (2015, Nov. 18). 2. The boundaries of free speech and a free press. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/11/18/2-the-boundaries-of-free-speech-and-a-free-press/

In international human rights law, freedom of the press is outlined in the International Bill of Human Rights, which encompasses the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These documents include the rights protected as well as exceptions, or derogations, if they are applicable. The UDHR is not a treaty, so states are not legally bound to it (Australian Human Rights Commission). Still, the document serves as a foundation for international human rights legislation. Article 19 of the UDHR protects the right to “receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Article 29(2) briefly states general derogations for the rights laid out in other articles:

“In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society” (United Nations General Assembly, 1948).

Unlike the UDHR, the ICCPR is legally binding to the states that ratify it. The ICCPR contains similar language in paragraph 2 of Article 19 relating to freedom of the press, but goes farther in the following paragraphs to mention restrictions. These acceptable restrictions “shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: For respect of the rights or reputations of others; For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals” (United Nations General Assembly, 1966). Additionally, Article 20(1) prohibits war propaganda, which is often distributed by means of government and independent news media and involves the strategically crafted systems of gathering and distributing information as to incite war support (Miller, 2004, 8). Freedom of the press includes the media’s right to freely publish information, but also includes the people’s right to receive accurate information, especially during times of political tension, such as war or elections when this right may be jeopardized. The 2009 Joint Declaration of the United Nations, Organization of American States, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and African Commission on Human and People’s Rights emphasized the importance of people’s access to accurate, impartial information (UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression et al., 2009). Because freedom of the press includes the ability to both receive and impart information, prohibiting war propaganda can be seen both as the protection of people’s right to receive impartial news and the limitation of the press from spreading inaccurate or violence-inciting media. Miller argues that war propaganda includes not only outward attempts to garner war support through the media, but also subtle manipulation of the media by the state to prevent effective dissent, resulting in “information dominance” by the state so they may further their military agendas (Miller, 2004, 14). Article 20(2) of the ICCPR prohibits advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that incites discrimination or violence, which applies but is not limited to freedom of the press.

The Article 4 of the ICCPR also includes measures for states of emergency and highlights the rights and articles from which states cannot derogate, including the right to life (Article 6), protection against torture (Article 7), protection against slavery (Article 8), protection against debt imprisonment (Article 11), protection against punishment for a crime that was not illegal at the time it was committed (Article 15), the right to recognition before the law (Article 16), and the right to religion and freedom of conscience (Article 18). The specified list of rights to be protected during emergencies does not include freedom of the press, meaning states are permitted to restrict the press under the conditions “that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion, or social origin” and that states inform the United Nations of the right from which they derogated, the reasons they derogated, and the date on which the derogation will end (United Nations General Assembly, 1966, Article 4(1), Article 4(3)). Hafner-Burton, Helfer, and Fariss argue that the processes outlined in derogation clauses of human rights law allow derogators to take the necessary actions during an emergency situation and signal to the international community that those actions will be temporary and carried out in a lawful manner (2011, 673-674). The United Nations includes the descriptive conditions and processes by which states can derogate from rights such as freedom of the press because otherwise states may be hesitant to ratify human rights treaties in the first place, and therefore not protect those rights at all. According to Siehr, “The common task of emergency clauses in human rights instruments is to cope with the challenge of finding a middle course between the recognition of the legitimate right of sovereign States to defend their constitutional, democratic order and the prevention of misuse of the tool of emergency rights” (Siehr, 2004, 546). This can prove to be difficult, as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the primary body for monitoring freedom of the press and information, reported “that perpetrators of internet shutdowns often try to justify them as a ‘precautionary measure’ or as a matter related to ‘national security,’ ‘public safety,’ or ‘hate speech,’ when the underlying motivations appear strongly correlated with moments of political instability, protests, communal violence, or elections” (UNESCO, 2022, 51).

To ensure that derogations from freedom of the press, specifically those in the name of disinformation campaigns, are necessary, lawful, and transparent, UNESCO has recommended: that state restrictions freedom of the press include input from a variety of independent groups, civil society organizations, and research specialists (UNESCO, 2020, 14); that UNESCO partner with other United Nations bodies to guarantee that derogations from freedom of the press are ethical and do not violate the right more than necessary (12); that relevant media actors increase the capacity of independent press councils in their monitoring efforts (217).

