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Freedom of Association/Conflicts with other Rights/FederalismConflicts with other RightsDifferences in state and federal law contribute to varying levels of freedom of association across the United States. While Supreme Court cases such as Bates v. Little Rock, Shelton v. Tucker, Roberts vs. United States Jaycees, Boy Scouts of America vs. Dale, and Christian Legal Society vs. Martinez upheld the right to freedom of association, the right continues to be violated across states. Furthermore, despite its support from the Supreme Court, the system of federalism often leads to the restriction of freedom of association by local courts and authorities.

Particularly in South Florida, Lance Compa investigates how nursing home workers’ rights to free association have been violated. Furthermore, Compa explains how federalism exacerbates these violations. Noting the Palm Garden nursing home case, Copa discusses how nursing home workers were threatened with pay and benefit cuts if they decided to join unions. Additionally, Compa notes Palm Garden’s personnel manual, which states, “This is a non-union health center...if you are approached to join a union, we sincerely hope you will consider the individual freedoms you could give up, and the countless risks you could be taking.” After workers were in fact fired for joining unions, Compa notes, the NLRB asserted that Palm Garden must reinstate employees, as they had violated the workers’ right to free association. Still rejecting rehiring the employees, Compa explains that Palm Garden appealed to federal court, where the case still remains pending indefinitely. Furthermore, while the Supreme Court may uphold freedom of association, this does not mean the right can be strictly enforced throughout the United States, as appealing to federal courts demonstrates a significant challenge.

Additionally, Compa notes how freedom of association has been restricted for food processing workers. Specifically, Compa discusses the abuses faced by Smithfield workers in North Carolina, a state dominated by the food processing industry. Firing union activists and actively intimidating and discriminating against organizing workers, the Smithfield Plant violated its workers' freedom of association in numerous ways. Compa stresses that these abuses were ultimately the result of federalism, a system that contributes to the restriction of freedom of association. Compa states, “Instead of fulfilling the affirmative responsibility of government authorities to protect workers’ rights, state power was used to interfere with workers’ freedom of association in violation of international human rights norms.” Noting how local police were permitted to intimidate workers at the Smithfield Plant, Copa affirms how local authorities restrict freedom of association, countering federal law. This demonstrates how the division of state and federal power can weaken the strength of freedom of association, as local governments can discreetly work to limit the right.
Freedom of Association/Conflicts with other Rights/Other fundamentalConflicts with other RightsThe right to associate - specifically, the right for associations to exclude people from membership for whatever reason they want - may conflict with the right not to face discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as race and gender. The US Supreme Court has decided cases where an association’s decision to exclude members conflicts with non-discrimination law. In Roberts v. US Jaycees ( 1984) , the court rejected the free-association claim of a male-only business organization because its association was neither “expressive” nor “intimate.” In Boy Scouts v. Dale ( 2000) , however, the court held that the Boy Scouts of America could exclude gay members because not being able to do so would violate the organization’s right to expressive association.

Free expression is critical to the practice of free association. The US Supreme Court explicitly protects “expressive” association because many associations exist to express a particular viewpoint. If a government restricts the advocacy of certain ideas, it will almost certainly restrict the activity of groups whose purpose is to express those ideas. Additionally, freedom of association depends on the free exercise of religion. As Locke wrote in A Letter Concerning Toleration, a church is a “a society of members voluntarily uniting” (Locke 1689, 9). Religious observance often requires worship in large groups, so restricting these religious practices entails the abridgement of free association. Roberts v. US Jaycees: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/468/609 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale: https://www.oyez.org/cases/ 1999/ 99-699

A Letter Concerning Toleration: https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/toleration.pdf
Freedom of Association/Conflicts with other Rights/PositionConflicts with other RightsNumerous scholars offer interpretations of the hierarchy of rights, placing freedom of association at differing levels of importance. Noted by Tom Farer in “The Hierarchy of Human Rights”, human rights are non-negotiable, and thus are prioritized within the hierarchy. As to why certain rights remain at the top of the hierarchy, Farer answers “because all other rights are dependent on them.” Furthermore, Farer claims that a consensus among United States human rights organizations is that the rights to life, physical security, and due process are essential human rights. Excluding freedom of association from his selection of non-negotiable human rights, Farer undermines its importance within the hierarchy of rights. Thus, Farer emphasizes that the rights to life, physical security, and due process hold precedence over the right to free association.

Fernando Surez Muller argues that there is a select group of fundamental rights that are essential to the exercise of all other rights. With this, Muller emphasizes that certain rights must be prioritized in order for others to be functionally implemented. When analyzing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Muller interprets freedom of association to be a right of particular importance. Muller argues that the rights to communication and expression are impossible to exercise without the right of free association, claiming, “Related to this transcendental right to communication (cell 6) are also all mobility rights (mentioned in articles 13 to 15) because communication is not only a matter of expression but it is also a matter of transporting and receiving the message and this requires freedom of association.” Thus, from Muller’s perspective, freedom of association maintains a high position within the hierarchy of human rights.

Explained by Kimberley Brownlee and David Jenkins of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the right to associate often only pertains to certain associations. Because of this, different rights to different associations have varying ranks within the hierarchy of rights. Brownlee and Jenkins claim “However, since not all associations operate according to either implicit or explicit declarations of consent, exactly what counts as consent is a difficult thing to assess: How do we know when association is free? This problem is exacerbated by the hierarchical form that many associations take.” For this reason, Brownlee and Jenkins note that explicit associations, group identifications that are easy to identify and thus protect, are often prioritized within the hierarchy of rights.
Freedom of Association/Conflicts with other Rights/StatusConflicts with other RightsThe Universal Declaration of Human Rights places freedom of association at a high position of value. The document asserts: “ Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; No one may be compelled to belong to an association.” While the document does not enumerate human rights in hierarchical order, the platform of the United Nations and the inclusion of the freedom of association within the document suffices the right’s universally accepted importance and position of high status.

Additionally, the inclusion of freedom of association within the European Convention on Human Rights emphasizes the value of the right. Asserting the importance of freedom of association, Article 11 claims, “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.” Stressing freedom of association to be an essential human right, the Convention echoes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, upholding the value of freedom of association.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms similarly elevates freedom of association to a high status. Within its fundamental freedoms section, the charter emphasizes “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: a. Freedom of conscience and religion; freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication; freedom of peaceful assembly; and freedom of association.” Explicitly stating that the freedom of association is one of the four fundamental freedoms, the Charter clearly asserts that freedom of association is essential to the liberty of individuals. Given the select group of fundamental freedoms, the placement of freedom of association within the list demonstrates its uplifted position within the greater hierarchy of human rights.

In the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the International Labour Organization additionally upholds the pertinence of freedom of association. Within the declaration, the ILO asserts four categories to be promoted by member states, including freedom of association. Similar to The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, by only including a select group of rights, the Declaration affirms the high status of these freedoms. Thus, the inclusion of freedom of association within the four categories asserts its importance
Freedom of Association/ContributionsHistoryAn array of historical events have contributed to the identification of the right to freedom of association as a fundamental right ranging from the red scare during the Cold war, guilt by association laws, and the dismantling of legislation permitting the existence of racial segregation. A specific event that contributed to the identification of freedom of association as a fundamental right was the emergence of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; this enactment historically marked the end of segregation and legally prohibited the discrimination of people on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender or religious affiliation. After this act was enacted into law, people living in the American South were free to associate with anybody regardless of their racial or ethnic identity. Although the Civil Rights act was an example of legal identification of the freedom of association as a fundamental right, this was not the first time in history that association was debated over whether or not it constituted a right. The introduction of the acknowledgment of the right to freedom of association begins with the existence of guilt by association laws, as well as labor union provisions. These legal prohibitions restricting an individual from freely exercising their right to association with people of their choosing point to the significance of the legal precedent permitting the right to freedom of association to remain protected under law.

An example of an event that led to the classification of the right to freedom of association as impenetrable liberty under the law is drawn from a ruling that was decided in the early 20th century but drew upon a case from the 1890s to point out the precedent that the right to freedom of association had under Missouri state law. “The distinction [of the right to freely associate] was of some significance in the criminal syndicalism cases of the early twentieth century precisely because the Missouri Supreme Court had three decades earlier (in 1896) invalidated a St. Louis vagrancy ordinance that sought to forbid residents from “knowingly...associat-[ing] with persons having the reputation of being thieves, burglars, pickpockets, pigeon droppers, bawds, prostitutes or lewd women or gamblers, or any other person, for the purpose or with the intent to agree, conspire, combine or confederate, first, to commit any offense, or, second, to cheat or defraud any person of any money or property.” It was here, in a context far removed from public meetings and speeches, that lawyers and judges first considered a right to freedom of association.” (Whittington, 2008, pg. 81). This specific analysis of the documented Missouri Supreme Court invalidation placed upon the St. Louis' vagrancy ordinance in 1896 underlined an imperative element to the right to freely associate; a state cannot legally abridge someone from willingly associating with people that are assumed to have a negative reputation or past history within the legal system. This legal precedent solidified the right to freedom of association as a federally protected right; prohibition of the freedom to exercise an individual’s right to freedom of association would result in federal action against a state that chose to interfere.

Although the freedom to associate with people freely can include restrictions placed on an individual, there are indeed group prohibitions under the right to freedom of association. “Notions of political discrimination in the public workplace derived initially from the Cold War era in a series of cases dealing with loyalty oaths. Loyalty oath cases derived from the fear of the spread of Communism after the Russian Revolution in 1917. During this time and thereafter, many laws were passed in the United States which sought to limit the ability of Communists or Communist sympathizers from gaining government employment and undermining the government. In particular, numerous federal and state laws were passed prohibiting the holding of public employment by those who refused to swear that they had not had any connection with the Communist Party.” (Secunda, 2008, pg. 351). When the US government chose to reinforce fierce associative laws prohibiting the free exercise of choice to associate in groups with people that held different political ideological beliefs, the federal right to freedom of association was subjunctively infringed upon. During a volatile time for the US, while fighting against communist encroachment, the right to freedom of association was more or less viewed as something that could be used as a tool or weapon. By prohibiting the association of people in the US and Communists or supporters of the communist party, the US government was sending a clear message to those who aligned themselves with communism, that they would not be welcome to share their beliefs with other people through threats of blackballing or guilt by association.

An example of ideological group association that was upheld as a right to the freedom of association occurred in 1984, in of Roberts v. US Jaycees case. “Moreover, group expression is deemed essential in a democratic society to preserve political and cultural diversity and to protect unpopular views from majoritarian control.” (pg. Jameson, 1985, 1065). This idea of group expression extends beyond intimate associations, in the Supreme Court case Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the national organization of US Jaycees limited their full membership status to men aged eighteen to thirty-five; and subsequently prohibited women and older men in the organization from being eligible for full-time memberships. Justice William J. Brennan ultimately ruled that the inclusion of women and older men in ‘associate’ memberships constituted an acknowledgment of membership status. Thus the Jaycees had no legal right to exclude them from associating with the organization as full-time members. This ultimately affirmed the state of New Jersey’s court decision to institute an antidiscrimination policy within the bylaws of the US Jaycees membership requirements. “In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state’s interest in eliminating gender-based discrimination justified the impact that requiring the Jaycees to admit women may have on the male members’ freedom of association.” (Jameson, 1985, pg. 1058). Although the U.S. Jaycees were a private organization, the prior inclusion of women and older men as part-time members led the court to rule in favor of the NJ state decision, the Jaycees could not legally restrict women from associating themselves as full-time members within the Jaycees organization.

A situation that brought to light forceful infringements on the right to freedom of association occurred in the 2000s, following the exposure that the Boy Scouts of America excluded a scoutmaster from being a part of the organization after learning of his sexual orientation. “Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 2000, US Supreme Court struck down this application of New Jersey’s anti-discrimination law on the ground that forcing the Scouts to allow homosexuals to be members and scoutmasters would alter the Scouts’ “message” and thus violate their First Amendment right of freedom of expressive association.” (Alexander, 2008, pg. 6). Due to the nature of the scout’s organizational message, specifically mentioning their goal to “instill clean and straight moral values”, the Supreme court ruled in favor of the organization’s right to freely associate with those that aligned with their moral values. This particular ruling signifies the dichotomy within the right to freedom of association; a private organization can restrict members from joining if their personal associations go against their organization’s message and central core tenets. The difference between this case and that of the US Jaycees case was rooted in how the organization viewed members. Boy Scouts of America subjectively denied homosexuals entry from their scout memberships and the entire program, whereas Jaycees had already included women and older men in their associative memberships within the organization. Thus, the supreme court aligned its rulings with factual precedent; if a state interfered with an organization's right to associate with those who they chose, then the federal government would step in and uphold the right to freedom of association as long as the provisions of membership were not violated. Therefore, it did not violate the Jaycees' right to freedom of association by allowing women and older men to move from part-time members to full-time. However, with BSOA, their organization’s values and the core central message would have been infringed upon if the court demanded that the Boy Scouts accept homosexuals as scout leaders and members.

A circumstance in history where the right to the freedom of political association was upheld by the Supreme Court followed the exercise of discriminatory voting blocs by the Democratic party in Texas. “In Terry [Terry v. Adams, 1953], the Court prohibited a county in Texas from giving effect to what amounted to (successful) racial bloc voting. Democrats far outnumbered Republicans in the county, and thus the Democratic primary winners always prevailed in the general elections for county offices. Further, white Democrats appreciably outnumbered black Democrats within the county’s Democratic Party. Although the Court in one of the earlier White Primary cases had forced the Democratic Party in Texas not to discriminate against black voters in its primaries —which, after all, were run by the state itself out of tax revenues—and the Democratic primary in this county was indeed open to black voters, the white Democrats organized themselves into the Jaybird Club and held their own, privately supported “pre-primary primary.” (Alexander, 2008, pg. 5). The right to freedom of association does not necessarily extend to the right to freely exclude an entire group of people from a public political organization through the use of racial bloc voting. The Democratic party was prohibiting the right to freedom of association by not allowing Black voters to have a choice of whether or not they wanted to associate themselves with the candidate that the Jaybirds had elected.

Historical events that contributed to a widespread belief in the importance of the right to freedom of association can be shown from the decision in the Supreme Court case Loving v. Virginia; decided in 1967, this case determined that Southern states were legally required to allow interracial marriages to be permitted under law. The Loving decision brought forth a significant argument in favor of the right to freedom of association, a state could not legally abridge the right to freely associate with people in intimate capacities.

The right to freedom of group expression underlines the exceptions within precedent regarding the exercise of group political identities or participation with associative organizations. “Specifically, these cases dealt with the so-called "spoils system," or political patronage, which rewards public employment based on loyalty to a given political party. In Elrod v. Burns, for example, the plurality decision written by Justice [William] Brennan found that Illinois public employees, who were non-confidential, non-policymaking employees, could not be fired merely because of their partisan political affiliation." (Secunda, 2008, 352). The Burns decision highlights an interesting exception to the right to freedom of association, although the spoils system was legal under the Constitution, the use of political patronage against state employees for their political identity association was a direct infringement upon an individual’s exercise of the right to freely associate. In this particular IL public school, employees found themselves penalized for choosing to associate themselves with a particular political party or organization based on the principle that the state of IL deemed it appropriate to fire employees based on their political associations.

Another example of protecting the right to freely associate intimately with another person is underlined by the decision in Lawrence v. Texas. In 2003, the Supreme court struck down a TX sodomy law as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In an attempt to dictate the specific terms under the right to freedom of association, TX had formed a sodomy law prohibiting the free exercise of intimate forms of association. “‘Bowers had held that there was no constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy.' In overturning Bowers, Lawrence's central holding was that the Texas sodomy statute at issue furthered no legitimate state interest which could justify the intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual. The most important constitutional innovation wrought by this holding is the apparent attachment of some form of heightened scrutiny to the right to be free from decisional interference in matters of an intimate nature. Indeed, implicit in this holding is the need to balance individual privacy interests against legitimate and substantial state interests.” (Secunda, 2008, pg. 357). The significance of an intrusion on private associations in regards to exercising the freedom of association as a fundamental right divides the debate in half, a state government cannot abridge the freedom of association when deciding who someone can intimately be associated with under federal law. A legitimate state interest would need to be produced in order for an intimate association to be prohibited under TX state legislation.

References:

Alexander, Larry. "What is Freedom of Association, and what is its denial?." Social Philosophy and Policy 25, no. 2 (2008): 1-21.

Epstein, Richard A. "Public Accommodations Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Why Freedom of Association Counts as a Human Right." Stanford Law Review 66 (2014): 1241.

Inazu, John D. "The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association”, 2010.

Jameson, Ann H. "Roberts v. United States Jaycees: Discriminatory Membership Policy of a National Organization Held Not Protected by First Amendment Freedom of Association." Catholic University Law Review 34, no. 4 (1985): 1055-1086.

Secunda, Paul M. "Reflections on the Technicolor Right to Association in American Labor and Employment Law." Kentucky Law Journal 96, no. 3 (2008).

Whittington, Keith E. 2008. “INDUSTRIAL SABOTEURS, REPUTED THIEVES, COMMUNISTS, AND THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION.” Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (2). Cambridge University Press: 76–91.
Freedom of Association/Country forcesHistoryAssertions of freedom of association as a right first emerged during the Enlightenment period of the 17th and 18th centuries from philosophers such as Locke and Montesquieu. Locke forms his argument on a larger scale in terms of political society as a whole: “Nothing can make any man so but his actually entering into [society] by positive engagement and express promise and compact. This is that which, I think, concerning the beginning of political societies, and that consent which makes any one a member of any commonwealth” (Locke 1690, 158). Montesquieu however specifies his argument in terms of economic associations: “… all associations of merchants, in order to carry on a particular commerce, are seldom proper in absolute governments” (Montesquieu 1748, 352). Conversely, if associations are not “proper” in absolute governments, one can conclude that Montesquieu advocated for freedom of association as a necessary component of a democratic society to protect individual interests. While Enlightenment philosophers were among the first to raise the issue of association rights, it took several hundred years for it to be officially and legally codified. Major historical movements that have promoted freedom of association are of twofold importance: firstly, association rights are often exercised to highlight societal or political injustices, but the right itself also lends legitimacy to the people who want to see progress in their societies and governments.

In terms of formal acceptances of freedom of association, the first country-specific code emerged in France in 1789 and the United States in 1791. In the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, Article 11 establishes that “the free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law” (“Declaration of the Rights of Man”). Shortly after the publication of this document, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was ratified, ensuring that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (U.S. Constitution. Amendment I). While freedom of association is not explicitly identified here, the freedoms that are listed are specific elements of what constitutes freedom of association as a whole.

CODIFIED LAWS THAT PROTECT FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

The promotion of freedom of association did not emerge on an international scale until after World War II. First in 1948 with the adoption of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 20 provides that “everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. No one may be compelled to belong to an association." This was the first international agreement to refer to human rights and liberties that everyone should enjoy, regardless of nationality or citizenship. And while this is not a universally legally binding document, it serves as a baseline for legal frameworks around the world and establishes freedom of association as a fundamental right of democratic societies. Building upon the UDHR later in 1966, the UN established the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to ensure the protection of fundamental civil and political rights in each of its participant countries. Article 22 states that:

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others…

While the UDHR is an internationally focused agreement, it is not legally binding for the partner countries and therefore has no real jurisdiction or right to action. Conversely, the ICCPR as a legal document guarantees the rights it establishes in each country that ratifies the Covenant.

AMERICAN LABOR AND TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

The American labor and trade union movement of the early 20th century was a major historical force that contributed to a more widespread belief in freedom of association. In light of the industrialization of the 18th and 19th centuries, the movement fought for the rights of workers to form trade unions and bargain collectively. As we saw in the UDHR, one can think of union membership as an exercise of freedom of association. An example from the decade before the promulgation of the UDHR that might make this clear is the passage of the National Labor Relations Act into law in 1935. Its main objective was to guarantee freedom of association for employees via the formation of union organizations. Section 7. C provides that “employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection…” (United States Code: National Labor Relations). Because of the work of trade organizations like the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, freedom of association was now a legally protected right for American employees in their places of work.

WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE

The women’s suffrage movement of the 19th and 20th centuries was greatly dependent on freedom of association as a means of action, and it also helped to promote a more widespread belief in this freedom as a fundamental right. Organizations like the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA) in the US and the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU) in the UK were instrumental in organizing efforts of like-minded people who wanted to see gender equality for political rights. One of the most notable events of the movement was the Seneca Falls Convention that convened in 1848. At this convention, Elizabeth Cady Stanton produced the Declaration of Sentiments, which explained both what activists wanted to see produced from their actions (i.e., gender equality socially, politically, religiously, and economically), but also how they planned to use freedom of association to publicize their message and complaints. The Declaration proclaims that “we shall employ agents, circulate tracts, petition the State and National legislatures, and endeavor to enlist the pulpit and the press on our behalf. We hope this Convention will be followed by a series of Conventions embracing every part of the country” (Stanton, 1848). By utilizing freedom of association to organize the efforts of their activists, they could achieve greater clarity of message and work more efficiently to bring their goals to fruition.

AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Similar to the women’s suffrage movement, the Civil Rights Movement in America was highly dependent on the right to join organizations of one’s choosing and therefore was crucial to affirming the importance of freedom of association. But unlike the suffrage movement, there was an added barrier to the free utilization of this right— institutionalized racial segregation and discrimination. Organizations like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) emerged as a way for like-minded individuals to coordinate efforts and provide support for other activists, but they were often met with resistance on grounds of racial discrimination. In the landmark case NAACP v. Alabama, John Patterson sued the state in an attempt to ban the organization from operating in Alabama based on the argument that “the NAACP was a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in Alabama” (Rubinowitz 2017, 1237). Patterson then “obtained an order compelling the NAACP to provide its membership list as part of the state’s assessment of the organization.” But “the organization refused to comply because of the harm that would cause both the individual members and the NAACP itself" (Rubinowitz 2017, 1237). The case reached the Supreme Court in 1958, and a unanimous Court decided in favor of the petitioners, explaining that “in the circumstances of this case, compelled disclosure of petitioner's membership lists is likely to constitute an effective restraint on its members' freedom of association…” (NAACP v. Alabama 357, 1958).

ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT

The anti-apartheid movement in South Africa spanned several decades of the 20th century and was aimed at dismantling the systemic racism that the government of South Africa was built on. It utilized and promoted freedom of association as a means to organize resistance efforts and promote fundamental equality which contributed to a widespread belief in this right. The African National Congress (ANC) was the primary group leading the liberation movement for many years before being forced to go underground in the 1960s. Despite this, and after decades of repression, censorship, and violence at the hands of the apartheid government, the resistance efforts reached new heights in the 1980s. As more community organizations began to appear, it became clear that there was a need for greater structure to achieve their goals of liberation. This led to the creation of organizations like the United Democratic Front (UDF) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The importance of these organizations cannot be overstated-- it was the persistent efforts of anti-apartheid associations that won out in the end and put the ANC in power from 1994 onwards (ANC History: The Struggle for People’s Power, 2023).

SOLIDARITY

The Solidarity movement was a trade union movement in Poland in the late 20th century that leveraged freedom of association to protest the communist regime. Communist rule in Poland had long been unpopular, and Solidarity was not the first movement to arise in opposition to them, but it was the first to successfully utilize the right of association to produce change which proved its importance as a fundamental right (Bartkowski 2009, 2). Following years of economic decline, Poland saw massive labor strikes in the summer of 1980. The trade union Solidarity was born out of the Gdansk Shipyard under the leadership of Lech Walesa and was legalized by the Polish government shortly thereafter as they determined that “it is considered expedient to establish new self-governing trade unions that will genuinely represent the working class” (Gdansk Agreement 1980, 11). They became the first legal trade union in the Eastern Bloc, and they eventually grew into a popular political movement. But as its popularity and size continued to develop, the communist regime imposed martial law and forced Solidarity underground. However, Solidarity survived this repression and later played a key role in the appointment of the country’s first non-communist prime minister nearly a decade later (Bartkowski, 2009).

References:

“ANC History.” African National Congress. Accessed June 16, 2023. https://www.anc1912.org.za/history/. Baron de Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat. The Spirit of the Laws. Translated by Thomas Nugent. Batoche Books, 2001.

Bartkowski, Maciej. “Poland’s Solidarity Movement (1980-1989).” International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, December 2009. https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/polands-solidarity-movement-1980-1989/.

“Declaration of the Rights of Man.” Avalon Project. Accessed June 16, 2023. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp.

Khronika Press. “The Gdansk Agreement: Protocol of Agreement between the Government Commission and the Interfactory Strike Committee Concluded on August 31, 1980 at Gdansk Shipyards.” World Affairs 145, no. 1 (1982): 11–19. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20671927.

Locke, John. “Of the Beginning of Political Societies.” Essay. In Two Treatises of Government 10, 10:146–58. London: Thomas Tegg et. al, 1823.

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson (U.S. Supreme Court June 30, 1958).

Rubinowitz, Leonard S. 2017. “The Courage of Civil Rights Lawyers: Fred Gray and His Colleagues.” Case Western Reserve Law Review 67 (4): 1227–75. https://search-ebscohost-com.uc.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=123785450&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

Stanton, Elizabeth Cady. “The Declaration of Sentiments.” The Seneca Falls Declaration 1848 . Accessed June 16, 2023. http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1826-1850/the-seneca-falls-declaration-1848.php.

United Nations General Assembly. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). New York: United Nations General Assembly, 16 December 1966.

United Nations General Assembly. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). New York: United Nations General Assembly, 1948.

U.S. Constitution. Amendment I

United States Code: National Labor Relations, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 Suppl. 2 . 1935.
Freedom of Association/Country intepretationCulture and PoliticsThe right to freedom of association is recognized by the United Nations as universal and intrinsic to every human being, encompassing an individual’s right to interact and organize with others to collectively “express, promote, pursue and defend common interests”. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a key text in the history of international human rights law, states in its Article 20 that “everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association” and “no one may be compelled to belong” to one, with an individual’s right to “form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests” being expanded upon in Article 23 (UN General Assembly 1948, 5-6). Freedom of association is also closely related to freedom of assembly, with the latter often being seen as falling under the umbrella of “association”. However, this freedom is not guaranteed to the same capacity in every state, with countries having their own interpretations and practices of the right within their legal code, in part due to their unique cultural and political context. This results in different protocols and limitations related to the formation of associations, with some states interpreting the right in a more restrictive manner and outlawing certain groups, placing obstacles in their creation, or impeding them through particular practices, while other states are more lenient as long as the organizations are not engaging in violent practices.