References:

Australian Human Rights Commission. 2007. “What is the Universal Declaration on Human Rights?” Accessed July 5, 2024. https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/commission-general/projects/what-universal-declaration-human-rights

Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Laurence Helfer, Christopher Fariss. 2011. “Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties.” Cambridge University Press 65, no.4. 673-707. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831100021X

Miller, David. 2004. “Information Dominance: The Philosophy of Total Propaganda Control?” in War, Media, and Propaganda: A Global Perspective, edited by Yahya Kamalipour and Nancy Snow. 7-16. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=IyQeVFowLnwC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=war+propaganda+mediums&ots=ld3JH7kqKU&sig=HmizgQAGnNbDQew_MLGqn3h9_QU#v=onepage&q&f=false

Siehr, Angelika. 2004. “Derogation Measures under Article ICCPR, with Special Consideration of the War against International Terrorism.” German Yearbook of International Law, 47. 545-593. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/gyil47&id=1&collection=journals&index=

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, International Telecommunication Union, Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development. 2020. “Balancing act: countering digital disinformation while respecting freedom of expression: Broadband Commission research report on ‘Freedom of Expression and Addressing Disinformation on the Internet'” https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000379015.locale=en

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. 2022. “Press Freedom in Times of Crisis and Transformation.” UNESCO Global Report 2021/2022: Journalism is a Public Good. 44-81. https://doi.org/10.18356/9789210015424c006

United Nations General Assembly. 1948. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Accessed July 5, 2024. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

United Nations General Assembly. 1966. “International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights. Accessed July 5, 2024. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights

UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the ACHPR Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information. 2009. “Joint Statement on the Media and Elections.” Joint Declarations of the representatives of intergovernmental bodies to protect free media and expression, 2013. 53-56. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/5/99558.pdf