While the Constitution of the United States recognizes and protects the rights to freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom to petition the government, it does not explicitly mention the right to freedom of association. However, as the report by the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association in the U.S. affirms, “The right to freedom of association is implicitly guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution, read together, which protect the rights of free speech and assembly and due process, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in a number of cases” (“Report..” 2017, 10). These cases include NAACP v. Alabama and Bates v. Little Rock (1960) in which the Supreme Court recognized the right of individuals to “associate together free from undue state interference” and that “freedom of association finds protection within the First Amendment’s free speech and assembly clauses” respectively (“Case Studies” 2023, 1). This gives citizens the ability to “associate, organize and act collectively”, forming special interests groups and allowing workers to unionize, though the latter is “regulated by several pieces of legislation at the federal, state and local levels” and laws that are “supplemented by court and tribunal decisions that establish related standards and principles” (“Report…” 2017, 10). The freedom of association is not absolute in the United States, as “forms of association that are neither ‘intimate’ nor ‘expressive’ within the meaning of First Amendment Case law may not receive constitutional protection” (“Overview of Freedom of Association” 2023). Nevertheless, even individuals who form associations for the purpose of engaging in assembly can be subject to government oversite, as the UN’s Special Rapporteur wrote that the “Supreme Court has held that the right to assemble is not absolute, allowing the authorities to impose restrictions on the time, place and manner of assembly and to require permits”, though they are “prohibited from restricting assemblies based on their content”. He further noted that the “interpretation by the Supreme Court of this right falls short of international standards, owing to the approach to restrictions on the time, place and manner of assembly” (7). Under the legal code, the Supreme Court has also held that “compelled association” can violate the Constitution: "in some circumstances, laws requiring organizations to include persons with whom they disagree on political, religious, or ideological matters can violate members’ freedom of association, particularly if those laws interfere with an organization’s message” (“Overview of Freedom of Association” 2023).

Freedom of association in Niger is explicitly granted in article 9 of the country’s constitution, giving citizens the right to form unions, non-governmental organizations, and political parties with certain restrictions. During a visit to Niger to report on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Special Rapporteur Clément Nyaletsossi Voule noted: “Ordinance No. 84-06 of March 1, 1984, on the regime of associations reaffirms discrimination in the Nigerien Constitution against territorial associations and indigenous peoples, where associations of a regional or ethnic nature, specifically associations of ethnic groups, tribes and other territorial divisions are prohibited (Voule 2022, 13). He further wrote that this “censorship of certain types of associations is not in line with international standards relating to freedom of association and the obligation of democratic states to guarantee pluralistic spaces and to ‘leave no one behind’ in the implementation of sustainable development goals.” (13). The legal code in Niger does not allow for the creation of these groups, interpreting the right to freedom of association differently than in countries where it is not prohibited to form political groups along those lines. Though the Constitution of Niger does provide for the right to association, Special Rapporteur Voule emphasized that in practice it can be quite difficult to exercise in the country: “The Special Rapporteur became aware, during interviews with representatives of civil society, of the time needed to register associations and receive recognition orders, which can range from two to ten years. While these deadlines are provided for by Ordinance No. 84-06, the procedure established by Decree No. 2022-182 may accentuate the slowness of the process, making it practically impossible to create associations, in particular those whose purpose is to respond to the current political and social situation and to act accordingly.” (Voule 2022, 16) Niger’s ability to exercise the right is considerably hindered by its slowness in carrying out the registration process, creating a discrepancy between its legal code and the reality for its citizens.

Iran, a theocratic state, guarantees freedom of association in its constitution, though with certain restrictions. In its 2022 Country Report on Human Rights in Iran, the U.S. Department of State stated that the Iranian Constitution protects the “establishment of political parties, professional and political associations, and Islamic and recognized religious minority organizations, as long as such groups do not violate the principles of freedom, sovereignty, national unity, or Islamic criteria, or question Islam as the basis of the country’s system of government” (“Iran” 2023, 40). Authorities have the power to regulate them and decide whether an association violates the constitution, with the Department of State’s report stating that the government limited freedom of association through “the imposition of arbitrary requirements on organizations” and broadening “arbitrarily the areas of civil society work it deemed unacceptable, to include conservation and environmental efforts” (40). While providing for the right under its legal code, the government interprets it in a more restrictive manner and heavily regulates it, prohibiting the formation of several types of groups, such as trade unions and labor organizations The non-profit organization Freedom House found that labor organizations and nongovernmental agencies that seek to address human rights violations are routinely suppressed, though “groups that focus on apolitical issues also face crackdowns” (“Freedom in the World” 2023).

While the right to freedom of association is considered a universal human right, it is not applied in a standard manner. Countries often hold different standards for the freedom, with their own rules and regulations, interpretations, and practices.

References:

“Case Studies: Freedom of Association.” 2023. Case Categories The First Amendment Encyclopedia. https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/encyclopedia/case/12/freedom-of-association.

“Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report: Iran.” 2021. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/iran/freedom-world/2021.

“Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report: Iran.” 2023. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/iran/freedom-world/2023.

“Iran.” 2023. U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State. March 20. https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/iran/.

“Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association on His Follow-up Mission to the United States of America.” 2017

“Overview of Freedom of Association.” 2023. Constitution Annotated. https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-8-1/ALDE_00013139/.

UN General Assembly. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, , 217 A (III), https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2021/03/udhr.pdf

Voule, Clément Nyaletsossi. 2022. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association in Niger

https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G22/388/85/PDF/G2238885.pdf?OpenElement
Freedom of Association/Culture and Politics/PollingCulture and PoliticsThe World Bank measures freedom of association across 156 countries using a scale ranging from 0 ( very low freedom of association) to 1(very high freedom of association). Looking at high income countries, with the exception of Israel, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Singapore, freedom of association is generally reported to be above the world median. Additionally, among wealthier countries, the World Bank data demonstrates that levels of freedom of association have remained generally fixed since 1975, when the data was first collected. In particular, the data reveals Burundi, China, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Vietnam, and Yemen to have very low levels of freedom of association (below 0.3). Countries with very high levels of freedom of association (above 0.8) were more numerous, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Trinidad and Tobago, Switzerland, Sweden, Sri Lanka, Spain, South Africa, Slovenia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Portugal, Peru, Papua New Guinea, Panama, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Namibia, Mongolia, Mexico, Mauritius, Malawi, Liberia, Latvia, South Korea, Japan, Jamaica, Italy, Ireland, Honduras, Greece, Ghana, Estonia, Denmark, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Costa Rica, Canada, Benin, Belgium, Australia, and Albania.

An Open Government Partnership (OGP) report reveals additional insights about freedom of association. The report surveys individuals within 78 OGP partnered countries about elements of freedom of association. Furthermore, the survey presents that approximately 25% of freedom of association issues within OGP countries are rooted in restrictive laws on foreign funding. Additionally, the survey demonstrates that OGP countries presenting challenges to freedom of association generally have not taken actions towards better protecting the right in the future. When asked to respond to “In practice, people can freely join any political organization they want”, the majority of OGP countries responded “Agree” or “Strongly Agree”. Though, when asked to reply to “In practice, people can freely join any (unforbidden) political organization they want”, a large number of OGP countries, approximately 20%, responded “Disagree” . This finding demonstrates that in reality, freedom of association may be less protected by countries’ governments than it is perceived to be.

Within the International Labor Organization, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) addresses violations of freedom of association. In their 2018 annual report, the CFA reported 402 freedom of association complaints from Africa, 410 from Asian and the Pacific, 657 from Europe, 1,681 from Latin America and 186 from North America. Furthermore, their data reveals decreases in complaints in Africa, Asia and the Pacfic, and North America and increases in complaints in Latin America in 2018. 100% of the freedom of association cases examined by the CFA were brought about by workers, rather than employers. 50% of these workers were from the private sector. Violations of trade union rights and civil liberties composed the majority of freedom of association cases investigated by the CFA.
Freedom of Association/DependantsConflicts with other RightsFreedom of expression and freedom of religion are two of the most critical liberties for upholding freedom of association. As noted by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), “freedom of expression is frequently a necessary component of the rights to freedom of assembly and association when people join together for an expressive purpose” (ICJ n.d.), indicating that the liberties are intertwined. The United States Supreme Court itself has also stated that it “has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion” (Roberts v. United States Jaycees 1984, 618). In other words, true freedom of association is not possible without the freedom to speak or to practice a religion, both of which often involve congregation and organization among citizens.

Freedom of expression and freedom of religion are often discussed together in court cases, indicating that the two rights are enmeshed. For example, in 2009 the country of Honduras experienced a coup d’etat when then-President Zelaya was forced out of office by members of his own cabinet and other government organs. Many protested this act, including four judges who expressed their support for rule of law by attending demonstrations and conversing with others. These individuals were also a part of the Association of Judges for Democracy (AJD), and used the organization’s platform to speak out against the coup. Once it was found that the judges had and expressed political opinions in these ways, they were stripped of their positions, prevented from holding AJD membership, and convicted of violating the judicial code of ethics (Lopez Lone et al. v. Honduras 2015, 14-48). The plaintiffs, then, appealed the judgements to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (IACHR), citing infringements on both freedom of expression and freedom of association. The Court eventually confirmed that the rights of the judges had been violated, explaining that their political participation was acceptable “in a context in which democracy is being impaired” (Lopez Lone et al. v. Honduras 2015, 57), while in other cases impartiality of officials is necessary. On the subject of the liberties that were violated and their importance, the Court stated that “it has recognized the relationship that exists between political rights, freedom of expression, the right of assembly and freedom of association, and that these rights, taken as a whole, make the democratic process possible. In situations where there is a breakdown of institutional order following a coup d’état, the relationship between these rights is even clearer, especially when they are all exercised at the same time in order to protest against actions by the public authorities that are contrary to the constitutional order” (Lopez Lone et al. v. Honduras 2015, 52). In addition, it claimed that “the ability to protest publicly and peacefully is one of the most accessible ways to exercise the right to freedom of expression, and can contribute to the protection of other rights” (Lopez Lone et al. v. Honduras 2015, 55). Through this case, the IACHR affirmed that freedom of expression is deeply intertwined with freedom of association.

The critical connection between freedom of expression and freedom of association is further made clear in the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) case of Williams v. Zimbabwe. Between 2003 and 2013, individuals representing the organization Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) participated in protests where they used verbal expressions, held placards, and more. As a result, members were arrested multiple times by the Zimbabwean police and charged with attempts to disturb the peace and similar crimes under the state’s criminal code. Even after the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe stepped in and defended the rights of the victims, police continued to perform arbitrary arrests and blocked members of WOZA from peacefully protesting. As a result, members of the organization filed a complaint to the ACHPR stating that the Zimbabwean government had denied them multiple rights, including freedom of association and freedom of expression, as defined by the African Charter (Williams v. Zimbabwe 2021, 1-3). When deciding this case, the Court states that they would analyze the alleged violations of both rights at the same time, because “the rights to freedom of expression, assembly, and association are intertwined to the extent that they are fundamental human rights that form the foundations of democratic societies”(Williams v. Zimbabwe 2021, 18). The Commission also stated that, in the past, they had “found a violation of freedom of expression when the State violated the rights to freedom of association and freedom of assembly” (Williams v. Zimbabwe 2021, 18). Eventually, the body was led to the conclusion that the restrictions placed on freedom of expression, and by default freedom of association, were not justified. As noted in the case report, “associations must be given the freedom to pursue a wide range of activities, including exercising their rights to freedom of expression and assembly” (Williams v. Zimbabwe 2021, 18), summarizing how both rights are critical to each other in the context of the case and in general.

Judiciaries have also often examined freedom of religion and freedom of association together, as can be seen in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) case Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova. In 1992, the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia was created. It applied to the Moldovan government for recognition as a religious denomination, as was required by Moldovan law. However, the application went unanswered by the government, and so for the next seven years the institution alternated between pursuing legal proceedings against the government and reapplying for recognition. In every case, the government ignored or refused the Church’s requests, stating that it was “not a denomination distinct from the Orthodox Church but a schismatic group within the Metropolitan Church of Moldova and that any interference by the State to resolve the conflict would be contrary to the Moldovan Constitution” (Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova 2001, 10). On top of this, members of the Church of Bessarabia were continually harassed, intimidated, assaulted, and prevented from worshiping or conducting services by authorities. As a result, the institution and individual members applied to the ECHR to hear their case on the grounds that it was breaching the freedom of religion as defined by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In their assessment, the court sided with the applicants, noting that “refusing to recognise the applicant Church…amounted to forbidding it to operate, both as a liturgical body and as an association” (Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova 2001, 24), indicating that religious communities are akin to associations, which are also protected under the Convention. As a result, the Court ruled that the Moldovan government had violated the right to freedom of expression, and added that the regime’s “refusal to recognise, coupled with the authorities’ stubborn persistence in holding to the view that the applicants could practice their religion within the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, infringed their freedom of association, contrary to Article 11 of the Convention” (Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova 2001, 35). The ruling, then, exemplifies how associations can be religious in nature, and religions can act as associations, meaning that the protection of religion is critical to upholding freedom of association, and vice versa.

References

International Commission of Jurists. “Chapter four: Freedom of Assembly, Association, and Expression.” Accessed July 5, 2023. https://www.icj.org/sogi-casebook-introduction/chapter-four-freedom-of-assembly-association-and-expression/

Lopez Lone et al. v. Honduras. Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 30 ¶ 14-18, 52, 55, 57 (Oct. 6, 2015). https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_302_ing.pdf

Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, Application no. 45701/99, ECtHR of 2001. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-59985%22]}

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep468/usrep468609/usrep468609.pdf

Williams v. Zimbabwe, African Comm. Hum. & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 446/13 (February 25, 2021) https://rfkhr.imgix.net/asset/WOZA-Case-_-ACHPR-Full-Decision-compressed-2.pdf
Freedom of Association/Depends on governanceCulture and PoliticsThe United States Supreme Court has recognized two types of associative freedoms protected under the Constitution; expressive and intimate (Congress, Amdt 1.8.1). Expressive association covers an individual’s right to form and join groups or unions that express a collective purpose, while intimate refers to an individual’s right to maintain private associations (Hudson Jr., 2009). Freedom of association is covered under Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The United States Court system has recognized both aspects of freedom of association through multiple court cases such as Boy Scouts of America v. Dale and Roberts v. United States Jaycees (Hudson Jr., 2009). The United Nations Human Rights Office states “Freedom of association is an essential element of democracy that serves as a vehicle for the exercise of many other rights guaranteed under international law, including the right to freedom of expression (UN Human Rights. 2023).

Examples of expressive association include interacting and organizing amongst other citizens to collectively express and promote common interests, as well as the right to form and join trade unions, or work for non-governmental organizations(NGOs). Within the intimate aspect of association, those in democracies have a right to hold private relationships and associations without interference. In major democratic regimes such as the United States and the United Kingdom, freedom of association is respected and protected. In the United States, “officials respect the constitutional right to assembly; laws and practices give wide freedom to NGOs and activists to pursue civic and policy agendas; and federal law guarantees trade unions the right to organize and engage in collective bargaining (Freedom House, 2023).” In the United Kingdom, the freedom to assemble, go on strike, and bargain collectively are also all respected. NGOs may also operate freely, and workers have a right to organize trade unions, and even their own Labour Party. While perfect freedom is not always the case, as seen in examples of police brutality against protesters in the United States, and in the UK with the Police, Crime, Sentencing, and Courts Act of 2022, freedom of association is generally upheld and protected within democratic regimes. However, global democracy is on the decline, and in the 2015 John Hopkins University Press’ Journal of Democracy, Douglas Rutzen discusses how authoritarianism is placing an increasing threat to civil society. He says, “Since 2012, more than 160 laws constraining the freedoms of association or assembly have been enacted or proposed in 60 countries. This trend is consistent with the continuing decline of democracy worldwide(Rutzen, 2015, 30).” Freedom in the World 2023 shows us that 2022 was the 17th consecutive year of a global decline in freedom. As freedom of association is recognized by international law, this is not reflected when exercised within authoritarian regimes. In Countries such as Venezuela, freedom of association is strongly restricted and those who exercise this right can face major consequences. “The government is being investigated for crimes against humanity regarding how they treat opposition protests; Human Rights activists and members of NGOs face harassment, threats, and arrest; and the government has cracked down on labor unions with opposition unions and several labor union leaders have been arrested or killed (Freedom House, 2023)”. The autocratic regime of Kazakhstan also has strict restrictions on those who assemble and protest. Those who fail to follow these restrictions are subject to detainment, torture, and death as seen in the 2022 gas price protests in western Kazakhstan. “NGOs continue to operate but face government harassment when they attempt to address politically sensitive issues. There are extensive legal restrictions on the formation and operation of NGOs…Workers have limited rights to form and join trade unions or participate in collective bargaining. The government is closely affiliated with the largest union federation and major employers, while genuinely independent unions face repressive actions by the authorities. The country’s major independent trade union body was dissolved in 2017(Freedom House, 2023).” Intimate association is also not free within an autocracy as seen in Russia. Although private relationships are allowed, social media is heavily monitored, minority religious groups are often targeted, and political repression has impacted private discussions with cases of citizens reporting others for expressing views or associations in opposition to the government. “The government restricts freedom of assembly. Overwhelming police responses, the excessive use of force, routine arrests, and harsh fines and prison sentences have largely discouraged unsanctioned protests, while pro-Kremlin groups are able to demonstrate freely… The government has also relentlessly persecuted NGOs, particularly those that work on human rights and governance issues. Civic activists are frequently arrested on politically motivated charges(Freedom House, 2023).” Exercising freedom of association within an autocratic regime is heavily restricted and poses a major risk. While sometimes possible to assemble and protest, it is not without registration and approval, being met with police force, or facing other significant consequences. As the middle ground between democracy and autocracy, hybrid regimes recognize freedom of association accordingly. Freedom House ranks countries on a scale of 1-4; democratic regimes typically place at a 3 or 4 regarding freedom of association, whereas autocratic regimes place at a 0 or 1. However, hybrid regimes consistently place at a 1, 2, or 3 depending on the nation. As declared by the European Parliament, Hungary has now transitioned from a deficient democracy, into a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy. (European Parliament Press Release, 2022).” However, according to Freedom House, Hungary exemplifies a true hybrid regime with the possession of liberty and limitations to the freedom of association. The freedom to assemble is constitutionally protected and often respected, scoring a 4/4; however, associations with NGOs that go against the government agenda are subjected to stigmatization, monitoring, and fines placing associative freedom at a 2/4 (Freedom House, 2023). The hybrid regime of Jordan, a constitutional monarchy with an elected lower house in parliament, has a registration system for the formation of associations that must be approved by authority (Makary, 2007). In the International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law’s 10th volume issued in 2007, Marc Makary examines the case studies of Jordan and Lebanon and the guarantees of freedom of association in non-democratic environments. He states “While freedom of association in Jordan is protected by the Constitution, its laws are contrary to the standards for freedom of association set by International Law. Article 16 of the Constitution grants Jordanians the right ‘to establish societies and political parties provided that the objects of such societies and parties are lawful, their methods peaceful, and their by-laws not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.’ While Article 16 seems to provide space for individuals to establish associations, its paragraph (iii) places the establishment of associations and political parties under the control of the law with Jordanian Law N° 33 of 1966 granting absolute discretion to the Minister of Social Affairs or the Minister of Interior to register associations, ban undeclared associations, and establish long and burdensome administrative procedures (Makary’s, 2007). ” Makary’s findings have not changed much since 2007, as the current hybrid regime strictly limits free assembly, heavily monitors and regulates NGO operations in an arbitrary manner, and limits the industries in which unions may form with the limited right to strike (Freedom House, 2023). Hungary was on the more positive end of the spectrum with middle averaging scores, contrary to Jordan with scores of 1/4 and 0/4 regarding freedom of association. Hybrid systems can fluctuate how much freedom they allow for people to associate with each other. Democratic regimes remain at the top levels of ability regarding the right to exercise freedom of association without interference; whether that be through assembly, union membership, expressive group discussion, or intimate association, citizens of democracies face little to no limits. In contrast, Autocratic regimes place heavy restrictions and limits on the exercise of this freedom and often punish those who do. While the actions do not vary much depending on the regime, the ability to do so freely without interference is truly where the differences lie.

European Parliament. 2022. “MEPs: Hungary Can No Longer Be Considered a Full Democracy. News. European Parliament.” Www.europarl.europa.eu. September 15, 2022. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220909IPR40137/meps-hungary-can-no-longer-be-considered-a-full-democracy.

Freedom House. 2023. “ Freedom in the World 2023 Country Report.” Freedom House. 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/explore-the-map?type=fiw&year=2023

Gorokhovskaia, Yana, Adrian Shahbaz, and Amy Slipowitz. 2023. “Marking 50 Years in the Struggle for Democracy.” Freedom House. 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2023/marking-50-years.

Jr, David L. Hudson. 2009. “Freedom of Association.” Www.mtsu.edu. 2009. https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1594/freedom-of-association.

Makary, Marc. “Notification or Registration? Guarantees of Freedom of Association in Non-Democratic Environments: Case Studies of Lebanon and Jordan.” n.d. ICNL. Accessed June 19, 2023. https://www.icnl.org/resources/research/ijnl/notification-or-registration-guarantees-of-freedom-of-association-in-non-democratic-environments-case-studies-of-lebanon-and-jordan.

Rutzen, Douglas. "Authoritarianism Goes Global (II): Civil Society Under Assault." Journal of Democracy, vol. 26 no. 4, 2015, p. 28-39. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/jod.2015.0071.

United Nations Human Rights. 2023. “OHCHR Freedom of Assembly and of Association.” n.d. OHCHR. https://www.ohchr.org/en/topic/freedom-assembly-and-association#:~:text=Everyone%20has%20the%20rights%20to,protests%2C%20both%20offline%20and%20online.

United States Congress. Constitution Annotated. Amdt1.8.1 Overview of Freedom of Association. https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-8-1/ALDE_00013139/
Freedom of Association/Fundamental and protectedCulture and PoliticsFreedom of Association refers to the right to associate and interact with organizations and individuals in terms of organizing and demanding common interests. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights defines this right as, “The right to freedom of association involves the right of individuals to interact and organize among themselves to collectively express, promote, pursue and defend common interests. This includes the right to form trade unions.”(OHCR). This right is stated under the 20th article of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which states, “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. (2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.”(United Nations 1948). This right is generally associated with labor unions and is stated as the right of ‘Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining’ according to the International Labour Organization which is a United Nations body that advances economic justice and rights such as the freedom of association.

This right is generally interpreted and defined differently under different constitutions pertaining to the various importance of the right to the environment and culture of the country. For example the United States’ constitution does not explicitly state the right to freedom of association rather in the first amendment it states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”(US Constitution Annotated 2022). Therefore the United States supports a form of association and does not allow the prohibition of ‘assembly’ of individuals ‘peaceably’. This right is often associated and phrased in constitutions as the ‘Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining’ this implies a distinction between the two concepts; with collective bargaining being associated with the demands rather than the organization of the individuals.

Liberal democratic countries often support this right based on common understandings from the English philosopher John Locke who in his writing of "Two Treatises of Government". Locke championed three fundamental unalienable rights which are: the right to life, liberty, and property. As such he does not explicitly state the right of freedom of association, yet he does describe the right of individuals to join together in pursuit of their interests. Locke argues, “The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his rule.”(Locke 1689) individuals have the natural right to associate with others based on mutual consent, forming communities and engaging in collective endeavors. He believed that individuals should have the liberty to create associations, including religious congregations, trade unions, and political organizations, in order to protect and advance their shared interests.

Furthermore, John Locke introduced the concept of the ‘Social Contract’ exploring the idea of a collective agreement that establishes the norms, behaviors, and rules necessary for the formation of a society and a functioning government. John Locke, in his influential work "Two Treatises of Government," argued that individuals willingly enter into a social contract to form a civil society. This organized entity consent to be governed by an authority that protects their natural and unalienable rights of life, liberty, and property. Locke argues that if the government violates this social contract by infringing upon these fundamental rights, they have the right to resist and potentially overthrow the government.

The idea of the social contract highlights the notion of individuals entering into a collective agreement to form a society and a government that serves their common interests and protects their rights. The concepts put forth by Locke contribute to the understanding of the relationship between individuals and the government, as well as the rights and responsibilities that arise from this social contract in terms of freedom of association.

Furthermore, this right according to international organizations, specifically the International Trade Union Confederation, which has utilized an index to rank and identify the extent of the adoption of this right around the world(The International Trade Union Confederation 2022). According to the index, all countries generally have a clause or article that pertains to a form of right of freedom of association but many countries obstruct this right through justifications of ‘Free Speech’ of businessmen against their employees, ‘National Interests’, among other reasons for infractions on this right.

Whereas, the exceptions of the right generally exist in different frequencies, it is generally unjustified according to the ILO and ITUC to obstruct this freedom, whereas according to the OHCR in their comparative study Authoritarian regimes tend to obstruct this freedom for their political and national interests and while they may allow association to exist it would ultimately be ineffective. For example, the ILO details in its ‘Arab States Workers' Organizations’ page figures which detail the limitations of the application of the right of freedom of association in which a multiplicity of Arab countries do not allow for migrant workers to join trade unions. This is seen as the ILO states, “With the exception of Bahrain and Oman, across the Arab States migrant workers are excluded from trade union representation by law.” This shows a general common exception based on the environment of freedom of association in the case of the Arab states, many of which have a significant labor pool of expatriate workers.

To conclude, while most states are part of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and almost all countries recognize the constitutional right to association, the limitations and exceptions to this right vary significantly based on the specific environment and cultural context.


Bibliography


Constitution Annotated. 2022. “U.S. Constitution - First Amendment Resources Constitution Annotated Congress.gov Library of Congress.” Constitution.congress.gov. 2022. https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-1/#:~:text=Congress%20shall%20make%20no%20law.