Early American history was characterized by hostility to the common law of seditious libel, which restricted political speech. Legal objections sought to restrict the law's oppressive implementation, as in the Zenger case in 1735 (Rabban 1985, 799). English authors like Trenchard and Gordon (under the alias Cato) defended the truth and disregarded the notion that language's "bad tendency" might be used as a form of seditious libel (Rabban 1985, 799). Theoretical defenses of free speech highlighted its importance in limiting governmental authority and fostering good governance. The notion that free speech and the press were necessary for a free society and individual liberty was well-known in both America and England (Rabban 1985, 802). These ideas about the right to free speech were prevalent even before the Sedition Act of 1798 and had a significant impact on how the First Amendment was interpreted (Rabban 1985, 802). Early cases like the Bradford case (1694) added to the Zenger case’s questioning of the common law's long-standing definition of seditious libel. They brought up arguments that the jury should decide whether a publication was seditious and challenged the notion that true remarks might constitute libel (Rabban and Levy 1985). This demonstrated the widespread resistance to the idea of seditious libel in eighteenth-century England and colonial America. Levy however find that these early cases and thinkers such as Cato did not go far enough in their libertarianism regarding Freedom of the Press (Rabban 1985, 802). These arguments were accompanied by theoretical defenses of political expression rights. Different individuals asserted that freedom of speech and the press were crucial for limiting governmental power and upholding a free society, both in England and the American colonies. There is a grand shift between freedom of expression, seditious libel, and freedom of the press before and after the American Revolution (Rabban 1985, 804). The press enjoyed less actual freedom in the years leading up to the American Revolution than it did during the majority of the colonial period. Speaking out against the cause of the Revolution was silenced by those in favor of independence, which curbed freedom of expression (Rabban 1985, 805). Following the Revolution, many states continued to pursue seditious libel cases, and grand juries were more inclined to recommend indictments—especially in light of the Sedition Act of 1798. Seditious libel was not often challenged by libel victims in this era (Rabban 1985, 805). However, in modern-day America, most restrictions of freedom of expression, including that of the press, are limited. Slander, obscenity, pornography, sedition, incitement, fighting words, violation of copyright, trade secrets, food labeling, non-disclosure agreements, the right to privacy, public safety, and perjury are examples of common restrictions on the press. Outside of that, there are no other limits on the Press (Cornell Legal Information Institute). However, 57% of U.S. journalists are either extremely or very concerned about the freedom of the press as of 2023 (Pew Research 2023). More than 50 journalists were arrested or jailed in the US in 2021 while performing their jobs (Freedom Tracker). In 2022, reporters covering the school shooting in Uvalde were threatened with arrest, as well as prevented access from reporting in certain areas (Hernández and Farhi 2022). Journalists have been on high alert regarding potential future suppression of media in the U.S. Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, the print media tends to act mostly self-regulatory and functions without many statutory restrictions. Everyone including the media has the right to freedom of expression in the UK, according to the Human Rights Act (HRA). However, this right "may be subject to formalities, conditions, restrictions, or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society." (Murray et al. 2022). However, libel in the UK functions differently in the US for the press. Britain actually has stricter regulations on freedom of the press. Since the country's libel rules have historically made suing for libel an easy pursuit, oligarchs and other wealthy foreigners and businesses have utilized British courts to sue journalists for news they don't like (Global Campaign for Free Expression 2023). It is far easier to sue these journalists in the UK. In contrast to the US' constitutional tradition, laws in the UK penalizes speech critical of public officials. The UK allows for greater ability to protect one’s public image and reputation (Global Campaign for Free Expression 2023). In comparison to the aforementioned libel cases in the US, the limits of the media are far stricter. In conclusion, there is a complicated and developing narrative to be found in the history of press freedom and early American democracy. The harsh use of seditious libel laws was vigorously resisted in early American history, with examples like the Zenger trial questioning accepted notions of libel. The theoretical foundations of free speech as a defense against excessive political power were well-established, laying the groundwork for the First Amendment's interpretation. While there are certain limitations on the freedom of speech and the press in modern America, they are often only applicable to situations involving slander, obscenity, provocation, and issues related to public safety. However, recent instances of journalists receiving threats, being detained, and having their access restricted underscore growing worries about press freedom in the United States. The UK's libel rules albeit more relaxed have had a history of being exploited by companies upset by the media. The appropriate balance to strike in this dynamic environment between defending free speech and attending to valid concerns is still up for discussion. It is clear that while the concepts of free speech are fundamental to democratic societies, how these concepts are actually put into practice can differ greatly, with repercussions for the media, public discourse, and individual liberty. In the ever-changing world, it is crucial to be attentive to defending and upholding the core ideals of freedom of expression and the press as these difficulties are negotiated (Global Campaign for Free Expression 2023).

Bibliography



Cornell Legal Information Institute. “First Amendment.” LII / Legal Information Institute. Accessed September 22, 2023. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first_amendment.

Freedom Tracker. “More than 50 Journalists Arrested or Detained While on the Job in the US in 2021.” U.S. Press Freedom Tracker. Accessed September 22, 2023. https://pressfreedomtracker.us/blog/arrests-of-journalists-remain-a-threat-to-a-free-press/.

Global Campaign for Free Expression. 2023. “Media Regulation in the United Kingdom.” September 2023. https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/publications/uk-media-regulation.pdf.

Hernández, Arelis R., and Paul Farhi. 2022. “Journalists in Uvalde Are Stonewalled, Hassled, Threatened with Arrest.” The Washington Post, June 28, 2022. https://www.washingtonpost.com/media/2022/06/28/we-were-seen-enemies-journalists-uvalde-threatened-by-police/.

Murray, Calum, Fergus Nolan, Jessica Withey, Joanna Conway, and Katie Major. 2022. “Spotlight: Free Speech and Media Freedom in United Kingdom.” Deloitte Legal, November 21, 2022. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=91802897-644e-4932-b0fc-eea0e84ed037.

Pew Research. 2023. “Most U.S. Journalists Are Concerned about Future Press Freedoms.” Pew Research Center. May 2, 2023. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/05/02/most-u-s-journalists-are-concerned-about-press-freedoms/.

Rabban, David M. 1985. “The Ahistorical Historian: Leonard Levy on Freedom of Expression in Early American History.” Stanford Law Review 37, no. 3 (February): 795-805. https://doi.org/10.2307/1228715.