ILO. n.d. “8.Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining (Decent Work for Sustainable Development (DW4SD) Resource Platform).” Www.ilo.org. https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/dw4sd/themes/freedom-of-association/lang--en/index.htm.

———. n.d. “Workers’ Organizations (Arab States).” Www.ilo.org. https://www.ilo.org/beirut/areasofwork/workers/lang--en/index.htm. Locke, John. 1689. Two Treatises of Government. S.L.: Blurb.

McCombs School of Business. 2022. “Social Contract Theory.” Ethics Unwrapped. 2022. https://ethicsunwrapped.utexas.edu/glossary/social-contract-theory#:~:text=Social%20contract%20theory%20says%20that.

“OHCHR Freedom of Assembly and of Association.” n.d. OHCHR. https://www.ohchr.org/en/topic/freedom-assembly-and-association#:~:text=The%20right%20to%20freedom%20of.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1964. The First and Second Discourses. Bedford Books. ———. 1987. On the Social Contract. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. (Orig. pub. 1762.).

The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. 2016. “Social Contract.” In Encyclopædia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/social-contract.

The International Trade Union Confederation. 2022. “2022 ITUC Global Rights Index.” The International Trade Union Confederation. Sharan Burrow, General Secretary. https://files.mutualcdn.com/ituc/files/2022-ITUC-Rights-Index-Exec-Summ-EN_2022-08-10-062736.pdf.

United Nations. 1948. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights - English.” OHCHR. United Nations. December 10, 1948. https://www.ohchr.org/en/human-rights/universal-declaration/translations/english.
Freedom of Association/Fundamentally acceptedHistoryThe Freedom of Association only became formally recognized in the US in 1958 with the landmark NAACP v Alabama SCOTUS decision (“NAACP v. ALABAMA, 377 U.S. 288” 1964). Just after the Brown v Board of Education ruling the NAACP became incredibly active in Alabama. When the state tried to demand a list of the organization's members, the NAACP refused. Freedom of Association can be found in the majority opinion where Justice John Marshall Harlan II wrote “It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.” (“NAACP v. ALABAMA, 377 U.S. 288” 1964). Since the NAACP was allowed to organize their political group as an association and were afforded the privacy and rights they argued in the case.

Prior to this, this right can be found in several U.S. cases leading up to the 1958 opinion. The Supreme Court did not always recognize Freedom of Association however. In 1886, a case centered on the forming of state militias, the Court declared that the government had the ability to regulate and prohibit associations “have the power to regulate or prohibit associations and meetings of the people, except in the case of peaceable assemblies.” (Cornell Legal Information Institute). The right to protest is clearly laid out here, while the Freedom of Association is denied. Later on, in a 1945 case, the Court applied the freedom of assembly stating, “[i]t was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are inseparable.” This allowed unions to discuss benefits and consequences of organizing (“Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)”). Throughout the 1950s, the Court started to refer to the freedom of association as a separate but related freedom, close to speech and assembly, found in the First Amendment. By 1958, the Court deemed it "beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of" civil liberties like the freedom of speech. (Cornell Legal Information Institute). Internationally, the earliest autonomous associations were founded by religion. The Roman Catholic Church was the most important institution in medieval Western Europe. It kept its own organization and self-government, even in the several states where it served as the recognized religion (“Freedom of Association: History”). They encouraged trade associations, guilds for artisans, and other associations, frequently with the consent of the nation's ruler, who was typically a monarch (“Freedom of Association: History”). Outside of the US, one of the first instances of the debate regarding Freedom of Association in terms of organized labor was in Great Britain. At the end of the 18th century, the Comination Acts suppressed attempts to organize unions (“Freedom of Association: History” n.d.). This caused radical reformers to protest, driving workers to violence. Eventually, the government backed the repeal of the Acts in 1824. This repeal served as Britain’s first major increase in the ability to organize and unionize. Despite some infringements on labor rights in the 1980s and 1990s, the Trade Union Congress is still a strong force in the United Kingdom’s politics and economy (“Freedom of Association: History”). This was an early implication through labor rights that Freedom of Association existed. In order to address bad working conditions and social unrest, the ILO (International Labor Organization) devised a tripartite organization that included representatives from industry, labor, and government (“Freedom of Association: History”). The International Labor Organization (ILO) approved Convention No. 87 on freedom of association in 1948, and Convention No. 98 on the right to collectively bargain in 1949. As of 2013, 152 countries had ratified Convention No. 87, and 163 had ratified Convention No. 98, demonstrating how highly accepted these treaties are around the world (“Freedom of Association: History”). There are eight fundamental ILO conventions, some of which forbid child labor, forced labor, and employment discrimination. Only 14 of the 189 international standards treaties have been ratified by the US Senate, and only two of the eight core agreements (on forced labor in 1991 and child labor in 1999) have been ratified (“Freedom of Association: History”). On the other hand, nations in the former Soviet Union approved ILO treaties without ever putting them into use. Communist nations argued that since the Communist Party and its affiliated labor organizations represented workers' interests, there was no need for free trade unions, which are highly specific to certain trades (“Overview of Freedom of Association”). Thus, Soviet trade unions were the antithesis of free association and an "anti-trade union" paradigm. The official unions didn't shield workers from exploitation; instead, they made them labor longer and harder to satisfy government demands (Constitution Annotated). In democratic nations, private companies occasionally adopted a similar strategy known as "company unionism," but the Soviet Union's methods were systematic in nature and a crucial component of the totalitarian regime. The Soviet Union imposed its model on its Eastern European satellite governments and exported it to other communist nations (Constitution Annotated). The largest country still using a Communist Party-controlled official union structure is the People's Republic of China (Constitution Annotated). One of the ILO's greatest historical contributions was the inspiration and assistance it provided to Poland's Solidarity movement, which saw millions of workers rise up starting in 1980 and demand the implementation of Conventions 87 and 98 as well as the establishment of the right to form free unions (International Labor Organization 1982). As a result of the movement's success—10 million workers joined within a month of Solidarity's founding—a free trade union was officially recognized for the first time in a Communist nation. The Polish Solidarity Revolution had a tremendous impact on the entire Soviet bloc (International Labor Organization 1982). Solidarity's success was a rejection of the previous regimes. After seven years of nonviolent protest, Polish workers mounted a nationwide strike that compelled the government to re-legalize Solidarity and concede to partially free elections in June 1989, which ultimately led to the overthrow of the government (International Labor Organization 1982). Soon after, the Soviet Union as a whole disintegrated, paving the way for the rise of several new republics. Small clandestine publications that explained to employees their rights under ILO treaties served as the foundation for the entire operation (International Labor Organization 1982).

References:

Constitution Annotated. “Overview of Freedom of Association.” Library of Congress. Accessed September 11, 2023. https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-8-1/ALDE_00013139/.

Cornell Legal Information Institute.“Overview of Freedom of Association.” LII / Legal Information Institute. Accessed September 11, 2023a. https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/overview-of-freedom-of-association.

“PRESSER v. STATE OF ILLINOIS.” LII / Legal Information Institute. Accessed September 11, 2023b. https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/116/252.

“Freedom of Association: History.” Democracy Web. Accessed September 11, 2023. https://democracyweb.org/freedom-of-association-history.

International Labor Organization. 1982. “Interim Report - Report No 217, June 1982.” June 1982. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2900704.

“NAACP v. ALABAMA, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).” FindLaw. Accessed September 11, 2023. https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-supreme-court/377/288.html.

“Overview of Freedom of Association.” Library of Congress. Accessed September 11, 2023. https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1-8-1/ALDE_00013139/.

“Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).” Justia Law. Accessed September 11, 2023. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/323/516/.
Freedom of Association/History/EraHistoryThis right became an element of political discourse in the late Enlightenment, especially in the mid and late 1800s , as seen in the works of authors such as John Stuart Mill and Leo XIII.

References:

Catholic Church. Pope (1878-1903 : Leo XIII). Rerum Novarum : Enciclica Di Leone XIII Sulla Questione Operaia. Lugano :Edizione a cura dell'Organizzazione cristano-sociale del canton Ticino per la celebrazione del LXX, 1961.

Mill, J. S. (1975) Three essays : On liberty, Representative government, The subjection of women. London: Oxford University Press.
Freedom of Association/History/Noteworthy written sourcesHistoryFreedom of association, as it is defined today, largely originates from the works of various political theorists. Early recognition of this freedom, however, can be found before and after the lifetimes of John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. Following the enactment of a constitution in 1815, the newly-independent Kingdom of the Netherlands took concrete steps to codify freedom of expression, which took this form following revisions in 1848 and 1983:

“The right of association shall be recognized. This right may be restricted by Act of Parliament in the interest of public order" (Article 8).

The early Dutch interest in protecting free association arguably stemmed from their war of independence against Spain, and the decentralized form of republican governance that followed. This phenomenon is evidenced by the Union of Utrecht (1579) and the Act of Abjuration (1581). While neither document explicitly mentions the right to free association, they establish the necessary framework for its eventual adoption into the Dutch Constitution.

The Union of Utrecht was enacted prior to a formal declaration of independence from Spain, and would eventually influence the U.S. Articles of Confederation (for better or worse). It declared that the provinces and cities of the United Netherlands are entitled to “special and particular privileges,” as well as the freedom to maintain regional “franchises” and “long practiced customs.” This language primarily served as an acknowledgement of the differing factions and organizations that existed within and beyond Holland, and the efforts by William of Orange and other Dutch revolutionaries to garner a larger base of support. Regarding religion (an issue largely forced upon them by the Spanish Inquisition), the document protected individuals from being “investigated or persecuted because of [their] religion,” and allowed for religious ordinances to be established on a regional basis so they could be “most fitting for the repose and welfare” of different communities. In protecting religious freedom, the Union of Utrecht implicitly acknowledged the right to join religious organizations, which amounted to an intersection between the issues of religion and association.

The Act of Abjuration represented a definitive declaration of independence from Spain, which came to fruition following the Eighty Years’ War. The authors of this document asserted that royal subjects, when confronted with a tyrannical ruler, may collectively “proceed to the choice of another prince for their defense.” They admonished Habsburg Spain, which operated “under the mask of religion” to suppress associations in Holland that dissented against Catholicism or Spanish political rule. As the discontented subjects of a monarch can reasonably be termed as an association with shared interests, this document would theoretically assert their right to collective action. The Act of Abjuration sought to identify and protect the interests of Dutch society as a whole, while asserting that smaller associations within this broader collective were entitled to the political power previously wrested from them by Spain.

Neither the Act of Abjuration nor the Union of Utrecht explicitly mentioned the right to free association. The eventual adoption of this right in the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1848, however, affirmed an ideological movement promoting free association that began in earnest during the Dutch revolution against Habsburg Spain. This experience undoubtedly shaped the Constitution of 1815, which currently recognizes free association as an enumerated right.

Pope Leo XIII forcefully argued for free association in Section 51 of Rerum novarum ( 1891) , an extremely influential text in Catholic thought: "Private societies, then, although they exist within the body politic, and are severally part of the commonwealth, cannot nevertheless be absolutely, and as such, prohibited by public authority. For, to enter into a "society" of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State has for its office to protect natural rights, not to destroy them."

References:

“Act of Abjuration 1581, Dutch Declaration of Independence.” n.d. Www.age-of-The-Sage.org. https://www.age-of-the-sage.org/history/dutch_independence_1581.html.

“Union of Utrecht 1579.” n.d. Www.constitution.org. https://www.constitution.org/1-Constitution/cons/dutch/Union_Utrecht_1579.html.

“Recht Tot Vereniging.” 2021. Gert-Jan Leenknegt, Nederland Rechtsstaat. November 1, 2021. https://www.nederlandrechtsstaat.nl/grondwet/inleiding-bij-hoofdstuk-1-grondrechten/artikel-8-recht-tot-vereniging/.

Netherlands 1814 (Rev. 2008). n.d. Constitute. Comparative Constitutions Project. Accessed August 1, 2024. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Netherlands_2008.

Catholic Church. Pope (1878-1903 : Leo XIII). Rerum Novarum : Enciclica Di Leone XIII Sulla Questione Operaia. Lugano :Edizione a cura dell'Organizzazione cristano-sociale del canton Ticino per la celebrazione del LXX, 1961.
Freedom of Association/Legal Codification/InternationalLegal CodificationYes. It is protected explicitly in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights. Specifically, free association is upheld by Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which claims, “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”Additionally, it is enshrined in Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which claims “ Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; No one may be compelled to belong to an association.” In Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the rights to association are specifically outlined, as it upholds “In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Lastly, The International Labor Organization similarly supports freedom of association in the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which asserts that all members have “freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;”
Freedom of Association/Legal Codification/Most countriesLegal CodificationConstitutions written after 1900 very often protect free association.

As the right to free association is upheld by numerous United Nations treaties, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it would be expected that most countries maintain legal provisions protecting it. Though, investigated by UN Special Rapporteur Maina Kiai, many countries enforce legislation that explicitly restricts civilians’ entitlements to free association (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law).

For example, noted by Kiai, in Malaysia, the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 bans individuals under the age of twenty one from organizing public demonstrations. Additionally, stipulated by the same act, children under the age of fifteen cannot participate in demonstrations. Article 33 of the Constitution of Mexico, Kiai asserts, prohibits foreigners from engaging with Mexican politics. Similarly, Kiai notes that in Myanmar, Article 354 prohibits foreigners from assembling. Through these various forms of legislation, political and social association are highly restricted, as individuals are prohibited from expressing their associations through protest and civic engagement.

Additionally, Kiai presents how legal restrictions on sexual orientation limit free association in several countries. For example, in Russia, a ban on gay pride parades was upheld by Moscow’s city council in 2012. Likewise, in Nigeria, the President ushered in the Same Sex Marriage Act in 2014, prohibting gay marriage and the ability to “participate in or support gay clubs, societies, organizations, processions or meeting.” Kiai notes a similar anti-homosexuality law was signed by Uganda’s president in 2014. Demonstrated by these numerous legal restrictions to homosexuality, free association is unprotected in numerous countries, as one can often be punished for associating with a specific sexual orientation.

In the remainder of his report, Kiai continues to elaborate on numerous legal provisions that restrict free association. For example, Kiai notes how both Chile and Turkey utilize counter-terrorism legislation to restrict free association. Similarly, he explains how criminal laws in Vietnam and El Salvador often deter individuals from exercising their rights to free association, as their voices may be met with harsh penalties from their governments.

Witnessed through Kiai’s reporting, the restrictions to free association are plentiful. This ultimately demonstrates that despite its entitlement by numerous United Nations treaties, the right to free association is highly vulnerable to violation and not widely internationally upheld.
Freedom of Association/Legal Codification/USLegal CodificationNo.

The right to free association is not explicitly stated in the United States Constitution. Though, The Supreme Court has historically upheld the constitutional right to free association, invoking the Fourteenth and First Amendments (Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School). In 1958, The NAACP v. Patterson ruling established this precedent. In response to Alabama’s aims to limit the NAACP’s business within the state, the Supreme Court ruled that it was “the right of petitioner's members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment” (Oyez). Furthermore, the court asserted that freedom of association was undoubtedly covered by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Oyez), which asserts no individual may be “"deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” The court additionally demonstrated the First Amendment to protect free association, Justice Harlan claiming “Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.” Thus, while the right to free association is not explicitly described by the Constitution, as witnessed in NAACP v. Patterson, it is upheld by American constitutional law.

References:

Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, “First Amendment”: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first_amendment
Freedom of Association/Legal Codification/US exceptionsLegal CodificationYes. As seen in Roberts v. US Jaycees, the right may be weighed against other state interests, especially when the association in question is neither expressive nor intimate. In that case, free association rights were curtailed to ensure adherence to non-discrimination laws.

Additionally, a significant exception to free association rights in the United States is witnessed through legislation regarding political parties. For example, in New York State Board of Elections vs. Lopez Torres, the court claimed,

A political party has a First Amendment right to limit its membership as it wishes, and to choose a candidate-selection process that will in its view produce the nominee who best represents its political platform. These rights are circumscribed, however, when the state gives a party a role in the election process...Then for example, the party’s racially discriminatory action may become state action that violates the Fifteenth Amendment Demonstrated by New York State Board of Elections vs. Lopez Torres, if a party associates with discriminatory or racist behavior, it cannot be involved in the state’s election process, demonstrating a limitation on free political association.

Additionally, sections of the Federal Election Campaign Act are often interpreted to be exceptions to free association, as they require the public disclosure of individuals’ political donations. This position was echoed by the Buckley v. Valeo ruling, where the Supreme Court argued that new campaign finance laws, “impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedom of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions.” Thus, witnessed by Buckley v. Valeo, campaign finance laws may be interpreted as an exception to free association, as one cannot privately financially contribute to the political party they associate with.

Within universities, freedom of association, specifically the right to associate as an exclusive religious group, may be regulated by anti-discrimination clauses. This was observed in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, where the court ruled in favor of Hastings’ College of Law’s anti-discrimintation policies, which prohibited Christian student group’s from excluding non-christians. Therefore, on university campuses, individuals must be able join any student group, regardless of their religious association. Ultimately, this decision restricted the parameters of free association, as one cannot actively discriminate on the basis of it.

Consequently, decided by Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, certain groups can legally exclude individuals from associating with them. Furthermore, if an individual’s beliefs do not coincide with the group’s mission, the individual may be prohibited from membership. Specifically, the court claimed that by mandating the Boston Veterans’ Council to include Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual individuals in their parade, the Massachusetts State Court, “violates the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say.” Thus, while still restricting free association, the ruling counters Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, as individuals can be restricted from associating with certain groups if it is deemed that their identity does not conform to the group’s platform. Ultimately, these exceptions arise from the implicit nature of the freedom of association within the Constitution, as what qualifies as “association” is highly subject to interpretation by Supreme Court justices. For this reason, depending on who is sitting on the bench, freedom of association can be left unchecked or potentially be highly restricted.

References:

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)

Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010),

Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995),

New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008)

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)
Freedom of Association/Legal Codification/US implicitLegal CodificationSince the 1950s and 60s, SCOTUS has, to an extent, ruled that the speech and assembly rights imply a right to associate, especially for politically expressive purposes. For example, it ruled in NAACP v. Alabama that the NAACP cannot be forced to submit a membership roster to a state government. In 2000, in Boy Scouts v. Dale, the court held that the Boy Scouts could exclude gay members (in violation of state non-dsicrimination laws) because not being able to do so would undermine their ability to express a viewpoint - expressive association.

In Roberts v. US Jaycees, an organization for young business leaders’ ban on female members was challenged because it violated state non-discrimination law. This case is notable because the court identified a new form of association: intimate association. The opinion of the court states that “certain intimate human relationships be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.” The opinion places this right under the general aims of the First Amendment. The court ruled against the organization, but in so doing, it established the idea that Americans have the right to free intimate and expressive association. Still, one could argue that in a state with true freedom to associate, any group of people would be able to enact whatever membership restrictions it wanted, regardless of whether or not it falls into the categories of “expressive” or “intimate.”

Although assembly is the First-Amendment freedom that most seems to correspond with association, SCOTUS has not derived free association this way. Rather, it uses a more nebulous combination of various First-Amendment rights. As the majority held in NAACP v. Button, “It is not necessary to subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly, for there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity.”

References:

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U. S. 640

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)

Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)
Freedom of Association/Limitations - Restrictions/Country exceptionsLimitations - RestrictionsRestricting certain groupings and gatherings that are involved, or likely involved in crimes as was seen with the response to the formation of the Ku Klux Klan as a vigilante association, is a typical exception to the right of freedom of association (Australian Law Reform Commission 2016) . In response to the crimes committed by the organization, Congress passed a Force Act in 1870 and the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871, which authorized the suppression of disturbances to the peace by force (Gruberg). This was in effort to stop terrorist organizations through heavy punishments, such as the suspension of habeas corpus under these acts. These acts were eventually found by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional and were repealed; however, although direct restrictions upon the group (who was behind the 1963 bombing of a black church in Alabama, numerous murders including that of three civil rights workers in 1964 Mississippi, and other criminal efforts to impose white supremacy on the masses and restrict the rights of African Americans) and its freedom of assembly and association have not been able to lawfully prevent such crimes in the name of violations of the freedom of association, modern civil rights laws and increased national surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation have indirectly impacted the KKK’s and other criminally-involved groups’ (such as terrorist groups like ISIL) freedoms of association and assembly. The First Amendment of the US Constitution grants the right to “peaceable assembly,” and any indication of unpeaceable assembly warrants government interference. When also the association infringes upon another group’s freedoms of association, endangers public safety and order, or does not benefit/or harms social need, as can be seen with the efforts of the KKK to restrict black Americans rights to vote and peaceably assemble, necessary limitations are placed upon the right.

In terms of certain limitations on peaceable assembly, the government has the right to limit this freedom based upon “time, place and manner” restrictions: “Time, place and manner restrictions are content-neutral limitations imposed by the government on expressive activity (O'Neill). These restrictions come in many forms including imposing limits on the noise level of speech, capping the number of protesters who may occupy a given forum, barring early-morning or late-evening demonstrations, and restricting the size or placement of signs on government property. ” These limits ultimately regard the facilitation of legitimate regulatory goals, such as preventing traffic congestion or preventing interference with nearby activities.

Religious rights often conflict with the right to free association. As observed in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, where a Christian student organization argued their First Amendment right to prohibit non-christians from their group, religious associations have used their rights to religious freedom to restrict certain individuals from associating with them. Though, as the Supreme Court ultimately ruled against the Christian Legal Society, rights to free association were ultimately upheld over contradicting religious rights.

A similar issued was observed in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group. Though, in this case, the Supreme Court asserted the right of groups to prohibit membership from individuals whose beliefs do not coincide with the group mission.Furthermore, Hurley exhibited how religious rights can counter rights to free association, as the decision emphasized that certain individuals could be blocked from associating with religious groups on the basis of their identity.

Rights to public safety additionally contradict rights to free association. This is often the argument made when prosecuting individuals associating with criminal and terrorist groups. For example in City of Chicago v. Morales, the Supreme Court upheld a Chicago law which criminalized public gang association, asserting that gang members had no constitutional rights to free association (Cole). Exhibited by the court’s decision, individuals are not constitutionally protected to align with criminal groups, as the public’s right to safety against such groups weighs against personal rights to association.

In regards to the right to free political association, parties hold a contradicting First Amendment right to limit party membership. Furthermore, while a candidate can identify as associating with a specific political party on a ballot, that party has the ability to disassociate from them (Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School). Through this, a candidate often cannot freely affiliate with the party they associate with, exhibiting a contradiction to the right to free association.
Freedom of Association/Limitations - Restrictions/DerogationsLimitations - RestrictionsIn Article 22 of the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the right to freedom of association is granted to all, including joining trade unions (United Nations 1966) . Restrictions can only be placed on this right if the restrictions are prescribed by the state’s law and “are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Similarly, in Europe, derogations are permissible only when “prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” as is stated in Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (European Court of Human Rights 1953, 12). And Article 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights mirrors the decree of the ICCPR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1969) . Regarding the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and its adoption of Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, this body is in place to protect the labor interests of those around the world, and they are prohibited by international law to formulate and/or apply law so as to prejudice against any group (Swepston 1998, 172).
Freedom of Association/Limitations - Restrictions/JurisprudenceLimitations - RestrictionsThe freedom of association is derivative from the First Amendment which guarantees the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition (Hudson 2020) . These freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition all form sub-categories of the freedom of association. Collectively, this right permits a group to act in the collective interest of its members and to maintain private associations and assemblies without government interference. The legal problems regarding its practice have only recently arisen- particularly from the loyalty investigations of the Communist Party membership and a series of other cases in the 1950s and 1960s in relation to the activities of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute 2020) . For example, in 1958, with the case of the NAACP v. Alabama, the right to freedom of association was strengthened and supported by the Supreme Court who ruled in favor of the NAACP’s decision to withhold a list of members in the organization from the government (Hudson 2020) . In response to Brown v. Board of Education 1954, Alabama authorities was closely investigating the NAACP under the foreign corporation law. The NAACP complied with the state’s request of its business records, including its charter and list of organizational officers and staff. They refused, however, to give lists of rank-and-file members due to confidentiality, potential economic reprisal attacks, and potential repression. Giving up the lists, civil rights activists said, would dissuade members and potential recruits from associating with the organization, ultimately violating their right of association.

Prior to this case the Court had supported a stronger suppression of the freedoms of association and assembly regarding organizations that were alleged to be involved in subversive and unlawful activities. In 1928’ s New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman and 1951’ s Dennis v. United States the Court had ruled in favor of government efforts to restrict and limit the rights of assembly and speech of both the KKK and the Communist Party (U.S. Supreme Court 1928, 1951) . In this case, however, the Court said NAACP did not cause harm to government or society, and they had complied with the demands of the Alabama government sufficiently; therefore they were justified and protected by law in their decision to withhold membership lists.

Later, in the 1967 case of United States v. Robel in which Eugene Robel, an inactive member of the Communist Party, was charged with violating the Subversive Activities Control Act when he continued his work at the Todd Pacific Shipyards, a location that was deemed by the Secretary of Defense to be a defense facility (U.S. Supreme Court 2020) . Under the Act, his actions was illegal due to his membership to the Communist Party and members of the Party’s legal inability to remain employed at a location deemed a “defense facility”. The Supreme Court ruled that the “defense facility” employment provision was an unconstitutional abridgment of the right of association regardless of its application solely to active Party members. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that the provision was overbroad while Justice William J. Brennan added that the designation of defense facilities being a power given to the Secretary of Defense was unconstitutional because the Act provided no meaningful standards for the Secretary to follow. This case was a milestone because, once tested, the Court upheld the broad freedoms of association and continued the prohibition of government interference and bias towards any individual based upon an affiliated association. Later cases regarding the Bar examine and admission to the bar further backed this right. In 1971’ s Baird v. State Bar of Arizona and Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, the Supreme Court established that the government could only deny admission to the bar if an applicant’s membership in a group advocating overthrow of the government (such as the Communist Party) was legitimately coupled with the specific intent to achieve that end (U.S. Supreme Court 1971) .

These cases established that organized groups in association that gather in efforts to advance political, economic, religious, or cultural matters may gather without government interference (and particularly without government knowledge of listed members) unless the group explicitly poses a threat to society or engages in criminal activity.

Under American jurisprudence, permissible exceptions to the freedom involve matters of internal affairs such as discrimination cases. In the 1976 case of Runyon v. McCrary, discrimination based upon race was established as a limitation to a body’s freedom of association after two children were denied access to certain private schools in Virginia as a result of the schools’ admitted segregationist school policies (U.S. Supreme Court 1976) . Later, in the Roberts v. United States Jaycees court case of 1984, the court ruled that the Jaycees, an organization of young business leaders that only fully accepted male members and who claimed that the anti-discrimination laws that forced them to accept qualified women was a breach of their freedom of association, lacked “the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women,” ultimately prohibiting their exclusion of women (Bernstein 2020) .

Also, if the state has a compelling interest, it can justifiably limit associations’ rights to organizational autonomy (Alexander 2008, 14). Here, the state would be setting limits and requirements for how a group is organizationally run and made up. By giving an organization a quota, the state forces a particular pattern of inclusion that is in the public interest. For example, the US government is permitted to work to create less segregated schools, involving programs like the Moving to Opportunity (MTO). It is permitted to do in efforts to promote certain patterns of inclusion and acceptance within communities and associations (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1992) .
Freedom of Association/Limitations - Restrictions/PermissibilityLimitations - RestrictionsFreedom of association is an essential facet of modern democracy, yet it is often overlooked in political discourse on the natural rights and liberties of the citizen. This could be due to the fact that freedom of association and assembly are often so closely related to freedoms of speech and expression, or it could be because it is so difficult for political theorists to decide which association should be allowed and which can be justifiably restricted. Whatever the case, the debate over exceptions to the right of free association continues to change and evolve even in the modern era.

John Locke is one of the earliest proponents of natural right theory; his second “Treatise on Government” famously outlines humankind’s three essential rights to life, liberty, and property (Locke, “Treatise on Government”). He does not specifically mention people’s freedom of association, but scholars point to his writings on religious assembly as an indication of his stance on the right. In a George Mason University publication, Eric Claeys refers to a passage from Locke’s “Letter Concerning Toleration,” which states that a church is simply a “free and voluntary society” (Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration”), saying that “if one reads the same passage from the Letter with an eye toward issues about associational freedom, Locke is making a far more radical point: All private societies, churches and otherwise, deserve a presumption of associational freedom” (Claeys, “The Private Society and the Liberal Public Good in John Locke’s Thought”). In light of Claeys’ assessment, it is easy to observe Locke’s thoughts on the freedom of association in the constitution that he wrote for the Carolina Colony in 1669. For example, Article 103 of this document states that “no person whatsoever shall speak anything in their religious assembly irreverently or seditiously of the government or governors, or of state matters” (Locke, “The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina: March 1, 1669” ). This reveals a reluctance on Locke’s part to allow any association of citizens to gather in opposition of the established government, perhaps because he understands the potential threat that this could pose to political society. His position on the freedom of association is made all the more clear in his 108th Article, which stipulates that “assemblies, upon what presence soever of religion, not observing and performing the above said rules, shall not be esteemed as churches, but unlawful meetings, and be punished as other riots” (Locke, “The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina: March 1, 1669” ). The “above said rules” to which Locke refers consist mostly of provisions to ensure free membership and movement between various religious establishments, but the classification of non compliant assemblies as “unlawful” or “riots” implies a Locke’s hesitation to allow totally free and unrestricted assembly.

Subsequent political theorists built upon Locke’s theory of rights and liberties, and a number of them elected to deal with the right to freedom of association more directly. The United States Constitution, much of which rests upon Lockean political theory, is one of the first documents to directly address freedom of assembly in its text. Perhaps the buildup to the American Revolution, in which groups like the Sons of Liberty and the Stamp Act Congress were outlawed and broken up by the British government, affected the Constitutional Convention’s decision to include assembly in the Bill of Rights. The Constitution’s First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances” (The Constitution of the United States of America). The Constitutional Convention, led by prominent statesman James Madison, used the word peaceably to signal that citizens were not entitled to the complete freedom of assembly if such activity could potentially generate violence or unrest (Law Library of Congress, “The Right to Peaceable Assembly”). The Cornell Law Review writes that this guarantee gradually came to protect citizens’ rights to participate in organizations that regularly utilize their members’ constitutional rights to freely assemble and petition the government. It states that over time, “Supreme Court decisions gradually determined that “the right of association is derivative from the First Amendment guarantees of speech, assembly, and petition” (Legal Information Institute, “Right of Association”). While Madison and his colleagues did not directly address freedom of association in the Constitution’s text, they did lay the groundwork for its realization years later.

French diplomat Alexis De Tocqueville traveled to the United States in the early 1800s in order to observe the country, and in 1835 he published his findings in his first volume of Democracy in America. In this work the Frenchman sung praise for the American system of government, applauding it for spreading liberty and freedom within its borders. However, even de Tocqueville understood the danger inherent in the guarantee of totally unrestrained freedom of association. Linking the freedom of association to such constitutional rights as the freedom of petition and freedom of the press, he writes that “it cannot be denied that the unrestrained liberty of association for political purposes is the privilege which a people is longest in learning how to exercise. If it does not throw the nation into anarchy, it perpetually augments the chances of that calamity” (De Tocqueville, Democracy in America). De Tocqueville goes on to explain that American association is generally peaceful because citizens tend only to use it to oppose political groups, but he nevertheless must address the danger inherent in the guarantee of unrestricted freedom of association. Even in what he sees as a most ideal form of government, the Frenchman recognizes the risks inherent in unrestricted freedom when it comes to assembly and association.

Decades later, John Stuart Mill came to a similar conclusion in his 1859 work, On Liberty. Mill was familiar with the American system of government, as evidenced by his mentions of American religious toleration and prohibition of “fermented” drinks, so it is possible that his thinking was influenced in some way by Madison’s work on the Constitution (Mill, “On Liberty”). In his work, Mill advances the theory that humans band together solely for the purpose of protection, and that therefore we can never have the authority to restrain others’ liberty. However, he notes that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (Mill, “On Liberty”). Later on, he explicitly asserts that “freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived” (Mill, “On Liberty”). Clearly, Mill is aware of the dangers implicit in the creation of total freedom of assembly, and he agrees with the Constitutional Convention that this important right can permissibly be subject to certain regulations and limitations.

The political and philosophical debate over freedom and association and its acceptable limitations evolved dramatically in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Writing just over a century after Mill, First Amendment scholar Thomas Emerson produced an article entitled “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,” in which he addresses a number of issues relating to freedom of association by assessing court precedents and the lessons of history. Like the documents from Mill and Madison, Emerson’s article holds that complete freedom of association would be detrimental to society. Using the example of an organization whose sole aim is to perpetrate a successful bank robbery, Emerson points out that “some types of association need, and are entitled to, greater protection than others” (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,”). He goes on to state that “the legal doctrine that protects associational rights must be able to distinguish between them and to afford the required measure of protection in each case” (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression”). Taking into account twentieth-century court decisions, Emerson explains that “the Supreme Court, in recognizing an independent "right of association," has undertaken to give that right constitutional protection primarily through application of a balancing test” (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression”).

This balancing test is incredibly important in determining the constitutionality of certain restrictions on citizens’ association because it must avoid violating citizens’ unequivocal right to free expression while still preventing the perpetration of unlawful action (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,”). The case of NAACP v. Alabama is one case in which the Supreme Court attempted to find this balance. This instance in which the NAACP argued that the state of Alabama could not constitutionally require the organization to disclose a list of its members, proved incredibly important to our modern understanding of the right to association. Writing the majority opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan II explained that “it is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (Franklin, “NAACP v. Alabama”). This differed from other contemporary cases, such as New York ex. rel Bryant v. Zimmerman, in which the Supreme Court had ruled in favor of the state’s ability to restrict association related to the Ku Klux Klan. The difference, Harlan explained, was that unlike the KKK, the NAACP did not present a threat to society. For this reason, the organization and the members involved were protected under the First Amendment’s protection of citizens’ freedom to peaceably assemble (Franklin, “NAACP v. Alabama”). Harlan, like Madison, Locke, and Mill, understood the importance of restricting free association in order to preserve the peace in society.

The right to free association is famously difficult to address because the general consensus is that association should not be completely free. For that reason, political theorists and philosophers have gone to great lengths over the centuries to define exactly when and why free association should be limited or left alone. The general consensus is that assembly and association are detrimental to society when they lead to violence or unrest, but as with other rights it is difficult for theorists to decide exactly what criteria turn a given gathering from an expression of free assembly into a potential threat to civil society.

“John Locke, Two Treatises ( 1689) - Online Library of Liberty,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/john-locke-two-treatises- 1689.

Locke, John, “A Letter Concerning Toleration,” trans. William Pope, 1689, accessed at https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/toleration.pdf, 9.

Eric R. Claeys, “The Private Society and the Liberal Public Good in John Locke's Thought,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2007, https://doi.org/10. 2139/ ssrn.1027965.

“Constitution of the United States of America,” Bill of Rights Institute, October 3, 2019, https://billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/constitution/?utm_source=GOOGLE. 5

“Right to Peaceful Assembly” (Law Library of Congress, 2014) , https://www.loc.gov/law/help/peaceful-assembly/right-to-peaceful-assembly.pdf.

John Stuart Mill, “Mill, ‘On Liberty,’” in The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill: On Liberty, ed. Jonathan Reiley (New York, NY: Routledge, 1998) , 45.

Thomas I. Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,” The Yale Law Journal 74, no. 1 ( 1964) : p. 1, https://doi.org/10. 2307/ 794804
Freedom of Association/Limitations - Restrictions/Private curtailmentLimitations - RestrictionsPhilosophers and political theorists generally agree that it is sometimes necessary to curtail free association, but this agreement does not answer questions of which forms assembly and association can permissibly be restricted, how they should be limited, or who should control their regulation. It often falls to the government to decide when to step in during times of popular uprising or violent protest, but history also shows a number of instances in which private actors have curtailed citizens’ right to free association or assembly.

The most common way for private actors can curtail free association is by prohibiting assembly and demonstration on their privately-owned property. In U.S. law, there exists a precedent that protects citizens’ right to free association on public property precisely because the right is not guaranteed when it is practiced on private property. This doctrine was first introduced in 1936, when Jersey City mayor Frank Hague issued an ordinance prohibiting members of the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) from gathering in a public space and distributing “communist” literature (Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,”). The CIO, with the help of the American Civil Liberties Union, successfully argued that the New Jersey ordinance was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Hague appealed to the Supreme Court, which upheld the original decision and struck the ordinance down (Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,”). Justice Owen Roberts justified the decision for Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization by likening public spaces such as streets and parks to public forums, in which the free flow of ideas and discourse must be protected under the First Amendment. He made this ruling because he recognized that private actors retained the right to curtail citizens’ right to association when that association occurred on private property. In order to preserve the right to peaceable assembly, the Court’s decision set the precedent for the “public forum” doctrine, which continues to protect the right to association in public spaces to this day (Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,”). Writing for The First Amendment Encyclopedia, David Hudson writes that “in the Court’s forum-based approach, the government can impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in all three categories of property, but has limited ability to impose content-based restrictions on traditional or designated public forums” (Hudson, “Public Forum Doctrine - The First Amendment Encyclopedia,”). The doctrine specifically aims to protect peaceful association on public property because the right is not guaranteed when assembly occurs on private property.

One example of a private actor using its ownership of property to curtail free association can be observed in the 1994 case of Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. In this case, the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida filed a suit against anti-abortion protestors who had been blocking entrances to the building, harrassing abortion patients, and demonstrating outside of staff members’ homes (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). A court order was issued, ordering protestors to refrain from trespassing on Center property, blocking its entrances, and abusing staff and patients. When the court order was violated, the “the court created a 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveways (including the public sidewalk) within which all antiabortion speech was banned. It also prohibited excessive noise and images that patients could see or hear during surgery and recovery” (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). The Supreme Court later upheld the buffer zone rules, but struck down the prohibition of protestors’ practice of showing images to clients. It also ruled that the Florida court’s 300-foot buffer zone that prohibited protestors from approaching clients and staff at the Center and at their homes was too restrictive of First Amendment rights (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). The ruling, according to Chief Justice Rhenquist, sought to preserve protestors’ right to association and assembly while still protecting the patients and clients from intimidation and abuse (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). It also serves as a reminder that private citizens still reserve the right to curtail free association if said association makes them feel unsafe or threatened.

Both the Madsen and Hague cases illustrate that judges, in particular, have immense power to determine the breadth of citizens’ right to freedom of association as guaranteed in the First Amendment. For example, in the case of Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court determined that free expression in the form of a rock concert in New York’s Central Park could be subject to volume regulations under the First Amendment (O'Neill, “Time, Place and Manner Restrictions”). This decision, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, led to the creation of a test to determine whether assembly and expression could be restricted. The test asks whether the regulation is “content neutral,” whether it is “narrowly tailored” to fit a specific governmental interest, and whether it still provides ample opportunity for the message to be communicated (O'Neill, “Time, Place and Manner Restrictions”). If a regulation passes all three prongs of this test, then it can legally restrict or control the time, place, or manner in which assemblies like protests are carried out. The Law Library of Congress writes that since Kennedy’s decision, “the Supreme Court has held that it is constitutionally permissible for the government to require that a permit for an assembly be obtained in advance” (“Right to Peaceful Assembly: United States - Law Library of Congress”). Kennedy’s ruling also allows the government to “make special regulations that impose additional requirements for assemblies that take place near major public events” (“Right to Peaceful Assembly: United States - Law Library of Congress”). This legal doctrine has significantly shaped the way in which state and federal governments treat freedom of association and the right to peaceable assembly. While the Supreme Court can hardly be considered a private actor, Justices like Kennedy rely on personal study and private experience to create policy that affects American freedom of association as a whole. Citizens within a political society have the right to free association as long as it is peaceable and does not infringe upon others’ rights or liberties. This principle lends itself to a number of complexities because its parameters for free association are so vague, but over the past few centuries the United States has worked to define when and how private actors can curtail others’ right to free association. The result is that the Supreme Court, and the justices that make it up, have set out precedents that test whether certain forms of association are constitutional and which ones can justifiably be restricted. The definition of public spaces as areas of free association and creation of buffer zones for private properties represent significant steps forward in this effort.

References:

Lynne Chandler Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,” Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, accessed June 16, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/619/hague-v-committee-for-industrial-organization.

David L Hudson, “Public Forum Doctrine - The First Amendment Encyclopedia,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/824/public-forum-doctrine.

“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. - The First ...,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/10/madsen-v-women-s-health-center-inc.

Kevin Francis O'Neill, “Time, Place and Manner Restrictions,” Time, Place and Manner Restrictions, accessed June 17, 2020, https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1023/time-place-and-manner-restrictions.

“Right to Peaceful Assembly: United States - Law Library of Congress,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/peaceful-assembly/us.php.
Freedom of Association/Limitations - Restrictions/Specific limitationsLimitations - RestrictionsThe right to freedom of association is not an absolute right because it is subject to certain limitations. Political thinkers and legal experts generally agree that assembly and association can be justifiably restricted if it conflicts with other citizens’ security, liberty, or property. Another case in which the right is subject to certain limitations is in a case of emergency or long-run disaster. Recent history shows a number of instances in which the U.S. government has justified the restriction of the right to free association during times of war and natural disaster. Interestingly, it did not effectively curtail citizens’ right to free association during the recent COVID-19 pandemic. Freedom of association most often restricted in the event of war. In his work, “The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly,” Washington University scholar John D. Inazu briefly explores the effect that World War I had on citizens’ right to gather and discuss the country’s affairs. He writes that during the late World War I years, “the freedom of assembly was constrained by shortsighted legislation like the Espionage Act of 1917 (and its 1918 amendments) and the Immigration Act of 1918, and the Justice Department’s infamous Palmer Raids in 1920” (Inazu, “The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly”). William Riggs of the First Amendment Encyclopedia similarly notes that the Vietnam War era, in particular, saw drastic reductions in Americans’ rights to peaceable assembly and association. He writes that “the war in Vietnam quickly became the focus of major protests that resulted in increased government attempts to limit First Amendment protections. These efforts mostly dealt with the right to assemble and what constituted appropriate free speech criticism of the war” (“Vietnam War
Freedom of Association/Philosophical Origins/TheoriesPhilosophical OriginsIn Roberts v. US Jaycees, the Supreme Court noted that US jurisprudence has created two constitutionally protected categories of association: expressive (e.g. interest groups and political parties) and intimate (e.g. friends and family). There is little originalism present in key expressive-association rulings. NAACP v. Alabama ( 1959) , the first case where the Supreme Court held that a right to expressive association exists, did not draw on originalism. There is also little originalism present in the intimate-association jurisprudence, though it has been influenced by long-standing common-law ideas.

The Supreme court established the idea of intimate association in Roberts, holding that it “has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State.” The majority opinion cites Meyers v. Nebraska ( 1923) , a case that helped establish a right to make individual educational choices. The opinion cites old ideas going beyond education, stating that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to “marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Though it does not embrace originalism, the ruling does invoke historical common-law understandings that may have existed when the Constitution was written.

As Richard Boyd argues in “The Madisonian Paradox of Free Association,” America’s founders explicitly chose not to include free association in the Bill of Rights. James Madison, the primary author of the Bill of Rights, feared the influence of factions, which private associations furthered. Boyd writes that Madison viewed association as a “second-order” right (Boyd 2008, 258), whose existence is tolerable because institutions can mitigate its worst effects (247). The following passage from “Federalist No. 10” illustrates his attitude toward factions arising from free association: It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. Boyd suggests several possible reasons why Madison may not have enumerated the right to associate. It is possible that he saw it as implied by other First-Amendment rights, such as free assembly. It also may have been seen as less important or vulnerable than other rights, and Madison may have seen it as the type of auxiliary right protected by the Ninth Amendment. Finally, the right’s exclusion may have been because the founders were too skeptical of it for its inclusion (258).

Despite modern views of assembly as related to association, at the time of America’s founding, it would have been better understood as related to the right to petition. According to Congress’s online annotated Constitution, the assembly clause meant that the people have a right to assemble in order to petition the government. The site says that assembly was initially seen as a “subordinate and instrumental” right. The state constitutions mentioned in my original piece on freedom of association should be interpreted the same way. In fact, this is even more clear in these state constitutions than in the national one. The state constitutions surround the right to assemble with expressly political language, such as the right to petition and advocacy for the “common good,” while the First Amendment’s guarantees are political, but not entirely political (it protects religion, and protected speech and press are often, but not always, political).

The opinion in NAACP v. Alabama derives freedom of expressive association from a combination of speech, assembly, and the Fourteenth Amendment, not merely freedom of assembly. It states that, “Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”

References:

NAACP v. Alabama: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/357/449

Meyer v. Nebraska: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/262/390

Richard Boyd, “The Madisonian Paradox of Freedom of Association”: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/madisonian-parad ox-of-freedom-of-association/ABDB2F9951FD811C0AC84F76327EBACC

List of key expressive association rulings: https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/encyclopedia/case/142/expressive-association

Congress Annotated Constitution: (“Freedom of Assembly and Petition”)https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1_4_1/#:~:text=First%20Amendm ent%3A,for%20a%20redress%20of%20grievances.
Freedom of Association/Threatening to governmentLimitations - RestrictionsFreedom of association is a valuable right that encompasses the relationships, organizations, and environments in which a public can manifest other freedoms, such as expression, speech, and assembly. As Tom Kahn, a civil rights activist stated, “Freedom of expression without freedom of association is the right to speak freely in the wilderness” (qtd. in Democracy Web). As such, this freedom grants people power and influence in the government and society around them. In both democratic and authoritarian regimes, government authorities have a variety of reasons why they might restrict freedom of association, including being threatened by the right.


Freedom of association is not solely limited to political associations; it encompasses intimate associations - such as familial, romantic, and other personal relations - as well as collective associations which are any group of people that associate for a common purpose (Brownlee, Kimberly, and Jenkins, 2019). The level that a government is threatened by freedom of association depends on the nature of the government, the purpose and goals of the association, the resources of the association, and other environmental factors. Intimate associations can be regulated for a variety of possible reasons, including social engineering, paternalism, and moralism, though these could be considered more proactive (to promote an agenda) rather than reactive (to a perceived threat) (Alexander, 2008, 16-19). Collective associations, on the other hand, can threaten government authorities especially when the goals or beliefs of the association diverge from those of the ruling elite. Lambda, an LGBTQ+ organization in Mozambique, has been denied official registration with the state on the grounds that such organizations “are contrary to the moral, social, and economic order of the country and offend the rights of others or the public good” (qtd. in Amnesty International, 2024, 8). Even though the Constitutional Council of Mozambique declared this clause - which is found in Mozambique’s Law on Associations - as unconstitutional, Lambda was still denied legal recognition “as of November 2023, even though they fulfilled all substantive and formal requirements outlined in the Law No. 8/91, which governs the right of association” (Amnesty International, 2024, 8).


As Larry Alexander stated in the Cambridge University Press, “One of the most common bases for association and non-association has been that of beliefs. Those who share certain beliefs associate with one another in order to discuss, strengthen, and promote such shared beliefs” (Alexander, 2008, 6). If these beliefs do not align with those of the state, the state may seek to regulate freedom of association so as to not spread the opposing beliefs further. This is especially relevant for authoritarian regimes that are known to repress dissenting ideologies. The 2023 individual country scores of the Freedom of Association Index (FAI) correlate with those of the Democracy Index (DI), with countries that scored high on the DI also scored high on the FAI, and those that scored lower on the DIx scored lower on the FAI. China, one of the lowest-scoring states for example, scored a 2.1 (on a scale of 0-10 with 10 the most democratic) on the DI and a .04 (on a scale of 0-1 with 1 the most free) on the FAI. Conversely, Denmark, a more democratic country (with a DI score of 9.3) scored a .93 on the FAI (Our World in Data). It is reasonable to conclude that authoritarian regimes consider the right to associate as threatening to their control over the state and the public.


The presence of a public sphere, “a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed” is only possible with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association (Habermas, 1964, 49). The way in which authoritarian regimes operate, “in general, [marshaling] decision making power into an individual or family, the military, or at the highest ranks of a powerful organization such as a party-state,” cause public association and therefore the possibility of widespread difference to put the control of the regime in danger, leading to more extreme restrictions on the ability to associate (Hasmath, 2023, 4). The public sphere is powerful, and authoritarian states take care to prevent association in the public sphere from threatening their power. However, Hasmath proceeded to argue that the public sphere can be effective and present in authoritarian regimes when associations operate tactically to circumvent government repression. Regimes that rely on the strict adherence to national identity often find cultural, ethnic, and religious associations (formal and informal, political and nonpolitical) that differ from that promoted by the state as threatening. In the Xinjiang region of China, the state represses cultural gatherings among the Uyghur Muslim population “to prevent what they perceive as the threat of terroristic activities” (Brownlee, Kimberly, and Jenkins, 2019). The US Department of State additionally reported that,


“Labor laws in China do not allow for freedom of association, which is a core labor standard. Independent unions are illegal in China and employers are under no obligation to bargain with workers in good faith…In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, state-sponsored forced labor remains a significant part of the CCP’s campaign of repression against Uyghurs and members of other Muslim minority groups.”


While the right to association is often more frequently perceived as threatening to authoritarian regimes and with higher perceived consequences, it has throughout history been seen in democratic states as threatening as well. In the United States “in the 1950s and 1960s, the Court adjudicated many cases in which the government asked U.S. citizens to reveal or disavow their actual or perceived affiliations with the Communist Party” (Cornell Law School). The United States government during the Red Scare was notorious for going after individuals with alleged associations with the Communist Party, enacting legislation that would regulate association in the name of protecting democracy. However, the 1951 US Supreme Court case of Dennis v. United States concurred “that there was a distinction between the mere teaching of communist philosophies and active advocacy of those ideas. Such advocacy created a ‘clear and present danger’ that threatened the government” (Oyez). The case decision maintained that it would be constitutional for the United States to restrict association if it was perceived as a clear and present danger. This decision was not overturned in the 1969 Brandenburg v. Ohio case, even though Dennis upheld its accordant restriction to free association and Brandenburg overturned its accordant restriction. In Brandenburg, the Court noted that the role of “the courts in applying the clear and present danger test were simply to determine whether, on balance, the ‘gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.’ In fact, in Brandenburg, the Court cited Dennis as good law,” though scholars are still divided on whether the Brandenburg and Dennis decisions are in conflict and whether Brandenburg de facto discounted Dennis (Walker, 2009).


Unless there is a clear and present danger, the government must respect citizens’ right to associate freely as decided in the 1958 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) v. Alabama Supreme Court case. It was decided that the state of Alabama “obtaining the names of the Association's membership would likely interfere with the free association of its members, so the state's interest in obtaining the records was superseded by the constitutional rights of the petitioners” (Oyez). It should be noted that the fact that Alabama sought to regulate freedom of association by compelling the NAACP to release its membership list in the first place points to it perceiving the right as a threat. John Patterson, the attorney who filed the original lawsuit against the NAACP, “claimed that the organization had harmed the citizens of Alabama by promoting, among other things, the Montgomery Bus Boycott and the admission of Autherine Lucy to the University of Alabama. Patterson believed that the resulting negative publicity that accompanied these events in the national media had damaged the state's reputation” causing the need to disclose members’ identities (Brown, 2008).


References:


Alexander, Larry. 2008. “What is Freedom of Association, and What is its Denial?” Social Philosophy and Policy, 25 no. 2. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052508080163


Amnesty International. 2024. “Violations of rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly based on sexual orientation, gender identity and/or expression: Submission to the UN Independent Expert on sexual orientation and gender identity.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ior40/7655/2024/en/


Brown, Steven. 2008. “NAACP v. Alabama.” Encyclopedia of Alabama. Updated 2024. https://encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/naacp-v-alabama/


Brownlee, Kimberly, and David Jenkins. 2019. “Freedom of Association.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freedom-association/


Cornell Law School. N.d. “Amdt1.8.1: Overview of Freedom of Association.” Legal Information Institute. Accessed June 14, 2024. https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/overview-of-freedom-of-association


Democracy Web. n.d. “Freedom of Association: Essential Principles.” Accessed June 14, 2024. https://www.democracyweb.org/node/84


Emerson, Thomas. 1964. “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression.” The Yale Law Journal 74, no. 1. https://doi.org/10.2307/794804


Habermas, Jurgen, Sara Lennox, and Frank Lennox. 1974. “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964).” New German Critique, no. 3, pp. 49-55. https://doi.org/10.2307/487737


Hasmath, Reza. 2023. “Discourse, Deliberation and Difference in an Authoritarian Public Sphere.” Journal of Deliberative Democracy, 18 no. 2. https://doi.org/10.16997/jdd.1182


Our World in Data. 2023. “Democracy Index, 2023.” https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/democracy-index-eiu


Our World in Data. 2023. “Freedom of Association Index, 2023.” https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/freedom-of-association-index


Oyez. n.d. “Dennis v. United States.” Accessed June 14, 2024. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/341us494


Oyez. n.d. “National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.” Accessed June 14, 2024. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1957/91


US Department of State. n.d. “China’s Disregard for Human Rights.” Accessed June 17, 2024. https://2017-2021.state.gov/chinas-disregard-for-human-rights/


Walker, James. 2009. “Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969).” Free Speech Center at Middle Tennessee State University. https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/brandenburg-v-ohio/
Freedom of Association/TraditionsPhilosophical OriginsWhile freedom of association is a fundamental human right today, it has not always been recognized as such. Furthermore, several philosophers stretching from the Enlightenment period to the 20th century have argued for restrictions to be placed on freedom of association, rendering it a conditional right. Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, and Carl Schmitt are four such philosophers who, despite being products of varying centuries, disputed the classification of freedom of association as a fundamental and unconditional right in their respective social, political, and economic contexts.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)

Hobbes viewed freedom of association as an important social right, but not as a fundamental or unconditional one. Freedom of association was subject to political authority under the agreement that both the citizens and authority entered into to maintain societal and political order. This agreement exists to counter the natural state of human life which is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes). By giving up some freedom and liberty in exchange for order, protection, and security from the sovereign or authority, the natural state of humanity can be counteracted (Lloyd). Hobbes emphasized that while individuals are allowed to form relationships and create associations with others, these groups are ultimately subordinated to the sovereign, who can dissolve associations for the good of society to maintain peace and order.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778)

Rousseau’s views on freedom of association are heavily centered on his ideal of a social contract. This is a relationship that exists between the individual and the state in which the individual experiences no net loss of freedom, but rather exchanges some of his natural freedom for civil freedom (Bertram). In his seminal work The Social Contract, Rousseau explains this exchange by emphasizing that man should promote the common good of society over his own interests: “Each citizen would then be perfectly independent of all the rest, and at the same time very dependent on the city; which is brought about always by the same means, as the strength of the State can alone secure the liberty of its members.” (Rousseau, 24). The main issue with unconditional freedom of association came from his claim that “the required degree of social cohesion could not, in practice, be achieved merely through appeal to rational self-interest” (Chappell). This is not to say that Rousseau believed in stamping out individuality in its entirety, just that devotion to a stable political and societal status quo should be the main priority of civilized societies.

Karl Marx (1818-1883)

Marx held a more complex view of freedom of association than other political philosophers. His philosophy was rooted in a socially mediated economic structure that would then, in turn, impact a society's political and social practices—he believed in abolishing private ownership of production (capitalism) and instead establishing collective ownership (socialism or communism). He believed that capitalist systems limit and distort freedom of association because of their economically exploitative and class-based structures; relationships in capitalist societies are never between “individuals,” but rather between “workers and capitalist, between farmer and landlord” (Marx, 44). Socialist or communist political and societal structures would allow freedom of association because individuals could unite freely based on their interests and needs (Jian-xing, 351).

Carl Schmitt (1888-1985)

Schmitt was a prominent member of the Nazi party, and his views on freedom of association are very much influenced by his “anti-democratic and anti-liberal” political beliefs (Frye, 818). In a similar approach to Hobbes, Schmitt believed that freedom of association is an important but highly conditional right that is subject to a central authority. If associations prove to be a threat to the central authority or order of society, the authority must dissolve them (Vinx). He stipulates that the decisions of the authority should not be influenced by external morals, but rather solely based on political reasoning (Vinx). His parameters on freedom of association raise concerns over the potential to justify authoritarianism and the abuse of democratic principles.


REFERENCES

Bertram, Christopher, "Jean Jacques Rousseau", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/rousseau/>.

Chappell, Richard. “Rousseau and Freedom.” Philosophy, et cetera, April 27, 2005. https://www.philosophyetc.net/2005/04/rousseau-and-freedom.html.

Frye, Charles E. “Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political.” The Journal of Politics 28, no. 4 (1966): 818–30. https://doi.org/10.2307/2127676.

Hobbes, Thomas. “The Project Gutenberg eBook of Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes.” Edited by Edward White and David Widger. The Project Gutenberg eBook of Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes, March 27, 2021. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm.

Jian-xing, Y., Jun-guo, C. A reconsideration of Marx’s idea of “association of free individuals”. J. Zhejiang Univ.-Sci. 2, 348–355 (2001). https://doi-org.uc.idm.oclc.org/10.1007/BF02839474

Lloyd, Sharon A. and Susanne Sreedhar, "Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2022/entries/hobbes-moral/>.

Marx, Karl. Edited by Matthew Carmody. The Poverty of Philosophy, 2009. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/poverty-philosophy/.

Rousseau, Jean-Jaques. Translated by G.D.H/ Cole. The Social Contract or Principles of Political Right. Accessed July 13, 2023. https://discoversocialsciences.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Rousseau-Social-Contract.pdf.

Sowell, Thomas. “Karl Marx and the Freedom of the Individual.” Ethics 73, no. 2 (1963): 119–25. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2379553.

Vinx, Lars, "Carl Schmitt", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/schmitt/>.

Williams, Garrath. “Thomas Hobbes: Moral and Political Philosophy.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed July 11, 2023. https://iep.utm.edu/hobmoral/.
Freedom of Expression/Conflicts with other Rights/FederalismConflicts with other RightsThe principles of federalism play an interesting role in the manner in which the right to freedom of expression is exercised. Historically, the founding fathers were divided on whether there should even be a bill of rights; the Constitutional Convention of 1787 did not include an explication of rights in the writing of the Constitution (Hail, 2020). The Bill of Rights was written as an afterthought, and as political scientist James Burnham observed, “ ‘These rights, in short, are limits, not powers’ (p. 87). Thus the constitutional theory of the founders was premised upon limitations to the powers of the federal government as reflected in the Bill of Rights” (Hail, 2020). Eventually, with the growth of the Union over the next 200 years, state constitutions started to include explications of the protected rights within their states, and as a result, some states are more protective over individual rights than the federal government itself: “For example, at the national level the right to privacy is derived from implications in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and 14th Amendments. By contrast, half the states have enumerated constitutionally or by statute an explicit, and typically broader, right to privacy. Federalism gives the states latitude to experiment with policy areas under the First Amendment that it does not give to the national government, even though the latter retains an important role.” (Hail, 2020).

Federalism scholar Daniel J. Elazar observed that the states participate in policy experimentation and also provide more legal protection in addressing the unique and specific local/regional needs (Hail, 2020). However, in terms of actual exercise of the freedom of expression in particular, and related conflicting law between that of state and federal, “Federal speech laws survive more than half the time, state laws survive only a quarter of the time, and local laws almost always fail. This free speech federalism is likely attributable to some combination of federal courts deferring to federal lawmakers and the relative poor quality of law- making at the lower levels of government.” (Winkler 187, 2009).

The federal government holds more power regarding cases involving freedom of expression, often bending both federal and state law to its will, oftentimes going out of its way to justify federal laws while heavily scrutinizing already narrow state laws. In the 1999 case of United States v. McCorkle, a federal court declined to identify the federal government’s reasoning for compelling secrecy regarding an order sealing transcripts of in camera proceedings sought by a newspaper. Another court deemed that the newspaper who was seeking access to the transcripts had failed at its job to offer effective alternatives to complete closure, “yet, under strict scrutiny the burden of showing no less-restrictive alternatives belongs to the government, not the challenger. Moreover, the newspaper had no information about what the subject of the bench conferences was and thus could not reasonably be expected to offer suitable alternatives to closure” (Winkler 172, 2009). This case saw federal right-of-access restrictions upheld solely because courts supposedly did not follow the traditional requirements of the strict scrutiny standard.

Another case, contrastingly, shows the federal courts doing everything they could to invalidate the state restrictions. In the 1993 case of Lind v. Grimmer, a federal court “invalidated the application of a state law denying media access to pending complaints filed with the state campaign-finance spending commission. The court reasoned that the government interest in encouraging people to run for office was not protected by the restriction because complainants and others remained free to air their charges informally to the public. Yet, the same could be said about any restriction on the right of access” (Winkler 172-173, 2009).

Since the 1965 case of Bond v. Floyd, legislators, like any other citizen, are protected under the free expression embodied in the First Amendment. After being elected to the Georgia House of Representatives, Julian Bond, who was an African-American, was refused his seat due to anti-Vietnam war statements he made. Some House members challenged that his statements aided the US’s enemies and violated his mandatory oath to support the Constitution and therefore, he was not permitted to a seat in the House (Hudson Jr., 2009). The Court ruled in favor of Bond due to his fundamental rights to freedom of expression and speech because: “Free expression in the legislature not only serves the deliberative process and allows voters to choose their representatives according to their expressed beliefs and opinions, it also reinforces the constitutional safeguards of federalism and the separation of powers. As an expressive act that registers the will, preference, and opinion of a legislator, voting performs a unique communicative function. It expresses loyalty or dissension, agreement or abstention. It can also inform voters of a legislator's position on matters of public concern. Not only is legislative voting expressive, it is also representative and political, and therefore critical to the proper functioning of participatory democracy” (Scherr 257, 1991).

From the provided evidence, federalism can serve to protect the right to freedom of expression, but oftentimes, it allows for the federal government to somewhat bully state courts into the decisions that best suit them at the time.

References:

Federalism, Michael W. Hail, The First Amendment Encyclopedia, Free Speech Center at Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro.

Freedom and Federalism: The First Amendment’s Protection of Legislative Voting, Steven N. Scherr, 257, The Yale Law Journal, 1991 New Haven.

Hudson: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1597/free-speech-during-wartime#:~:text=Freedo

Free Speech Federalism, Adam Winkler, 172-173, 187, Michigan Law Review, 2009 Ann Arbor.
Freedom of Expression/Conflicts with other Rights/Other fundamentalConflicts with other RightsRights to privacy may in some cases conflict with the right to free expression. For instance, according to Duke University Law Professor George Christie, there are cases in Europe in which speech pertaining to information not already known by the public can be successfully argued to be a violation of privacy, and thus illegal (Christie). However, Christie argues that this argument is more difficult to make in the United States, as freedom of expression is the “preferred value” over privacy in American jurisprudence. This preferred value is exhibited in even the most extreme cases, such as Snyder v. Phelps, where the court upheld the rights of the Westboro Baptist Church to protest adjacent to the funeral of a Marine who had been killed in Iraq (Christie).

As explained by Christie, while the Snyder v. Phelps case did strongly affirm the right to free speech, an additional conflicting right emerged from Justice Alito’s dissent. Alito asserted that the protests could violate the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, as the disturbing language of the church protests may have caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress. Through this, Alito affirms that individuals have a legal right to not be afflicted by speech that results in emotional distress, contradicting the right to free expression.

Additionally, rights to public safety may contradict rights to free expression. This is largely demonstrated by international law, which upholds restrictions on free speech when they are intended to prevent defamation, protect national security, and uphold public health (Govindu). If speech comes into conflict with any of these areas, it is generally accepted that it can be curtailed by the government. In this way, the rights of others to public safety can overpower the right to individual expression.

In the United States, the Schenck v. United States and subsequent Brandenburg v. Ohio rulings outline the ways in which free speech can be limited in the name of public safety. In Schenck, the court upheld that speech was not constitutionally protected if it will “create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent” (Cornell Law School). The guidelines for restricting speech were then further clarified in Brandenburg, which asserted that speech could be prohibited if it was “"directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Exhibited by these two cases, the public has a right to be protected from dangerous speech. Therefore, through the protection of public safety, the right to free expression is contradicted.

References:

Christie, George. "Private: The Conflict between Freedom of Speech and Other Rights and Values." ACS Expert Forum (2011). https://www.acslaw.org/?post_type=acsblog&p=7987

"Freedom of Speech: Historical Background." Cornell Law School. Legal Information Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/freedom-of-speech-historical-background

Govindu, V. “CONTRADICTIONS IN FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION.” The Indian Journal of Political Science 72, no. 3 (2011): 641–50.
Freedom of Expression/Conflicts with other Rights/PositionConflicts with other RightsThe freedom of expression is essential to the development and upholding of an individual’s inherent sense of self and personal dignity, and as a result, the protection of this right is necessary to the protection of society as a whole (Civic 118-119, 1997). After the court ruling of Whitney v. California, which deemed that the freedom of expression is not an absolute right, Justice Brandeis “declared free expression to be the means to attain the truth, and the truth to be at the foundation of liberty and happiness” (Civic 120, 1997).The fundamental nature of this right is protected in the Preambles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and both assert human dignity as the foundation for all other rights protected in the documents, further asserting that human dignity is the foundation of all human rights (Civic 134, 1997).

A survey carried out by FindLaw in 2015 found that of the 1,000 American adults asked to participate, 30% believed their freedom of speech to be the right of upmost importance from the Bill of Rights. Although all given rights are important, and it can be dangerous to start ranking rights’ power and relevance, Stephanie Rahlfs, attorney-editor with FindLaw.com states “it's interesting to note that the Founding Fathers placed freedom of speech into the First Amendment as a cornerstone of the Bill of Rights” (FindLaw, 2015). As time has passed, The Supreme Court has even professed this freedom to be “the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom;” for example, this right is what allows for the fundamental right to vote, the right which powers democracy, to be constitutionally protected (ACLU 2020). Although the right to freedom of expression falls under a small category of rights with “preferred position,” (a concept which was inspired by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s opinion in the 1919 case of Schenck v. United States, which ultimately recognized the hierarchal primacy of the First Amendment and the rights protected under it), the right has been tested many times throughout American history (Pacelle Jr.). For example, during times of compromised national security such as WWI, First Amendment rights have been significantly compromised, with some citizens having been censored, fined, and jailed: “It was during WWI -- hardly ancient history -- that a person could be jailed just for giving out anti-war leaflets” (ACLU, 2020). From this example, we see that although freedom of expression ranks high on the list of protected rights, it does not outweigh the importance of the common good or the need for general societal peace.

References:

Americans Say Freedom of Speech is the Most Important Constitutional Right, According to FindLaw.com Survey for Law Day, May 1, PR Newswire Association LLC, 2015 New York.

Freedom of Expression, American Civil Liberties Union, 2020 New York.

The Right to Freedom of Expression as the Principal Component of the Preservation of Personal Dignity: An Argument for International Protection Within All Nations and Across Borders, Mélanne Andromecca Civic, 118-120, 134, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, 1997 Philadelphia.
Freedom of Expression/Conflicts with other Rights/StatusConflicts with other RightsIn 1919, Justice Holmes, in his dissent regarding the case of Abrams v. United States which saw the arrest of Russian immigrants convicted for handing out anti-war leaflets in New York City, stated that “the right to freedom of expression is at the very foundation of our constitutional theory. The expression of competing ideas in the marketplace of ideas is the best means of discovering the truth.” (Civic 119, 1997). Holmes advocated that the truth is at the “foundation of pursuit of the ultimate good, and pursuit of the ultimate good is the theoretical framework of the Constitution. Therefore, through free expression and the search for the truth, the ‘purpose’ of American liberty and democracy is realized” (Civic 120, 1997).

Almost 20 years later, Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo wrote in the majority opinion of the 1937 case of Palko v. Connecticut (which questioned whether Palko’s second conviction of a crime violated the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy) the first explicit hierarchal ordering of human rights (Pacelle Jr.). The verdict of this case caused to Cardozo write that “some Bill of Rights guarantees--such as freedom of thought and speech--are fundamental, and that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause absorbed these fundamental rights and applied them to the states. Protection against double jeopardy was not a fundamental right” (Oyez 2020). Cardozo argued further that certain fundamental rights, including the rights to freedom of speech, religion, and press were the “very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty”(Pacelle Jr., 2020). The next year, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone argued in Footnote 4 of the majority opinion in United States v. Carolene Products that the Court should allow civil and individual rights to occupy a “preferred position” when dealing with economic disputes that also affect fundamental rights (Pacelle Jr., 2020).

Ultimately, from these Supreme Court rulings, one can gather that freedom of expression is a fundamental right that “also underpins most other rights and allows them to flourish. The right to speak your mind freely on important issues in society, access information and hold the powers that be to account, plays a vital role in the healthy development process of any society” (Index on Censorship, 2013). As Amartya Sen writes in his book “Development as Freedom,” access to the freedom of expression is a necessity in the development process of a society and is a developmental goal of its own. The freedom is “both the primary end and the principal means of development” (Index on Censorship, 2013).

References:

Preferred Position Doctrine, Richard L. Pacelle Jr., The First Amendment Encyclopedia, Free Speech Center at Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro.

The Right to Freedom of Expression as the Principal Component of the Preservation of Personal Dignity: An Argument for International Protection Within All Nations and Across Borders, Mélanne Andromecca Civic, 118-120, 134, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, 1997 Philadelphia.

Why is access to freedom of expression important?, Index on Censorship, 2013 United Kingdom: https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/03/why-is-access-to-freedom-of-expression-important/#:~:text=Freedom%20of%20expression%20is%20a,development%20process%20of%20any%20society.
Freedom of Expression/ContributionsHistoryThe expression of thoughts, ideas, art, entertainment, and more started long before their rights were explicitly proclaimed or protected. The oldest piece of art archeologists have discovered dates back 45,000 years (Cascone, 2021). Archeologists have found objects from 400,000 years ago that “would probably have required a level of symbolic communication close to that of language.” Hunter gatherer societies had religion of their own (Peoples et al., 263, 2016). But while humans have been expressing themselves for millennia, the protection of their expression has not always been existent – especially when the content of their expression offends or hurts another party in some way.

David Konstan cited Arnaldo Momigliano, who explained: “In the second part of the fifth century and during the greater part of the fourth century every Athenian citizen had the right to speak [in the assembly] unless he disqualified himself by certain specified crimes.’ This freedom was, according to Momigliano, ‘an Athenian fifth-century idea’, and the term that best expressed it was parrhêsi” (Konstan, 1, 2012). However, as David Konstan argues, parrhesia was less of a “right” and more of a “license to express one’s views, whatever the context.” Athenian citizens understood it as “an expectation, a feature of social life.” Konstan compares the ideal to an American citizen who proclaims “This is a free country, isn’t it?” in response to “an attempt to silence them” (Konstan, 4, 2012). However, as evidenced by the trial of Socrates, this ideal is not always protected by law when the idea contradicts beliefs espoused by the community – for Socrates’ case, questioning the gods and thus “corrupting the youth.” On this trial, some “authors affirm the view of Athens as fundamentally tolerant, with Socrates’ trial, ‘the decision to prosecute an old man for saying and doing what he had been saying and doing for so many years,’ as an aberration, perhaps brought about by ‘the wounds of recent history’”, the recent history being the violent tyranny of the Thirty set in place by the victorious Spartans after the Peloponnesian War (Saxonhouse, 102, 2006). Socrates’ teaching of Critias caused a stir in Athens, likely contributing to his prosecution more on his association rather than the content of the expression itself.

The events of the Enlightenment were essential to rights themselves and the development of expression among them. Expression can be understood as the dissemination of someone’s thoughts, thus touching on the ideals of individual ownership of self and self-agency. Locke defines freedom in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding as the “Power in any Agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other” (Locke, 303, 1690). Voltaire was one of the more prolific writers of the era, consistently firing back publicly and publishing satires. He was one of the most influential thinkers in the Enlightenment because of his willingness to challenge the status quo and stretch speech rights into the categories of the offensive, which inspired critique and dissension from others. In one of his dialogues, Voltaire said, “People say stupid and insulting things, but must speaking be forbidden? Everybody can write what they think in my country at their own risk…If it finds that you have spoken foolishly, it boos you; if seditiously, it punishes you; if wisely and nobly, it loves you and rewards you…Without the freedom to explain what one thinks, there is no freedom among men” (Voltaire, 140, 1994). The Enlightenment transformed the conception of rights for the Western world, and led ultimately to the important declarations of the rights to expression found in revolutionary documents.

The first guarantee of expression was speech in the English Bill of Rights of 1689. Among the guarantees were rights found in the American First Amendment, including “the right to petition and freedom of speech and debate” (Vile, “English Bill of Rights”, 2009). The Massachusetts Body of Liberties in 1641 and the adoption of the Virginia Bill of Rights were early American colonial legislatures’ expression of the rights of free press and speech (FIRE, “History of Free Speech”, 2022). The first 10 amendments to the Constitution of the United States include the First Amendment – that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (National Archives, “The Bill of Rights: A Transcription”, 2023). All of these are tenets of free expression – they protect the people from prosecution of the state for expression or behaviors that counter state interests. In France, similar revolutionary ideals took form in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789, which states that “No one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law” (Yale Law Library, “Declaration of the Rights of Man – 1789”, 2008). These early expressions of the law include important things – that the government cannot restrict it, but most agreed that there are circumstances where free expression does not apply.

To understand the idea of free expression, it is important to understand accepted exceptions to the expressed First Amendment right. Among these, the government has permitted laws which prohibit certain types of speech in specific times, places, and locations – such as imposing limits on the noise level of speech, capping the number of protesters who may occupy a given forum, barring early-morning or late-evening demonstrations, and restricting the size or placement of signs on government property” (O’Neill, “Time, Place, Manner Restrictions”). Any restriction of this kind has to pass “a three-prong test outlined by the Supreme Court in Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989)…The regulation must be content neutral…It must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest…It must leave open ample alternative channels for communicating the speaker’s message.” In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that New York City officials could control the volume of amplified music at rock concerts in Central Park without violating the First Amendment” (Hudson, “Ward v. Rock against Racism, 2009). The government may also restrict speech which falls into the categories of “incitement, defamation…obscenity, child pornography…and threats” (Volokh, “Permissible Restrictions on Expression”, 2023). The Supreme Court ruled on restrictions of incitement – defined as “speech [that] is forbidden because it incites, or is likely to lead to, violence or illegal actions” – in the landmark decision in Brandenburg v Ohio (Vile, “Incitement to Imminent Lawless Action”, 2009). In this case, Brandenburg, a member of the KKK, was convicted under Ohio law for statements that “alluded to the possibility of “revengeance” (sic) in the event that the federal government and Court continued to “‘suppress the white, Caucasian race.” The Supreme Court overturned the conviction and held that “advocacy could be punished only ‘where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action’” (Walker, “Brandenburg v Ohio”, 2009). The second exception to free expression is defamation. Defamation deals with two types of tort action “that encompasses false statements of fact that harm another’s reputation”: libel and slander. Libel “generally refers to written defamation, while slander refers to oral defamation, though much spoken speech that has a written transcript also falls under the rubric of libel.” In New York Times Co. v Sullivan, the New York Times published an article with factual errors about protests occurring in Alabama. In the case, “The Court reasoned that ‘erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate’ and that punishing critics of public officials for any factual errors would chill speech about matters of public interest. The high court also established what has come to be known as ‘the actual malice rule’.” This rule says that the offended party “must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the speaker made the false statement with ‘actual malice’ — defined as ‘knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not’” (Hudson, “Defamation”, 2020). The third and fourth exceptions are obscenity and child pornography. Obscenity “refers to a narrow category of pornography that violates contemporary community standards and has no serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value” (Hudson, “Obscenity and Pornography”, 2009). The test for obscenity comes from Miller v California, a case where “the Supreme Court upheld the prosecution of a California publisher for the distribution of obscene materials.” The test in this case has three parts: “‘Whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value’” (Hudson, “Miller v. California”, 2009). The last exception to the first amendment is true threats. The test case for this exception is Virginia v Black, where a statute banning crossburning was upheld in the state of Virginia. The court’s reasoning was “‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. . . . Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death’” (O’Neill, “True Threats”, 2017). These exceptions to the first amendment illustrate that the right is not absolute in American jurisprudence, and the intent and manner of the speech – as illustrated above – weighs heavily in whether or not it is permissible.

References:

“The Bill of Rights: A Transcription.” 2023. National Archives and Records Administration. National Archives and Records Administration. April 21. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript#:~:text=Amendment%20I-,Congress%20shall%20make%20no%20law%20respecting%20an%20establishment%20of%20religion,for%20a%20redress%20of%20grievances.

Cascone, Sarah. 2021. “Archaeologists Have Discovered a Pristine 45,000-Year-Old Cave Painting of a Pig That May Be the Oldest Artwork in the World.” Artnet News. December 9. https://news.artnet.com/art-world/indonesia-pig-art-oldest-painting-1937110#:~:text=Archaeologists%20believe%20they%20have%20discovered,at%20least%2045%2C500%20years%20ago. David L. Hudson, Jr. 2020. Defamation. May 14. https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1812/defamation. “Declaration of the Rights of Man - 1789.” 2008. Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library - The Avalon Project. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp.

“History of Free Speech.” 2022. The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression. https://www.thefire.org/history-free-speech#timeline--23542--2.

Hudson, David L. 2009a. “Obscenity and Pornography.” Obscenity and Pornography. https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1004/obscenity-and-pornography.

Hudson, David L. 2009b. “Ward v. Rock against Racism.” Ward v. Rock against Racism. https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/370/ward-v-rock-against-racism.

Hudson, David L. 2009c. Miller v. California. https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/401/miller-v-california.

Konstan, David. 2012. “The Two Faces of Parrhêsia*: Free Speech and Self-Expression in Ancient Greece: Journal of the Australian Society for Classical Studies.” Proquest. Antichton. https://www.proquest.com/docview/1459226473?parentSessionId=2riArMLT%2B2G%2FrXHB8pHqr%2B%2FkAK%2FBkJYL8QsEw3yaHAg%3D&pq-origsite=primo&accountid=6167.

Locke, John. 1690. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. PinkMonkey. https://pinkmonkey.com/dl/library1/book1284.pdf.

O’Neill, Kevin Francis. 2009. “Incitement to Imminent Lawless Action.” Incitement to Imminent Lawless Action. https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/970/incitement-to-imminent-lawless-action.

O’Neill, Kevin Francis. 2009. “Time, Place and Manner Restrictions.” Time, Place and Manner Restrictions. https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1023/time-place-and-manner-restrictions.

O’Neill, Kevin Francis. 2017. “True Threats.” True Threats. https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1025/true-threats. Peoples, Hervey C, Pavel Duda, and Frank W Marlowe. 2016. “Hunter-Gatherers and the Origins of Religion.” Human Nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.). U.S. National Library of Medicine. September. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4958132/. Rickless, Samuel. 2020. “Locke on Freedom.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University. January 21. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-freedom/.

Saxonhouse, Arlene W. 2006. Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens. EbscoHost. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vile, John R. 2009a. “English Bill of Rights.” English Bill of Rights. https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/865/english-bill-of-rights#:~:text=The%20document%2C%20which%20initially%20came,U.S.%20Constitution%2C%20to%20members%20of.

Volokh, Eugene. 2023. “Permissible Restrictions on Expression.” Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. June 30. https://www.britannica.com/topic/First-Amendment/Permissible-restrictions-on-expression.

Voltaire, Frangois Marie, and David Williams. 1994. Political Writings. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge England: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139170451.

Walker, James L. 2009. Brandenburg v. Ohio. https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/189/brandenburg-v-ohio.
Freedom of Expression/Country forcesHistoryDebates and movements for the protection of freedom of expression are a recent development that “scarcely arose before the revolutions of the eighteenth century" (Zoller 2009, 803). But one can see that it is frequently in response to oppressive governmental measures that opposition arises to promote freedom of expression for democratic society and its citizens from external censorship. The intended outcome of these revolutions was to ensure the citizen’s right “to freely speak one's mind, represent one's viewpoint, defend one's opinions, communicate one's ideas… without fear for life, liberty, or possessions, but with peace of mind and a firm certainty of freedom from government harassment…” (Zoller 2009, 803). There are five notable historical movements and events that helped contribute to the widespread belief of freedom of expression as a fundamental right: the Enlightenment, The American and French Revolutions, the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the Arab Spring.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT

The promotion of freedom of expression as a universal right was first established by the philosophes of the Enlightenment in the 17th and 18th centuries. Frederick of Prussia, Immanuel Kant, and Johann Gottlieb Fichte all wrote on the idea of freedom of expression, especially in how it relates to free thought and opinion. James Schmidt quoted Immanuel Kant in support of the claim that freedom of thought, however praiseworthy in its own right, is much more valuable when informed by the thoughts of others: “‘… but how much and how accurately would we think if we did not think, so to speak, in community with others to whom we communicate our thoughts and who communicate their thoughts to us!’” (Schmidt [quoting Kant] 1996, 30). Agreeing with this sentiment, Frederick of Prussia also expressed his wish “to rule over a noble, brave, freethinking people, a people that has the power and liberty to think and to act, to write and to speak, to win or to die” (Schmidt [quoting Frederick of Prussia] 1996, 89). At this point in history, freedom of expression, especially in a monarchical context, became a key component of Enlightenment thought, as it was determined that the right to possess and share one’s opinions was the mark of a civilized society.

THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH REVOLUTIONS

Building upon Enlightenment philosophies, freedom of expression (or the lack thereof) played central roles in the American and French Revolutions of the late 18th centuries. However, how freedom of expression was expressed in each case manifested very differently.

In America, "as taxes were imposed without their consent, colonists believed their freedom of expression and representation was violated. Protests, petitions, and gatherings were quickly put down by government officials. Freedom of expression, speech, and the press were punishable and denied to many" (Charkins et. Al 2019, 35). The repression of what the colonists believed to be a fundamental right only exacerbated the situation and eventually led them to demand “the formation of a government that would promise protection of those inherent liberties" via the American Revolution (Pomerance 2016, 112). After the war, this eventually prompted the ratification of the First Amendment to the Constitution that confirmed that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (U.S. Constitution, 1791).

Conversely, while American efforts came from an institutionalized lack of freedom, the French struggle came from a surprising decision from King Louis XVI. In 1789, when he called a meeting of the Estates General, he began by “suspending censorship of publications, even allowing writings that criticized the monarchy…" (Pomerance 2016, 114). This afforded French people freedom of expression to a degree they had never seen before, and soon newspapers and pamphlets across France were calling for a democratic overhaul of the whole country. This top-down decision from the King paved a slightly untraditional path to revolution, especially in contrast to the Americans who were denied freedom of expression from their government. Louis had opened the floodgates, and just months after the first meeting, “there was little doubt that free speech and expression were high on the list of demands from the Frenchmen calling for change” (Pomerance 2016, 117). These sentiments were eventually listed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, in Articles 10 and 11 which state that “no one may be disturbed on account of his opinions, even religious ones, as long as the manifestation of such opinions does not interfere with the established Law and Order,” and “the free communication of ideas and of opinions is one of the most precious rights of man. Any citizen may therefore speak, write and publish freely, except what is tantamount to the abuse of this liberty in the cases determined by Law" (“Declaration of the Rights of Man”).

THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

International protections of fundamental rights did not emerge until the late 20th century in response to the “barbarous acts” of World War II (Amnesty International). And in response to these acts, it became a goal of the newly founded United Nations to set a global standard for freedom and justice for everyone, regardless of nationality or citizenship. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted in 1948 and establishes a comprehensive list of rights and liberties that everyone is entitled to. Freedom of expression is guaranteed by Article 19 which states that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (United Nations 1948). While the UDHR is not a legally binding document, it was the first international agreement focused on the protection of basic human rights and freedoms.

THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL

The fall of the Berlin Wall was a major turning point in the history of freedom of expression and its applications. During the Cold War, Europe was split between a democratic West and a communist East, with a physical manifestation of this divide erected in Berlin by the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Many basic freedoms and liberties were suppressed in the Eastern Bloc, and “human rights violations in East Germany centered mainly on freedom of movement, expression and association” (Human Rights Watch 1989). Before the fall, “the potential to express dissidence… [marked] the border between East and West," but after, East Berliners used their restored freedoms to express their opinions without fear of retribution (Zoller 2009, 806). The fall of the Berlin Wall was a major win for universal human rights, and it marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War that inspired similar democratic movements across the Eastern Bloc that eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

THE ARAB SPRING

Applications of human rights and freedoms will have to continue to adapt to societal changes. As recently seen with the Arab Spring uprisings, widespread access to the internet and social media channels that now allow near total freedom of expression on a global scale has reshaped how one can utilize this freedom for the promotion of democracy, but it has also raised questions as to how parameters of this right should be drawn in instances of dangerous or harmful views. Before the rise of the internet, “discussions focused on the idea of what a man was allowed to utter or write when he found himself to be at odds with an established orthodoxy…", but now, it is imperative that “national legislations should envisage legal instruments to carefully limit its application (when abusive), in those situations in which free speech becomes an obstacle for the free exercise of other fundamental rights” as free speech and expression can be shared on an international level (Racolța 2019, 8, 15). Although freedom of expression is now an expected right of democratic societies, it remains at the forefront of international discussions to determine how to both ensure the right itself for people deprived of it and to also protect people from abuses of free expression. 

References:

Charkins, Jim, Michelle Herczog, and Thomas Herman. “Breaking Down the Silos: The American Revolution--A Story Well Told.” Social Studies Review 58 (January 2019): 25–42. https://search-ebscohost-com.uc.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eft&AN=154271093&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

“Declaration of the Rights of Man.” Avalon Project. Accessed June 16, 2023. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp.

“EAST GERMANY.” Human Rights Watch World Report, 1989. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1989/WR89/Eastgerm.htm.

Pomerance, Benjamin. “First In, First Out: Promises and Problems of Free Expression in Revolutionary and Post-Revolutionary Governments.” Maryland Journal of International Law 31, no. 1 (January 2016): 107–79. https://search-ebscohost-com.uc.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=122460887&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

Racolța, Remus, and Andreea Verteș-Olteanu. 2019. “Freedom of Expression. Some Considerations for the Digital Age.” Jus et Civitas VI (LXX) (1): 7–16. https://search-ebscohost-com.uc.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=139539130&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

Schmidt, James. What Is Enlightenment?: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions. Philosophical Traditions. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. https://search-ebscohost-com.uc.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=4657&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

“Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Amnesty International, April 11, 2023. https://www.amnesty.org/en/what-we-do/universal-declaration-of-human-rights/#:~:text=The%20UDHR%20was%20adopted%20by,for%20freedom%2C%20justice%20and%20peace.

United Nations General Assembly. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). New York: United Nations General Assembly, 1948.

Zoller, Elisabeth. "Foreword: Freedom of Expression: Precious Right in Europe, Sacred Right in the United States," Indiana Law Journal 84, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 803-808
Freedom of Expression/Country intepretationCulture and PoliticsThe Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a document adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December of 1948, recognized freedom of expression as a universal human right, inherent and applicable to all individuals. A milestone declaration, it has subsequently influenced countless state constitutions, treaties, and legal codes, defining the right as including the “freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (UN General Assembly 1948, 5). Though a majority of nations grant freedom of expression to their constituents in a formal capacity, there are often discrepancies in the way they are practiced and protected, as well as interpreted, in part because of a country’s history, political philosophy, and social factors. Some states are more restrictive of expression, prohibiting or discouraging acts and speech that reflect negatively on the nation’s religion, regime, or culture, while others safeguard this form of expression. Nearly all have censorship laws in place that touch upon defamation and libel, hate speech, and obscenities, though with varying degrees of consequences and protection.

Nations with strong secular traditions, such as France, allow for criticisms and negative portrayals of religion under the right to freedom of expression, while theocratic states, like Iran and Pakistan, completely restrict it under threat of punishment. Freedom of expression has been a fundamental right for French citizens since the proclamation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789, which provided a “limited freedom of expression whose scope is defined by law,” leaving it up to legislators to establish those limits (Guedj 2021, 1). The right was redefined by the Law on the Freedom of the Press of 1881, which reemphasized the public’s ability to express itself while forbidding libel, defamation, offence to public decency and provocations to crimes, among others, and then again with the Pleven Act of 1972 and the Gayssot Act, which prohibited incitement to racial/religious hatred and Holocaust denial respectively (Colosimo 2018, 2). Those who violate these laws can be subject to fines or imprisonment. However, under France’s legislature, it is “possible to insult a religion, its figures and symbols,” as long as it does not incite violence or “insult members of a religion” for belonging to that faith (Colosimo 2018, 2). Though the lines between the two can be blurry, the right to freedom of expression in France is quite liberal when it comes to discussion around religion and allows for acts of expression that go against theological doctrine and criticize it.

There are several theocratic states that have provisions within their legal framework that also guarantee freedom of expression, though they heavily restrict it through strict anti-blasphemy laws that prohibit any act or speech that can be perceived as negative by governmental authorities and carry punishments. Article 24 of Iran’s constitution states, “Publications and the press have freedom of expression except when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of the public. The details of this exception will be specified by law” (“Islamic Republic of Iran” 2023, 14). Pakistan has a similar provision in its constitution with Article 19: "Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, and there shall be freedom of the press, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defense of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, committing, or inciting an offence" (Pakistan Constitution, ch. 1, art. 19). While Iran and Pakistan do have a legal freedom of expression, they restrict it, with the international non-profit organization Reporters Without Borders (RWB) citing various cases in which they censored and filtered what is put online and “punished citizens for statements that were considered blasphemous” (“2023 World Press Freedom Index” 2023, 5). Restrictions of expressions on religion are not only enforced in theocratic countries, however, as Finland forbids breaching the sanctity of religion “which includes ‘blaspheming against God,’ publicly defaming or desecrating to offend something a religious community holds sacred, and disturbing worship or funeral ceremonies” with violators being subject to “fines or imprisonment of up to six months” (“Finland 2021 Report” 2021, 3).

Thailand, a constitutional monarchy, guaranteed freedom of expression to its citizens since the 1997 Constitution of Thailand and continues to guarantee it with the various different constitutions that have followed since, though it has a distinct interpretation of the right when it comes to the royal family. Thailand’s government is very restrictive of the way citizens can partake in this right, particularly with its strict lèse-majesté laws, seen as one of the harshest in the world. Lèse-majesté is an offence against the dignity of a ruling head of state, an act that is prohibited under Thailand’s legal code which states, “Whoever defames, insults, or threatens the King, the Queen, the Heir to the Throne, or the Regent, will be punished with a jail sentence between three and fifteen years.” (Mérieau 2021, 77). The state’s right to freedom of expression does not cover speech or acts that are deemed negative towards the monarchy, with the law being considered ambiguous and open to the interpretation of authorities. This distinct interpretation of freedom of expression derives from the influence of Hindu-Buddhist culture in Thailand where kings were seen as divine figures to be respected, giving them a form of sanctity that left a lasting impact on the country’s political system (Mérieau 2021, 78). Other states that interpret freedom of expression in a similar way include Turkey, where it is illegal under Article 301 of the country’s penal code to insult the Turkish nation, its government, and its national heroes under threat of imprisonment (“Turkey: Article 301” 2006, 1).

Saudi Arabia, holds freedom of expression to a different status than the previously mentioned states, failing to articulate it in its law but still penalizing acts of expression that are deemed blasphemous or portray the regime in a negative light, with punishments ranging from hefty fines to death sentences. Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law of Governance, the country’s constitution-like charter, does not provide for freedom of expression or the press, simply stating, "Mass media and all other vehicles of expression shall employ civil and polite language, contribute towards the education of the nation, and strengthen unity. The media are prohibited from committing acts that lead to disorder and division, affect the security of the state or its public relations, or undermine human dignity and rights” (U.S. Department of State 2018, 23). This gives authorities ample power to determine what expression violates the law, placing heavy emphasis on the safeguarding of religious values and morals. A distinct feature of freedom of expression in the United States that differentiates it from many other nations is that certain hate speech is protected under the First Amendment. In the United States, “hate speech is given wide constitutional protection while under international human rights covenants and in other Western democracies, such as Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, it is largely prohibited and subjected to criminal sanctions” (Rosenfeld 2002, 1523). This was reaffirmed in the 2017 U.S. Supreme Court Case Matal v. Tam, in which the justices determined that hate speech falls under the protection of free speech: “With few narrow exceptions, a fundamental principle of the First Amendment is that the government may not punish or suppress speech based on disapproval of the ideas or perspectives the speech conveys” (2). The expression may be subject to punishment if it seeks to incite an imminent violent or lawless action This is quite a different interpretation than many other democratic nations, where expressions that are considered hate speech can be punishable by law. In Germany, for example, acts of expression that are racist, antisemitic, advocating for Nazism, denying the Holocaust, or glorifying the ideology of Hitler are illegal (“Germany: Freedom in the World” 2023, 9).

The right to freedom of expression is recognized as a fundamental human right that applies to all individuals by the United Nations, being adopted and incorporated into the legal code or constitutions of a majority of states around the world. The right differs, however, in its interpretation and practice within each individual country, as well as the extent to which it is protected. Some states interpret freedom of expression through a more restrictive lens, prohibiting negative acts of expression that touch upon religion, government, or culture, while others allow it with more lenient limitations. A state’s interpretation of freedom of expression can be influenced by its unique history, its political climate, as well as social and religious factors, resulting in different interpretations and practices of freedom of expression around the world.

References:

“2023 World Press Freedom Index – Journalism Threatened by Fake Content Industry.” 2023. RSF. Accessed June 14. https://rsf.org/en/2023-world-press-freedom-index- journalism-threatened-fake-content-industry. 

Colosimo, Anastasia. 2018. “Blasphemy in France and in Europe: A Right or an Offense?” Institut Montaigne. November 16. https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/expressions

“Finland 2021 International Religious Freedom Report.” 2023. U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/FINLAND-2021

“Germany: Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report.” 2023. Freedom House. Accessed June 9. https://freedomhouse.org/country/germany/freedom-world/2022. 

Guedj, Nikita. 2021. “The Law on the Freedom of the Press of 29 July 1881: A Text That Both Guarantees and Restricts Freedom of Expression.” Fondation Descartes. July 16. https://www.fondationdescartes.org/en/2021/07/the-law-on-the-freedom-of-the-press-of- 29-july-1881-a-text-that-both-guarantees-and-restricts-freedom-of-expression/.

“Islamic Republic of Iran 1979 (Rev. 1989) Constitution.” 1989. Constitute. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989?lang=en. 

Matal, Interim Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office v. Tam. 582 U.S. (2027)

Mérieau, E. 2021. “A History of the Thai lèse-majesté Law”. Thai Legal History: From Traditional to Modern Law, 60-70.

Rosenfeld, Michel. 2002. “Hate speech in constitutional jurisprudence: a comparative analysis.” Cardozo L. Rev., 24, 1523.

“Turkey: Article 301: How the Law on ‘Denigrating Turkishness’ Is an Insult to Free Expression.” 2006. Amnesty International. March 1. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur44/003/2006/en/. 

UN General Assembly. 1948. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, , 217 A (III), https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2021/03/udhr.pdf

U.S Department of State. 2018. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017: Saudi

Arabia.
Freedom of Expression/Culture and Politics/Depends on governanceCulture and PoliticsThe right to freedom of expression is not necessarily qualified as a protected human right in each country or sovereign government. Rather, it is a global human right, as stated in Act 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” (Civic, 1997, pg. 129). Within this declaration, a few key factors are revealed that are related to how the freedom of expression is exercised as a legally recognized right. First, expression is acknowledged as being equal to opinions; they are both very imperative when it comes to human rights and the exercise of freedom of expression. Without the acknowledgment of the inherent significance of freedom of expression in a group context or collective capacity, such as protections under the Constitution, the full exercise of the right will not be achieved without an elevated form of protection placed on it. “Therefore, naked freedom of expression, without some common sense or good community sense infused into it, ultimately will fail to protect the individual as a member of the community, by its total disregard for the needs of the society… Thus, while freedom of expression is essential to human dignity, additionally, for the ultimate good of the individual as a member of society, such freedom must be exercised responsibly and with a recognition of the integral relationship the autonomous self has with the greater society.” (Civic, 1997, pg.143). Although many different governments and nations recognize the significance of freedom of expression, they may not agree with the outcome of fully exercising this right for all citizens. Along those lines, when protections for freedom of expression are not present within a country or society, the full capacity for citizens to freely express their ideas and thoughts in an individual or community context will subsequently be stifled. The difference between protections of ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘freedom of speech’ is determined by the way that somebody voices or expresses an idea or opinion. Protections under the freedom of speech may be determined by the words themselves that are used, but the expression is conveyed through action, and moreover what a person is trying to show with that action. “The terms ‘expression’ and ‘action’ are functional ones, rooted in the fundamental character of a system of free expression and in the factors necessary to maintain its effective operation. Hence it is clear that the term ‘expression’ must include more than the mere utterance of words or other forms of communication. It must embrace a surrounding area of conduct closely related to the making of the utterance or necessary to make it effective.” (Emerson, 1964, pg. 24-25). Thomas Scanlon analyzed the theoretical significance of how freedom of expression is positioned between protected acts and the consequences of exercising this right. “The most common defense of the doctrine of freedom of expression is a consequential one. This may take the form of arguing with respect to a certain class of acts, e.g., acts of speech, that the good consequences of allowing such acts to go unrestricted outweigh the bad. Alternatively, the boundaries of the class of protected acts may themselves be defined by balancing good consequences against bad, the question of whether a certain species of acts belong to the private genus being decided in many is not all cases just by asking whether its inclusion would, on the whole, lead to more good consequences than bad.” (Scanlon, 1972, pg. 204-5). Within this analysis, the reflection of the significance of intention comes to light, where there is negative or malicious intent, protections remain absent under freedom of expression. One cannot use freedom of expression to instill violence, or suppression, but rather as a way to exude an opinion or idea that does not push these limitations under legal precedent. “However, since acts of expression can be both violent and arbitrarily destructive, it seems unlikely that anyone would maintain that as a class they were immune from legal restrictions. Thus the class of protected acts must be some proper subset of this class. It is sometimes held that the relevant subclass consists of those acts of expression which are instances of ‘speech’ as ‘opposed to action’.” (Scanlon, 1972, pg. 207). Freedom of speech differs inherently from the freedom of expression based on an action directive, a person can say something that goes against the government’s prerogative and not face legal consequences, but upon acting to overthrow or dismantle that government, the protection of expression does not extend to ‘fighting’ actions or malicious acts. This theorizing under the freedom of expression justly points out the differences between American protections of expression under democracy, versus a more autocratic regime that aligns itself with dictatorships or communist ideologies. For example, in the People’s Republic of China, a socialist democracy under the legal definition, the government chooses to remain neutral upon expression protections unless they conflict with the individualistic ideology of communal support. “The Communist perspective on free speech, by contrast, assigns absolute priority to the well-being of the community, and in so doing, sacrifices individual freedom of expression.” (Civic, 1997, pg. 127). Under the People’s Republic of China’s legal provisions, freedom of expression is intertwined with freedom of speech. “Speech and other forms of expression must be internally, as well as externally, restrained to serve all of the people [under the ideology of Communism]…Thus, the Chinese perception of free speech in particular, and human rights in general, is propelled by Communist ideology which emphasizes the interests of the community at the expense of individual interests. Finally, the ‘rights’ of the individual are defined relative to his duties to the community, and are subjected to qualification, restriction, and repression for community interests, as defined by the Communist Party elite.” (Civic, 1997, pg. 128). The gray area that is ‘freedom of expression’ within the ideology of Communism conflicts with the obvious reality of actually having protections of freedom of expression. Where there is no protection, there is a lack of freedom to act upon an idea or opinion. Although the freedom of expression is distinguishable from the freedom of speech, they are communally intertwined under the Communist ideology. Freedom of expression must serve to fit the relative overall needs of the community in the PRC through their freedom of speech, otherwise, it does not qualify legally as protection of freedom of expression.


References:

Civic, Melanne Andromecca. "Right to Freedom of Expression as the Principal Component of the Preservation of Personal Dignity: An Argument for International Protection within All Nations and across All Borders." In Hybrid, vol. 4, p. 117. 1997

Emerson, Thomas I. "Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression." The Yale Law Journal 74, no. 1 (1964): 1-35.

Scanlon, Thomas. "A theory of freedom of expression." Philosophy & Public Affairs (1972): 204-226

( 1972) : 204-226
Freedom of Expression/Culture and Politics/PollingCulture and PoliticsAccording to Pew Research, majorities in Australia, Turkey, the Philippines, Ukraine, South Africa and Nigeria report that it is important to have free press, an essential element of freedom of expression. Freedom of the press is considered very important by less than half of adults in South Korea, Japan, Israel, Indonesia, Russia, India, Tunisia and Lebanon, revealing these societies possibly place less of an emphasis on freedom of expression. Furthermore, Pew notes that despite the fact that freedom of the press has declined since 2015, support for freedom of the press has increased overall. This demonstrates that individuals value freedom of expression greater when it becomes limited. Additionally, according to Pew people with less education and people with populist views are less likely to assert freedom of the press to be important.

Focusing on the United States, a Cato Institute study showed 58% of Americans felt that the current political climate keeps them from expressing themselves. Within this statistic, 53% of Democrats say they do not need to censor themselves in comparison to 27% of Republicans and 42% of Independents. This demonstrates that among Americans, Republicans particularly feel their right to free expression is limited by certain social and political norms, as they feel the need to restrict their speech. In regards to hate speech, despite the fact that 79% of Americans find it “morally unacceptable”, the Cato study reveals 59% of Americans believe it should be allowed in the public. Analyzing these numbers, the study claims, “the public appears to distinguish between allowing offensive speech and endorsing it.” Additionally, the study asserts that 66% of Americans believe colleges need to do more to teach Americans about the value of free speech, emphasizing that Americans highly value freedom of expression.

Looking to college campuses, a 2017 Gallup poll found that 61% of college students strongly agreed that their campus climate prevents people from saying the things they believe. This was up seven percentage points from 2016, when Gallup previously surveyed students. A reversal from 2016, Democrats and Independents were more likely than Republican students to believe their college environment limited their ability to speak freely. Lastly, the study found that a smaller majority of students polled preferred a campus where all speech was allowed, demonstrating that students' value of free speech on campus has declined.

An additional Pew study found that globally, a median of 62% of individuals say their country protects individual freedom of expression. Furthermore, the study found that individuals in countries with advanced economies were more likely to report that their country supported freedom of expression than individuals in countries with emerging economies. In Brazil, Spain, Argentina, Italy and Mexico, more than 50% of surveyed individuals stated they did not agree with the statement that their country supports freedom of expression. Specifically, Brazil reported very low numbers for freedom of expression, 39% saying their country does not support free expression at all. Within Europe, individuals in countries with favorable populist parties, such as Sweden, were additionally less likely to report that freedom of expression was protected by their government.

References:

Emily Ekins, The Cato Institute, "The State of Free Speech and Tolerance in America," October 31, 2017: https://www.cato.org/survey-reports/state-free-speech-tolerance-america

Aidan Connaughton, Pew Research Center, "5 charts on views of press freedom around the world", May 1 2020: https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2020/05/01/5-charts-on-views-of-press-freedom-around-the-world/

Jeffrey M. Jones, Gallup,"More U.S. College Students Say Campus Climate Deters Speech," March 12, 2018, https://news.gallup.com/poll/229085/college-students-say-campus-climate-deters-speech.aspx

Richard Wike, Laura Silver, and Alexandra Castillo, Pew Research Center, "Publics satisfied with free speech, ability to improve living standards; many are critical of institutions, politicians," April 29, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/04/29/publics-satisfied-with-free-speech-ability-to-improve-living-standards-many-are-critical-of-institutions-politicians/
Freedom of Expression/DependantsConflicts with other RightsAlthough the idea of freedom of expression, as a right distinct from other rights, was only elucidated in the mid-20th century, multiple theorists advocated for something closely resembling freedom of expression long before that, even if they did not use the term. From these sources we get a sense of what freedom of expression entails, and of its value as a foundation for so many of the other rights that citizens exercise in a democratic society. What seems less evident, however, is the rights that freedom of expression is itself founded on – and therefore, what rights one must have to be able to exercise it. Based on an analysis of the meaning of expression, those rights include freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion.

Freedom of expression was first explicitly guaranteed, or at least widely accepted for the first time, in the system of international law established in the aftermath of World War II. Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads, “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, 5). The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights similarly states that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;” this consists of the “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds… orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice” (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 10).

Long before this, though, ideas hinting at a right to hold and express opinions can be found in political literature. In 1644, after Parliament passed an ordinance requiring pre-publication review of any printed material by the government, English poet-philosopher John Milton protested by anonymously publishing the polemic Areopagitica, in which he wrote, “give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties” (Milton 1644, 57). In 1789, James Madison wrote an early draft of the First Amendment which read, “the people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments…” (Read 2009). In his seminal 1859 treatise On Liberty, John Stuart Mill defended the freedom to express socially disfavored opinions: “the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it” (Mill 1859, 19). United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis wrote in 1927: “[the Founding Fathers] believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that, without free speech and assembly, discussion would be futile…that public discussion is a political duty, and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government” (Whitney v. California 1927, 274). Ten years later, his colleague Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote that the “freedom of thought, and speech” is “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom” (Palko v. Connecticut 1937, 302).

Together, these quotes imply a multi-pronged freedom of expression, which can be seen mirrored in the definitions (“seek, receive, impart”) given in the international statutes that guarantee this right today. Freedom of expression can thus be understood as comprised of the freedom to form opinions (and therefore the freedom to access the information required to do so), the freedom to proclaim those opinions, and the freedom to share and debate those opinions with one’s fellow citizens. They likewise give a sense of how crucial freedom of expression is to the functioning of democracy, and indeed to liberty itself; that it acts as a safeguard that protects all other rights.

Therefore, to answer the question of what rights are needed for one to have freedom of expression, we can ask what rights are necessary for the realization of each of the above prongs. First and foremost, we can intuitively appreciate that freedom of speech and of the press are essential for the ability to form, declare, and discuss opinions. This double-barreled right is intimated in the aforementioned writings: Milton advocates the liberty to “utter,” and Madison and both Justices specifically refer to speech; the necessity of a concomitant freedom of the press is supported by Milton’s call for a liberty to know, and by Madison’s reference to the freedom to write and publish one’s views in a manner distinct from speech. Freedom of assembly (referenced by Brandeis) is similarly crucial for the practical ability to exercise the right to expression: a citizen cannot fully acquire information and form opinions based on it, or fully participate in debates about those opinions, without the freedom to interact with as many diverse voices as they possibly can. Finally, though not specifically mentioned above, freedom of religion is required as well. This is not only because one topic that many people wish to express the strongest of opinions about is religion, but because religious expression often encompasses actions as well as speech and writing, and thus would not be sufficiently protected without its own discrete supportive right.

The most foundational body of law laying out these rights is the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which has inspired language in the constitutions of countless other countries. Moreover, due to the uniquely American practice of judicial review, US Supreme Court cases can provide illustrative examples of how these rights are vital to the freedom of expression.

In the early history of First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court proved amenable to claims that speech and the press could be restricted if there was a “clear and present danger” to national security or other critical national interests, as outlined in the 1919 case Schenck v. United States, and subsequently reinforced with Abrams v. United States that same year. Issued amid the nationalist fervor of World War I, both cases concerned people punished for distributing anti-war writings under the 1917 Espionage Act, which broadly criminalized interfering with the war effort or undermining public morale (Schenck v. United States 1919, Abrams v. United States 1919). Likewise in Whitney v. California (1927), the Court upheld a conviction under California’s “criminal syndicalism” law, which criminalized speech that advocated for social or political change by force, even if it was in general and imprecise terms. In that case, the convicted person had been a member of a Communist organization that broadly advocated revolution against the government, but insisted she had never personally called for or supported violence (Whitney v. California 1927).

The tide began to turn with Stromberg v. California (1931), where the Court struck down a state law banning the display of red flags, and notably incorporated the right to free speech against the states for the first time. The Court found that a “sign, symbol, or emblem” like a flag was protected speech under the First Amendment, and further wrote that free speech is a central component of the liberty protected by the Constitution: “It has been determined that the conception of liberty … embraces the right of free speech” (Stromberg v. California 1931, 283). The Court subsequently relied on that right to free speech to offer a passionate defense of the “opportunity for free political discussion,” which it called “essential to the security of the Republic” (Stromberg v. California 1931, 283). Still, it took decades for the overly permissive “clear and present danger” test for limits on free speech to be effectively superseded by a more protective standard of “imminent lawless action,” which the Court invoked in the 1969 case Brandenburg v. Ohio. Explicitly overturning Whitney, the Court wrote that Ohio’s criminal syndicalism statute punishes “mere advocacy” (which can be translated as political expression), and thus is unconstitutional based on the First Amendment freedoms of speech and the press (Brandenburg v. Ohio 1969, 395).

Apart from national security/law and order, the predominant justification for government attempts to restrict speech and the press has tended to be some form of offense or social disruption caused by the expression. The Court invoked something like the freedom of expression when it ruled for a plaintiff arrested for wearing a jacket with the words “fuck the draft” in Cohen v. California (1971), finding that California could not exercise a “governmental power to force persons who wish to ventilate their dissident views into avoiding particular forms of expression,” and justified this statement under the First Amendment right to free speech (Cohen v. California 1971, 403). In Miller v. California (1973), the Court largely overturned obscenity laws restricting printed material (which had famously ensnared classics like Ulysses, Lady Chatterley’s Lover, and Tropic of Cancer due to sexual content), similarly deriving a wide-ranging right to express one’s views in writing from the First Amendment: “in the area of freedom of speech and press the courts must always remain sensitive to any infringement on genuinely serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific expression” (Miller v. California 1973, 413).

Freedom of assembly, as provided for in the First Amendment right to peaceably assemble, is another supportive right for freedom of expression. This right was notably litigated before the Supreme Court in the 1937 case De Jonge v. Oregon, in which the Court upheld the plaintiff’s right to speak at a peaceful meeting of the Communist Party (and incorporated this right to the states for the first time). In its ruling, the Court defended the importance of “free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means” (De Jonge v. Oregon 1937, 299). Of this opportunity the Court said, “therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government” (De Jonge v. Oregon 1937, 299).

The final right undergirding the freedom of expression is freedom of religion. Multiple rulings have found that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment imposes a high standard for restrictions on religious acts. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner (1963), the Court ruled in favor of a plaintiff who was denied unemployment benefits after losing her job for refusing to work on Saturdays on account of her Seventh-Day Adventist faith. The Court’s opinion indicated that a right to expression stems from the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion: “the imposition of such a condition upon even a gratuitous benefit inevitably deterred or discouraged the exercise of First Amendment rights of expression;” therefore, to “condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith” is impermissible because it “effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties” (Sherbert v. Verner 1963, 374). Subsequent rulings would similarly protect religious life choices and behaviors on the grounds of a Free Exercise Clause right to religious expression, such as Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), where the Court found that Wisconsin could not require parents to send their children to school past eighth grade when it was contrary to their Amish beliefs (Wisconsin v. Yoder 1972). Likewise in Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (1993), the Court overturned a city ordinance targeting ritual animal sacrifice by practitioners of the Caribbean religion Santeria (Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah 1993).

In Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo (2020), concerning COVID-19 capacity restrictions on houses of worship, the Court found that even a temporary abridgement of the ability to attend religious services constitutes an “irreparable harm” to free exercise rights, and thus must meet the highest level of judicial scrutiny (Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo 2020, 5). Most recently, the Court made clear that the Free Exercise Clause protects religious expression in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022), where it ruled in favor of a high school football coach’s practice of praying on the field after games: “The Clause protects not only the right to harbor religious beliefs inwardly and secretly. It does perhaps its most important work by protecting the ability of those who hold religious beliefs of all kinds to live out their faiths in daily life through ‘the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts’” (Kennedy v. Bremerton School District 2022, 12).

While a clearly delineated freedom of expression is relatively recent, these examples show how it has been identified decades and centuries prior, in a wide variety of situations. The rights of freedom of speech and the press, assembly, and religion have all been highlighted as essential to free expression. These rights are therefore crucial not just for themselves, but because of the right to expression that grows out of them, that being the groundwork without which any definition of a free society cannot exist.

References:

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Justia, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/250/616/ (accessed June 9, 2023)

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), Justia, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/395/444/ (accessed June 9, 2023)

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), Justia, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/508/520/ (accessed June 9, 2023)

Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), Justia, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/15/ (accessed June 9, 2023)

De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), Justia, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/299/353/ (accessed June 9, 2023)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, UN Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/ccpr.pdf

Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. ___ (2022), Justia, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/597/21-418/#:~:text=Justia%20Summary&text=The%20Constitution%20neither%20mandates%20nor,it%20allows%20comparable%20secular%20speech (accessed June 9, 2023)

Mill, John Stuart. 1859. On Liberty. Kitchener, Ontario, Canada: Batoche Books Limited, https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/mill/liberty.pdf

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), Justia, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/413/15/ (accessed June 9, 2023)

Milton, John. 1644. Areopagitica. Courtesy of the Online Library of Liberty, Liberty Fund, Inc., 2006, http://files.libertyfund.org/files/103/1224_Bk.pdf

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), Justia, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/302/319/ (accessed June 9, 2023)

Read, James. 2009. “James Madison.” The First Amendment Encyclopedia, Free Speech Center, Middle Tennessee State University, https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1220/james-madison#:~:text=%22The%20people%20shall%20not%20be,of%20liberty%2C%20shall%20be%20inviolable

Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. ___ (2020), Justia, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/592/20a87/#:~:text=Justia%20Summary&text=In%20challenges%20under%20the%20Free,requirement%20of%20neutrality%20to%20religion (accessed June 9, 2023)

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Justia, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/249/47/ (accessed June 9, 2023)

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), Justia, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/374/398/ (accessed June 9, 2023)

Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), Justia, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/283/359/ (accessed June 9, 2023)

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, United Nations, https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2021/03/udhr.pdf

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), Justia, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/274/357/ (accessed June 9, 2023)

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Justia, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/406/205/ (accessed June 9, 2023)
Freedom of Expression/EraHistoryFreedom of expression is a relatively new term, however, not a new concept. For much of its history, the individual freedoms covered under freedom of expression were established in isolated contexts throughout time and eventually translated into this overarching concept of freedom of expression. The identification of this freedom is a product of many contributions over several centuries, resulting in associations to multiple eras and contributors: yet remaining limited to being a fundamental element of democratic regimes. The composition of freedom of expression possesses two elements associated with the present-day interpretation. The first element is the origins of the foundational freedoms covered under the overall “Freedom of expression.” The second element is the transition from individual freedoms to the broader notion of expression.

Today, it is universally understood that freedom of expression includes freedom of speech and freedom of the press. While freedom of speech has origins in ancient Greece through the concept of Parrhêsia, (Konstan, 2012, 1), freedom of the press and expression have a significant concrete appearance through the works of John Milton in Areopagitica(1644). In the book Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens, Arlene Saxonhouse discusses how Milton “Protests the licensing of books and the governmental restraints thereby placed on free expression in published works… Milton argues in a series of allusions to the world of ancient Athens, tying Milton to the values expressed by the ancient Athenian, connecting freedom of speech to human virtue and political freedom’’ (Saxonhouse 2005, 20). The next significant development to freedom of expression was the ratification of the Bill of Rights into the U.S. Constitution; a document that drew inspiration from the English Magna Carta (1215). Although the Magna Carta did not explicitly mention free speech, it did guarantee certain liberties that would be conceptualized into modern democracy and go on to inspire the Bill of Rights, i.e The First Amendment (WEX Definitions Team, 2020). Thus, The First Amendment became an important development in what would come to be called freedom of expression. However, it wouldn't be until 1948 that “freedom of expression” was officially coined and universally recognized. Following World War II, freedom of information was declared a fundamental human right but the language of “freedom of expression” was not agreed upon until it was drafted and entered into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 by an American committee (Kleinwächter, 2022). Between The First Amendment and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, innovations such as the telegraph and radio broadcasting proposed new obstacles to information sharing beyond borders. This led to multiple treaties and conventions discussing the censoring of content shared internationally, thus challenging freedom of speech and press, however, no explicit mention of freedom of expression was mentioned in these international treaties(Kleinwächter, 2022). Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this includes the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information through any media regardless of frontiers.” It was here that the individual freedoms within the First Amendment translated into the united concept of “freedom of expression” and then became internationally recognized into law through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966 with the same language used in Article 19 (Kleinwächter, 2022). With a long evolution and multiple developments contributing to the concept today, the identification of this freedom is not limited to a single era, but rather significant to several. .. The associations of these eras parallel the significance of the identification of this freedom in relation to a specific type of regime. These dates, as well as the overall notion of this freedom, are important to the development and expansion of democracy and democratic institutions. This element of democracy facilitates open debate, proper consideration of different perspectives, and the negotiation and compromise necessary for consensual policy decisions (Freedom House, 2023). Without this freedom, true democracy would not exist as “the suppression of ideas is inconsistent with the concept that a democratic society bases its decisions on full and open discussion of all points of view (Bogen, 1983, 464).” Expressing content or discontent for a government, policy, or principle, as well as proposing solutions or critiques, amongst expressions of other topics, allows for the democratic process to function for its intended purpose and is profoundly within the right of an individual to do so as a protected human right. Unlike the association to a single regime type, this freedom is not limited to a single political leader. Instead, multiple figures, often not in positions of leadership, opposed the censoring of opinions and ideas, and acted as the main contributors to the expansion of freedom of expression. Those who drafted the Magna Carta opposed the monarchy of King John; Milton opposed government censorship, and the Framers of the Constitution opposed absolute power by a single ruler. All of these developments over time resulted in the association to several contributors who led us to the contemporary understanding of this freedom. This long evolutionary process with collaborative efforts from key points and figures throughout history has resulted in the identification of this right being tied to multiple eras and figures, yet to only one regime type.

References:

Konstan, David. 2012. “The Two Faces of Parrhêsia: Free Speech and Self-Expression in Ancient Greece.” Antichthon 46. Cambridge University Press: 1–13. doi:10.1017/S0066477400000125.

Saxonhouse, Arlene W. 2005. Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens. Cambridge University Press. 11-37

WEX Definitions Team. 2020 “Magna Carta.” LII / Legal Information Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/magna_carta#:~:text=The%20writers%20of%20the%20Bill.

Bogen, David S. 1983. “The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press” 42. Maryland Law Review. 429-465. https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2503&context=mlr

Freedom House. “Freedom of Expression.” 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/issues/freedom-expression

Kleinwächter, Wolfgang. 2022. “A History of the Right to Freedom of Expression.” Observer Research Foundation. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/a-history-of-the-right-to-freedom-of-expression/
Freedom of Expression/Fundamental and protectedCulture and PoliticsEven though freedom of expression is not written into the US Constitution, as are many fundamental rights in the USA, most people would agree that this right is fundamental and should generally be protected, however the level to which it should be protected may differ from person to person.

Most people would think that freedom of expression is fundamental because it allows for conversations in two different areas of life: legal discourse and everyday life. Most Americans believe that freedom of expression is a fundamental right that should be protected. People should be allowed to express their opinions without fear of being “cancelled” or that they will be harmed for voicing their opinion. The Knight Foundation produced a survey on Americans’ views on free speech and found that 91% of them think that protecting it is crucial to protecting American Democracy (Knight Foundation, 2022). This necessity for freedom of speech becomes especially true when two people have an opposing viewpoint on something because they should be able to disagree freely, without fear of punishment. However, in a New York Times Article, most Americans have begun to bite their tongue because they’re afraid of “cancel culture,” a phenomenon that occurs when a politician, celebrity, or another influential person speaks in a certain way that causes a withdrawal of support. Some people may feel like others don’t need to express everything they’re thinking. In this article, “America has a Free Speech Problem,” the authors say that a poll created by Times Opinion and Siena College found that “84 percent of adults said it is a ‘very serious’ or ‘somewhat serious’ problem that some Americans do not speak freely in everyday situations because of fear of retaliation or harsh criticism” (America Has a Free Speech Problem, 2022).

In an interview between Sean Illing and Brian Leiter for Vox, Leiter explains that “we have massive amounts of worthless, dangerous speech in the public sphere right now” (Illing, 2019). It seems as if Leiter isn’t saying that freedom of speech is a “bad” thing, so much as that some people may be abusing this freedom. If speech were more regulated, and people weren’t allowed to post whatever they wanted without being fact-checked, then the speech could be less damaging—there could be less fake news, for instance. Limitations on freedom of expression could under such circumstances prevent unnecessary harm. Justice Murphy, in Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, argued that there are “certain categorical exceptions to First Amendment protections, including obscenities, certain profane and slanderous speech, and ‘fighting words’ (Chaplinsky v New Hampshire). This case is still upheld today, so anyone engages in such speech may be punished by the law.

While freedom of expression protects most people’s actions, it does not allow people to express themselves however they want. Some exceptions have been asserted over the years in American law. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, a student was reprimanded by school officials for making a “lewd and vulgar speech” at an assembly. This is similar to Schenck v. United States, which ruled that yelling “fire” in a crowded theatre is not protected by the first amendment. So, the constitution has allowed for “freedom of speech,” there are exceptions when it seems it’s not appropriate for the setting. In this article, she mentions that “people can’t go around saying what they think all the time when that speech infringes on other’s rights. There needs to be a limit for what people do say, where people say it, when people say it” (Hanna, 2022). While they may not be rare, exceptions to the protection of freedom of expression should be made when our words negatively impact someone else.

It seems as if freedom of expression in the United States is less censored than in other parts of the world. In nations such as North Korea, Turkmenistan, Libya, Syria, and Belarus “the media is either state-controlled or silenced, the internet is filtered, and highly censored and restrictive laws are used—often in tandem with fear and intimidation—to prevent the spread of ideas and information” (Countries with Freedom of Speech 2024). While freedom of expression seems to be a priority in the United States, other countries do not protect people’s rights to express themselves freely. Freedom of expression is protected when it does not cause unnecessary harm or potentially put someone at risk. And on the off chance that it does negatively affect someone, or causes them harm, then there should be exceptions to their ability to freely express themselves.

References:

Knight Foundation. 2022. “Free Speech for All? Poll Reveals Americans’ Views on Free Expression Post-2020.” Knight Foundation. January 6, 2022. https://knightfoundation.org/press/releases/free-speech-for-all-poll-reveals-americans-views-on-free-expression-post-2020/.

The Editorial Board. 2022. “America Has a Free Speech Problem.” New York Times, March 18, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/18/opinion/cancel-culture-free-speech-poll.html.

Illing, Sean. 2019. “Free Speech: Is It Actually a Good Thing?” Vox. Vox. March 4, 2019. https://www.vox.com/2019/3/4/18197209/free-speech-philosophy-politics-brian-leiter.

“Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.” 2019. Oyez. 2019. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/315us568.

Hanna, Verina. 2022. “Limitations Are Necessary for Freedom of Speech.” THE ALGONQUIN HARBINGER. March 17, 2022. https://arhsharbinger.com/29742/opinion/limitations-are-necessary-for-the-freedom-of-speech/#:~:text=The%20limitations%20of%20the%20freedom.

World Population Review. 2022. “Countries with Freedom of Speech 2020.” Worldpopulationreview.com. 2022. https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-with-freedom-of-speech.
Freedom of Expression/Fundamentally acceptedHistoryaugment with new material expression answer for demonstration
Freedom of Expression/Government curtailmentLimitations - RestrictionsIn some cases, governments have curtailed freedom of expression for reasons that are not generally seen as permissible by the standards of the United States.

As noted by Professor Jérôme Viala-Gaudefroy, not all types of expression are protected under US law. Those involving “obscenity, fraud, child pornography, harassment, incitement of illegal conduct and imminent lawless action, true threats, and commercial speech such as advertising, copyright or patent rights” (Viala-Gaudefroy 2021) can be restricted, among others. That said, there have been instances within the US where the right was curtailed for a reason not listed above. These justifications, therefore, would be viewed as non-permissible restrictions on freedom of expression.

The Minnesota state legislature passed a statute that barred voters and other individuals from wearing political apparel and accessories inside a polling place on election day, which included a “political badge, political button, or other political insignia” (Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky 2018, 1). The legislation was meant to create “an island of calm in which voters [could] peacefully contemplate their choices” (Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky 2018, 11), essentially eliminating disruptions at the polling place. However, the ban was challenged by the Minnesota Voters Alliance (MVA) and other individual plaintiffs, who argued that it violated their first amendment rights “both on its face and as applied to their particular items of apparel” (Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky 2018, 1). The Supreme Court agreed with the general sentiments of the Minnesota law, stating that “casting a vote is a weighty civic act, akin to a jury’s return of a verdict, or a representative’s vote on a piece of legislation. It is a time for choosing, not campaigning. The State may reasonably decide that the interior of the polling place should reflect that distinction (Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky 2018, 11). However, the body ruled in favor of the MVA, explaining that the legislation was too broad and muddled - “the State must be able to articulate some sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out… the unmoored use of the term ‘political’ in the Minnesota law, combined with haphazard interpretations the State has provided in official guidance and representations to this Court, cause Minnesota’s restriction to fail even this forgiving test” (Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky 2018, 12-13). The state’s ban on expression within polling places was thus not deemed permissible.

Similar to US law, the European Convention on Human Rights does not protect all types of expression. Article 10 of the document clearly states that the right can be restricted when “necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of reputation or rights of others, for preventing disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary” (Council of Europe 1950, 12). However, what a country believes is a necessary restriction on one of these grounds does not necessarily match up with the opinion of the European Court of Human Rights, which has the final say on what types of expression are permissible.

In 2005, journalist Eynulla Fatullayev, an Azerbaijani national, visited Nagorno-Karabakh, a region that has been the subject of a territorial dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan and at the time was controlled by Armenian military forces. Fatullayev interviewed both locals and officials during his visit, as well as some Azerbaijani refugees who had fled the region, which he then published the following year. In his piece, Fatullayev claimed that during the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 1992, civilians “had been mutilated by [their] own” (Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan 2010, 4) Azerbaijani forces as they attempted to flee the region, among other statements. Upon reading the article, a group filed a criminal complaint against Fatullayev, asking that he “be convicted of defamation and of falsely accusing Azerbaijani soldiers of having committed an especially grave crime” (Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan 2010, 5). Fatullayev was later convicted of these crimes, as well as of terrorism or the threat of terrorism for another article he had published which appeared to address Iranian-Azerbaijani relations and threaten ethnic conflict. As a citizen of a country that signed the European Convention on Human Rights (hereby known as“the Convention”), Fatullayev was able to appeal his convictions to the European Court on Human Rights (“the Court”) on the grounds that his right to freedom of expression as defined by Article 10 of the Convention had been violated. The Court sided with the applicant, saying that he was presenting a set of opinions in a debate and did not seek to defame or act maliciously towards the victims and actors involved in the war, and thus was not abusing their rights. Additionally, the Azerbaijani government’s interference was not “necessary in a democratic society” or “a pressing social need” (Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan 2010, 22). Therefore, the body concluded “that the statements that gave rise to the applicant's conviction did not amount to any activity infringing the essence of the values underlying the Convention or calculated to destroy or restrict the rights and freedoms guaranteed by it…the applicant's freedom of expression cannot be removed from the protection of Article 10” (Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan 2010, 22). By the Court’s standards, then, Azerbaijan’s attempt to inhibit the applicant’s freedom of expression was unacceptable.

References:

Council of Europe. 1950. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf

Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, Application no. 40984/07, ECtHR judgment of 4 October 2010. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=001-216685

Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 849 F. 3d 749 (2018). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1435_2co3.pdf

Viala-Gaudefroy, Jérôme. 2021. “The Idolization of Free Speech in the United States.” The Conversation, February 22, 2021. https://theconversation.com/the-idolization-of-free-speech-in-the-united-states-155778#:~:text=Free%20speech%20is%20not%20absolute,advertising%2C%20copyright%20or%20patent%20rights
Freedom of Expression/History/Noteworthy written sourcesHistoryNoted philosophers have written commentaries on laws, freedoms, and political theory; these include John Stuart Mill's noteworthy work On Liberty.

Many international treaties, charters, and conventions also work to avidly incorporate the freedom of expression in its foundations. The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

References:

John Stuart Mill, On Liberty
Freedom of Expression/History/SourceHistoryThe ancient Greeks within the Athenian Democracy, using the words “parrhesia” and “isegoria” (dating back to the fifth century BCE) were the first to emphasize the freedom to speak candidly and to "say what one pleased" a subset of freedom of the future declaration of freedom of expression (Bejan 2019, 97). From the ancient Greeks, “Parrhesia” specifically describes the freedom to say whatever one pleased, and a similar idea describing freedom of expression, “isegoria,” describes the right of citizens to publicly address and debate against the democratic assembly (Lu 2017, 4). “Isegoria” is derived from the root word “agora” which translates to marketplace, and thus the meaning of this version of freedom of expression addresses that of public speech. This right to “isegoria” was more heavily based in the ideas of equality of all men to have access to the government than for the principles of freedom (Bejan 2019, 99). On the other hand, “parrhesia” held a broader meaning. This idea is more about the right to speak freely or frankly. This word implies a willingness of the speaker to be open, honest, and courageous in dealing with the consequences of the sometimes controversial truth which he spoke while those who listened had to tolerate any offense taken from the speaker.

During meetings of the dêmos, a term used to describe the populace of Athens, the herald of the assembly would call “who wishes to speak?” (Wallace 2004). In this venue, the populace could voice their opinions and concerns to be heard by the assembly. Parrhesia extended beyond the dêmos; it was present in Athenian humor and was capitalized on by philosophers like Plato and Socrates (Wallace 2004). What the Athenians lacked was “a conception of precisely those inalienable rights which have been the foundation of the modern libertarian doctrine: freedom of speech, of religion and so on.” (Finley 1983). What this meant was that since there was no conception of these laws, such as a constitution, the Athenian government could censor certain persons or ideas as they saw fit. Parrhesia might not have been absolute, or last in Athens after the fall of democracy in Greece, but its memory was preserved by scholars and served as inspiration for future generations.

The origins of freedom of expression can be traced as far back as the 16th century. During this time, the Protestant Reformation occurred. Before the Reformation, the Church would put down any attempts at reform, typically in brutal fashion. “The birth of [freedom of expression] is credited to the Protestants – those who, as their name indicates, dared to protest and reclaimed the right to dissidence” (Zoller 2009). The Protestant Reformation showed that it was possible to gain freedom of expression and was one of the key sources of inspiration of the Enlightenment, which was one of the most important sources of inspiration for Americas founding fathers (Bristow 2010). Shortly after the Declaration of Independence, the Virginia Colonial Legislature adopted The Declaration of Rights, which included freedom of the press (Lewis 2007). During the period between the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the First Amendment, “nine of the original thirteen states had such provisions in their constitutions or other basic documents.” (Lewis 2007). When the Constitution was drafted in 1787, it was the creators and supporters of these state rights that insisted they be included in the federal Constitution. The First Amendment in the Bill of Rights establishes the specifics of the freedom to express, including freedom of speech, freedom of the press, the right to peacefully assemble, and the right to petition the government. At the same time, the French Revolution was in progress and the new National Assembly created the Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789. Within this declaration, it states “The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law.” (Declaration of the Rights of Man 1789). Both France and the United States were establishing new governments in the wake of a revolution from a monarch. The censorship employed by these monarchs was one of the key reasons why both countries explicitly outlined the freedom to citizens to express themselves in their new constitutions.

To summarize, when was the oldest source that mentions freedom of expression? While it was not specifically mentioned, it can be seen in the 16th century during the Protestant Reformation. It was specifically mentioned and recognized in England’s 1689 Bill of Rights, but this did not extend to the citizens. Freedom of expression was not given explicitly to the citizens until France and the United States did so in 1789 with the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and the U.S. Constitution.


References: “Avalon Project - Declaration of the Rights of Man - 1789.” Accessed June 6, 2024. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/rightsof.asp

Becker, Sascha O., Steven Pfaff, and Jared Rubin. “Causes and Consequences of the Protestant Reformation.” Explorations in Economic History 62 (October 1, 2016): 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2016.07.007

Bristow, William. “Enlightenment,” August 20, 2010. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/?ref=artshelp.com

Burch, Kerry. “Parrhesia as a Principle of Democratic Pedagogy.” Philosophical Studies in Education 40 (2009): 71–82. https://eric.ed.gov/?id=EJ864311.

Finley, Moses I. Politics in the Ancient World. Cambridge University Press, 1983.

National Archives. “Bill of Rights (1791),” May 18, 2021. https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/bill-of-rights

On Misconceptions Generated By Translating Parrhesia and Isegoria as “Freedom of Speech,” Chin-Yu Ginny Lu, 4, The University of Arizona, 2017 Tucson.

Two Concept of Freedom (Of Speech), Teressa M. Bejan, 97-99, Oxford University, 2019 Oxford.

Wallace, Robert W. “THE POWER TO SPEAK —AND NOT TO LISTEN— IN ANCIENT ATHENS.” In Free Speech in Classical Antiquity, 221–32. Brill, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789047405689_011

What is Freedom of Expression, Freedom Forum Institute Editors, Freedom Forum Institute, 2020 Washington D.C.

Zoller, E. “Foreword: Freedom of Expression: ‘Precious Right’ in Europe, ‘Sacred Right’ in the United States?” Indiana Law Journal, 2009. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Foreword%3A-Freedom-of-Expression%3A-%22Precious-Right%22-Zoller/a06d65926e0118f6353c2d09b3638038d266ceed.
Freedom of Expression/Legal Codification/InternationalLegal CodificationMultiple human rights regimes at both international and regional levels enshrine the universal freedom of expression in their frameworks, in accordance with the other fundamental values that these documents uphold. Although in international documents this freedom relates mostly to the unabridged ability of individuals to express their thoughts and opinions, it also protects media and press institutions that disseminate news and information throughout societies.

For European countries, the right to free expression is entitled by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, though it is not an absolute law. According to the article, freedom of expression can be restricted if it incites crime or jeopardizes natural security, public health, personal reputations or the authority of the judiciary. Additionally, In Africa, both the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression assure members of the African Union the right to free expression. In Mexico and South America, the American Convention on Human Rights, also referred to as the Pact of San Jose, upholds the right to free expression. Internationally, the United Nations lists numerous treaties that uphold the right to free expression. Most predominantly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) enshrine the right to free expression. Through these various treaties, freedom of expression is upheld by international law. In the context of international human rights regimes, freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In both documents, freedom of expression is found under Article 19. In the UDHR, the right is listed as such: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” (UN, 2014) Article 19 of the ICCPR is worded very similarly but includes greater specificity, as it explicitly lays out protected ways to consume and impart information, including “...orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of [one’s] choice.” (OHCHR, 2014) Regional human rights regimes also enshrine freedom of expression in a similar manner. The Organization of American States’ (OAS) Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression is composed of 13 articles that lay out protections of the freedom of expression and nuances of those protections in various contexts, including accessing information, censorship, communication freedoms, and privacy aspects. The American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man includes the freedom of expression in Article 4, with similar wording to Article 19 of the UDHR and the ICCPR. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights protects the right to “receive information,” and the right to “express and disseminate [one’s] opinions within the law.” (AU, 1986) This right is also established in the American Convention on Human Rights in Article 13 and is expanded by Article 14. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights consists of two sections, the first echoing the wording of the UDHR and ICCPR, as well.

References:

American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Basic Documents - American Declaration. (n.d.). https://www.cidh.oas.org/basicos/english/basic2.american%20declaration.htm.

European Convention on Human Rights. https://www.echr.coe.int/. (n.d.). https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. OHCHR. (n.d.). https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx.

PLC, A. M. B. F. T. (n.d.). African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Legal instruments. https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=49.

Organization of American States. Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression. http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=26. 2021.

United Nations. (n.d.). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. United Nations.

https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights.
Freedom of Expression/Legal Codification/Most countriesLegal CodificationThe right to free expression, expressed in terms of freedom of speech, is “formally granted by the laws of most nations” (World Population Review), though the degree of liberty that comes with entitlements to free expression may differ. Furthermore, a Free Expression Index generated by Pew Research Center in 2015 demonstrates one method for comparing the strength of free expression internationally (Pew Research Center). In developing the index, Pew surveyed 38 countries on eight questions pertaining to free expression. Pew proceeded to then rank the countries on a scale of zero to eight-eight meaning the country fully supported free expression. From their results, the United States and Canada demonstrated the highest levels of free expression, with scores of 5.73 and 5.08 respectively, while Senegal and Burkina Faso showed the lowest levels of free expression, with scores of 2.06 and 2.94, respectively. Thus, demonstrated by the Pew Research index, while many countries may support free expression within their constitutions, the degree to which free expression is practiced and enforced often varies.

References:

Pew Research Center: “Global Support for Principle of Free Expression, but Opposition to Some Forms of Speech,” November 8, 2015: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/11/18/global-support-for-principle-of-free-expression-but-opposition-to-some-forms-of-speech/ (Accessed November 9, 2022

World Population Review: https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/countries-with-freedom-of-speech (Accessed November 9, 2022)
Freedom of Expression/Legal Codification/USLegal CodificationThe right to free expression is not stated explicitly in the United States constitution, though it is universally accepted as covered by the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” The rights to free speech, press, assembly, and petition are generally viewed are elements of the right to free expression in the USA.
Freedom of Expression/Legal Codification/US exceptionsLegal CodificationSeveral Supreme Court cases have placed restrictions on the right to free expression, creating exceptions to the First Amendment. For example, in Schenk v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that free expression is not constitutionally protected when it will “to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent.” The qualifications for limiting dangerous speech were later established by Brandenburg v. Ohio: “Freedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”

Additionally, there is a legal exception for “fighting words”. This was decided by the Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire decision, where the court upheld that it was illegal for Walter Chaplinsky to call a police officer “a damned Fascist.” Another exception to the First Amendment is obscene language. In Miller v. California, the court clarified what qualifies as obscene language, which was described as speech that “To the average person, applying contemporary community standards, appeal to the prurient interest; Depict or describe, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct, as specifically defined by the applicable state law, and taken as a whole, lack any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Therefore, expression that falls under these standards may be regulated. Defamation, “a statement that injures a third party’s reputation” (Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School), is an additional exception to freedom of expression in the United States. The standards for defamation were established in New York Times Company v. Sullivan, which claimed that in order to sue a news outlet for defamation, one must have proof that the outlet was aware of their false claims prior to publishing. Lastly, commercial speech may be regulated in order to protect consumers. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York, the Court described a four-part test for determining whether or not the government could limit commercial speech: “At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” Ultimately, demonstrated by these numerous cases, although the United States Constitution upholds freedom of expression, there are various exceptions to the First Amendment.

References:

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 48 (1919): https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/249/47/

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969): https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/395/444/

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 572; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942): https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/315/568/

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 37 (1973): https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/413/15/

New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964): https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/376/254/

Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 US 566 (1980): https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/557/

Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/defamation#:~:text=Defamation%20is%20a%20statement%20that,for%20defamation%20and%20potential%20damages.
Freedom of Expression/Legal Codification/US implicitLegal CodificationYes. The First Amendment is presumed to guarantee the right to free expression by guaranteeing the right to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of peaceable assembly, and freedom of petition, though the phrase “freedom of expression” is not explicitly used in the Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has gradually portrayed freedom of expression as being implicit in the U.S. Constitution. This reality stems from legitimate discourse on activities that may not fall under the grammatical definition of speech, but nevertheless warrant protection by the judiciary in order for democratic norms to prevail. From early cases pertaining to free religious exercise to several landmark judgments in the latter half of the 20th Century, the Court has introduced and expanded its mythology surrounding free expression. Some forms of expression that may be protected—and regulated—include religious expression, protests, fighting words, imminent threats, obscenity, and expressive student conduct in academic settings.

Prior to various cases dealing with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, no significant attempt had been made by the court to examine the relationship between free expression and American constitutional law. Despite the separate inclusion of freedom of religion in the Constitution, cases revolving around religious activity have shaped the Court’s commentary on free expression. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Court ruled in favor of a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses in New Haven who had been prosecuted for engaging in religious solicitation without a license from the local government. The justices primarily asserted that the Constitution guarantees the “freedom to act” for the Cantwell solicitors, or other groups that engage in religious expression (Justice Roberts, 1940). Solicitation can neither be termed as purely speech or purely expressive, however, due to the combination of speech and physical expeditions that are typically involved. While the freedom to “act” may insinuate a right to engage in expressive activities, the justices never directly mentioned expression—a reality that, combined with the ambiguous nature of soliciting, did not establish expression as a fundamental right.

Given the legal ambiguity established by Cantwell, the Court likely understood the necessity of defining expression as it pertained to religious issues. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the justices established a compelling interest test for government statutes that potentially abridge certain forms of religious expression. Writing for the majority in response to a lawsuit from a Seventh-Day Adventist who was fired and denied unemployment benefits for refusing to work on Saturday, Justice Brennan asserted that “the imposition of such a condition [labor mandates lacking in exemptions for religious workers] … inevitably deterred or discouraged the exercise of First Amendment rights of expression” for religious groups (Justice Brennan, 1963). Given that this ruling directly mentioned free expression in response to a lawsuit claiming religious discrimination, it can be argued that Sherbert clarified the position of free religious expression implied by Cantwell.

Following several landmark decisions on expression issued by the Warren and Burger Courts, religious exercise reintroduced itself in the ongoing debate over the extent to which freedom of expression can be invoked in the courtroom. In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court rejected a Free Exercise Clause challenge of a narcotics statute in Oregon (specifically, one that regulated Peyote, which was ingested by Native American Church adherents as a religious custom) while acknowledging attempts in the past to “punish the expression of religious doctrines [the state] believes to be false” (Justice Scalia, from United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). In a ruling that was sharply criticized by religious groups following its release, the Court confirmed the implicit right of expression as it pertains to religion. While it may be argued that the decisions in Cantwell, Sherbert, and Smith merely affirmed the previously enumerated right of free religious exercise, the various references to expression in all three of these decisions fit within a broader line of judicial reasoning in expression-based cases that extend beyond religion, which will be further discussed below.

As Smith indicates, The Court’s acknowledgment of freedom of expression being an implicit right can be evidenced by decisions that limit this right altogether. In ruling that expressive activities that constitute a clear and present danger to the public are not protected, for example, the Court implies that any activities that do not exhibit this danger are lawful. This precedent was established by Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), which affirmed the ability of government officials to censor modes of expression (i.e. Charles Schenck's pamphlets, which advocated for illegally avoiding the draft) that impede on the government’s ability to wage war, while acknowledging that such activities may be protected during times of peace. As the distribution of pamphlets would likely constitute expression rather than physical speech, it may be inferred that the justices, in limiting freedom of expression in some cases, acknowledged its legality in others.

The Court furthered this assertion in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) by ruling that the burning of draft cards in public places during times of war is not protected speech, as the prohibition of this activity was “an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression” (Justice Warren, 1968). In both decisions, the Court chose to constrain—rather than outlaw—forms of expression that cannot be termed as speech. Finally, governmental regulations for public protests were affirmed in Cox v. New Hampshire 312 U.S. 569 (1941), in which the justices asserted that “time, place, and manner restrictions” have the effect of “safeguarding the good order upon which [civil liberties] ultimately depend” (Justice Hughes, 1941). Given that no right can be limited without prior acknowledgement of its existence, it can be argued that the Court implicitly recognized free expression in Schenck and Cox before directly mentioning it in O’Brien.

In light of the Court’s commentary on free expression when confronted with issues pertaining to free exercise and public disturbances, its decisions in Barnette, Tinker, and Morse represent the most notable examples of free expression being recognized as an implicit right. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the court condemned an effort by school administrators to force students to salute the American Flag as an “effort” to “muffle expression” in the schoolhouse (Justice Jackson, 1943). Despite their dissent being primarily motivated by personal religious beliefs, the plaintiffs alleged a violation of the Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The Court clearly interpreted the situation as compelled expression, as defining it as physical speech would not accurately reflect the situation.

In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Court broadly affirmed the implicit right to free expression in a decision that largely reflected the language of cases that have already been discussed. The justices affirmed that any governmental interest in promoting order in public schools is “not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression” enjoyed by students, who “do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate” (Justice Fortas, 1969). In this instance, the Court emphasized freedom of expression without qualification, as its commentary on restrictions that school officials could plausibly enact without abridging the rights of students serves to further affirm the existence of free expression. This rationale was reaffirmed by Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), in which the Court limited student speech (or, more precisely, displaying a banner) that can be “reasonably regard[ed] as promoting illegal drug use,” which remains a major example of the judiciary restricting the implicit right of free expression (Justice Roberts, 2002). In reaffirming and providing exceptions for the precedent set by Tinker (with the exception of Justice Thomas, who called for Tinker to be overruled), the Court maintained its record of acknowledging and limiting free expression.

Following the Court’s landmark decision in Tinker, the question of implicitness was all but resolved, and nearly all subsequent cases served to determine the scope—rather than legitimacy—of free expression. Eventually, the justices were again confronted with the issues of anti-war expression and profanity following peace activist Paul Cohen’s arrest in a California courthouse for wearing a shirt depicting an explicit anti-war slogan. In Cohen v. California 403, U.S. 15 (1971), the Court asserted that California’s law prohibiting such behavior “infringed [Cohen's] rights to freedom of expression guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution,” which were extended to the states via selective incorporation through the Due Process Clause (Justice Harlan, 1971). In Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), the Court again confronted the issue of expression deemed profane by governmental actors in ruling that the burning of the American Flag represented “expressive conduct” that was “sufficiently imbued with elements of [political] communication,” making it protected under the Due Process Clause (Justice Brennan, 1989).

In Cohen and Johnson, the Court rejected attempts by state government officials to impose limitations on forms of expression it viewed as offensive to the general public—a remarkable feat for freedom of expression, which would nevertheless be limited in other cases. Expression pertaining to pornographic material was hindered in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), which concerned the right (or lack thereof) of businesses to distribute explicit content through the U.S. Postal Service. In ruling that obscene expression can be regulated while “acknowledging the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression,” the Court established a clear standard for certain forms of explicit expression that can be regulated (Justice Burger, 1973). In Walker v. Texas, Sons of Confederate Veterans, 576 U.S. 200 (2015), the justices ruled that state governments can reject proposed license plate designs on account of their potential to offend the general public due to their established history of “communicat[ing] messages from the States.” In particular, the Court cited Arizona's “Hereford Steer” License Plate, New Hampshire's “Old Man of the Mountain” License Plate, and various other examples of license plates in other states to affirm this argument (Justice Breyer, 2015).

In summary, the implicit right of free expression has developed from the commentary of free exercise cases and evolved into an implied right that the Supreme Court no longer questions. It does not contain any strict limitations, as any standard beyond the establishment of an overbearing governmental interest would negate its effect of addressing the shortcomings of the free speech clause.

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/310/296/

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/374/398/

Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/494/872/

United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/322/78/

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/249/47/

United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/391/367/

Cox v. New Hampshire 312 U.S. 569 (1941) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/312/569/

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/319/624/

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/393/503/

Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/551/393/

Cohen v. California 403, U.S. 15 (1971) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/15/

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/491/397/

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/413/15/

Walker v. Texas, Sons of Confederate Veterans, 576 U.S. 200 (2015) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/576/200/

Epstein, McGuire, and Walker, 2021. Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties, and Justice. Thousand Oaks, California: Cq Press, An Imprint Of Sage Publications, Inc.
Freedom of Expression/Limitations - Restrictions/Country exceptionsLimitations - RestrictionsThe following country-specific descriptions are from a 2019 US Government Report.

Argentina: Argentina protects the right to free press, without prior restraint. However, it does not explicitly protect other forms of expression, such as free speech. Argentina criminalizes speech likely to incite violence. Additionally, Argentinian penal law contains protections for one’s honor, making it a fineable offense to slander someone, intentionally discredit them, or falsely accuse them of a crime. However, these penalties do not apply in matters of public interest. Although Argentine courts have interpreted limits on free expression narrowly, they have allowed these limits where they are established by law, meet the needs of a democratic society and where the limits are proportional to their goals.

Canada: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the right to “thought, belief, opinion, and expression, subject to limits that can be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” Courts have interpreted the right to free expression broadly. Courts have made judgements about the constitutionality of limitations through proportionality analysis, taking several factors into consideration. They are more inclined to protect political speech, or speech that serves another social value, such as art or science. Courts are also more willing to accept narrower limits with less extreme penalties (civil versus criminal, for example). They have refused to allow limitations based on the offensiveness or unpopularity of the expression’s content. Their courts ruled unconstitutional a law banning the spread of false news. Despite free expression’s broad protections, courts have upheld anti-hate-speech laws. Additionally, interruptions of public speeches, especially using obscene language, may criminally disrupt the peace. Canada’s equivalent to the FCC has the power to take action against outlets that spread false information, but it has only acted very limitedly on a few occasions. Finally, Canada bans foreign broadcasters from attempting to influence its elections.

China: China’s constitution claims to protect free expression, but this is not true in practice. The country’s cybersecurity law bans the online spread of several categories of information, including those that undermine “national security, national honor, and national interests”; that incite “subversion” or those that threaten to “overturn the socialist system”; and that include“violent, obscene, or sexual information.” Similarly, the press cannot publish material that violates constitutional principles; undermine state sovereignty and territorial integrity; endanger national security; incite discrimination; undermine public order; promote obscenity, gambling, or violence; or “endanger public ethics.” The country’s Radio and Television Administration places similar limits on expression. Finally, the country tightly monitors foreign journalists, who must be approved by the government. France: The French Constitution protects the “communication of ideas and opinions.” However, the Constitution also states that speech may not “interfere with the established law and order” or constitute an “abuse of this liberty in the case determined by law.” Though French courts interpret restrictions narrowly, they use proportionality to balance free speech against other public interests. Free speech is sometimes balanced against rights such as privacy and the presumption of innocence, meaning that defamation, which truth does not necessarily preclude, is often not allowed. One whose speech incites criminality may be considered complicit in the act. Hate speech, which “incites discrimination,” is a jailable offense, as is the denial of crimes against humanity, such as the Holocaust. Defamation of public officials and institutions is a fineable offense, although good-faith reporting is exempt. During an event organized by public officials, it is illegal to disrespect the flag or national anthem. French radio and TV broadcasts may be regulated to protect values such as dignity, pluralism, public order, and the well-being of adolescents. The CSA, the French equivalent to the FCC, regulated broadcasts to ensure adherence to French law. Although it does not engage in prior restraint, the CSA may issue cease-and-desist orders and fines. It also may remove foreign broadcasts that undermine French interests.

Germany: German Basic Law (constitution) stipulates that free expression (it lists forms of expression but does not use the term) “shall find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honour.” General laws, as the Constitutional Court articulated, “aim to protect a legal interest per se without regard to a particular opinion.” For example, Germany has a blanket ban on speech inciting “hatred against part of the populace.” There is one notable exception to the General-Law requirement: speech that violates the dignity of victims of the Nazis or glorifies their abuses (although pro-Nazi material and hate speech often overlap). Israel: Though free expression is not explicitly protected in Israeli Basic Law, its courts have protected it, with exceptions for speech with a “near certainty” to cause “real harm” to safety. Israel restricts several types of speech, such as incitements to violence and terrorism and holocaust denial. It uses balancing tests to determine when speech can be restricted, and it sometimes restricts the quality and quantity of speech in ways that do not eliminate the viewpoint completely. Israeli law criminalizes insulting public servants, but courts have ruled that this law can only be enforced in extreme circumstances, where the insult severely harms the servant’s dignity. Israel restricts the rights of foreigners to broadcast.

Japan: The Japanese Constitution protects all types of free expression. However, it also states that citizens “shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare.” Japanese courts will consider the type of speech (political speech is especially protected), the necessity of restriction, and the manner of restriction. In Japan, it is illegal to disrupt a political campaign speech. Defamation, insult, and intimidation are forms of criminalized speech in the Japanese Penal Code. Article 231, the “Insult” section of the Penal Code, is broad: “A person who insults another in public, even if it does not allege facts, shall be punished by misdemeanor imprisonment without work or a petty fine.” There are significant restrictions of Japanese broadcasts. They must be politically fair, show as many sides of a political issue as possible, respect “public morals,” and be truthful.

Netherlands: The Dutch Constitution automatically incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into law (see the International Agreements Section). The Constitution also allows limitations on expression by act of parliament “without prejudice to the responsibility of every person under the law.” Different expressive freedoms have different level of protection in the Constitution. For example, the press’s protection from prior restraint is absolute, but freedom in performances that may be seen by children is not.

New Zealand: New Zealand’s Bill of Rights, a 1990 statute, guarantees free expression, with limits that can be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” It is a jailable offense to act, including to speak, in a way likely to incite someone to disorderly and violent behavior. In a public place, it is a fineable offense to intentionally insult or offend anyone, or to use obscene language. Under a 1993 statute, it is illegal to distribute in writing or broadcast material that is “threatening, abusive, or insulting,” and to use a public place to do the same or to incite ill will against a particular group of people. Broadcasts must adhere to standards of political balance and “the observation of good taste and decency.”

Sweden: Sweden’s system protects free speech and press. Interrupting courts, weddings, funerals, or public deliberation is a crime. Disorderly conduct with the intent to agitate is also a crime. For example, someone was convicted for singing and playing music in his home to disrupt a political gathering outside. Sweden’s hate-speech law bans any “statement or other message that is spread and disseminated that threatens, or expresses condescension against, an ethnic group or another group of persons based on race, skin color, national or ethnic origin, faith, sexual orientation, gender, or gender identity or expression.” It is a crime to broadcast without a permit. Sweden requires at least half of its broadcasts to be produced by Europeans. America places these restrictions on speech much less frequently, or not at all.

Hate Speech: Foreign countries often do not share America’s aversion to banning hate speech. America is more the exception than the norm; a 2008 EU treaty, for example, mandates that its members develop a mechanism for prosecuting purveyors of hate speech.

Blasphemy: About 71 percent of countries have blasphemy laws, generally defined as laws insulting to a particular religion or its adherents, often an established state religion. Blasphemy laws are stereotypically associated with theocratic, authoritarian states. Some unexpected countries have them, however. For example, it is a fineable offense in Italy to “vilify with insulting expressions” religious ideas (it is only a jailable offense if one vandalizes religious items) (End Blasphemy Laws).

Political Content: Many countries ban certain forms of political speech, especially that which undermines the government. In China, for instance, it is illegal to post anything online that will “endanger the sovereignty, overturn the socialist system, incite separatism, break national unity, advocate terrorism or extremism, advocate ethnic hatred and ethnic discrimination, . . . [and] create or disseminate false information to disrupt the economic or social order.”

Public Deliberations: It is often illegal to interrupt public deliberations, especially by a governing body. In Sweden, for example, one cannot legally interrupt events such as religious ceremonies, marriages, or court proceedings (contempt of court is also a crime in the US). In Japan, it is illegal to disrupt a speech that is part of an election campaign. Proportionality Analysis: Courts abroad are much more likely than American courts to use proportionality in determining whether infringement on a right is allowable. This requires weighing the evil of infringing on free expression against the objective the state was trying to achieve. In hate speech, for example, this means weighing a lessening of free speech against the goal of maintaining a tolerant society.

References:

US Free Speech Cases: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/landmark-cases/freedom-of-speech-general/

RAV v. St. Paul: https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/270/r-a-v-v-st-paul

Imminent lawless action: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/970/incitement-to-imminent-lawless-action

Free press cases in the US: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/landmark-cases/freedom-of-the-press/

Island School District v. Pico: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1981/80-2043

Info on broadcast TV and radio, which includes descriptions of all relevant cases: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/broadcast-radio-and-television

Article on German Bill: https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-government-approves-hate-speech-bill/a-52433689

Article on EU hate speech: https://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134239713/France-Isnt-The-Only-Country-To-Prohibit-Hate-Sp eech

Blasphemy internationally: https://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/special-reports/respecting-rights-measuring-the-world-s-bl asphemy-laws

Blasphemy in Italy: https://end-blasphemy-laws.org/countries/europe/italy/

US Government Report on Free Expression Abroad (info on China, for example): https://fas.org/irp/eprint/lloc-limits.pdf

Japanese Penal code: http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1960&vm=04&re=02
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